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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation explores the histories of Walpole Island (Bkejwanong), Sarnia 
(Aamjiwnaang), and Kettle and Stoney Point (Wiiwkwedong and Aazhoodena) between 1790 
and 1867 in what became Lambton County, Ontario. Anishinabe peoples faced tremendous 
challenges during this crucial period in their histories stemming from the loss of the Ohio Valley, 
non-native settlement, and intense pressure to surrender the land and settle permanently on 
reserves. With few exceptions, literature on the subject of Upper Canadian history and Indian 
policy largely accepts the decline of Anishinabe communities as an inevitable consequence of 
demilitarization after the War of 1812. The fact that Anishinabe peoples continue to live in these 
same communities as they have for hundreds of years, complicates such analyses. Through the 
lens of ‘two-eyed seeing’ I interrogate this contradiction and explore the many ways that the 
Anishinabeg sought to combine Indigenous knowledge and worldviews with the tools to survive 
in Eurocanadian economies between 1790 and 1867. While this story is not one of swift decline, 
I argue that Indigenous leaders sought a future for themselves that differed fundamentally from 
the one that unfolded in the years before Confederation.  
 This study uses petitions, Indian Affairs and municipal documents to explore the 
confluence of local processes that undermined Anishinabe attempts to co-exist with 
Eurocanadians. While it is true that Great Britain no longer needed its ‘Indian allies’ after the 
War of 1812, this does not sufficiently explain why fellow Loyalists and settlers did not accept 
Anishinabe peoples as partners in a province that both communities helped establish. While 
policy is an important part of this process, it is only a part of this story. My focus is on the 
relationships established between two peoples, and the construction, devolution, and 
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disintegration of these relationships. Plans made by Anishinabe Chiefs to create a self-sufficient 
and independent future in Upper Canada were gradually undone by a combination of politics, 
policy, land and economics. These coalesced over the first half of the nineteenth century to 
radically transform their vision to one that by Confederation, increasingly sought to confine and 
define ‘Indians’ as legal wards. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  I have not the least doubt of the sincerity of our love to promulgate 
  the happiness and prosperity of Indians; but it happens sometimes  
  with the affairs of men, that out of the purest motives to do good,  
  there will be an error in judgement and practice, which will produce  
  a reaction, and consequently a bad ending. 
 
        Peter Jones, 7 July, 1830
1
 
 
 In 1827, Anishinabe peoples
2
 in southwestern Upper Canada transferred more than two 
and a half million acres of land to the British Crown in the Huron Tract Treaty.
 3
  With the 
exception of Walpole Island (Chenail Ecarté) and land reserved at Sarnia (Upper Reserve), St. 
Clair (Lower Reserve) and Kettle and Stony Point, this agreement was the last in a series of 
treaties negotiated in the region between 1790 and 1827.
 4
 A little more than ten years later, 
Quakgwan, a War of 1812 veteran and Chippewa Chief
5
 would petition the Governor General 
for a deed to one hundred acres of land near the Ausable (or Sable) River in Bosanquet 
Township which he purchased in common with others in 1840.
6
  Quakgwan’s ‘band’ cleared the 
land and established farms on this lot, located just southeast of Stony Point. Some lived in log 
homes and had extensive improvements.
7
 In the language of the day, and according to the 
                                                          
1
 Library and Archives Canada, Record Group 10: Indian Affairs, Volume 438, Peter Jones, River Credit to J.B. 
Clench, Carradoc, 7 July, 1830, 769-71. (hereafter cited as LAC, RG 10/Volume) 
2
 See glossary in Appendix A. 
3
 Robert Surtees, “Indian Land Surrenders in Ontario, 1763-1867,” Treaties and Historical Research Centre (Ottawa: 
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1984), 44. 
4
 Walpole Island Chiefs were not parties to any of these agreements and the territory remains unceded today.  
5
 Quakgwan (spelled Quakegon, Qua-ke-gone and Equaikegon), means “Feather.” Born c. 1790 in Michigan, he is 
identified in the documents as a Chippewa Chief. Greg Curnoe, Deeds/Nations, Occasional Publications of the 
London Chapter, Ontario Archaeological Society, #4 (London: Coach House, 1996), “Q”; Major John Richardson, 
Tecumseh and Richardson: The Story of a Trip to Walpole Island and Port Sarnia (1849, Reprint, Toronto: Ontario 
Book Co., 1924), Appendix. 
6
 Known by the French as the Rivière aux Sables or au Sable River. 
7
 See glossary in Appendix A. for a definition of ‘band’ and ‘improvement.’ “Stony” Point is the official spelling of 
the reserve registered with the Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development (AANDC). The 
community uses the name “Stoney Point” or Aazhoodena. The Federal government expropriated the Stony Point 
Reserve under the War Measures Act in 1942 and the community merged with Kettle Point.  
 2 
ideological aims of British policymakers, they were becoming ‘civilized.’ Despite their success, 
Quakgwan’s community no longer exists on the lot in Bosanquet. In 1850 the Indian Department 
sold the land to Allen Kennedy, a sawmill operator and local official, and the residents of the 
landless community resettled on Walpole Island and in the Sarnia Indian Village. Quakgwan 
intended to relocate to a lot on Walpole Island, but died before he could make the journey.  
 Quakgwan and other “traditional patriarchs”8 of his generation, challenge many 
established notions about the relationships between Eurocanadians and Indigenous peoples in 
nineteenth century Upper Canada. We know for instance that Aboriginal people became legal 
wards after 1857, and most certainly upon passage of the 1876 Indian Act.
 9
  However, 
Quakgwan’s life and those of Anishinabe peoples in southwestern Ontario between 1790 and 
1867, tell us that it was not always this way. 
 This dissertation seeks to explore a common contradiction in the settlement of 
southwestern Ontario. On the one hand, histories of this period, in the words of archaeologist 
Neil Ferris, suggest that Anishinabe peoples faced “decline and ruin” after the War of 1812.10 On 
the other, their continued habitation on the lands they reserved in the nineteenth century, as 
distinct cultural entities suggests that an alternative narrative is necessary. British Indian policy 
provided the impetuous to settle Aboriginal people on reserves in Upper Canada but policy is 
really only one side of the story. By 1850, Quakgwan and his community had molded a way of 
                                                          
8
 Victor Gulewitsch, The Chippewas of Kettle & Stony Point: A Brief History (Chippewas of Kettle & Stony Point 
Historical Claims Research Office, 1995), 18. 
9
 20 Vict. c. 26. An Act to encourage the gradual Civilization of the Indian Tribes in this Province, and to amend the 
Laws Respecting Indians,10 June 1857 in Statutes of the Province of Canada (Toronto: Stewart Derbishire & 
George Desbarats, 1857), 84-88; 39; Vict. c. 18. An Act to amend and consolidate the laws respecting Indians, 12 
April, 1876. Available Online at AANDC, https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/.../1876c18_1100100010253_eng.pdf. 
The 1876 Act defines a ‘person’ as an “individual other than an Indian.” 
10
 Neal Ferris, The Archaeology of Native-Lived Colonialism: Challenging History in the Great Lakes (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 2009), 2. 
 3 
life that worked in both Indigenous and European worlds and envisioned a future that was 
fundamentally different than the one that unfolded between 1790 and 1867.   
 The differences between the expectations of leaders like Quakgwan and the reality that 
confronted them are the subjects of this study. For much of the early nineteenth century, 
Anishinabe leaders including Quakgwan and Walpole Island Chief Peterwegeshig
11
 negotiated 
the complexities of two worlds by ‘seeing with two eyes,’ or in the words of Ojibwe author 
Edward Benton-Banai, by “balance[ing] the knowledge of modern survival with the knowledge 
of native culture and spirituality.”12 Sustaining balance and recogninzing one’s place and 
“responsibility in maintaining the goodness and beauty of Creation” are key to the Anishinabe 
philosophy of Mino-Bimaadziwin, a path to living a Good Life of health, happiness and well-
being.
13
 Thus, the treaties signed by Anishinabe peoples at the turn of the nineteenth century and 
the actions taken by individuals such as Quakgwan, were part of a deliberate plan to acquire the 
best of both worlds and coexist with Eurocanadians in a mutually-beneficial, balanced and 
culturally meaningful manner. 
 In order to survive in northeastern North America Aboriginal peoples continually revised 
and re-evaluated their relationships with Europeans.
14
  For much of the eighteenth century, 
Indigenous systems of knowledge, when applied to the growing problems created by war, 
displacement and re-settlement, protected the land and facilitated communication and 
                                                          
11
 Curnoe, Deeds/Nations, 100. Born near Swan Creek, Peterwegeshig or “In Between Dawn” [c.1811-1920] lived 
on Walpole Island.  
12
  Sheldon Krasowski, “’A Numiany’ (The Prayer People) and the Pagans of Walpole Island First Nation: 
Resistance to the Anglican Church, 1845-1885” (M.A. Thesis, Trent University, 1999), 54; Edward Benton-Banai, 
The Mishomis Book: Voice of the Ojibway People (Red School House, Hayward, WI: Indian Country 
Communications, Inc., 1988), 112. 
13
 D’Arcy Ishpeming’enzaabid Rheault, “Anishinaabe Mino-Bimaadiziwin,” (M.A. Thesis, Trent University, 1998), 
xxv, 112. 
14
 Colin Calloway, New Worlds for All: Indians, Europeans and the Remaking of Early America (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1997), xiii. 
 4 
understanding between their confederacies and colonial representatives. Utilizing the diplomatic 
conventions of the Covenant Chain, Anishinabe peoples allied themselves with the French and 
then the British throughout the “sixty years war for the Great Lakes,”15 to defend the land; to 
secure a consistent supply of European trade goods, and maintain a relationship of co-existence 
with settlers and their governments.   
 In the nineteenth century, Peter Jones described the Covenant Chain as a “treaty of peace 
and friendship,” in which participants “solemnly covenanted, by going through the usual forms 
of burying the tomahawk, smoking the pipe of peace, and locking their hands and arms 
together.” While the Chain seems to have its origins among the Mohawk in the Hudson Valley, it 
was extended to many nations in the Great Lakes Borderlands including the Western Anishinabe 
at the Great Peace of Montréal in 1701.
16
 At Niagara in 1764, the English “entered into a treaty 
of friendship with the Ojebways” and united them with a silver chain.17 In conjunction with 
written copies of documents, wampum belts served as mnemonic aids to “jog [the] memory,” 
transmitting the oral understandings of the chain among the multiple parties.
18
 British and 
Indigenous speakers exchanged large and elaborate Covenant Chain wampum belts portraying 
figures holding hands or illustrating individual ‘links’ in the chain.19 The Two-Row Wampum or 
Gus-Wen-Tah (Kahswentha) shown in Figure 1 below, is often referred to as a treaty because it 
symbolizes the nation-to-nation or sovereign status of First Nations in their diplomatic relations 
                                                          
15
 David Curtis Skaggs and Larry L. Nelson eds., The Sixty Years’ War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814 (Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 2001).  
16
 See Gilles Havard, The Great Peace of 1701: French-Native Diplomacy in the Seventeenth Century. Trans. by 
Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001). 
17
 Peter Jones and G. Osborn, A History of the Ojebway Indians With Especial Reference to Their Conversion to 
Christianity (London: A.W. Bennett, 1861), 113 & 129. 
18
 Norman Jacobs (Haudenosaunee) in Legend and Memory: Ontario’s First Nations, directed by Dean Henry and 
David Hawkins (Toronto, ON: TV Ontario, Visual Education Centre, Ltd., 2002), VHS. 
19
 The number of links in the chain generally corresponded to the number of nations pledged to the alliance. See also 
figure 9.  
 5 
with the Crown, its representatives and subjects. “Counterbalancing” the two parallel rows of 
purple beads symbolizing the two polities are three rows of white beads representing “peace, 
friendship, and resepect.” The middle row balances political sovereignty within a broader 
relationship of “interdependence,” caring and support. Taken together, John Borrows writes the 
belts, including those exchanged at Niagara (see also Figure 9) “support a notion of citizenship 
that encourages autonomy and at the same time unifies and connects us to one another, and to the 
lands we rely on.” 20 
Figure 1: Gus-Wen-Tah (Kahswentha) or Two-Row Wampum 
 
 
 
 
 Though the Covenant Chain never mythologically linked the Western Confederacy or the 
British to them in peace and tranquility, legal historian Mark Walters notes that the spiritual 
significance of the Covenant Chain cannot be ignored.  “The chain metaphor implied notional 
links of kinship, an extrapolation of the clan unit that was the basic building block of local, 
national and confederal aboriginal political organizations.”21 Walters suggests the Chain created 
a “normative foundation” or “common conceptual ground” which the British understood, 
respected and acknowledged with pledges of mutual aid and presents.
22
 Though the Chain had 
the potential to mitigate some of the effects of colonial power brokering, historian Richard White 
                                                          
20
 John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2002), 149-50. 
21
 See glossary for First Nations in the Western Confederacy. Mark D. Walters, “Brightening the Covenant Chain: 
Aboriginal Treaty Meanings in Law and History after Marshall,” 24 Dalhousie Law Journal, 75(2001): 81. 
22
 Walters, “Brightening the Covenant Chain,” 88-89. 
 6 
points out that “as a single grand alliance” it “was a myth.”23  The British were often uncaring 
and did not ‘polish’ the chain sufficiently with wampum and support in the form of presents. It 
‘broke’ several times as a result. In 1754 Hendrick told the Lieutenant-Governor of New York 
James De Lancey that cordial relations between the two nations were in peril. The Mohawk 
“thought the Covenant Chain was broken because we were neglected.”24 
 Though the Covenant Chain was not infallible it could be repaired, and Hendrick and 
Pontiac both used it as a vehicle to restore balance to the Covenant Chain diplomatic 
relationship. Arrogant and disrespectful British officials increasingly failed to observe Covenant 
Chain protocols after the defeat of France. Fearing that the British planned to “take their land and 
enslave them,” 25 Pontiac and several hundred warriors took all but two of the British forts in the 
Great Lakes region in the spring of 1763 and redistributed much needed guns, ammunition and 
foodstuffs to their villages. Each nation interpreted their relationship and position within the 
Covenant Chain alliance differently and as a consequence, support and agreement with Pontiac’s 
methodology was by no means universal. Nonetheless, enough leaders recognized that their 
ability to shape British policy largely depended upon their capacity to muster a unified 
response.
26
 In future, when Indigenous leaders in the Great Lakes met British officials in council 
to discuss critical issues concerning sovereignty, trade and land, they would do so as 
representatives of a Western Confederacy. If British officials wished to avoid further conflict 
thereafter, they had to renew the Covenant Chain with presents, fair trade, and assist the Western 
                                                          
23
 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 
(Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1991), 225. 
24
 E.B. O’Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, Vol. 6, (Albany: 
Weed, Parsons & Co., 1855), “Council held at Albany, 28 June, 1754,” 867; LAC, RG 10 Series 2/1, “Meeting of 
the Commissioners of Indian Affairs, Albany, 28 September, 1744.” 
25
 Gregory Evans Dowd, War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 2002), 66 & 78. 
26
 Dowd, War Under Heaven, 53. 
 7 
Nations to protect their territories from encroachment.   
 In an effort to curb “great frauds and abuses” associated with non-Aboriginal settlement, 
the Proclamation of 1763 specifically stated that Aboriginal people were not to be “molested or 
disturbed,” in the sovereign enjoyment of their territory west of the Appalachian Mountains, 
including the Great Lakes Basin. A licensing system restricted traders to the posts and 
empowered only the Crown to purchase Aboriginal land at councils called for that purpose and 
attended by representatives of both nations.
27
 The Board of Trade and Plantations, responsible 
for colonial administration, hoped the Proclamation would curb the behavior of abusive traders 
and settlers, limit the number of fraudulent transactions, and contain settlement to that which 
could reasonably be managed and afforded. 
 Greeted with much hope and promise by Indigenous peoples and officials in the Indian 
Department, Sir William Johnson, Alexander McKee and others received copies of the 
Proclamation in 1764 and immediately set about informing Aboriginal people, traders and 
settlers of the provisions.
28
 As Borrows writes, that summer at Niagara, Johnson bound two 
thousand peoples from twenty-four Nations with the English and the Proclamation of 1763 
became a treaty.
29
 Even so, the language used in the Proclamation of 1763 is vague and 
contradictory. It clearly states that “the several Nations or Tribes of Indians” were “connected” 
to, and under the “Protection” of Great Britain, but these sections remain separate from clauses 
pertaining to European settlements.
30
 Referring to Indigenous peoples as “Nations” and “Tribes,” 
                                                          
27
 The Royal Proclamation, 7 October, 1763, in As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian 
Native Studies, ed., Ian A.L. Getty and Antoine S. Lussier (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1983), 29-38. 
28
 The Papers of Sir William Johnson, ed. James Sullivan, Vol. 4 (Albany: University of the State of New York, 
1925), Lords of Trade to Indian Superintendents, 10 October, 1763, 214. 
29
 John Borrows, “Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History, and Self-Government,” 
in Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada, ed. Michael Asch (Vancouver: U BC Press, 1997), 161 & 163. 
30
 See glossary in Appendix A for an explanation of the word ‘tribe.’ The Royal Proclamation, 7 October, 1763 in 
 8 
but not “subjects,” the Proclamation clearly distinguisnes between their territories and colonies 
where non-Aboriginal settlement existed. By prohibiting non-natives from being in the Indian 
Territory without license or permission, it recognizes the policy of “non-interference” expressed 
by the Two Row Wampum since Aboriginal laws and customs by default must have prevailed.
31
  
But the Proclamation also contained a procedure for surrendering these rights that was unclear 
and unenforceable, and that officials and settlers later found ways to abuse. The British Crown 
neither acknowledged the sovereign status of Aboriginal peoples nor sanctioned the supremacy 
of Indigenous law in the Indian Territory. Though they lacked the tools to assume such a 
monumental task, Crown officials assumed an intermediary role between the conflicting 
aspirations of settlers and Aboriginal people.
32  
The 1774 Quebec Act folded the Indian Territory 
north of the Ohio River (essentially the Great Lakes Basin), into the newly created Province of 
Quebec and again banned settlement beyond the posts. Casting off the restrictions contained in 
the Proclamation of 1763 and subsequent Quebec Act, the American colonies ultimately took 
lands in the Indian Territory as “the fruits of independence.”33 Though attempts to restore the 
balance of power in the Great Lakes basin ultimately failed, combining western ways of ‘doing,’ 
with Indigenous ways of ‘knowing’ continued to inform and guide Anishinabe communities in 
their relationships with non-Aboriginal neighbours. 
 Although the treaties signed in the period between 1790 and 1827 swallowed most of 
southwestern Ontario, they represent a continuum in evolving Covenant Chain diplomacy. Thirty 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows, ed. Getty and Lussier, 29-38. 
31
 Borrows, “Wampum at Niagara,” 159. 
32
 Paul McHugh, “The Politics of Historiography and the Taxonomies of the Colonial Past,” in Making Legal 
History: Approaches and Methodologies, ed. Anthony Musson and Chantal Stebbings (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 176. 
33
 Woody Holton, Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves and the Making of the American Revolution (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 211. 
 9 
years after the Proclamation of 1763, and within the lifetimes of many present at the Council at 
Niagara in 1764, the St. Clair Chiefs signed the 1790 McKee, 1796 Chenail Ecarté and 1818-
1827 Huron Tract agreements. Surrenders of this magnitude necessitated that leaders provide for 
the future prosperity of their communities. Their intentions can be described clearly as 'two-eyed 
seeing,' and after 1790, treaties were a part of their plan to cultivate and maintain a balanced, 
“peaceful co-existence” with Europeans.34   
 In 1818 twenty-three Anishinabeg leaders gathered at Amherstburg to present their terms 
for the surrender of their territories to Superintendent John Askin. Bear Creek Chief Chawme 
[also Chawne, d. c1823]
35
 explained that they wanted reserves in locations of their choosing, and 
sufficient land for agricultural and hunting purposes. The chiefs requested payment for the land, 
“half in hard money and half in cloathing,” for fifty years, separate and in addition to any 
pensions or presents already received. They wanted a blacksmith and husbandman paid out of 
their annuities to repair their tools and teach them to farm. These terms enabled Anishinabe 
reserve communities to build relationships with their Eurocanadian neighbours, engage in 
commerce as sovereign entities, retain use of their territories, and control the proceeds of their 
land sales. They agreed to a limited term of fifty years because they expected to be self-sufficient 
when the land payments expired in 1868.
36
 If the British kept their end of the bargain and 
protected Anishinabe lands from encroachment, the acreage in the treaties would have been 
immaterial and the funds raised from sales and leasing would have facilitated economic 
development. While Anishinabe communities did build relationships with local Eurocanadian 
                                                          
34
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35
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36
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settlers and officials, the partnership ultimately failed on multiple levels. By 1868, independent 
communities under the stewardship of leaders like Quakgwan should have become the norm, not 
the exception.  
 Indigenous communities in southwestern Ontario responded and adapted to the 
imposition of settlers and officials; so much so that Ferris argues they “maintained a traditional 
livelihood well into the 19th century.”37 The degree to which Anishinabe communities in 
southwestern Ontario maintained their cultures and economies is directly related to their isolation 
and much of it occurred at the expense of the vision of ‘two eyed seeing.’ Indigenous and 
European economies were not necessarily contradictory in the nineteenth century and the loss of 
the former did not have to be a prerequisite to engage in the latter.
38
 If Aboriginal people had 
been able to coexist and interact with Eurocanadian society on their own terms, the best of both 
worlds was indeed within their grasp.  
 Using both archaeological and documentary evidence, Ferris contends that Indigenous 
leaders did not preside over communities in “decline and ruin.”39 At the same time, the 
Anishinabek could also not accept policy as a neutral factor in their lives. Elemental in 
establishing a history of encounters on their own terms, Western District Chiefs viewed 
‘civilization’ policy in the context of the treaties, as a social and political alliance between 
sovereigns and a program of economic development.
40
 Like their neighbours, the chiefs engaged 
in spirited debate about the best ways to pursue their goals. Although they did not always see 
‘eye-to-eye,’ they shared common assumptions about the way they expected their futures to 
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unfold. ‘Seeing with two eyes,’ required control of the land and access to resources, political 
sovereignty and strategic partnerships with Eurocanadians.   
 In 1829, the Bishop of Quebec agreed, informing Governor-General James Kempt that 
“little can be accomplished in the civilization of the Indians without their concurrence and aid.”41 
But Anishinabe reserves, surrounded by non-Aboriginal communities largely hostile to their 
sovereignty and independence, soon faced a complex bureaucracy they did not anticipate.  
Walpole Island Chief Bauzhigeeshigwashekum wished to educate Anishinabe children “so that 
they may learn to read, put words on paper, and count, so that the white traders might not cheat 
them,” and Sarnia Chief Joshua Wawanosh voiced a similar refrain, hoping that their children 
could learn “to live like white people.”42 But as Figure 2 below illustrates, living ‘like white 
people’ meant earning an independent living while retaining their own culture; not ridding 
themselves of one and adopting another, wholesale. The residential school grounded in the 
pedagogy of cultural replacement perverted the Chief’s desire for education. While historian 
David Nock writes that he had a change of heart later in life, in 1873 Sarnia’s Missionary E.F. 
Wilson opened the Wawanosh Home for Girls (near the Shingwauk Residential School in Sault  
                                                          
41
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Ste. Marie) with the intent “to produce children who would be interchangeable with white 
children except for colour.”43 The St. Clair Chiefs refused to surrender their culture, language 
and spiritual beliefs and because they did not acquiesce to their demands, officials and residents 
of the Town of Sarnia described them as obstinate and increasingly blamed them for retarding 
the progress of their communities. Wawanosh and Bauzhigeeshigwashekum sought a balance 
between two extremes, approaching their relationships with Eurocanadians on their own terms 
while pursuing a place for their communities in the region’s future. In this context, the 
Anishinabeg formulated responses to policy that ultimately strengthened their culture and 
enabled them to survive. This is a story of “suvivance,” and not domination and ruin.44 
Scope and Methodology 
 Anishinabe peoples survived by re-inventing themselves and their communities in a 
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geographical region that brought both “imposition and innovation”45 Though they came together 
in larger groupings for certain social, economic and political activities and had a collective 
interest in the land desired for settlement, Anishinabe peoples in the Western District borderlands 
were otherwise independent entities possessing their own cultures and beliefs. Their choice of 
reserve locations in 1818, and where they currently reside corresponds with these historic 
demarcations.46 This study focuses on the histories of Walpole Island (Bkejwanong), Sarnia  
(Aamjiwnaang), and Kettle and Stoney Point (Wiiwkwedong and Aazhoodena), and 
Eurocanadians between 1790 and 1867 in what became Lambton County. Originally known as 
the District of Hesse, Lambton County was carved out of the Western District in 1849. It is 
bounded in the west by Lake St. Clair and the St. Clair River, in the north by the southwestern 
shore of Lake Huron, in the east by the Sable River and in the south by the County of Chatham-
Kent. (Figure 3 below). These Lines Drawn Upon the Water,
47
  between the Townships, across 
the County, and around the reserves solidified as the nineteenth century advanced. Before 
Lambton County, Anishinabe peoples found themselves bounded only by their proximity to 
other nations, their ancestral territories and the seasonal availability of resources within.  
Wyandotte Chief Peter Dooyentate Clarke simply wrote that “the Great and Good Spirit made 
us, and placed us here.”48 Undoubtedly, the potential for human occupation in southwestern 
Ontario extends to at least 10,000 years B.P. but the role the Detroit-St. Clair River system 
played as the major drainage outlet between the upper and lower Great Lakes eradicates evidence  
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Figure 3: Lambton County 
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and complicates dating.
 49
 The modern shoreline of Lake Huron appeared approximately 6000 
years ago,50 but underwater archaeological expeditions suggest that habitations several thousand 
years older lie beneath the waters of Lakes Huron and Michigan.51 Certainly 3000 to 4000 years 
ago, archaic hunter-gatherers camped along the shores of Lake Huron and Lake St. Clair and 
along the St. Clair, Thames, Sydenham and Ausable Rivers. By the early Woodland Period 3000 
to 2000 years ago, shells, metals, and flint travelled a well-worn trade route along the Mississippi 
River through the Detroit borderlands to the upper Great Lakes.
52
   
 The first Anishinabek, meaning “spontaneous”53 or Original Man,54 traveled from the 
east to the Great Lakes Basin. A Midewiwin We-kaun or priest told Ojibwe historian William 
Warren that over the course 200 years, “the great Megis (sea-shell) [which] showed itself above 
the surface of the great water,” led their “forefathers” from the Atlantic Ocean along the St. 
Lawrence River into the heart of the continent. Until separating at Michilimackinac in 1525, the 
Ojibway, Odawah and Potawatomi, known later as the Three Fires, considered themselves to be 
one people.
55
 While research concerning the ancestral origins of the Anishinabek remains 
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constantly in flux, archaeological evidence complements these oral histories.
56
 
 Approximately 2000 years ago, pottery designs suggest that two distinct cultural trends 
developed on either side of the Grand River in southwestern Ontario.  Ontario Iroquoian peoples 
emerged in the east while what are known as Western Basin Tradition peoples occupied the 
Thames River Valley and extreme southwestward portion of the Ontario peninsula into 
Michigan. Western Basin Tradition lifestyles closely mirror those of Algonquian peoples (Cree, 
Ojibwe and Algonquin) who lived in semi-permanent summer villages and utilized local 
resources in seasonal patterns throughout the Great Lakes.
57
 They maintained gardens and grew 
Indian corn on the mainland around Walpole Island and along the St. Clair and Sarnia flats.
58
 
While there are no definitive links between earlier archaic and woodland peoples, without 
evidence to the contrary, there is no reason why the Anishinabeg would not be “descended from 
various…cultures that had occupied the region previously.”59 These ancestral Anishinabeg 
peoples coalesced into groups occupying territories along the northern shores of Lakes Huron, 
Superior and St. Clair as well as inland rivers until approximately 1000 years ago when Ontario 
Iroquoians expanded into their territories. 
 
Iroquoian-speaking peoples like the Wyandotte (Huron) and Petun, occupied lands 
between Lakes Simcoe and Georgian Bay and the Neutral or Attawandaron inhabited the north 
shore of Lake Erie. By the 1550s, Neutral villages reached Chatham and pushed the emergent 
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Western Anishinabe into the Detroit-Michigan borderlands.
60
 Never entirely peaceful to begin 
with, relations between Anishinabe and Haudenosaunee peoples (Six Nations after the 1700s)
61
 
deteriorated in the second half of the seventeenth century. By the 1650s, the Haudenosaunee had 
displaced the Wyandotte, destroyed Petun and Neutral villages in southwestern Ontario and 
driven some Anishinabe as far west as Wisconsin, and east to villages on the north shore of 
Lakes Huron and Superior.
62
  
 French documents note the presence of Saulteaux and Mississauga villages on Harsen’s 
Island (adjacent to Walpole Island First Nation) and along the north shore of Lake St. Clair as 
early as 1603 and record the steady presence of Anishinabe peoples in the region from the 1640s 
onwards.
63
 In the early 1700s, Odawa, Wyandotte, Miami and Potawatomi villages along with a 
number of voyageur traders and a small settlement of farming families from New France settled 
the Detroit River region.
64
  
 In the eighteenth century, Anishinabe and Haudenosaunee leaders creatively worked to 
strengthen their relations with French and British colonial officials through the Covenant Chain. 
In the nineteenth century, Peter Jones explained that one hundred years earlier, “…the 
Nahdooways, [Haudenosaunee] acknowledging they were conquered, freely gave up their 
country; at the same time agreeing ever after to call each other “Brother.”65 In 1700, 
Haudenosaunee and Algonquian representatives met at Onondaga where the Algonquians told 
the Five Nations “wee desire to have free liberty of trade; wee make a firme league with ye Five 
                                                          
60
 Nin.da.waab.jig, Minishenhying Anishinabe-Aki, 4. See glossary in Appendix A for Wyandotte. 
61
 See glossary in Appendix A. 
62
 Huron or Wyandotte ([W]Ouendat), Petun and Neutral in the more southerly portion of the province fled 
westward into Michigan as far as Madeline Island, Wisconsin. They re-settled around Detroit in the eighteenth 
century. David D. Plain, The Plains of Aamjiwnaang (Victoria, BC: Trafford Publishing, 2007), 4 & 9. 
63
 Ferris, Archaeology of Native-Lived Colonialism, 35. 
64
 Plain, Plains of Aamjiwnaang, 19.   
65
 Jones and Osborn, History of the Ojebway Indians, 32. 
 18 
Nations and…desire to be united in ye Covenant Chain, our hunting places to be one, and to 
boile in one kettle, eat out of one dish, and with one spoon, and so be one…”66 After meeting 
again in Montréal in 1701, Aboriginal peoples negotiated Dish with One Spoon agreements with 
greater frequency as increasing settlement placed stress on fur and food bearing animals. 
Between 1701 and 1755 the number of “Detroit Indians” increased as Chippewa (Ojibwe) from 
the St. Mary’s River and Lake Superior, Odawa from Michilimackinac, and Potawatomi from St. 
Joseph moved back into southwestern Ontario.67 According to Wyandotte Chief Peter Clarke, the 
four nations at Detroit agreed to occupy and share the territory and its resources. The Wyandotte 
used the area between the Thames River and Lake Erie while the Chippewa utilized the area 
north from the Thames to “the shores of Lake Huron and beyond.”  The Ottawa settled the St. 
Clair River region and northwestern Michigan to Michilimackinac, while the Potawatomi 
established themselves southwest of Detroit. Sealed with wampum, “it was understood among 
them…that each of the four nations should have the privilege of hunting in one another’s 
territory.”68  
 Populations in the borderlands remained relatively stable after the 1770s enabling 
observers to associate various nations with particular regions. Moravian missionary John 
Heckewelder’s estimate of the number of warriors west of the Mississippi made in the 1770s 
included 350 Potawatomi near Detroit, 300 Wendat near Lake Erie and 900 Ottawa around Lake 
Superior.
69
  Estimates of Chippewa (Ojibwa) warriors in the St. Clair borderlands ranged 
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between 3000 and 5000 in the same period suggesting as that more than 30,000 people resided 
there.
70
 By 1800, approximately five groups utilized hunting territories around seasonal camps or 
villages located at Lake St. Clair (St. Clair River), Kettle Point (Ausable River), Bear Creek 
(Sydenham R.), Anderdon (Detroit River) and on the Thames River (Muncey). Each community 
comprised of smaller interrelated extended families or clans, had total populations of 150 to 300 
people.
71
 For instance, a census taken in the 1790s records 167 “Indian settlers” or 48 men, 61 
women and 58 children living in 20 houses at the Chenail Ecarté and 4 on Harsen’s Island.72 
Among these “semi-autonomous” groups, “a common language, a common history, and a 
common culture” united them.73 Nevertheless, given the seasonality of Algonquian settlement 
and the presence of peoples of mixed European and Indigenous ancestry, adoptees and refugees, 
it is extremely difficult to link cultural groups to precise locations at specific times.
74
 By the 
1800s, Wyandotte and Anishinabe peoples had lived in the region for well over one hundred 
years, working out agreements amongst themselves and with small European settlements nearby, 
to share the land, waters, and resources.
75  
 After 1800, Missionaries, surveyors and others encountered the Anishinabek in semi-
permanent summer villages at the St. Clair rapids and Chenail Ecarte, and inland along Big Bear 
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Creek
76
 and the Sable River. Indian Agent William Jones wrote that: 
  The chief Hunting Grounds of these Indians that occupy the Upper  
  Reserve are the unsettled Parts of the Townships of Sarnia and Moore,  
  but they depend much on Fishing; the Hunting Grounds of the Walpole  
  or Chenail Ecarte Indians are the unsettled Parts of Sombra or Dover,  
  and in the Marshes of the Islands, where they kill great Numbers of Musk  
  Rats, Ducks, and other Game; the Channels abound also with Fish; the  
  Indians of the river Aux Sables hunt chiefly over the unsettled Parts  
  of the Canada Company’s Tract.77 
 
 From these larger villages, smaller parties of three to six families travelled to hunting 
camps in the winter and to interior maple sugar camps in early spring.
78
 Between October and 
February, missionaries and officials often found the St. Clair Anishinabe away hunting in 
Michigan.79 Wawanosh and several families had a village on the southern shore of Lake Huron at 
the rapids (Sarnia), while Ashkebahgahnequod and Wahpagas camped near Kettle and Stony 
Point. Their people hunted from Goderich to Saginaw.80 In the early 1800s, Moravian missionary 
Christian Denke noticed that Anishinabe on the St. Clair planted crops of Indian corn and squash 
annually at the Chenail Ecarté. Further along the river, Indian agent George Ironside Sr. 
described this land as “already cleared” and surveyor Mahlon Burwell discovered fields of 
Indian corn, pumpkins and beans inland at the Sable.
81
 In late summer and early fall, individuals 
snared small game and gathered fruit, nuts, berries, and medicinal plants in preparation for 
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extended journeys to winter hunting camps.82 Oftentimes the sick, elderly and children stayed 
behind in the permanent summer settlements where they stored food in caches and pits and 
where small game hunting, fishing and gathering mitigated scarcity when hunts were less 
successful.
 83
 As non-Aboriginal agricultural settlement, deforestation and drainage in the district 
increased, the seasonal availability of resources from year to year became less certain and 
predictable.  
 Anishinabe communities were a visible presence in the region and their residents played 
an important role in the economic life in the colony. They traded with their neighbours who at 
this time were primarily French families like the Laforges at Sarnia, the Babys’ on the St. Clair 
and discharged British soldiers and loyalists residing on the Thames and Sydenham Rivers.
84
 
While travelling from York to Detroit, Lieutenant-Governor John Graves Simcoe relied 
extensively on the expertise of Indigenous guides to feed and shelter his party. Anishinabe 
people traded fish, fowl and game, cranberries, pitch, chestnuts and medical treatments
85
 for 
goods of European origin such as “pork, flour, potatoes or clothing.”86 Until wagon roads were 
cut and inns and taverns built along them, Aboriginal villages were the only places of respite 
along the waterways and narrow trails that traversed the district.
87
 At the turn of the century, 
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Richard Cartwright estimated that the more than 5800 packs of furs traded in the northwest were 
worth £87,390 to the British colonial economy. In 1812 alone, more than 15,000 furs and skins 
from fifteen varieties of animals sent from the Northwest left the Port of Quebec for England.
88
 
Officials deliberately encouraged the Western Nations to settle near the towns of Malden and 
Amherstburg to supply the local garrison, traders and settlers.
89
 These circumstances changed in 
the nineteenth century as British troops withdrew, and peacetime markets gradually excluded the 
products of Anishinabe labour. 
 The reserves all fronted superior fishing sites, but each had different and culturally and 
economically valuable attributes that Chawme and the St. Clair Chiefs sought to protect from 
encroaching settlement in 1818.90 Walpole Island contained a diverse ecosystem of Carolinian 
forest, oak prairies, and marsh delta.
91
 The denser hardwood forests punctuated by marshes in the 
reserved areas of Moore, Shawanoe, and Bear Creek were used for gathering wild rice, maple 
sugaring, hunting deer and trapping small game.
92
 A seven thousand acre wetland near Lake 
Wawanosh contained two acres of cranberry marsh east of Point Edward and the Sarnia “flats” 
where the Anishinabe camped and planted corn.
93
 Less suitable for agriculture but abundant in 
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cedar and pine and sub-surface resources like gravel and salt, the sand plains of Kettle and Stony 
Point led to interior hunting grounds but remained close enough to establish thriving barter 
economies with settlers.
94
 All the reserves had been important sites of pre-contact trade and 
settlement, and the fact that they were situated along vital waterways guaranteed access to 
transportation throughout the entire Great Lakes Basin. Protecting them by treaty was a 
necessary step in preserving Anishinabe economies.  
 Subsistence patterns identified with specific groups made economic and social sense 
when repeated on a yearly basis and the localized ecological and environmental expertise 
enabled village residents to make rapid changes and correctives in the event of abundance or 
scarcity.
95
 Local foodstuffs, when historically plentiful, or available through trade meant that 
permanent villages centered on a wheat or corn-based economy made little economic sense. In 
this environment, agriculture on a small scale was only needed to supplement or complement 
existing resources. Only over the course of the nineteenth century, as European settlement 
increased and various resources failed did Anishinabe peoples seek alternatives. When they did, 
they continued to do so in a way that integrated trade, agriculture and wage labour into this 
seasonal cycle.
96
 
Borders and Boundaries 
 Anishinabe peoples did not all arrive willingly or at once but were part of a great 
movementt of Indigenous people east of the Mississippi displaced by war and settlement. 
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Consequently, the Detroit River region and what would become known as southwestern Ontario 
retains a unique history as a result of the “Indian Territory” outlined in the Proclamation of 
1763.
97
  By 1763, settlers in the American colonies outnumbered the French by a ratio of 20 to 1 
and in the decades after, immigration to eastern North America tripled.
 
Settlement once limited 
to the Atlantic seaboard, spread over the Appalachian Mountains eroding the territories of 
Indigenous peoples in the process (Figure 4 below).
98
 Pushed westward, the Shawnee, along with 
the Haudenosaunee and Moravian Delaware (Leni Lenape), met Miami and Potawatomi peoples 
moving eastward from the Midwest into the vast Indian Territory, west of the Appalachian 
Mountains. Ojibwe and Odawah from Wisconsin and Minnesota ventured south to join the 
Mississauga in Ontario. 
 The Revolution Calloway deemed “a disaster” for Indigenous peoples became a 
catastrophy as displaced and war-weary Ohio Valley nations confronted conflicting and 
contradictory policies of two countries on their lands.
99
 While some came to Upper Canada as 
loyalists in the 1780s, others remained in the borderlands between Michigan and Upper Canada, 
in an effort to hold the northwest Indian Territory in the presence of American settlement. The 
boundary established in 1783 remained unsurveyed until after the War of 1812 and much to the 
annoyance of the American government, the British manned and maintained the forts of Niagara, 
Detroit and Michilimackinac in what was now American territory.
100
 Though British officials  
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Figure 4: Indigenous Territories Advancing West 
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remained uninterested and Americans considered the Ohio Valley “a den for Indians and 
traitors,”1 encroaching settlement at the same time reduced the Indian Territory in stages until the 
1814 Treaty of Ghent all but confirmed the volatile Detroit River boundary. 
 Borderlands between peoples transitioned to boundaries between nation-states and their 
effect on Indigenous peoples in the northwest is well-recognized in the literature.
2
 In the words 
of Tecumseh, “The Great Spirit above has appointed this place for us, on which to light our fires, 
and here we will remain. As to boundaries, the Great Spirit above knows no boundaries, nor will 
his red people acknowledge any.”3 The territories utilized by Anishinabe peoples, Ojibwa, 
Odawa and Potawatomi defy political and international boundaries established after 1763,
4
 
leading historians to study Aboriginal people in Ontario by Nation or Confederacy,
5
 by reserve 
community, or treaty.
6
 I adopt the concept of the “treaty region” used by Brian Alan Baker and 
similarly adapted by historians Phil Bellfy, Karl Hele, and Edmund Danziger, to address the 
spatial and temporal challenges faced by borderlands peoples.
7
 Despite the presence of the 
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international boundary, its waters connected peoples in the western Great Lakes and they shared 
common cultural backgrounds and outlooks as a result. Permanent villages established in Upper 
Canada remained the centre of larger territories in what became the United States.
8
  
 Irrespective of confederacy style government, mobility over wide swaths of territory 
actually mitigated scarcity and maintained kinship-based connections and sovereignty. 
Documents from the region consistently assign geographical specificity to the major dodem 
(totem) families: evidence which Johnston and Bohaker suggests represents continuous 
occupation of the western Great Lakes region by Anishinabek peoples, despite the presence of 
conflicting names of French and British origin. Clan-based dodems and other forms of kinship, 
according to Bohaker, are structures of governance that Anishinabe peoples integrated into the 
systemic seasonal exploitation of local resources.9 Warfare and Canadian and American policies 
of removal and retrenchment in the late 1830s and 1840s forced some Anishinabe and Wyandotte 
peoples to migrate to Michigan and Kansas and others to seek asylum in Canada.10 While 
European observers later viewed Anishinabe mobility as a cultural flaw or weakness, it was a 
strategy of survival made necessary by colonial policy and settler behavior.   
 The ‘treaty region’ therefore, enables me to study communities reserved in the 1827 
Huron Tract Treaty individually and as a broader collective of Indigenous peoples in the Great 
Lakes Basin. This perspective highlights important unifying characteristics as well as differences 
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in their histories and development that otherwise might go unnoticed.
11
 Before arriving at an 
agreement the chiefs were willing to sign, parties to the Huron Tract Treaty negotiated over a 
span of nearly ten years. Throughout this process, several councils are well documented, as are 
complaints about the context and implementation of the treaty in later decades. These records 
show that Anishinabe Chiefs repeatedly communicated the needs and desires of their 
communities to British officials, allowing me to write about a people with a clearly articulated 
vision of their future and to discuss what happened to them during the crucial years of Upper 
Canada’s economic, social and political formation. 
Methodology 
 Aboriginal people defined the shape and appearance of British policy in their 
communities.
12
 Records of the Department of Indian Affairs and Western Superintendency 
contain thousands of documents written by, for, and about Anishinabe people.
13
 Countless 
petitions, council speeches, letters and memorials contain a counter-narrative to a history of 
generalized decline. Anishinabe Chiefs signed the Huron Treaty with the Crown intending to 
preserve their relationship with its representatives and settlers in surrounding communities. Both 
context and intent “appear in correspondence surrounding the treaties and in subsequent 
complaints by the Indian leadership when obligations were not met.”14 Most Anishinabe adults in 
the first half of the nineteenth century never learned to speak or write in English, and non-elites 
in general did not write in the colonial period.
 
Despite this, chiefs found locals willing to assist 
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them and wrote their own letters and petitions in Ojibway and English. In many instances the 
dearth of sources is alleviated by consulting these documents. 
 The act of petitioning represented an important method of political participation for the 
disenfranchised.
15
 In Upper Canada, a “great majority of petitioners were ordinary people” 16 and 
hundreds of petitions and memorials written by Anishinabe peoples to their agents, Governor-
Generals and the Crown lie in the files of the Western Superintendency.  According to Ravi de 
Costa, petitions are an important form of Indigenous activism and identity formation,
 17
 and 
should be recognized as the principal means through which the Anishinabe made issues of 
concern to them known to government and society at large in the nineteenth century. Containing 
the same council rhetoric utilized by Indigenous speakers in colonial America, Upper Canadian 
petitions sent by Anishinabe people are an extension of the Covenant Chain alliance and an 
example of adaptive two-eyed seeing.  
 Over the course of the nineteenth century, the fact that British officials “lost their 
understanding of how the terminology worked” is, according to J.R. Miller, “one of the striking 
features” of European-Indigenous relations.18 Indeed, by the 1840s, officials appear to have 
‘forgotten’ all aspects of the Covenant Chain alliance. In the many investigations into Indian 
Affairs conducted between 1828 and 1858, colonial and Crown officials consciously ignored 
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documentation created prior to the War of 1812.
19
 Responding to this new protocol, in 1819 
Western Confederacy Nations assembled at the Huron Reserve in Anderdon (Windsor), where 
they officially lit their Council Fire and voiced their first collective petition to the Duke of 
Richmond.
20
 One chief rose to tell the interpreter, “[w]e find that our ancient mode of conveying 
our ideas in wampum, has no more effect.” He hoped that by handing him a written memorial, 
their concerns would “appear” to the Duke “…as a serious matter.”21 Norman Shields writes that 
General Indian Councils were imperitive in the formation of a province-wide resistance to 
coercive aspects of policy after 1840. Anishinabe Chiefs also used petitions to access the 
political process decades earlier.
22
 While on the surface it appears that Indigenous peoples lacked 
influence in the formation of policy, Anishinabe leaders vigorously petitioned participants, 
officials and commissioners, before the largest and most contentious inquiries into their affairs 
held in 1844 and 1858.
23
  
 Reworking the deferential and reverential language of European petitions allowed chiefs 
to communicate Covenant Chain metaphors to the Crown.
24
 In a petition to their superintendent 
about several issues of concern on Walpole Island, Peterwegeshig concluded; “Father~ You have 
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all my words at present, and now I give you my hand of friendship, and when you see our Great 
Father the Governor General, I, through you, heartily shake his hand. I have the honor to be your 
Most Obed[ient] servant. Pe ter we ge shigh [his mark]”25 The St. Clair Chiefs communicated 
with their agents, the government and the Crown though these “paper talks”26 and they are an 
important aspect of the relationship between Anishinabe peoples and the British and Canadian 
governments.  
 The importance of this method of communication can be seen in an elaborate address 
given to the Governor General, His Excellency the Right Honourable Earl of Dufferin in 1874 
(Figure 5 below). Together with their “white Brethren,” Walpole Island First Nation welcomed 
him to their territory and reaffirmed their “fealty and attachment” to the Crown through Queen 
Victoria. Signed by Peterwegeshig, who was then seventy-five years old, and a number of chiefs, 
councilors and their descendants, the document is a classic example of what De Costa calls an 
“’indigenize[d]’…petitionary form.”27  Combining Western and Indigenous cultural symbols,  
the petition includes portraits of Aboriginal leaders and village landscapes surrounded by 
decorative gold leaf and architectural columns. When petitions alone were insufficient to garner 
action from Indian Department officials, leaders like Peter Jones in the 1830s and Peterwegeshig 
and Wawanosh in the 1840s corresponded covertly in Ojibway and raised funds to present their 
petitions to the Governor General and the Queen in England.
28
 Radforth argues that in 1860, the 
eighty chiefs and warriors and 200 to 400 Anishinabe people who appeared before the Prince of  
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Figure 5: 1874 Walpole Island Address to the Earl of Dufferin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Dufferin Addresses, 1872-1878; Vol. I, Book 319, 18 August, 1874, 
watercolour, black ink, gouache & gold paint, 49 x 74.2 cm. Library and 
Archives Canada, Accession. No. 1978-49-179. 
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Wales in Lambton County used the event to bring attention to their own issues.
29
 As the 
provincial legislature drew closer to achieving responsible government, chiefs turned to political 
organization and public appearances in an effort to circumvent the colonial government and 
‘speak’ directly to the Crown.30 They did not remain silent about their circumstances.   
 In addition to six commissions of Inquiry conducted between 1828 and 1858, documents 
kept by the Indian Department including requisitions for supplies, census returns, school reports 
and merchant receipts are a window into the lives of Anishinabe people prior to 1867. In what 
Calloway calls “zones of interaction,” Indigenous people wrote about their circumstances in 
letters to the department, or in letters written by others at their behest.
31
 I have supplemented 
these with papers from the Western District, the municipal records of Sarnia and township 
records of Kent and Lambton, Crown lands and survey records, gazetteers and the observations 
of contemporary observers contained in local newspapers, travel diaries, memoirs and 
missionary reports. It is my intention to weave the histories of Aboriginal peoples and 
Eurocanadians together. 
 Places and spaces where contact is absent often remain in darkness. A dearth of 
documents in the early history of Upper Canada is a universal problem and extant documents in 
European and Indigenous communities in particular, are neither uniform nor complete.
32
 These 
factors notwithstanding, Indian Agents William Jones and Superintendent Joseph Clench for 
instance displayed a surprising level of ignorance about the people and communities under their 
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direct superintendence and of the laws and policies they were supposed to enforce. The Indian 
Department executive complicated matters by treating all the Huron Tract communities as one 
administrative unit until 1862 when after decades of petitioning, Walpole Island separated their 
council. Kettle and Stony Point remained part of the Sarnia ‘band’ until 1919, and officials 
included or excluded them, along with families residing at Moore and Enniskillen, from Sarnia’s 
censuses and agricultural data without explanation. Data for individual communities is 
sometimes erratic and inconsistent as a result. According to Robert Berkhofer, the people who 
“managed “Indian policy” determined what it became.33 The Western or Sarnia Superintendency 
suffered disproportionately from a number of incompetent Indian agents and superintendents 
formally accused of neglect and breach of duty.
 34
 In some cases, unresolved issues documented 
for decades are scattered throughout the files of department employees. The volume of 
correspondence required to discuss them says much about the bureaucracy’s complexity and 
focus on documenting problems rather than dealing with people. In other cases, the opposite is 
true and silence speaks to the neglect Huron Tract communities experienced at a crucial point in 
their history.  
 Bonita Lawrence writes that it is vital to “document…[the] processes of colonization 
from the perspectives of those who experienced it.” John Borrows suggests this can be 
accomplished by uniting European documents with Indigenous “speeches, symbols, and 
conduct.”35 Anishinabe peoples utilized “a wide range of media,” “asserting…their collective 
                                                          
33
 Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr.  The White Man’s Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 141.  
34
 Leighton, “The Development of a Federal Indian Policy,” 56.  
35
 Bonita Lawrence, “Rewriting Histories of the Land: Colonization and Resistance in Eastern Canada,” in Race, 
Space and the Law: Unmapping a Settler Society, ed. Sherene H. Razack (Toronto: Between the Lines Press, 2002), 
25; Borrows, “Wampum at Niagara, 155-6. 
 35 
and individual identities” in kinship relations, council proceedings, memoirs and oral histories.36 
Sarnia historians Aylmer and David Plain and members of the Walpole Island, Kettle and Stony 
Point First Nations write their own histories that combine oral and family histories, genealogies, 
art, and culture, with documents. While community histories are primarily for scholarly and 
community purposes, outside researchers produce others for the specific claims process.  These, 
unfortunately, can and do remain privileged and inaccessible.
37
 Ameliorating these conditions 
requires outside funding, extensive consultation, and long-term partnerships between researchers 
and First Nations communities.
38
  
 Academic studies in the last thirty years overwhelmingly show that Canadian Indian 
policy from its inception to the present has, with rare exceptions, ignored the view and needs of 
the very people it claims to serve. According to Susan Dion, “historical amnesia” continues to 
dominate the early history of the Province of Ontario, contributing to a discourse that in legal 
and policy terms, considers Aboriginal self-determination to be a relatively modern 
phenomenon.
39
 Aboriginal people experienced “continuity” and “change” at various times and 
responded with both “accommodation and resistance.”40 Anishinabe scholar Leanne 
Betasamosake Simpson reminds us that “it is not impossible to have plans and strategy in the 
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face of injustice.”41 This study seeks to explore the issues faced by Anishinabe peoples and the 
strategies they used in their attempts to ‘see with two eyes’ in Lambton County.  
Historiography 
 The period between the American Revolution and 1812 attracts intense historical interest, 
and the history of southwestern Ontario remains contested space as a result. In particular, it is 
now recognized that Anishinabe and Haudenosaunee participation in the War of 1812 connects to 
a broader struggle to regain the Ohio Valley after the American Revolution.42 Afterwards, 
intermittent warfare in the form of brutal backcountry raids destabilized and dislocated 
Anishinabe villages. Many Anishinabe families who eventually settled in Upper Canada, had not 
experienced a stable period of peace for thirty years or more. The Western District’s proximity to 
the border with the United States ensured that residents remained in a state of uneasy alert, long 
after eastern Upper Canada returned to peace and security.  These events disproportionately 
affected Anishinabe peoples and interfered with their ability to establish communities in Upper 
Canada in the post-treaty period. 
 Historians interpret the cession of hostilities after 1815 and the expansion of 
Eurocanadian agricultural settlement as the beginning of a period of decline for Anishinabe 
communities. Consequently, Upper Canadian Aboriginal histories are dwarfed by intense 
historical interest in the post-Confederation period, when passage of the 1876 Indian Act and 
resistance in Western Canada attracted national attention. Despite the fact that Anishinabe 
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peoples and Eurocanadians inhabited the same space, Upper Canadian history is largely fractured 
into two traditions: one that focuses on Aboriginal peoples and policy and a separate history 
tracing rural, Eurocanadian settlement. Combining them reveals many histories waiting to be told 
and a great deal of understanding yet to be gained. We know for instance, that Anishinabe 
communities did not develop in the same way as their adjacent non-Aboriginal neighbours 
during what was a crucial time in the expansion of Upper Canada’s economy and government. 
Therefore, if officials and settlers viewed Anishinabe communities as antithetical to that process, 
then British 'Indian' policy is only one aspect of a complex story.  
 Tony Hall notes that Indian policy, as it appeared on the Canadian plains in the late 
nineteenth century, originated in Upper Canada.43 Paradoxically, the use of top-down approaches 
in most policy studies tends to conceal the outcomes in Indigenous communities. Tobias, for 
instance, notes that the British intended to “protect” Aboriginal peoples from 1763 to the War of 
1812, yet, these years witnessed the largest losses of Aboriginal lands in North American 
history.44 While the literature recognizes the abject failure of British policy, this is attributed to 
legislation passed in 1850 and after. This study suggests that long before 1850, relationships and 
cooperative agreements between Anishinabe people and non-Aboriginal settlers broke down. 
This occurred in an era of limited legislation and in the utter absence of ‘protection.’ 45  
 Contemporary literature on Indian policy as it unfolded in southern Ontario is virtually 
non-existent. Several dissertations and articles examining British colonial policy initiated by 
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McNab, Milloy, Leighton and Upton in the 1970s remain broad in scope and largely 
unpublished.46 These studies focus on documents produced in the administration of Indian 
Affairs, primarily through the British Colonial Office, Office of the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies and the Lieutenant-Governor in Canada. To this, John Leslie added his investigation of 
the six inquiries into the nature and direction of the Indian Department, but from the perspective 
that Aboriginal peoples did not contribute to policy development or implementation.47 While 
these studies identified important goals and objectives of British colonial policy, as McNab and 
others argue, until recently, the effects of this policy as a “process on the ground” in Indigenous 
communities remained largely understudied.48  
 The development of chronological studies of particular policy goals unintentionally 
creates a ‘taxonomy’ of Aboriginal decline. Historians attribute the decline to various policies 
and events and disagree as to when and why it occurred. Surtees and Johnson suggest the 
inadequacy of the treaty system precipitated economic and social decline while Upton attributes 
it to Bond Head's forced surrenders and removal policy which destroyed what little goodwill 
remained after 1836. Boyce Richardson proposes that the Union of the Canadas in 1841 
centralized bureaucracy, enabling settlers to dominate and override Aboriginal concerns while 
Milloy argues that this occurred only after the transfer of authority of Indian Affairs to the 
                                                          
46
 Leighton, The Development of Federal Indian Policy in Canada; John F. Leslie, “Assimilation, Integration or 
Termination?: The Development of Canadian Indian Policy, 1943-1963” (PhD Thesis, Carleton University, 1999); 
David T. McNab, “Herman Merivale and the British Empire, 1806-1874” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Lancaster, 1978);  John Sheridan Milloy, “The Era of Civilization-British Policy for the Indians of Canada, 1830-
1860”  (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oxford, 1978); L.F.S. Upton, “The Origins of Canadian Indian Policy,” 
Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol. 8, No. 4 (November 1973): 51-61. 
47
 John. F. Leslie, “Commissions of Inquiry into Indian affairs in the Canadas, 1828–1858: Evolving a Corporate 
memory for the Indian Department” (Ottawa: Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada, Treaties and 
Historical Research Centre, 1985) and “The Bagot Commission: Developing a Corporate Memory for the Indian 
Department,” CHA, Historical Papers, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1982): 31-52.  
48
 McNab, No Place for Fairness, 7; William C. Wicken, The Colonization of Mi’kmaw Memory and History, 1794-
1928 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 160. 
 39 
colonies in 1860.49 After examining the material culture of nineteenth-century villages in 
southwestern Ontario, archaeologist Neal Ferris criticizes historians as a whole, for telling what 
he believes are tales of decline that begin with contact.50    
 The fact that historians disagree as to the timing and overall impact of colonial policy, 
suggests the effects were uneven in Aboriginal communities, and that studying policy broadly is 
ineffective in determining outcomes.51 Authors of policy studies do not dispute the fact that 
successive British and Canadian administrations refused to allow Aboriginal peoples to be 
‘Indian’ and citizens regardless of the nomenclature used to distinguish specific policy 
paradigms. Yet policymakers, political scientists and historians do simultaneously refer to them 
as civilization, assimilation, termination, integration, protection, and a myriad of other 
descriptors. This indicates that local circumstances played a greater role than previously assumed 
and that more research needs to be done to uncover the impact of policy in communities.  
 Howlett suggests the periodic “paradigm” shifts identified by Leslie, Tobias, Milloy and 
others conceal an underlying policy of assimilation that from the end of the War of 1812 to the 
present, remains fundamentally unchanged.52  As a consequence, self-determination is articulated 
by Indigenous academics and leaders as an antidote to historic and current assimilative policies 
                                                          
49
 See Upton, “The Origins of Canadian Indian Policy” & Milloy, “The Era of Civilization,” as well as Robert J. 
Surtees “The Development of an Indian Reserve Policy in Canada.” Ontario Historical Society, Vol. 61 (1969): 87-
98; Leo Johnson, “The Mississauga–Lake Ontario Land Surrender of 1805,” 233–53; Boyce Richardson, “Kind 
Hearts or Forked Tongues? The Indian Ordeal: A Century of Decline,” The Beaver (Feb./Mar. 1987): 16-41. 
50
 Ferris, Archaeology of Native-Lived Colonialism, 10. Emphasis on dependency and decline present in older 
studies portraying Aboriginal people as victims of progress reappears in Marxist and systems-theory analyses 
implicating the world-wide shift to capitalism in the subjugation of Indigenous peoples. E. Palmer Patterson, The 
Canadian Indian: A History Since 1500 (Don Mills, ON: Collier-MacMillan, 1972), 72; Denys Delâge, Bitter Feast: 
Amerindians and Europeans in Northeastern North America, 1600-64, trans. Jane Brierley (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
1993). 
51
 David T. McNab, “Herman Merivale and Colonial Office Indian Policy,” in As Long as the Sun Shines and Water 
Flows, ed. Getty and Lussier, 85-103. 
52
 Michael Howlett, “Policy Paradigms and Policy Change. Lessons from the Old and New Canadian Policies 
towards Aboriginal Peoples,” Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Winter 1994): 631-2. 
 40 
in the Department of Aboriginal Affairs.53  Current conflict between Indigenous peoples and the 
Canadian State, Weaver and Howlett suggest, is the outcome of a new paradigm of self-
determination and coexistence, consequences of the failed 1969 White Paper and 
recommendations of the 1996 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP).54 The RCAP, 
precipitated by the controversial and vague inclusion of “Indians, Inuit and Métis peoples” in the 
1982 Constitution, four failed first minister’s Conferences, and a decade of Indigenous protest, 
recommended a renewed relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian state.55 
Nearly twenty years later, if there is to be a new policy paradigm recognizing Indigenous self-
determination, it is crucial that the origins and methods by which it was undermined in the 
nineteenth century are understood.56  These origins will not be found in the metropole alone but 
in the colonies and communities where it came to fruition.57 
  According to Catherine Hall, colony and metropole influenced each other through 
ideological exchanges such that one cannot be studied to the exclusion of the other.58 Yet even 
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within these structures, “the state is not a separate 'level' from civil society, but a part of it, 
evolving and legitimizing the rules and framework within which social life is structured.”59 Thus, 
officials, missionaries and settlers who, on the surface appear to share similar philosophies, 
differed quite markedly in their motives and behavior, and Elbourne cautions historians who 
might over-stress humanitarianism's influence on British Indian policy.60 British parliamentarians 
perhaps regretted the effects of colonization, but like their Canadian counterparts today, they 
would not sacrifice economic expansion or progress for the moral reformation of Indigenous 
peoples.61 Perhaps closest to the truth was Sir John Seeley who in 1883 concluded that Great 
Britain “conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind.”62 As a consequence, I 
use the terms ‘British policy’ and ‘empire’ frequently but with caution, and with the 
understanding that they are not monolithic.
63
  
 Political scientists and legal historians who continue to explore the implications of policy 
for state and judicial purposes, utilize major policy statements like the several commissions of 
inquiry into Indian Affairs and Indian Act legislation. Conversely, cultural and social historians 
shifted focus to post-colonial studies of ‘nation’ and ‘empire’ as ideas or discourses.64 A lack of 
sources for this kind of analysis in the early nineteenth century naturally draws researchers from 
various disciplines to the late Victorian period when literacy rates and the institutionalization of 
                                                          
59
 K.J. Anderson, “Cultural Hegemony and the Race-definition Process in Chinatown, Vancouver: 1880-1980,” 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, Vol. 6 (1988): 131. 
60
 Elizabeth Elbourne, “The Sin of the Settler: The 1835-36 Select Committee on Aborigines and Debates Over 
Virtue and Conquest in the Early Nineteenth-Century British White Settler Empire,” Journal of Colonialism and 
Colonial History, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2003): 8. 
61
 Michael D. Blackstock, “The Aborigines Report (1837): A Case Study in the Slow Change of Colonial Social 
Relations,” Canadian Journal of Native Studies, XX, 1 (2000): 68. 
62
 Klaus E. Knorr, British Colonial Theories 1570-1850 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1944), 250. 
63
 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1737 (London: Vintage Books, 1996), ix.  
64
 Anderson, “Cultural Hegemony and the Race-definition Process”; Adele Perry, On the Edge of Empire: Gender, 
Race and the Making of British Columbia, 1849-1871 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001); Jennifer Reid, 
Louis Riel and the Creation of Modern Canada: Mythic Discourse and the Creation of the Modern State (Winnipeg: 
University of Manitoba Press, 2012). 
 42 
religion, science and education, created intellectual elites and commonsensical acceptance of 
progress and improvement.65 Valverde and others suggest that by 1880, these circumstances led 
many to believe that complex social problems caused by increasing immigration and 
urbanization could be ameliorated through reform.66 The dominance of the post-1880s era in 
colonial and Indigenous studies in general, is deceptive.  Because of its tendency to overshadow 
the multifaceted and contradictory nature of the earlier part of the century, Francis, contends that 
the term ‘Victorian’ is a misnomer. The Victorian sense of empire, with its attendant moral and 
biological superiorities, if it ever existed, differed markedly to the era of civilization-assimilation 
and the period before 1860.67 
 Epitomized by British officials like Herman Merivale, reformers earlier in the century 
deemed ‘civilization’ a culturally and developmentally acquired trait and the amalgamation of 
the empire’s diverse populations, a virtual certainty.68 While almost every generation after 1815 
looked to labour, progress and technology to lead them to a prosperous future, until the post-
Confederation period, these were largely informal sentiments limited to the vision and resources 
of local private interests.69 This is very different from what is understood as late nineteenth 
century ‘Victorian Imperialism,’ promulgated by the middle-class, influenced by a post-
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Confederation relationship with Great Britain, and facilitated by Macdonald’s National Policy.70 
Macdonald, who as Attorney General, introduced the 1857 Gradual Civilization Act, and 
nationalized Canada’s Indian policy in the 1870s, was familiar with Anishinabe and 
Haudenosaunee peoples in Ontario. While he believed in the inviolable superiority of British 
culture and institutions and the need to assimilate Indigenous peoples into colonial society, his 
papers, according to Smith and Evans, do not suggest that biological determinism or cultural 
essentialism shaped earlier approaches to Aboriginal policy or law in Upper Canada.71 
 The tendency to project uniform ideologies onto Eurocanadian “colonizers,” in earlier 
decades of the nineteenth century, as Westcott notes, oversimplifies complex and varied sets of 
beliefs in the colonizing process.72  On an individual basis, Eurocanadians and Anishinabe 
peoples struggled with the intersection of Indigeneity and empire. On the one hand, Haig-Brown 
and Nock explore the stories of a number of individuals who sought to assist and advocate on 
behalf of Aboriginal people where they could, and on the other, Smith’s Mississauga Portraits 
reveals that Anishinabe who rose to prominent roles were often caught between the conflicting 
expectations of two cultures.73 In this role, a discussion of miscegenation or métissage is crucial 
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for not only did trading and military families marry into local Anishinabe communities, but new 
emigrants and settlers who followed did not necessarily share similar beliefs and experiences.74 
In the upper ranks of the Indian Department, “a prevailing ideology” and “a set of shared 
attitudes and assumptions about Indians” existed, but the ‘domestic’ side of the colonial equation 
complicates culturist analyses. As Sarah Carter notes, it is difficult to determine the degree to 
which local agents and settlers internalized or applied the “official mind,” without examining 
their actions in the local community.75 In the remotest corner of Upper Canada, unintended 
consequences and the absence of policy and action are as important as its deliberate imposition 
in other locales. 
 The “Inconvenient Indian,” made famous most recently by Thomas King, has a long 
history in British policy circles.
76
 There is no doubt that officials reconciled the moral 
philosophy to “civilize” Aboriginal peoples with a parsimonious policy based on practical 
expediency. Nevertheless, demographic, political and technological developments in the second 
half of the nineteenth century enabled the Colonial Office to “govern at a distance” empowering 
Eurocanadians to interfere in the lives of Indigenous peoples in formerly unimaginable ways.77 
In this respect, recent studies of the instruments or “softwares”78 of Empire are vital to 
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understanding reserve life in Upper Canada. Neu, Gettler and Curtis for instance demonstrate 
that the ability to transform people and places into ‘meaningful’ data, and “manipulate” that data 
in order to achieve particular policy goals, had profound consequences for the development of 
state bureaucracy in Upper Canada.79 On the one hand, agents increased their control of reserve 
economies and residency in concert with the replacement of barter and credit (goods) with 
currency (annuities). Counting, accounting and censuses enabled department officials to 
transform what was once a discourse of treaty and other entitlements into charity, and its 
recipients into a declining number of ‘deserving Indians.’80 On the other hand, settlers who 
squatted on Indian lands, Indian agents who falsified leases and pilfered band accounts and 
magistrates who refused to prosecute them were not utilizing the “technology of government”81 
or furthering the greater glory of the empirical project.  They were simply trying to improve their 
own immediate economic circumstances and that of their families.   
 Tracing the development of internal colonialism and structures that facilitated the 
expropriation of Aboriginal lands, resources and labour for the benefit of an emerging Canadian 
state, is vital. The resurgence of political economy in studies by Daschuk and Lutz recognizes 
the interconnectedness of a number of factors in the study of the “changing material 
circumstances,” or “conditions” of Aboriginal communities in response to Eurocanadian 
settlement. Like Sarah Carter before them, these authors are primarily drawn to Western Canada 
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in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
 82
 While Lutz sees hope and survival in economies on 
the West Coast, hopelessness and dependency haunt Shewell’s study of welfare policy.83 Beyond 
the devastation wrought on the prairies, the cyclical intersection between land and culture 
whereby “economic and ecological imperialisms reinforced each other” also contextualizes 
development in Upper Canada.84  Fifty years before similar circumstances unfolded on the 
plains, cholera85 and the Great Western Railway tore through Lambton County. The town of 
Sarnia’s expanding “urban frontier,”86 had far reaching effects on the surrounding rural 
landscape. Viewed as a hinterland ripe for agricultural, timber and resource exploitation, 
technological advances in drainage followed the railway and marshlands, lakes, and formerly 
uninhabitable swamps disappeared. Many of the primary fowling, fishing and gathering locations 
the Anishinabe had used for centuries took mere decades to obliterate.87  Aside from several 
resource studies, the “new” political economy has yet to reach Upper Canada in the period before 
1867 in a substantive way.
88
  
 Indeed many of the processes discussed here represent the breakdown of the relationship 
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between Anishinabe peoples and Eurocanadians on a local level by individuals who could not 
appreciate the totality of their actions.  Literature on entertaining and socializing in Upper 
Canada suggests interactions between Indian agents, officials and Anishinabe peoples occurred 
frequently and informally in the first decades of the nineteenth century. Whether in public or 
private, entertainment and socializing were important ways that Eurocanadians and Anishinabe 
peoples cemented economic and political alliances. Paxton argues that in the wake of the 
American Revolution, battlefield and blood connections created a “multi-ethnic military 
community” at Niagara and Julia Roberts similarly discovered individuals of mixed ancestry 
socializing in the Western District’s taverns.89 While these relationships deteriorated, the causes 
for what became mistrust and eventual legal segregation are complex.  
 Europeans often recreated the circumstances of their own oppression and “inflicted” them 
on Indigenous peoples in the colonies.90 Karsten agrees noting that “resistance to authority and 
defiance of legal rules” are “recurrent themes” in the histories of emigrants from the British 
Isles.91 In such an environment, Indian agents faced formidable local opposition whenever they 
appeared to advance Indigenous interests over those of merchants and farmers. By the twentieth 
century, some agents in Ontario had abandoned advocacy altogether. 92 As Hayes and Brownlie 
illustrate, through the use of sanctions and threats to withdraw government programs and funds, 
Indian agents influenced collective and individual decision-making, effectively turning reserves 
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into their own personal fiefdoms.93 Rhonda Telford’s explorations into the life of William 
Keating and George Ironside similarly highlighted the fact that many contemporary struggles 
waged by Aboriginal peoples are rooted in the “nefarious” behaviors of their Indian agents.94  
Unfortunately a majority of studies focus on Northern Ontario after 1850 and Western Canada in 
the post-Confederation period leaving the lives of other Indian Agents in the early reserve period 
largely unknown.95   
 State formation in Upper Canada is a source of debate largely because historians 
understand ‘government’ in terms of centralized bureaucracy.96 Academic interest in the 
development of responsible government and Upper Canada’s path to Confederation dwarf 
research into the growth of municipal government and institutions. Much of Lambton and Kent 
County’s administrative history remains the purview of a handful of local historians contributing 
to the impression that absent and incompetent governments remained the norm for much of the 
first half of the nineteenth century. To the contrary, Johnson argues that settlers had a good 
understanding of the workings of government and that various regulations concerning land, 
pensions, charity, employment and immigration affected their lives in appreciable ways. In terms 
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of race, class and gender, the petitioning process in particular permitted equal access, though 
perhaps not consideration, to the seat of government for the purposes of grieving one’s 
condition.97 The Western District’s distance relative to the seat of power as well as the reach of 
the Upper Canada Assembly to a town such as Sarnia necessitates a broader understanding of 
‘government’ and in particular the role of municipal government and local power structures in 
the lives of Anishinabe peoples. From the 1790s onwards, the process of state formation as it 
developed in Upper Canada gradually eroded the choices available to Indigenous peoples.98 
 Aitchison suggests the other side of responsible government was “home rule.” If the 
Royal Proclamation was the ‘Indian Magna Carta,’ Aitchison argues the 1849 Municipal Act was 
the “Municipal Magna Carta” giving local elected official’s immense power to decide the future 
shape of their communities.99 Municipal councils based their decisions on the philosophy of “the 
common good.”100 Officeholders however, tended to come from the earliest settlers, 
administrators and soldiers or their descendants. These men settled on military or Indian land 
grants and reaped the greatest rewards, becoming “persisters” who extended their political and 
economic influence in concert with the growth of the towns around them.101 Conversely, 
Anishinabe Chiefs and the villages once connected to them saw their social and economic 
fortunes decline in proportion as the nineteenth century progressed. Individual property 
ownership, the payment of taxes and exercise of the franchise became foundations of municipal 
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citizenship in this period. Settlers remained aware of the differences between Aboriginal people 
and themselves in this regard. However after 1849, they and their administrators grew 
increasingly intolerant under misconceived notions that cultural characteristics and 'special 
treatment' rather than historical differences were the reasons why Aboriginal people did not do 
their civic duty or pay their 'fair' share.102 Social constructions of citizenship and the failure to 
accommodate these differences as Great Britain transferred control of administrative affairs to 
Canada are important factors contributing to Indigenous marginalization. Legislated wardship 
imposed on Anishinabe peoples after 1850 effectively rendered them ‘aliens’ in their own 
lands.103  
  In the second half of the nineteenth-century; unlike their Eurocanadian neighbours, 
Anishinabe people in Canada were expected to be contained and self-sufficient on their reserves. 
Though officials promised the chiefs continued use of off reserve territories in the treaties, access 
became impossible as farmers enclosed them behind fences. The much-mythologized 
independent yeoman farmer remains problematic on an economic level, negating the communal 
nature of rural societies and the relationships formed in the day-to-day effort to eke out an 
existence in Upper Canada.104  Parr writes that few, if any farmers could clear the land and 
establish themselves successfully without resorting to wage labour, either by working for pay or 
hiring labourers to assist them in clearing their own land.105 But rural historians have not 
examined early reserve economies in Upper Canada, nor have they situated them in the broader 
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economic, social or political developments in the province.   
 It is Ferris' contention that the effects of a “catastrophic bureaucracy” did not begin to 
successfully undermine the economic and political functioning of Indigenous communities in 
southwestern Ontario until the latter decades of the nineteenth century. However, this is in 
respect to their own modes of subsistence. Internal modifications necessary to cope with change 
around them were primarily material in nature and not externally imposed.106 Lutz similarly 
argues that First Nations in British Columbia “never became irrelevant, not even in the twentieth 
century.” They instead integrated “work for pay” into a “moditional economy” combining 
several strategies.107  Lutz however, does not address the fact that a “moditional economy” in 
most cases, did not include opportunities to increase socioeconomic status beyond that of a wage 
labourer. This may be because, as many contend, Indigenous peoples neither desired nor needed 
to expand their earning power beyond the satisfaction of basic needs. Research instead suggests 
that First Nations place greater value on community well-being and approach business 
development from a balanced perspective that does not permit profit to be the sole motivating 
factor driving development on their lands. Rather, the benefits of wages, employment and 
training are only fully realized in the community when self-determination, “culture, traditions 
and values” are prioritized.108 As Leslie points out, “[t]rue integration should have been a two-
way street in which both Natives and non-Natives made appropriate adjustments to 
accommodate the other.”109 Enfranchisement provisions illustrate the “sharp divisions” drawn 
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“between subsistence and market economies,” legally entrenching folk ideologies that deemed 
'Indian' status incompatible with European socioeconomic success.110 In the early nineteenth 
century, what Anishinabe people could salvage and maintain of their 'traditional economies' was 
by way of necessity, and in direct proportion to what they could not acquire in the broader settler 
economy. It is a common refrain that the government no longer needed Anishinabe peoples as 
allies and this largely contributes to their location on the margins of a historiography that sees 
them as victims. But according to officials, they were needed after the War of 1812, not only for 
title to their lands and resources, which is most often studied, but also as passive consumers of 
goods made by non-Aboriginal settlers. 
 Canadian and Aboriginal histories often exist in terms of two separate historical 
traditions—to the detriment of our shared experience and collective understanding.111 This study 
seeks to contribute to a well-established dialogue that attempts to incorporate Indigenous 
perspectives and experiences into the history of Canada and reject the paradigm of decline that 
so often dominated studies of Aboriginal history in Ontario. Through Seven Generations, the 
Anishinabe in Ontario have shared interwoven ancestries and histories with Europeans that 
transcend mere policy analysis. Through treaty promises are most often recognized in the breach, 
the impact of that breach cannot be well understood if the original expectations are not known.
112  
Chapter Summaries 
 Two eyed seeing is not a conceptual framework crafted in response to the presence of 
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Europeans. This “philosophy of interconnectedness” balanced past and present, and physical and 
spiritual knowledge, necessary to live a good life.
113
 Moreover, this balanced approach provided 
the foundation that enabled the Anishinabeg to meet changing political and environmental 
realities in the Great Lakes Basin. From this perspective, chapters one and two discuss the 
aftermath of the American Revolution and War of 1812. Chapter one argues that the pre-contact 
resource sharing agreements and diplomatic alliances like the Covenant Chain shaped 
understandings and informed future peacetime relationships between the Anishinabe and 
officials in Upper Canada. After two contentious wars, the Treaty of Ghent signalled a future in 
which neither Indigenous nor European loyalists could return home. But the Proclamation of 
1763, conceptualized Indigenous nationhood in terms of a separate Indian Territory. When 
Anishinabe and Loyalists of European ancestry competed for the same land for settlement in 
Upper Canada, it quickly became apparent that not all British allies were created equal. An 
examination of 1783 Loyalist and War of 1812 claims demonstrates that while non-Aboriginals 
received compensation in the form of Anishinabe land, Anishinabe peoples bore much of the 
blame for loyalist suffering. Indigenous leaders held British officials to their promises of 
assistance however chapter two argues that few Anishinabe families received it. Indigenous 
loyalists faced extreme difficulties claiming these entitlements and the parsimony of the military 
and Indian Department directly affected treaty negotiations and the transition to village 
settlement.  
 Nine years after Chawme’s council speech Anishinabe leaders thought that Treaty 29 or 
the 1827 Huron Tract Treaty guaranteed them political independence, continued access to their 
territories, and provisions for future training and assistance. Their requirements cannot be found 
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in the treaty text and their carefully laid plans gradually went awry as a result. Despite passage of 
the 1839 Crown Lands Act, chapter three chronicles how officials and settlers used petitions and 
claims of loyalty to gradually undermine Anishinabe attempts to protect their land on Walpole 
Island and the Lower Reserve. Chapter four suggests Anishinabe and European economies on the 
St. Clair were once complementary but credit prohibitions, ill-crafted policies and an 
incompetent agent angered merchants and thwarted reserve development. These chapters allow 
us to see the effects of colonial Indian policy as it unfolded on the St. Clair. Over time, 
Anishinabe peoples became increasingly isolated from the communities around them and their 
neighbours viewed the reserves as impediments to future economic development. Legislators 
crafted the first comprehensive Indian Act in 1850, which combined these land and credit 
restrictions, on the premise that reserve settlement had been an abject failure.  
 In preparation for the transition to responsible government in Canada, the British 
Colonial Office withdrew assistance. On the eve of Confederation, the Upper Canadian assembly 
inherited and then proceeded to develop Indian policy on the premise that Aboriginal people 
were dying out. As Chapter 5 suggests, when the data did not align with their objectives, officials 
shifted their efforts to limit and ultimately deny treaty and other promised entitlements to 
‘Indians’ by withdrawing assistance and attempting to eliminate them as distinct peoples. 
Anishinabe peoples found ways to ‘see with two eyes’ but in a climate of shrinking entitlements 
and growing demands, many of their options to do so declined after 1850. Chapter six is a case 
study focusing on the life of Quakgwan, an Anishinabe leader who purchased land with funds 
raised independent of the Indian Department. Guided by his Anishinabe upbringing, Quakgwan 
successfully navigated Eurocanadian political and economic society. Quakgwan lived the events 
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discussed in previous chapters and ‘saw with two eyes’ until 1850 when the Indian Department 
used their newly acquired legislative powers to disperse the community. Decades later, his 
children’s inquiry into the final years of their father’s life starkly reveals how legislative 
authority after 1850 became unrelenting and absolute in the hands of the Indian Department. In 
conclusion, I posit that had officials made concerted efforts to honour the Huron Tract Treaty, 
the plans Anishinabe “patriarchs” made for their people would have led to self-sufficiency. This 
study offers a counter-narrative to the story of swift and inevitable decline most often presented 
in the post-war period. It offers hope for future treaty implementation in the Province of Ontario, 
another promise made in the wake of the death of Dudley George at Ipperwash Provincial Park 
in September 1995.  
 Linda Tuhiwai Smith argues for a “reframing” of approaches to Indigenous studies, 
criticizing governments for “fail[ing] to see many indigenous social problems as being related to 
any sort of history.”114 I began my graduate studies shortly before the release of Justice Sidney 
Linden’s report on Ipperwash. That same year barricades went up in Caledonia. I was teaching 
during the housing crisis at Attawapiskat and discussing Idle No More protests with my students.  
While I was writing, clan mothers walked the Great Lakes demanding clean water for their 
communities and as I finish my conclusion, Aboriginal leaders across Canada are demanding an 
inquiry into an incomprehensible number of missing and murdered women from First Nations 
communities. My students gave me very simple research questions for this study. They asked 
why and how do such things happen in Ontario?  Where did it all begin? Where did things go 
wrong? My hope is that this is a small contribution towards finding the answers. 
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Chapter 1: Loyalists of another Kind 
 The Proclamation of 1763 changed the fundamental understanding of the geographical 
extent of Indigenous sovereignty. From a force or authority encompassing the entire continent, 
the Proclamation linked it to a distinctive “Indian Territory” demarcated on maps, and bounded 
not by the extent of Indigenous territories but by the geographical limits of European claims. By 
doing so, the Proclamation created a visual representation of Indigenous sovereignty, tied only to 
the area north of the Ohio River after 1768. As the Proclamation line receded, the political 
strength of Anishinabe peoples to resist incursions on their lands eroded with it. With their 
homeland part of the United States after 1783, fellow loyalists and their governments did not see 
them as sovereign and independent peoples, nor did they consider them deserving of 
accommodation. Instead settlers in Upper Canada viewed Anishinabe peoples as another group 
of claimants and as competitors for favour and local resources.
1
 
 So long as British subjects received copious grants of Aboriginal land as compensation 
for the losses they sustained in colonial wars, the Anishinabe appeared morally, if not legally, 
culpable for the crimes and debts European nations accrued by fighting them. In the tradition of 
the “suffering traders” of the 1750s and 1760s, revolutionary “American sufferers” and Western 
District settlers; whose farms and businesses were ransacked during the War of 1812, lobbied 
intensely for land to compensate them for the personal sacrifices they made in the cause of 
empire. In this sense, loyalism is a major contributing factor to the creation of a settler identity in 
Upper Canada, and to a process of exclusion that prevented Aboriginal people from receiving 
similar consideration as Loyalists who fought for their homeland too.  
 The Revolution and War of 1812 reluctantly drew Indigenous nations into the conflict on 
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both sides, and they were perceived as enemies and allies at the same time as a result. Analogous 
to their non-Aboriginal loyalist brethren, the identities and the roles required of ‘Indians,’ 
‘Canadians,’ ‘loyalists,’ ‘Patriots,’ ‘Americans,’ ‘British,’ and those of mixed ancestry were 
complex and often conflicting.  Individual claims made to boards established to hear and 
compensate Loyalists and settlers who suffered as a result of the Revolution and War of 1812 
highlight the problem of shifting identities in the colonial period and demonstrate how the 
Western Confederacy and “Indians” in general came to be viewed as enemies in peace to the 
very people they helped defend in war. They were loyal in the sense that they made sacrifices 
and suffered losses as a direct result of their alliance with Great Britain. At the same time 
however, it was clear that Anishinabe peoples were not the same as the settlers around them. As 
Fellows argues, the American Revolution opened up a new era of victimhood and suffering and 
“Loyalists…use[d] their Myth as a weapon in their power struggle with the prior inhabitants of 
the country.”2  Officials favoured those who could appeal to wartime service and prove property 
losses which were sometimes the result of British policies and Indigenous resistance to them.
3
 
Aboriginal peoples had to see with two eyes to survive when their lands and villages were 
targeted. They chose their alliances carefully, negotiated treaties to protect their territories, and 
sought alternative sources to supply themselves with food and necessities. 
Western Confederacy Loyalists 
 The story of Indigenous loyalism in Ontario is most often told through the histories of 
Joseph Brant and Haudenosaunee peoples who settled along the Grand River in present-day 
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Brantford and near Quinte Ontario. Granted lands in consequence of their loyalty by Governor 
Haldimand in 1784, The Six Nations are by no means representative of the experiences of other 
Aboriginal peoples who came to British North America.
4
 As pacifists, the Christian and 
‘civilized’ Moravian Delaware, occupied an awkward position as neither loyalists nor rebels.5 
Like the Haudenosaunee, the Western Confederacy fought and died alongside the Redcoats. 
Having sacrificed their lands and villages in the northwest, they suffered devastating losses in 
similar measure to their Euroamerican counterparts. Colonial administrators encouraged them to 
form an Indian buffer state in the Western District’s borderlands preserving the fur trade and 
acting as a bulwark against further American aggression.
6
  The Western Confederacy were not 
only Loyalists in their own right, but loyalists of another kind.  
 Though Western Confederacy leaders sought a future based on a history of coexistence, 
displacement and confinement continued with the extension of British and American jurisdiction 
on each side of an international boundary dividing the waters and their ancestral territories.  The 
Ninth Article of the Treaty of Ghent restored the “possessions, rights and, privileges” enjoyed by 
Indigenous peoples to their 1783 status but the Treaty of Paris had ‘omitted’ Aboriginal peoples 
entirely.
7
 The Crown eventually recognized the Western Confederacy with medals and presents, 
but for economic and political reasons, British officials treated the Anishinabeg differently than 
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the Haudenosaunee.
8
  In an effort to stave off a united Indian uprising over their omission in the 
1783 Treaty, British policy-makers utilized a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy.  Arguing that 
Western Nations lost personal but not real property, British officials maintained that their 
territories in the Northwest had only undergone a temporary change of administration.
9
  
 Officials also believed the Western Nations required less assistance because they 
‘wandered,’ and did not live in permanent settlements like the Haudenosaunee or Moravians. 
Maintaining their hunting, trapping and fishing lifestyle was sufficient aid accomplished by 
retaining the Western posts of Detroit and Michilimackinac and the trade based around them.  
The British used the possibility that they might well regain the northwest as a key strategy to 
keep the Western Nations allied to them until 1815.
10
 By 1785, several thousand Haudenosaunee, 
Delaware, Mingo, Creek, Cherokee and some Anishinabe settled in Canada.
11
 But for the vast 
majority, who did not leave, their losses were no less catastrophic; they were simply postponed 
to a time when the landscape of Upper Canada was very different and far less hospitable. 
 The inclusion of Indigenous peoples under the moniker of ‘Loyalist’ was and is 
problematic because of the multifaceted understandings of the term. In her study, Jo-Ann 
Fellows characterizes “the Loyalist Myth,” particularly as it appeared in literary form, was 
primarily an upper class phenomenon, firmly rooted in notions of “great sacrifice and suffering, 
union with Great Britain, grievance and betrayal.”  By the late nineteenth century the myth 
celebrated Loyalists as “The Founders of the Nation” and justified the continued 
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institutionalization of their perceived values.
 12
  But these were not Indigenous Loyalists. In the 
years following the American Revolution, it was not entirely problematic for Aboriginal peoples 
to be independent sovereign allies and loyalists. Indigenous loyalism was an extension of the 
Covenant Chain alliance and economically and politically based. Anishinabe peoples, but also 
the Haudenosaunee and Moravian Delaware, occupied positions reflecting the complex, 
international status of their homeland in the Great Lakes Borderlands. While Paxton clearly 
states that Joseph “Brant was no loyalist,” Kelsay describes him as a “Loyalist and rebel.”13 
Unlike colonists, who had to choose between two European powers, Indigenous peoples 
maintained simultaneous affinities to their own nations and to whichever European power would 
best support them.
14
 Consequently, balancing the “two worlds” that Brant and other leaders 
negotiated was the only way to survive. Indigenous loyalism reflects a fluidity of identities 
existing at the time when certain choices did not always have to be made one way or the other 
and particular individuals could cross many boundaries between.  
Upper Canadian Loyalism 
  
Only a small percentage of individuals touched by the Revolution and torn by political, 
economic or social allegiances in the Thirteen Colonies physically relocated but those who did 
profoundly influenced the places they later called home.
15
 Recent literature on British 
sympathizers who resettled in Quebec (later Upper and Lower Canada) creates a complex and 
diverse portrait of loyalism.
16
 The individuals typically referred to as ‘Loyalists’ based their 
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decision to remain or flee on many factors including philosophical principles, notions of personal 
and financial survival and risk to life, property and livelihood.
17
 Though they share a common 
spatial and temporal emigration experience, the estimated 6000 ‘Loyalists’ who settled between 
Montreal and Detroit do not otherwise exist as a monolithic group.
18
       
 Some general similarities can be observed among those who settled in the Western 
District. As Table 1 below illustrates, merchants from Virginia, officials from Pennsylvania and 
farmers from the Mohawk Valley of New York and New Jersey formed the majority.
19
 Prior to 
the Revolution, traders and merchants like Frederick Fisher, supplied goods to Aboriginal people 
and information to the British. The Indian Department hired them as assistant deputies, 
interpreters and storekeepers when it reorganized after the death of Sir William Johnson in 
1774.
20
  In the Revolutionary period, they assumed the rank and roles of British officials, Indian 
Officers, soldiers and militia and fought in Loyalist regiments like Butler’s Rangers alongside 
the Western Nations. Men with commercial and official interests depended upon the largesse of 
British government appointments and contracts and stood to take a significant reduction in status 
and profits if the Revolution proved successful.
21
  
 Farmers from the western limits of the colonies and former ‘frontier’ squatters, who had 
spilled over the Appalachians into the Indian Territory, also claimed to be ‘loyalists.’ Many 
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illegal settlers held questionable allegiances and fled to Canada only after being expelled by 
Indigenous peoples alone or in concert with Rangers and British troops in targeted frontier raids. 
Individuals allied with the Western Nations along with their enemies and victims settled together 
in the Western District and in many respects, they make the region unique in terms of European-
Indigenous relations in the years that followed.
 22
   
The “Inquisition” 
 Entrusted with the responsibility for hearing claims, the “Commission to enquire into the 
Losses and Services of all such persons who have suffered…” or the Loyalist Claims 
Commission contributed to the construction of a Loyalist ethos in Upper Canada and to the 
exclusion of Aboriginal peoples from sharing in the distinction.
23
 Though the ‘Loyalist Myth’ in 
later decades was cloaked in the garb of duty and sacrifice, in the aftermath of the Revolution, 
loyalists primarily concerned themselves with securing relief followed by compensation. Initially 
reluctant to offer compensation to anyone on a broad scale, the British government hoped 
support would be temporary. Individual states, though obliged under Article Five of the Treaty of 
Paris to offer restitution to British Loyalists, passed edicts at the beginning of the conflict 
subjecting those with Tory leanings to various punishments. While mob violence was rare (See 
Table 1 below), it was not uncommon for ‘patriots’ in urban areas to monitor suspected loyalists, 
make them publicly swear oaths, and confiscate or destroy their property.
24
  After November 
1777, the Continental Congress advocated confiscating property belonging to suspected loyalists.  
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Table 1: Characteristics of Loyalist Claimants 
 
 New York  Pennsylvania  New 
Jersey 
Virginia North 
Carolina 
# of Claims analyzed 1106 206 239 130 153 
Merchants/commerce 17.7% 42.0% 28.0 64.0% 39.0% 
Farmers 74.7% 33.5% 50.1 12.8% 46.5% 
Officials 3.9% 13.0%  10.4 7.2% 11.0% 
Professionals 3.7% 11.5% 11.5 16.0% 3.5% 
Majority Claim  
Value £ 
-1000 
(77.5%) 
-2000 (73%) -2000 
(72.6%) 
-5000 
(71.6%) 
-5000 
(65.5%) 
Killed/Injured/ 
Imprisoned 
349 (31.8%) 69 (32.9%) 91 (38%) 50 (38.3%) 91 (59.4%) 
 
These states (colonies) supplied the majority of Loyalist Claimants in the Western District. 
Source: Adapted from Wallace Brown, The King’s Friends: The Composition and Motives of the 
American Loyalist Claimants (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1965), Appendix: 
Statistical Tables, 284-344. 
 
While the 1783 Treaty suggested property be returned to “real British subjects” and “Loyalists 
who had not borne arms,” many states sold them anyway.25 Officials initially thought that 
temporary relief payments would suffice until refugees could reclaim their property. 
Confiscation quickly made it apparent that policy would have to change from recovery to 
compensation.
26
 
 The British government realized it had to settle loyalists in Canada on a more permanent 
basis as the number and amount of claims mounted. In July 1783, the British government hired 
Sir John Eardley-Wilmot, a former Chief Justice and Justice of the Privy Council to head an 
inquiry into the losses.
27
 But rewarding loyalty would not be uppermost in the minds of 
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commissioners. It was instead hoped the commission would limit the number eligible for 
monetary compensation and settlement assistance in the form of provisions and agricultural 
tools, to the most needy and desperate. The burden of proof would be high and in the event the 
board approved a monetary award, it would only be a partial or token amount of their “lost 
fortunes.”28 Though the board vigorously investigated and assessed early claims for settlement 
assistance, definitions of ‘Loyalism’ broadened as the crisis faded and land could be substituted 
as a reward for “service” to the Crown.29 
 Board members initially employed strict criteria to determine the deservedness of claims. 
However, commissioners soon realized that neither loyalty nor losses could be verified with any 
real certainty, forcing them to judge most claims on their own merit.
30
 Outward expressions of 
loyalty varied from those who actively assisted or supplied British forces to “soft Loyalists” who 
merely stayed home and refrained from overt acts of partisanship.
31
 Irrespective of their own 
allegiance, widows and children sometimes became targets because of the behavior of spouses 
and relatives while others admittedly supported rebel activity by force or error.
32
 Although some 
certainly “misled” the Commission,33 an examination of claims made to the board shows that at 
least 30 to 40% of Western District claimants arrived after suffering imprisonment, injury or the 
death of family members. (See Table 1 above).
34
 Recognition, in any form, assured these 
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individuals that their losses were not in vain. 
 Though the claims represent an important source for investigating individuals and the 
circumstances motivating their migration, they do not create a cohesive portrait of the ‘Loyalist’ 
or define the loyalist experience. It is estimated that about 16% of the total American population 
opposed independence and fewer than 1% of the population of any given colony submitted 
claims, suggesting the greater number of British sympathizers in the Thirteen Colonies quietly 
remained neutral until and unless they were forced to choose a side.
35
 Moreover, given the 
chaotic circumstances, many eligible claimants simply may not have had the opportunity to 
appear before the board. British Indian agent Matthew Elliott is one of several claimants who 
filed late. Forced to flee into remote regions in the northwest, he remained unaware of the 
Commission’s hearings.36 Sessions were held only as far west as Niagara and most were in 
Montreal, Halifax and St. John. If an agent of the Crown like Elliot could not file, others might 
not have heard of the Commission at all. Consequently, while the Commission initially 
demanded evidence of service to the Crown, Commissioners found it necessary to relax their 
standards if they were going to quell demand and dispense any assistance at all. 
 Even by broadly defining ‘loyalty, not every eligible person received compensation and 
even fewer found it adequate. A successful claimant had to present “the very best Evidence 
which the nature and circumstances of each Case would admit…” and those lacking personal 
testimony, witnesses and documentation, found themselves suspect. Even though the claims 
process was not specifically structured to disqualify or favour a particular class, certain kinds of 
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loyalists received the maximum compensation. The most successful presented proof of losses 
consisting mainly of property, income and entitlements.
37
 This was evident in the first 
Commissioner’s report in 1784 which approved 2063 claims worth $47,250,000.  Claims 
totalling $35,000,000 in real and personal property accounted for more than 75% of this amount 
and another $443,000 represented lost incomes.
38
 Literate individuals possessing documentary 
proof of their losses with credible witnesses to testify to their value received the most favourable 
reception from the Commissioners.   
 Many kinds of losses could not be proven and Commissioners deemed them 
inadmissible. These included: coin or paper notes, some Crown grants, rents, estimated profits 
and debts from trade, unpaid wages, and appropriation or damage that occurred in the course of 
the war.
39
 Despite these distinctions, the Commission reported that it remained extremely 
difficult to assign monetary amounts to allowable losses, even when the claimant possessed 
deeds or receipts. Loss and depreciation through use or neglect as well as the additional value of 
improvements made to property and possessions were really subject to the opinion of 
Commissioners and to inflation by claimants. Though the Commission cross-examined witnesses 
for this purpose and went to some effort to investigate and compare like properties, admittedly 
“no fixed standard or mode of estimate” existed.40 While claimants frequently complained that 
the commissioners undervalued their losses, Commissioners complained that such a response 
was necessary to combat inflated claims. Estimates were commonplace and the value of loyalist 
losses; much like loyalist sentiments could not be determined with any real accuracy. 
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 Claimants with similar but considerable differences in the amount of their awards 
accused the Commissioners of favouritism and abuse.
41
 Indeed, in the absence of documentation, 
commissioners evaluated individuals on a set of unwritten rules based on their respectability, 
connections, appearance and character, or what they called “the belief of the Claimant, and other 
oral testimony.”42 One person judged to be a “suspicious character,” and another, a “drunken 
Irishman,” saw their claims reduced while individuals with small amounts were most likely to 
earn comments in the margins indicating the claimant was “a good man” or “a fair man.”43 It is 
no coincidence that investigations into one’s character intensified in proportion to the monetary 
value of the claim, leading some to call it “The Inquisition.”44  
 Following the Commission’s final sitting in 1790, the Board to investigate loyalist losses 
reportedly heard more than 4000 claims worth approximately £8,000,000 and allowed more than 
£3,300,000.
45
 Of this number, $2,745,000 (£686,250) went to 1400 Canadian claimants, a 
fraction of the more than 10,000 Loyalists who arrived in Upper Canada in the early 1780s.
46
 
The military and other British officials received 40% of their original claims while others, on 
average received 30%.
47
 Whether claimants succeeded, failed or avoided the process altogether, 
the Commissions’ influence was far reaching. 
 Although Western District loyalists share common characteristics and experiences, the 
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claims process paints a complex picture of loyalist sentiments and behaviors from the anguished 
to the indifferent. All came to Upper Canada with individual notions of their own sense of 
sacrifice and entitlement as well as what they felt to be adequate compensation in return. The 
subjective and exclusive nature of the claims process fueled some to petition the commissioners 
while others, who felt their sacrifice and loyalty remained unrewarded, requested various 
accommodations from governments in the future.
 48
  
 A toxic combination of Indigenous ancestry and sympathies, combined with a healthy 
dose of loyalist entitlement, made British Indian Officers and those connected to them in the 
military and merchant trade, a unique group of “American sufferers.”49 Brown’s study shows 
that these officials represented fewer than four percent of claims overall, but became the “most 
active and powerful class of Loyalists” as a result of their combined virtues of service, sacrifice 
and loss.
50
 They could vouch for each other’s character and loyalty and testify to each other’s 
losses, thereby gaining the most from the commission in terms of process and procedure. They 
also possessed the ‘right’ kind of losses such as commissions to various offices, government 
supply contracts and pension income they easily documented. Claimants with connections to the 
most influential members of these classes gained respectability and were more likely to be 
believed by commissioners. They also, on average, received a larger percentage of the amount 
they claimed. 
 The Johnsons, who evacuated their estates in the Mohawk Valley in 1775 and 1776, are 
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perhaps the best example of this phenomenon. John Johnson, heir to Sir William’s New York 
landholdings, commanded the King’s Royal Regiment, a militia he formed in 1776 from more 
than one hundred tenants who he later brought to Quebec as Loyalists.
51
 By vouching for each 
other, individuals with overlapping ties to the Johnsons, Butlers and other officials acquired 
through tenancy, military service and commerce successfully claimed what should have been 
inadmissible losses of currency and undocumented goods.
52
 Guy Johnson, Sir William’s son 
John, and others with large estates, competed for lucrative offices by pleading their cases directly 
in England on the basis of their indisputable reputations for service, sacrifice and loss to the 
British cause.
53
 While the average claimant received compensation in the amount of £178 
($700), John Johnson received the largest amount of £55,000 or $221,000.
54
 The Johnsons were 
only one example of British Indian department and military officials who possessed extensive 
estates and grants in what became the United States. Some were Crown gifts awarded for 
military and civil service but others such as the tens of thousands of acres held by Alexander 
McKee and George Croghan were deeded illegally after 1763 in consideration of their familial 
connections to influential Indigenous leaders.
55
 Initially, much of it was confined to areas of 
settlement and trade in New York and around Forts Albany, Pitt, and Detroit, but in the years 
prior to the Revolution, officials became much bolder.  
 Southern merchants and officials who sustained large financial losses as a result of 
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British policy, historically engaged in large illegal land deals.
56
 Beginning in the 1740s, settler 
violence, the Seven Years War and Pontiac’s Resistance cost traders dearly not only in the value 
of goods taken, but in out-of-pocket expenses and lost profits.
57
 While Amherst assured 
merchants terrorized by Pontiac’s warriors that they would be “amply paid for their loss,” he did 
not follow through on his promise.
58
 Traders estimated that they lost no less than £100,000 and 
their most vocal representative, George Croghan, who personally lost his home and £2000 in 
trade goods, led the “suffering traders” in their fight for compensation.59  When his visit to 
London failed, it was Croghan who orchestrated schemes to acquire Indian lands to recoup some 
of their losses.
60
 Mohawk leaders, at Johnson and Croghan’s behest, confirmed 127,000 acres of 
grants to merchants and officials connected with the Indian Department at the Treaty of Fort 
Stanwix (Rome, N.Y) in 1768, before they officially transferred the land to the Crown.
61
  Upon 
renewing the Covenant Chain, Johnson assured them that the surrender, which pushed the 
southern limit of the Indian Territory to the Ohio River, would satiate unending requests for land 
in the Thirteen Colonies.
62
 Johnson, Croghan and McKee also planned to settle large portions of 
the territory west of the limits of Pennsylvania and Virginia, including a fourteenth colony to be 
named Vandalia. The $6000 spent on Vandalia alone, along with other schemes to settle land 
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outside the legal boundaries of the colonies were not eligible for compensation according to 
instructions issued to the Loyalist Board of Claims.
63 
 McKee and his associates not only lost the 
money expended on these schemes but all of their potential profits.  
 From the 1760s onwards, landholding was a source of livelihood and wealth but for those 
with the right connections, large acquisitions served as a form of insurance against the perils of 
colonial life. Land leased or sold enabled the British Government, officials, merchants, traders 
and settlers to recoup losses and repay debts. Accordingly the circumstances, sentiment and 
sense of entitlement of the “suffering traders” of the 1760s and the “American sufferers” of the 
1780s represented a continuum of well-established behaviours cultivated long before the 
Revolution. Whether real or imagined, merchants and officials possessed an engrossed sense of 
entitlement and a heightened sense of loss, manifesting itself most notably in the demand for 
surrenders of Aboriginal lands to compensate Loyalists after the American Revolution.  
Re-visioning the Northwest 
 Observation of Covenant Chain protocol produced trade, alliance and resource sharing 
agreements negotiated for mutual co-operation and benefit. Indigenous leaders consented to the 
Vandalia Colony only in exchange for promise that McKee and Croghan would delay settlement 
for fifteen years and would personally select tenants thereafter.
64
 Using these agreements to 
manage the pace and nature of colonial expansion,
65
 Western Nations and British officials and 
settlers arranged similar trusts in the form of deeds for land in the Northwest and Upper Canada. 
In 1771 Gage sent terse directives to the Commandant at Detroit banning all private purchases 
and prohibiting settlement without express authorization from the King, but the Lieutenant-
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Governor permitted at least 321 families to settle in the Detroit River region long before any 
loyalists arrived.  By 1782 a census recorded more than 2000 people living ‘temporarily’ on the 
south shore of the Detroit River alone.
66
 The largest settlement belonged to French Canadians 
dating from the establishment of Fort Detroit and a number of other grantees settled under 
agreements made with local Wyandotte and Anishinabe leaders. Anishinabe peoples in the 
Detroit River borderlands exploited the process of selective shared settlement not only to protect 
their territories in the Northwest from American settlers but also to prevent such circumstances 
from reoccurring in Canada. 
 The evacuation of loyalists and subsequent American claim to the Ohio Valley forced a 
re-evaluation and restructuring of the Covenant Chain alliance.
67
 In “one of the most striking 
oversights in the whole history of British imperial policy,” Great Britain ceded the Ohio Valley 
in the 1783 Treaty of Paris and with it, the commitment to preserve the Indian Territory outlined 
at Stanwix in 1768.
68
  Article Two of the Treaty of Paris positioned the international boundary 
equal distance from the shore through the middle of the Detroit and St. Clair Rivers, dividing 
Anishinabe peoples and their lands and waters in the Great Lakes Basin and placing the 
Northwest squarely in American Territory.
69
  Along with several thousand Aboriginal people, 
many of the 7000 Loyalists who found themselves in Upper Canada were British officers and 
employees of the Indian Department, a generation that embodied the underlying philosophies of 
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the Covenant Chain and represented the Crown in its dealings with Aboriginal people.
70
 Yet at 
the same time, they possessed close-knit social, economic and political ties to local Indigenous 
leaders and their communities occupying a dual and often conflicting role, in which the personal 
and professional blurred. These circumstances combined with actions taken by the British 
government, including the creation of Upper Canada in 1791, suggested there would be ample 
room in the emergent province for all allies of the Crown.
71
  
 The personal and the professional blurred as early as 1783 when Indian Department 
Captains McKee, Elliott, Caldwell and Bird negotiated a surrender for seven square miles of land 
called the “New Settlement,” where the towns of Malden and Amherstburg would be established 
(Figure 6 below).
72
 At the same time, Jacob Schieffelin, a secretary of the Indian Department, 
obtained a deed for the same land. A conflict ensued and the Indian Officers accused Schieffelin 
of obtaining the deed “in a Clandestine manner from a few drunken Indians” who did not have  
the authority to surrender it.
73
 Neither Schieffelin nor the officers possessed the authority to 
make a surrender and Haldimand reminded them that “Deeds of Gift” to individuals were 
illegal.
74
 But unlike Schieffelin, Caldwell and the other officers could appeal to their service to 
the Crown, relationships with local Indigenous peoples and the usefulness of the settlement to 
the defense of the province to gain advantage. 
Aware of the need to settle refugees, Caldwell accused Schieffelin of speculation while referring 
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to his lands as a Loyalist settlement.
75
 Anishinabe Chiefs deeded the land to Schieffelin 
Figure 6: Indian Officer’s Grant and Caldwell Grant 
 
 
Source: Ernest Lajeunesse, Windsor Border Region: Canada’s Southernmost Frontier 
(Champlain Society. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), lxxiii. 
 
 “for…affection and esteem,” but his motives remain unknown. While McKee questioned 
Schieffelin’s intent and character, the agents admitted they would have gladly included him as a 
“proprietor,” had he supported them in their endeavours.76 As White surmises, British authorities 
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“obviously did not regard all cessions and settlements as encroachments” 77 and character and 
connections help to explain why officials approved the 1784 deed to Caldwell and McKee and 
denied it to Jacob Schieffelin.
 
The Indian Officers promoted their acquisition as a “proper” 
Loyalist settlement (Figure 6 above), and officials granted McKee permission to negotiate a 
legitimate surrender in 1786 as a result.
 78
  
 The contradictory language of the “official” agreement produced in 1786 highlights 
discrepancies embedded in the treaty process that would only worsen. The text granted the land 
to “His Majesty George the Third” but “in consideration of the goodwill, friendship and 
affection,” the Ottawa and Chippewa Nations of Detroit had for Alexander McKee.79 Anishinabe 
and Wyandotte Chiefs agreed to the settlement because they appreciated the British Crown’s 
assistance during the Revolutionary War, but McKee personified the Crown. They negotiated the 
treaty because he fought alongside them “against the enemy during the late war…” not because  
they wished to permanently surrender all their rights to strangers.
80
 For the future defence and 
settlement of the province, the gift to McKee was part of a broader understanding that 
Indigenous and non-Aboriginal loyalists would settle together. 
 Treaties negotiated in the Western District were too late to effectively regulate settlement 
and by their acquisitive behavior, Indian officers directly contributed to a problem they were 
charged with preventing. In July 1784, Detroit’s lieutenant-governor informed Haldimand that 
settlers claimed “almost all the Land between the Lakes Erie and Huron on both sides of the 
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Streight…” and a significant portion was “settled upon and improved…”81 Settlers continued to 
work their way into the interior along major rivers and streams.
82
 District government and a Land 
Board were created in 1788 to control settlement and survey the Indian Officer’s lands but only 
officers, militia and disbanded soldiers initially received lots.
83
 In the back concessions, 
squatting and irregular Indian Deeds and grants necessitated the negotiation of additional treaties 
to transfer more land to the Crown and legitimize the deeds of those already settled. 
84
  
 Simcoe believed many more loyalists remained in the United States and he proposed to 
lure a great number of them to the shores of Lakes Erie and the Detroit and St. Clair Rivers. 
Specifically to encourage these ‘Late Loyalists,’ the 1790 McKee Treaty received approval 
before negotiations began, making it the first ‘official’ treaty in the area.85 But the 1790 Treaty 
also came on the heels of the new and vicious phase in the ongoing battle to control the 
Northwest.
86
 American forces had already begun to attack Ohio Valley Nations in 1786 and 
would launch several more attacks until 1794.
87
 When Anishinabe and Wyandotte peoples 
granted “settlement rights” to 1,344,000 acres to the Crown in the spirit of friendship and 
alliance, the threat of an imminent American invasion remained real.
88
  The payment of £1200 
worth of guns, ammunition, clothing and supplies were received in May 1790, mere months 
before they defeated General Arthur St. Clair’s forces in October of that year. In the spirit of co-
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existence, this “Indian Deed of Present,” was a small price to pay in exchange for continued 
assistance and goodwill.
89
    
 At the same time, this is described as a “beads and blankets’ treaty” of the worst kind. 
Former Walpole Island Chief Dean Jacobs calculated that the one-time payment of goods 
amounted to less than one penny per acre.
90
 McKee, now the Deputy Superintendent General of  
Indian Affairs under John Johnson, misrepresented the size of the surrender to the chiefs. 
Intended to be for one mile of shared shoreline access on both sides of the Thames River,” on 
paper the surrender encompassed the entire southern portion of the Essex peninsula.
91
 
 The McKee Treaty also heralded a new era of institutional development in the region. In 
1785 John Johnson petitioned the Crown on behalf of Officers and Soldiers of the Provincial  
Troops and Indian Department. Loyalists wished to enjoy English freehold tenure and the 
“Blessings of British Laws and…British Government,” and Johnson requested the separation of  
Quebec from the western portion of the province. The Constitutional Act of 1791 accommodated 
their wishes, giving loyalists title to their land and a system of government to regulate settlement. 
The lease or sale of portions of each new surveyed township would fund the Crown and a 
Protestant Clergy.
92
 Two counties now formed the Western District: the peninsula south of Lake 
St. Clair to be called Essex and Kent north of the Thames River.
93
 The Constitution Act 
did not specifically mention Aboriginal people or alter circumstances in the Indian Territory. 
However, the contents affected Anishinabe peoples immensely. 
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 According to the 1786 Instructions to Lord Dorchester, land grants not only rewarded 
loyalties but tied settlers to the soil and kept them loyal. Single Loyalists received 50 acres while 
the heads of Loyalist families were entitled to 100 acres plus 50 more for each additional family 
member.
94
 Loyalist grants, later increased to 200 acres for every adult man or widow, were also 
exempt from settlement duties or fees.
95
 Military grants, capped at a maximum of 5000 acres for 
field officers and 3000 for captains, did not prevent those with civil and military connections 
from acquiring significantly more.
96
 For instance, Caldwell petitioned for a marsh near the New 
Settlement on the basis that it was worthless in its present state and the “improvement… would 
be of public benefit.” (Visible on Figure 6). Officials approved the grant in 1788 in recognition 
of his personal sacrifice and service in settling loyalists in the New Settlement.
97
 Only a year 
before, however, the Commandant at Detroit had criticized Caldwell for accepting goods and 
provisions intended for the settlers while granting the land to “many others who were not 
intended by the Indians or officers.”98 A number of these men fled illegal settlements in the 
western territories which disqualified them from claiming assistance. Because they possessed the 
right connections, Caldwell ‘made’ them ‘Loyalists.’ Indeed, of the 45 grants made in the New 
Settlement, Caldwell granted only two to Butler’s Rangers, five to the German Corps and four to 
naval or other veterans. Twenty went to individuals identified as “Loyalists.” However, only one 
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claimed losses, and none could be found on the official list of United Empire Loyalists.
99
 In 
contrast, of the 128 who settled further east along the shoreline, the overwhelming majority were 
veterans.
100
 Despite his questionable motives, Caldwell personally amassed 2000 acres in the 
area between Malden and the New Settlement.
101
 Negotiating these early treaties and agreements 
as representatives of the Crown, Caldwell and other Indian Officers used their authority to 
accuse their detractors of ‘speculation’ and ‘squatting.’ They secured the best and most valuable 
land in the district for themselves on the premise of continued friendship and assistance to the 
Anishinabe at a time of crisis and uncertainty.
102
 
 Though it came after the initial Loyalist migrations, the 1796 Chenail Ecarté Treaty, like 
the Haldimand Grant to the Haudenosaunee, finally recognized the sacrifices made by Western 
Nations. Executed two years after the British all but “abandoned” their Aboriginal allies in the 
Northwest by way of the Jay Treaty, negotiations for the Chenail Ecarté treaty occurred in very 
different circumstances than McKee’s made six years earlier.103 Victories against St. Clair in 
1790 and General Harmar in November 1791 were followed by a crushing defeat at Fallen 
Timbers in 1794 (Toledo, Ohio) and the evacuation of the Western Posts in July 1796. The 
modern-day states of Michigan, Ohio, Illinois, Wisconsin and Minnesota slowly flooded with 
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American settlers and local Indigenous peoples succumbed to coerced treaties of “peace.” The 
1795 Treaty of Greenville signaled the beginning of what would be a cycle of land cessions 
designed to permanently expel Aboriginal peoples from the northwest.
104
  
 The Chenail Ecarté Treaty recognized Anishinabe peoples as allies, loyalists and partners 
in the defense of the province by reserving “a refuge” “for the future residence of…the western 
nations of Indians.”105 In 1783 McKee had told Anishinabe warriors that the King would never 
“deprive you of an extent of country, of which the right of Soil belongs to, and is in yourselves 
as Sole Proprietors…” but as he spoke those words, he knew that the British would not keep this 
promise.
106
 By 1795 he wrote that “the distressed situation of the poor Indians who have long 
fought for us and bled fairly for us, will be no bar to a Peaceable accommodation with 
America…they will be left to shift for themselves…”107  He hoped this reserve would encourage 
some 2000 to 3000 Anishinabe refugees from the Northwest to relocate where the Chenail Ecarté 
River met the River St. Clair.
108
 Called Shawanoe or Shawnee Township, the 92,000 acre reserve 
was located on the mainland adjacent to and north of Walpole Island (Figure 7 below). For 
Eurocanadian settlers, the government purchased 40,000 acres for the future provincial capital of 
London at the same time.
109
 These agreements epitomized the kind of co-existence envisioned by 
Anishinabe leaders. 
Alexander McKee kept a post at the Maumee (Miami) Rapids from which he and other officers 
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officially and covertly supplied the Western Nations while they fought the Americans.
110
  On 30 
August, 1796, McKee gave an incredibly powerful speech to Anishinabe people assembled at a  
Figure 7: 1796 Chenail Ecarté Treaty 
 
 
Source: Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders, Vol. 1. (Toronto: Coles Publishing Co., 1971): 
19-22. 
 
location described as the Chenail Ecarté River. Using the rhetorical symbolism of the Covenant 
Chain, he told them the King wished to make provisions for “all his Indian Children” and 
especially “those in trouble and distress” at two locations.  McKee said one location was where 
they were “sitting,” described by Aboriginal people and the Indian department thereafter to be 
Walpole Island. The other location, to the north, was Shawanoe Township where McKee said 
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settlers needed “a little Wood and a little more room.” Otherwise, it was a meeting place “for all 
Nations… not for settling his own people, but for the comfort and satisfaction of…all his Indian 
Children.”111 The distinctions made by McKee left the understanding that “the London purchase 
was for non-Indian settlers” and “the Shawanoe purchase was specifically to be for Indians.”112 
Shawanoe contained good arable land, “suitable for hunting as well as for cornfields and 
villages,” and some Shawnee and Ottawa loyalists permanently moved there in the 1790s.113 
 McKee’s duty to act on behalf of Aboriginal peoples while negotiating for himself and 
the Crown all at the same time meant that this treaty in particular, would be fraught with 
problems. We would assume that Anishinabe communities preserved their agreements and orally 
transmitted them to future generations. However, with the exception of a few letters and  
speeches such as the one at the Chenail Ecarté in August 1796, McKee never officially recorded 
these promises as part of the treaty.  He negotiated a provisional agreement the previous autumn 
but by his own admission, a number of chiefs who met in 1795 did not attend in 1796. While he 
vehemently criticized Schieffelin for engaging in similar behaviors, his own speech suggests he 
met with individual leaders on three separate occasions, used bait-and-switch tactics and 
misrepresented the nature and conditions of the 1796 written agreement.
114
 Indigenous 
representatives speaking four languages attended these treaty conferences, yet McKee had no 
official interpreter present in 1790. Conflict between the written and oral understandings in later 
years suggests that inaccurate or misleading translations were the norm.
115
 McKee assured First 
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Nations that the Crown intended to reserve Shawanoe for them to replace their hunting grounds 
lost in the northwest,
116
 but the treaty bears no hint of this guarantee. Without a written record of 
his promises, they could not prevent the government from granting it to settlers in the 1840s.  
 Historic understandings between Indigenous peoples and Europeans in this period are 
very much a generational phenomenon; historically contingent and reliant upon the experiences 
and knowledge possessed by a particular group of people in similar circumstances. Focused on 
their own day-to-day survival, Indian Agents, officials, merchants and traders resorted to illegal 
and deceptive behavior. They did not have Anishinabe interests in mind and much of this 
collective knowledge went unrecorded as a result.  The 1796 Treaty was the last signed before 
the War of 1812. In the interim, the seat of government, established at Sandwich remained 
closely connected to the newly built military garrison at Fort Malden near the town of 
Amherstburg.
117
  
 Aamjiwnaang historian David D. Plain writes that it took Anishinabe peoples more than 
fifteen years to restore themselves to a peacetime existence after losing the Ohio Valley, only to 
be faced with the disruption of war on their territories again in 1812.
118
 While Indigenous 
peoples in the borderlands principally engaged themselves on the side of the British, they placed 
their fortunes on the side most likely to resist American settlement.
119
 For the duration of the 
conflict, both sides of the Detroit and St. Clair Rivers remained a veritable “international war 
zone.”120After the 1811 attack on Prophetstown (Tippecanoe), Aboriginal villages on Walpole 
and Bois Blanc Islands and the Indian Officer’s lands became places of gathering. Tecumseh and 
                                                          
116
 Leighton, “Historical Development of the Walpole Island Community,” 12.  
117
 Sandwich, now Windsor, was formerly the French settlement of L’Assomption.  
118
 Plain, Plains of Aamjiwnaang, ix. 
119
 Clarke, Origin and Traditional History of the Wyandotts, 93. 
120
 Tanner, Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History, 105.  
 84 
his allies camped on the Elliott farm and the area subsequently became a staging point for 
British-Indigenous actions in the Northwest in 1812 and 1813.
  
By 1813, 3000 warriors and their 
families supported 900 British regulars stationed at Fort Malden.
121
 Though early victories in the 
summer of 1812 at Michilimackinac and Detroit were attributed to both the physical and 
symbolic presence of Britain’s Indigenous allies, circumstances changed with death of General 
Isaac Brock at Queenston Heights in 1812. A series of defeats followed including the loss of 
British naval supremacy on the Great Lakes in the fall of 1813 which severed vital 
communication and supply lines to the western portion of the peninsula. Intending to regroup at 
Burlington Heights, Brigadier-General Henry Proctor proceeded to destroy Forts Malden and 
Amherstburg and retreated to Moraviantown, placing him at variance with Anishinabe and 
Wyandotte leaders.
122
 For more than a year afterwards, American forces occupied the district and 
sought revenge. After the war of 1812, a new group of claimants would come forward, basing 
their entitlement on loyalty and attributing much of their suffering to the Anishinabe.  
 Claims for compensation in the Western District highlight British military inadequacies 
and explain why settlers in the area and the Western Confederacy allies ended the war more 
divided than united. Much like the Loyalist Commission in the 1780s, claims initially made in 
1814 at Sandwich were part of a larger inquiry into losses.
123
 Divided into classes according to 
the perpetrator of the damage, Class One claims included loss or damage caused by His 
Majesty’s Forces and allied Indians while Class two included the same caused by American 
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forces and enemy Indians. A statistical analysis of all the Upper Canadian claims conducted by 
historian George Sheppard shows that British troops and “British Indians” were deemed 
responsible in nearly 85% of claims for multiple perpetrators and 43% of single perpetrator 
claims. In cases where settlers identified damage or theft of property, the perpetrator was just as 
likely to be an ally as the enemy and in 24.5% of cases where one person was responsible, that 
person was a “British Indian.”124 Sheppard concludes that in the aftermath of the war, many 
victims viewed the “British soldier and his Indian ally” as “the real menace of this war.”125 
Though Sheppard’s numbers are astounding, he focuses his study on the legacy of unresolved 
War of 1812 claims on the institutional development of Upper Canada. The implications of his 
findings for Indigenous-settler relations in the Western District nonetheless are profound. They, 
and the experiences of loyalists, help to explain how “our own Indians” became our enemies in 
the post-Revolutionary period.
126
  
 ‘Indians’ became the enemy regardless of the circumstances. My examination of 130 
claims attributing losses to His Majesty’s Indians taken from the occupied towns of Sandwich, 
Malden and Baldoon and Lake St. Clair indicate that settlers could not differentiate between 
‘enemy’ and ‘British Indians,’ and assumed rather than identified the perpetrator.127 Based on the 
presence of commanders like Proctor, Dickson and Brock, only 28 of these claims identified 
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British Indians as the culprits and only four claimants knew them by name or nation.
128
 
Claimants identified some Aboriginal allies because they were accompanied by well-known 
leaders like Tecumseh or Indian Department officers like Elliot and Caldwell but ninety-six 
claims offer no proof whatsoever and seven of these admit that the owners returned from militia 
duty to find their property stolen. How claimants knew the perpetrators were ‘Indians,’ and 
further, how they knew to associate them with British troops, particularly when they were not in 
the district at the time, is extremely suspect. In the absence of local informants or witnesses, 
claimants unable to identify the perpetrators of the damage to their property transferred their 
anger and resentment to the only ‘Indians’ around them. Anishinabe peoples, as a consequence, 
shouldered a great deal of blame for actions that were not their own. 
 During the war, the Detroit and St. Clair River borderlands were concurrently occupied 
by diverse groups of people focused on self-preservation including Aboriginal people and their 
families, settlers, refugees, militiamen, soldiers, volunteers, deserters and traitors.
129
 As a result 
the perpetrator remains unknown in approximately 25% of all claims made to the Department of 
Finance.
130
 Officers and commanders were supposed to identify themselves, but differences in 
colour and style of uniforms made it fairly easy to differentiate between them. With minor 
variations in overcoats, trim and decoration, Brock and Proctor’s 41st Regiment along with the 
Indian Department wore red coats while Caldwell’s Western Rangers wore green.131 The 
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American Army of the Northwest under William Hull and Henry Harrison wore blue.
132
 Kent 
and Essex Volunteers sometimes supplemented their uniforms with red overcoats or other 
identifiable accessories. In contrast, lacking funding and supplies, preference and sometimes 
necessity meant that volunteers carried their own personal weapons, and wore their regular 
civilian clothing in place of uniforms.
133
 Similarly, the clothing worn by the Corps of Voyageurs, 
French Canadian and American state militia volunteers shared common characteristics, not only 
with each other, but with the clothing worn by the Western Nations.
134
   
  Through trade, theft or gifting, Indigenous peoples and colonists had for centuries 
adopted the most practical articles from each other’s wardrobes.  By 1812, Aboriginal deerskin 
leggings and tunics, tomahawks and moccasins were commonly paired with cotton shirts, blanket 
coats, rifles and knives to create a uniform that was ubiquitous and practical.
135
 If acculturation, 
cross-cultural interaction and métissage made it difficult to distinguish among ‘Americans,’ 
‘Indians,’ ‘French,’ and ‘British,’ the identification of ‘enemy Indians’ in the midst of battle 
would, at times, be difficult. Certainly, residents in many cases would not be able to determine 
whether Aboriginal peoples on their property were enemies or allies. It seems to explain why 
beyond the claims already discussed, none identified these volunteer militia units or Aboriginal 
allies by their own national affiliation.  
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 The inability to separate friend from foe speaks to a broader phenomenon occurring in the 
district in which Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples began to lack intimacy and knowledge 
of each other and of the historic relationships between them, signaling the beginning of two 
worlds. In the absence of personal interaction, similarities between Loyalist and War of 1812 
claims suggest that the average settler viewed ‘Indians’ as a monolithic and non-descript group. 
Claimants identified Aboriginal people no differently in the 1780s than they did in 1812 
demonstrating that complex cultural and fluctuating national identities rendered categorization 
difficult. In 1783 they were “Burgoyne’s,” “Carleton’s,” or “Capt. Brant’s Indians,” and, while 
others were identified as “Friendly” or “Rebels,” claimants classified the Oneida who remained 
in New York State as “friends of the Americans.” However, in most claims, as in 1812, the 
perpetrators remained non-descript and are identified only as “Indians.”136 By 1812, though some 
attempted to distinguish between “our own Indians,” and “American” or “Enemy Indians,” the 
overwhelming majority simply refer to “damage done by Indians” or “H.M. Indians.” Sheppard’s 
statistics suggest that claimants erroneously attributed theft and damage, committed by the 
Seneca and other nations allied to the United States, to the Western Confederacy. I agree, 
questioning whether settlers did or even could differentiate between enemies and allies at all. 
More importantly, Loyalist and 1812 claims suggest that ‘Indians’ simply became a threat. They 
were perceived over time as the cause of individual suffering and loss, and responsible for the 
theft and destruction of homes, property and communities.    
 The association of Western Confederacy allies with a disproportionate amount of the 
damage was reinforced by local economic conditions after 1813. After an influx of goods and 
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supplies precipitated the declaration of war and northwestern campaigns, British forces and 
militia purchased goods and food from local residents at inflated wartime prices. After 1813 
goods became scarce and sporadic shortages
137
 led to scavenging and stealing. The final phase 
involved the retreat and return of part of the Western Confederacy in the weeks after the death of 
Tecumseh and the beginning of a concerted campaign by American forces to loot and destroy the 
district.
138
 Civilians bore the brunt of American and British strategies that laid a swath of settled 
areas to waste lest the produce of mills, stores and fields fall into enemy hands. The coldest in 
recent memory, the winter of 1811-1812 was followed by unusually wet and cold weather which 
reduced the quantity and quality of remaining harvests.
139
 In addition to satisfying of local needs, 
maintaining the large number of Aboriginal warriors and their families, British soldiers and 
militiamen and occupying American forces after 1813, meant that starvation became the norm in 
some areas. The same month that Proctor decided to destroy the Forts and retreat, he had been 
forced to introduce martial law to deal with growing hunger and discontent.
140
   
 The one thousand British soldiers and three thousand Aboriginal people congregated 
around Fort Malden and Elliot’s estate in the Western District required substantial provisions 
when British supply lines were severed.
141
 It is estimated that Aboriginal people consumed “16 
head of cattle and 25 barrels of flour” per day, substantially more than British soldiers.142 Local 
residents called Aboriginal people “a drain on British resources” because they consumed the 
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livestock, grain and produce of local farmers. The British army used warrants to legally demand 
surpluses from settlers, but all sides resorted to scavenging, threatening, stealing and looting for 
reasons of survival, revenge, entertainment and personal gain.
143
 Shortages caused by British 
supply problems and the inability of settlers to distinguish between enemies and allies meant that 
while British and American soldiers were sometimes considered looters and thieves, Aboriginal 
peoples almost always were.  
 The War of 1812 claims files contain detailed lists of goods stolen from homes, property 
and businesses in the Western District. Categorizing goods according to their usefulness in terms 
of survival, profit and revenge, I compared the 130 claims attributed to His Majesty’s Indians 
already discussed to 203 attributed to Enemy Americans.
144
 For each claim, I counted the 
number of times that objects grouped together in Table 2 below were reported stolen or 
damaged. By doing so, the purpose for items taken can often be deduced. For example, items like 
fence rails taken along with livestock and produce suggest hunger as the motive whereas horses 
taken with saddles, oats and apples to feed them indicate a pressing need for transportation. In 
cases where claimants reported that only their liquor, furs or silver plate were taken, I considered 
them luxury items. Though wooden items were probably taken to be burned, utilitarian items 
could also be sold and traded. Without proof, I counted furniture like bed stands, tables and 
spinning wheels in the neutral category of “household items.” In all cases, it should be 
acknowledged these claims are estimates and a great many were inflated in value and quantity.  
Nonetheless, the number of times that particular objects were reported stolen and by whom, says 
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a great deal about the motives of H.M. Indians and the Enemy. 
 Contrary to settler opinion, Table 2 below shows that Aboriginal people did not engage in 
a campaign of wanton looting and destruction. While women and children received some rations 
at Amherstburg, Anishinabe and Wyandotte peoples overwhelmingly sought food from settlers 
to feed themselves and their families. More than 85% of the goods taken from settlers consisted 
of necessities like grains, flour, apples, potatoes and corn; livestock and fowl, and wood for fires. 
On cultivated fields cleared of trees, items made of wood such as fence posts and barn boards 
were taken to provide fuel for cooking and heat. A number of horses and canoes were taken for 
transportation and utilitarian household items like kettles, pots, pans and linens (tablecloths, 
blankets and curtains) were also reported stolen.  The Indian Department continued to give some 
presents to the Anishinabe and Wyandotte, but British supply problems affected their quantity  
Table 2: Instances of Theft and Damage Attributed to ‘Indian’ Allies and the Enemy 
 
Source: LAC, RG 19, E5 (a)/3735, File 1, Claims 1-209, Class 4 Claims-Indians Attached to His 
Majesty, Western District and 3734, File 3, Class 2, Enemy Damages, Western District. 
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and distribution as the war progressed. Contrary to stereotypes associating looting and thievery 
with Aboriginal peoples, War of 1812 claims instead show that dire circumstances forced 
Anishinabe warriors to hunt and gather on the farms of their neighbours.  
 American troops in contrast, took more and different goods than the Anishinabe and 
Wyandotte. As Table 2 above shows, the enemy frequently helped themselves to non-essential 
and luxury items like money, silver, wine, whiskey, butter and salt. The Americans also took 
items the Anishinabe did not, such as firearms, tools and iron, and saddles and harnesses for their 
horses.
145
 In categories where they took similar goods, enemy troops often looted the valuable 
rather than the utilitarian. When the enemy took clothing, they focused on trunks, furs, coats and 
skins, and instead of canoes, they took boats and carts. Enemy soldiers also looted more items 
from merchants and damaged and burned an extraordinary number of houses, barns, stables and 
outbuildings, seemingly without purpose.  
  “Almost half of all wartime plundering incidents” according to Sheppard, “were blamed 
on British troops or their Indian allies.” Indeed, British troops sometimes supplemented absent 
pay and rations with what could be called ‘plunder.’146 Only five percent of claims indicate that 
“Indians” associated with British troops took valuables and alcohol, instances that were 
extremely rare.
147
 While the Western Nations consumed massive amounts of livestock, American 
troops fed enormous quantities of apples, hay and oats to their horses. The only beverages taken 
by “H.M. Indians” were barrels of apple cider and in one instance silver plate was reported 
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stolen.
148
 Another five percent of claims point to incidents where property was “destroyed,” but 
these consisted of finished wood items like pickets, rails and boards or the produce of gardens, 
fields and orchards. Apple and other orchard trees had a value to the farmer that was very 
different from cold and hungry warriors who simply saw them as forests of firewood. Similarly, 
soldiers, warriors and militia had to let the enormous number of horses required for the war 
effort forage on farmer’s fields, and they inadvertently trampled them in transport.149 Under 
these circumstances, angry and disheartened farmers used language suggesting such incidents 
were intentional. 
 The use of words like “destroyed” and “killed” to characterize losses caused by 
Indigenous peoples suggests settlers had little understanding of the circumstances of the war or 
the individual plight of people fighting on their behalf. This was perhaps compounded, as 
Sheppard’s book reveals, by ambivalence and hostility many felt towards a war they perceived as 
Britain’s alone. Indigenous warriors played an important role in the conflict, in part because 
many settlers and militiamen avoided fighting.
150
 Losses attributed to Aboriginal people, even 
when they were small amounts of foodstuffs, were described in extremely negative terms without 
any consideration of use or purpose.  For example, livestock was “killed,” fences “destroyed,” 
and apples “stolen” even when it was apparent that the objects were the necessary ingredients of 
a meal and were likely butchered, prepared and consumed on the property or within sight of the 
owner. Similarly transportation items necessary to engage the enemy like boats, canoes and 
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horses were “stolen” by Aboriginal people but “pressed into H.M. service” by the British. 
Though claimants resented the actions of British troops too, similarities between the language 
used to describe the actions of an enemy, who looted and burned personal property with 
abandon, and Anishinabe peoples foraging for sustenance suggests that victims did not care to 
see a difference in intent. Well-known Western District merchant Thomas Clark probably 
represented the sentiments of many when he wrote that the destruction was caused by “the 
ravages of the Enemy and also by the Irregularities of our own troops and Indians.”151 
 The regulations, reluctance and delays issuing compensation exacerbated hostility 
towards the Anishinabe and contributed to a sense that they owed their neighbours restitution. In 
a manner similar to those adopted by the Loyalist Commission, the 1814 regulations rejected a 
number of losses including most property in U.S. territory, horses that died in service, currency, 
rent, and harvests lost by militiamen while on duty.
152
 Commissioners insisted claimants could 
not prove their horses died in service and feared that if the expense was allowed, in future 
citizens would attempt to profit by volunteering “every worn out, ineffective animal in the 
country” to the army. Similarly, reimbursing farmers who lost their harvest while away on militia 
duty would set a “dangerous precedent” and discourage those at home from harvesting. The 
Commission also denied “trifling” claims under £10, bushels of apples and other produce and 
reduced other claims such that the vast majority received one-half to two thirds of the original 
amount.
153
 The greatest suffering for the average settler was caused by the loss of their current 
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harvest and their stored surplus, goods most-often taken by an anonymous perpetrator. The 
Commission’s Report suggested that these “evils” were contributions to a war effort that “every 
loyal subject ought cheerfully submit to…”154 Though it is estimated that nearly two thirds of 
those eligible for militia duty avoided serving,
 155
 (perhaps because for the reasons discussed they 
could not afford to) this was considerably more difficult in areas surrounding the military towns 
of Malden and Amherstburg. Claimants who were not offered restitution did not “cheerfully 
submit” to anything and it sowed the seeds of future conflict between the Anishinabe and 
Western District settlers.    
 If the majority of farmers failed to realize Anishinabe warriors defended the province 
with a zeal and ability that matched, if not surpassed, their own volunteer militia, an even greater 
number resented having to pay for it. Second only to the Niagara District, statistics from the 
1823-6 Commission show that the Western District claimed more than £65,000 or 20% of all the 
claims for damages during the War of 1812.
156
 When prominent sufferers through the provincial 
assembly demanded the British government settle claims arising from the War, the British felt 
the province owed some contribution towards the costs of their own defense. With the British 
unwilling and the province unable to settle them, outstanding War of 1812 claims remained a 
source of political and economic instability into the 1830s.
157
     
 “Indian Sufferers” filed claims with the Sandwich Board of Claims but the path they 
wove through the bureaucracy of the government was a harbinger of things to come in the 
administration of Indian Affairs. Of the 66 claims lodged with the board at Sandwich in 1815, 
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the Moravians filed 29, the Ottawa and Chippewa (Ojibwe) made 20, the Huron (Wyandotte) had 
13 claimants and the Shawnee lodged four.
158
 Many “had comfortable Houses and were in other 
respects well off” prior to the outbreak of hostilities and lost their farms, villages, cornfields and 
personal belongings when they retreated with Proctor.
 159
  They were unable to defend their lands 
against American occupiers. The Ottawa and Chippewa lost comparable amounts in basic 
necessities like cookware, bedding, clothing, firearms and horses. In total however, these claims 
are a very small sampling of the losses sustained by Aboriginal peoples in the Western District.  
A significant number returned to Michigan Territory after the defeat at Moraviantown, did not 
speak English or otherwise did not know to apply for compensation. In addition, documents 
suggest that bureaucratic bungling prevented a number of those eligible from submitting claims 
and from having their cases considered, and claims paid. 
 While the board accepted claims in 1815 and recommended replacing Indian presents, 
Amherstburg’s commanding officer and board president Lt. Col. Reginald James postponed 
judgment on compensation on the basis that Indigenous claimants were not “competent” to swear 
an oath. Not knowing what to do, the board officials recommended creating a list of chiefs who 
could vouch for the losses sustained by their people and referred the entire issue to the Governor-
General and Commander of the Forces, Sir Gordon Drummond. But James’ letter also noted the 
Six Nations had not yet appeared before the board because they were prevented from doing so by 
the acting Superintendent General at York.
160
 From there, the claims remained in limbo for eight 
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years until the 1823-26 Commission finally wrote to William Claus. Despite his position as 
Superintendent of the Six Nations (1796-1800) and Deputy Superintendent until his death, the 
nephew of Sir John Johnson seemingly knew nothing of the Western claims and professed to 
have never collected any from the Six Nations.
161
 In deference to their superior, clerks and 
storekeepers Joseph Brant Clench stationed at Fort George and George Ironside at Amherstburg 
referred the issue of Indigenous claims back to Claus in 1825. Ten years after the cession of 
hostilities, the claims retrogressed back to where they originated and were no closer to being 
paid.
162
  
 Like their non-Aboriginal fellow claimants, the Western Nations fell victim to the same 
political bickering between the governments of the Canadas and Great Britain. However, unlike 
their fellow claimants, Indigenous peoples in Upper Canada were prevented from receiving 
justice from the Board, and in some cases from appearing before it on their own behalf. This 
represents one of the earliest manifestations of bureaucratic ineptitude and exemplifies the 
invention of ‘policies’ arising not from law or legislation, but from the uncertainty of Indigenous 
status. Paradoxically, it was the Board’s opinion that it did not have jurisdictional authority, and 
the Western Chiefs could not represent themselves. At the same time, the Board ruled they were 
competent to testify before Drummond. If Indigenous peoples were not competent enough to 
bring their own claims before the board, they would not be considered competent to handle any 
compensation they received. As the next chapter will discuss, these funds did not reward their 
loyalty or compensate for losses; instead what they received provided initial funding for the 
‘civilization’ program. 
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 Though the Western Confederacy fought as independent allies to regain their lands in the 
Indian Territory, this was never clearly articulated to settlers and reproduction of their image in 
propaganda to incite fear had lasting and dire consequences. While the Americans initially won 
the battle of Frenchtown in 1813, British and Indigenous forces returned and killed 100 
Americans. Popular slogans such as “Remember the Raisin” were used to rationalize continued 
incursions into the northwest to take Aboriginal lands.
163
 British and Americans attributed the 
targeting women and children, looting, scalping, torture and other actions thought to deviate 
“from the gentlemanly standards of warfare,” to Aboriginal warriors, even though their own 
forces engaged in similar behaviors, particularly in the Ohio Valley.
164
 The Governor of New 
Jersey called John Graves Simcoe “a consummate Savage” because of his penchant for setting 
fire to Patriot-owned buildings.
165
 Europeans also had a long-standing tradition of disguising 
themselves as ‘Indians’ when committing such acts. In 1773, rebel “whites dressed as Indians” 
present at the Boston Tea Party felt themselves empowered to “do what they could not do in their 
normative roles.”166 Both McKee and Caldwell reportedly did the same at Fallen Timbers and in 
the summer of 1814 “one hundred armed men disguised as ferocious Indian warriors,” burned 
and looted the settlement of Port Talbot, just south of London.
167
 Therefore, the “imaginary 
Indian” not only represents an identity adopted by non-Aboriginals to defy policy and commit 
horrific acts in war. Unable and perhaps unwilling to seek revenge on Americans, settlers and 
officials utilized the image to blame Aboriginal people for wartime atrocities instead.
168
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 The “imaginary Indian” appeared in increasing frequency in propaganda and the popular 
press as a symbol of the barbaric characteristics of the enemy. Protesting the treatment of 
Loyalists in 1783, British illustrator William Humphrey offers a telling example of this 
confusing genre in which Aboriginal people are used as foils or symbols of American injustice. 
In The Savages Let Loose, (Figure 8 below), Humphrey portrays Americans as ‘Indians’ 
committing three horrific acts: scalping, tomahawking and hanging. Though these illustrations 
are meant to draw attention to the depravity of European enemies, the increased use of non-  
Figure 8: The Savages Let Loose, or the Cruel Fate of the Loyalists 
 
Source: William Humphrey, 1783. The Savages let loose, or the Cruel Fate of the Loyalists. 
350x437mm. Hand-coloured etching on paper. Used with permission of the Trustees of the 
British Museum. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Pulp Press, 2011).  Francis argues that Europeans failed to interact with Indigenous peoples or appreciate their 
cultures on their own terms.  Instead non-natives created an “Imaginary Indian” and projected their own 
expectations, fears, concerns and ideas about the Aboriginal peoples around them. 
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descript Aboriginal warriors to symbolize abhorrent behaviors like scalping and tomahawking, 
only served to demonize Aboriginal peoples and portray them as common enemy of both 
Americans and British citizens. Military commanders on both sides reinforced these stereotypes. 
 While General Hull feared and resented Aboriginal warriors for their unpredictable and 
inhumane behavior, Brock exploited this fear and encouraged the association of warriors with 
violence to terrorize the enemy in spirit and actuality.
169
 Hull’s Proclamation illustrates the 
effectiveness of British propaganda in this respect. Determined to raise support for an invasion, 
he wrote that:  
  [i]f the barbarous and savage policy of Great Britain be pursued,  
  and the savages be let loose to murder our citizens, and butcher our  
  women and children, this war will be a war of extermination. The first  
  stroke of the tomahawk, the first attempt with the scalping knife, will  
  be the signal of one indiscriminate scene of desolation. No white man,  
  found fighting by the side of an Indian, will be taken prisoner--instant  
  destruction will be his lot.
170
 
 
 The British made similar characterizations, associating Aboriginal people with theft and 
uncontrollable and unpredictable violence. Settlers schooled in such a manner could only see 
Aboriginal people as a potential threat, liable to turn on them at any time, in war or in peace. In 
many respects, relationships never recovered and enormity of the damage to local farms, 
properties and businesses served to obfuscate and overwhelm losses and sacrifices made by the 
Western Confederacy in the War of 1812. Even though Great Britain abandoned their territories, 
and their people also suffered, settlers nonetheless came to resent their Anishinabe neighbours, 
holding them responsible for the intensity of American retaliation and for their own misfortune. 
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Conclusion 
 Schmaltz argues loyalists were no different in sentiment and attitude towards Aboriginal 
people than those who remained in the United States or arrived as Late Loyalists.
171
 Before 
coming to Canada, a number of British sympathizers testified they had been employed by 
colonial governors to engage in offensive actions against Aboriginal people or had been 
victimized by them before and during the Revolution in circumstances similar to those in 
1812.
172
 Settlers and merchants, including Matthew Elliott cited both allied and “Rebel Indians” 
for stealing their horses, clothing, food, tools and livestock. To prevent goods from falling into 
the hands of the enemy and to weaken the resolve of suspected loyalists and patriots, both sides 
looted and burned homes, mills and storehouses. Many claimants indicated “Indians” killed their 
relatives during these incidents.
173
 These loyalists, though they no doubt hoped to make a new 
start in Upper Canada, likely continued to carry the kind of hatred and fear that comes with great 
suffering and loss. Given enough time, these sentiments may have been overcome. Instead, it 
seems that circumstances, as they unfolded in 1812, only revived them.  
 The War of 1812 continued the civil war which had erupted in the 1770s. The war, as 
Taylor points out, finalized what had only temporarily halted in 1783 and the struggle for the 
Northwest was a continuation of that war.
174
 The difficulties describing people of identical 
origins throughout this period of conflict is evident in the myriad of names given to people who 
crossed a border the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Talman argued that the 
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United Empire Loyalists intermarried and assimilated into the population of American 
immigrants and did not maintain a distinct identity in the years following their migration.
175
 John 
Eardly-Wilmot described them as “American Sufferers” while Robert Gourlay called them 
“Anglo-Americans.”176 In the 1960s, historian J.M.S. Careless noted that Loyalism alone did not 
unite settlers from America. They were neither “Britons,” nor were they quite “United Statesers.” 
Rather the arrival of the “British Americans” as he called them, spurred the later development of 
a separate (Upper) Canadian identity.
177
 Even Hull’s 1812 proclamation recognized values 
shared between Americans and their “brethren” in Upper Canada, whose collective “forefathers 
fought for the freedom and Independence” he promoted. He understood the artificiality of the 
border between the two countries in terms of the philosophies they shared: they were “children 
of the same family” and “heirs to the same heritage.” 178 Hull could appeal to a familial 
connection with some conviction by 1812, largely because of the immigration of thousands of 
Late Loyalists from the United States in the late 1780s and 1790s. The degree to which loyalty or 
the availability of cheap land motivated them is subject to debate in the literature because the 
definition was broadened to include “anyone who sympathized with and assisted British forces in 
any way.” Consequently, the 1791 Canada Act included provisions to expedite private land 
grants and between 1792 and 1796, 3000 Late Loyalists applied and another 500 arrived every 
year after 1811.  By 1812, they made up three-fifths of the population of Upper Canada.
179
   
Although early Loyalists had preferential access to land and settlement assistance, of direct 
                                                          
175
 Talman, “The United Empire Loyalists,” 5. 
176
 Gourlay, Statistical Account of Upper Canada, 115. 
177
 J.M.S. Careless, “Introduction,” The Defended Border, 3-4. Careless argues that “Loyalism” was not in itself a 
unifying identity.  
178
 General William Hull, Proclamation, Sandwich, 12 July, 1812, War of 1812: General Correspondence, Canada’s 
History, 24 July 2014, www.canadianhistory.ca  
179
 Taylor, Civil War of 1812, 56. 
 103 
consequence to Aboriginal peoples is the fact that they ultimately acquired, settled and alienated 
their land in a manner that was no different than their neighbours who arrived later.
180
                                                                                                                                                                                         
 In the tradition of Dish with One Spoon agreements, Tecumseh held fast to the idea that 
collectively held Aboriginal lands could not be surrendered without the consent of the whole.  
Decades of war, crop failures and poor hunts beginning in the late 1780s made the exchange of 
land for much needed goods difficult to resist.
181 
The McKee and Chenail Ecarté Treaties signed 
after the arrival of loyalists represent a continuum of the Covenant Chain alliance, and through 
them Anishinabe and Wyandotte peoples believed they could share their lands with sympathetic 
Europeans. Plans for the institutional development of Upper Canada alongside an Indigenous 
buffer state as expressed by Simcoe, McKee and Brock demonstrate that this was true for British 
officials as well. For Anishinabe peoples, the sharing of land historically helped to hold back 
unwanted settlement in their territories while providing protection from American policy and 
access to British goods in times of uncertainty.
182
 Simcoe, McKee and Brock’s Indian Territory 
was a “blueprint” for “a commercial empire and native state within the British mercantile 
system.”183 It offered the potential to combine the best of both Indigenous and European worlds 
and re-create the Northwest in the western borderlands of Upper Canada. 
 Regardless of where their loyalties stood at any one time, in the far western portion of the 
province, land represented opportunity for all interests to improve their immediate financial 
circumstances. Consequently, the acquisition of land by private individuals in authority and the 
‘official’ treaty process in which lands were granted in the King’s name involved the same 
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people acting in identical capacities as representatives of the Crown. The nature of the 
compensatory process and the desire of the British government to limit payouts meant that in 
1789 and 1812, settlers to Upper Canada found it easier to prove damages and receive 
compensation from allies than an enemy government that historically evaded restitution and 
ultimately persecuted them. Disdain for Aboriginal peoples was inevitable so long as their lands 
remained the only reward for loyalty, the only compensation available for the losses accrued in 
war and the only opportunity available for the repayment of debts acquired through trade. 
 Such circumstances developed because European-Indigenous relations were, after 1750, 
shaped in a theatre of war that was constant and unrelenting and one over which Indigenous 
peoples had little control. While Americans considered British and Indigenous lands to be the 
spoils of war, Indigenous peoples bore the brunt and were scapegoated in the process. The 
Western Confederacy took no interest in colonial politics and fought to protect their lands 
however both American and British commanders feared Indigenous warriors would be used 
against them.
184
 The Western Confederacy were continually courted as allies and attacked as 
enemies regardless of their commitment to the causes of others.
185
  As a consequence they could 
simultaneously be viewed as neutrals, allies, auxiliaries, mercenaries or sovereign nations and 
the British utilized whichever conceptualization was expedient at the time. Until 1815, 
Americans thought they were British guerilla fighters, and this in combination with the 
exploitation of the ‘imaginary’ Aboriginal warrior as something savage and uncontrollable, was 
not easily erased in the minds of settlers when peace was achieved. 
 The fact that some believed in the potential of co-existence does not explain the presence 
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of concurrent behaviors that undermined that very possibility. Though ‘loyalism’ has been 
studied as something tangible and consistent, ‘Loyalists’ have proven to be a conflicted, 
contradictory and complex grouping of family and friends, acquaintances and strangers, allies 
and enemies, and victims and perpetrators.  The wartime experiences of refugees and Western 
District residents in the War of 1812 as well as the Indian Department’s deceptive behavior 
sabotaged Simcoe’s and Brock’s grand designs. So long as the Indian Territory existed, 
independence was a possibility, but the British government would not go out of its way to help 
protect it, and few of its settlers would accommodate First Nations in Upper Canada.
186
  Those 
closest to Aboriginal peoples like McKee and Caldwell engaged in contradictory behaviors 
because they were no different from the settlers around them: they too saw no future for the 
Western Confederacy in Upper Canadian society once Americans claimed the northwest.
187
  
 Loyalists connected to the Detroit River region and the Western Confederacy merged into 
an “elite group” of mixed ancestry who through personal, business, military and political ties 
acquired more land and more control.
188
 Loyalists of Indigenous ancestry did not want monetary 
compensation but respect for their territories and acceptance of who they were as a people. The 
problematic notion of Western Confederacy Loyalism therefore is symptomatic of broader issues 
concerning the role of Aboriginal people in Upper Canadian society. The descendants of United 
Empire Loyalists and their governments recreated the claims process in the decades that 
followed by petitioning for various accommodations at the expense of Anishinabe peoples on the 
basis of loyalty, however one defined it. John Johnson oversaw the settlement of loyalist 
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refugees and his 1785 petition contained the fundamentals of their government. Johnson would 
do the same for the Anishinabe and other Indigenous peoples as the Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs.
189
 Before his death in 1830, he would transform compensation for Indigenous loyalists 
into a program to ‘civilize’ them. 
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Chapter 2: “An inconvenient debt”: Pensions, Pathogens and Presents on the St. Clair, 
1815-1840.  
 A traveler to the District after the War of 1812 noted that he was “struck by the 
devastation. Beautiful farms, formerly in a high state of cultivation, now laid waste, houses 
entirely evacuated and forsaken, provisions of all kinds very scarce, and where once peace and 
plenty abounded, poverty and destruction now stalked the land.”1 In contrast, Lieutenant-
Governor Francis Gore surmised that the War of 1812 was “in some cases injurious to 
individuals” but “a benefit to the Country at large.” Assessments crediting “wartime prosperity” 
and peaceful relations with the United States as legacies of the war are often taken at face value.
2
 
Beneficiaries of the war tended to belong to a particular class of merchants and professionals 
with residences and commercial connections east of York. Assessments like Gore’s do not 
accurately reflect the actual experiences of those in the northwestern borderlands.
3 
 The Western 
District experienced social, political and economic instability to a degree not witnessed or 
understood by residents in the east.   
 Though Anishinabe peoples experienced similar peacetime circumstances to their 
neighbours after 1814, demilitarization presented extreme challenges so long as expansionism 
remained part of American political discourse. The Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 placed the 
International boundary through the waters of the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers, and together with 
the Wyandotte, Anishinabe men in the district patrolled the border and caught deserters until 
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after the American Civil War. This chapter does not dispute the fact that the Anishinabeg faced 
difficulties in peacetime, but it argues for a different perspective. Indeed, the first three decades 
of peace were important to Indigenous peoples, not because they were no longer needed as allies 
after 1814 but because they had been allies for more than two hundred years previous and 
continued to consider themselves so. Though the boundary divided them into ‘American’ and 
‘British Indians,’ Anishinabe on both sides expected the British to keep the promises made to 
them as allied nations.
4
  Western Confederacy warriors contributed to the defense of the province 
in 1775, 1812 and again in 1837, yet the man responsible for orchestrating their settlement in 
villages, Sir John Colborne, characterized the assistance promised to them as “an inconvenient 
debt.” 5 Between 1814 and 1840, British policymakers intended to “rid” themselves of this debt 
as soon as possible.  
 The British Empire was not “One Big Thing”6 and increasingly after 1815, 
parliamentarians found themselves challenged at home and abroad by issues of reform and 
rebellion. The demobilization of soldiers into increasingly urbanized and industrialized centres 
combined with revolts against British rule in South Africa, Jamaica and Australia raised 
questions about the status and rights of the empire’s various inhabitants.7 The growing 
complexity of colonial management combined with new opportunities in European markets 
rendered mercantilist intervention ineffective and unnecessary. Free trade according to historian 
John Cell, enabled the British “to enjoy the economic benefits of informal empire without unduly 
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adding to the administrative and financial burdens of a formal one.”8 At the same time, growing 
antipathy towards Family Compact rule in Upper Canada led officials in the imperial 
government to conclude that “Britain would share in their prosperity and goodwill” if 
“grievances were remedied and the colonists left to govern themselves.”9 As a consequence, 
demands for self-government in Upper Canada coalesced with British desires to reduce the costs 
of colonial administration. Domestically, commercial interests seeking to control and profit from 
development and expansion played as great a role in orchestrating political change as farmers 
and professionals demanding local control of the assembly.
10
  Land had already proven to be a 
panacea for the settlement of the loyalist diaspora and could do the same for the impoverished 
and landless victims of British industrial capitalism.  
 As settlement in the southern portion of the district leveled out, the population of Kent 
(including the future Lambton), rapidly increased just as the Anishinabe established their own 
permanent villages.
11
 As Table 3 shows between 1831 and 1837, the population of the Western 
District increased by an average of 16% per year, peaking at nearly 18% in 1836 when the 
Rebellions deterred new settlers. Settlement resumed in 1840 at the rate of 10% and then 
stabilized to an average increase of 7% per year thereafter. In Kent, six years before the 
rebellions, the large 28% increase in population reveals the explosion of settlement in  
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Table 3: Total Population: Kent and Essex, 1831-1846
12
  
 
 
Source: Compiled using Total Population tables in Censuses of Canada, 1665-1871, Statistics of 
Canada, Vol. IV (Ottawa: I.B. Taylor, 1876), 86, 92-93, 100-102, 104, 112-114, 119-122, 126, 
128, 131, 134; AO, F 2007/10, Western District Municipal Records, MS 168, General Returns of 
Population, 1842-1845, 0135-0141. 
 
the townships fronting water. Between 1839 and 1840, increases stabilized to an average 9.8 % 
per year and continued at the district rate thereafter. It was clear that a new “empire of 
settlement” had begun. 13 As the following chapters discuss, the Anishinabe experienced 
difficulties esstablishing themselves in the community in proportion to the concentration of 
Eurocanadian settlement around them.
14
  
 Though no longer trapped in the war between the Americans and the British, Aboriginal 
peoples now found themselves caught between the demands of agricultural settlers and the 
                                                          
12
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interests of developers and industrialists.
15
 After 1830, the Indian Department officially ceased  
to operate as a branch of the military and was transfeered to civil control in Upper Canada under 
the administration of the Lieutenant-governor. Between 1828 and 1841, Lieutenant-Governors 
Colborne, Bond Head, and Arthur’s attitudes towards the settlement of Indigenous peoples 
shifted quickly from interest to hostility  to indifference. British authorities expected the 
Anishinabe to transition to quickly a settled existence as colonists just as policymakers sought to 
reduce and eventually eliminate the department. This left Anishinabe people vulnerable during a 
crucial period of state formation when elites in the colony and in Great Britain engaged in 
debates that would ultimately determine the shape and process of government in Canada.  
 This chapter examines the implementation of the civilization program in the Western or 
Sarnia district and asks why Anishinabe peoples in the region did not prosper and thrive like their 
Eurocanadian neighbours. At the time, officials in the government and Indian Department 
complained that the Anishinabe failed to plan for their future and were incapable of managing 
their own communities. To the contrary, Anishinabe peoples maintained stability in their own 
communities through the strength of their own leaders who negotiated one of the most significant 
treaties in the region’s history. The period between the end of the War of 1812 and the Act of 
Union offered a crucial window of opportunity for the successful establishment of Anishinabe 
communities in the fabric of Upper Canadian society. On the shores of the St. Clair River and 
Lake Huron, Anishinabe peoples settled on their own terms, but unlike their Eurocanadian 
neighbours they did so under the yoke of colonial bureaucracy and at the whim of uninterested 
and, at times, incompetent officials. McCalla estimates that under ideal circumstances, it would 
take at least two to three years for a farm to produce a surplus sufficient to purchase necessary 
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items, and another ten years to bring a farm into full production. Yet, colonial officials gave the 
Anishinabe less than ten years to fully transition to a sedentary way of life before they deemed 
the civilization program a failure.16 
Tecumseh’s Shadow17  
 In 1817, several Nations travelled from their lands in Michigan to attend a council on 
Drummond Island. Black Hawk, a Chief of the Sauk Nation (in present-day Illinois), read a 
speech given to them by Sir George Prevost at the height of the War of 1812 in which the 
Commander of the British Forces said, “My Children; we have taken each other by the hand and 
fought together—Our interests are the same—we must still continue to fight together…to drive 
the Big Knives…off all our Lands…”18 Lt. Col. Robert Dickson, whose wife was Sioux, made 
Black Hawk a Brigadier General in the British Army and throughout the war, Prevost, Dickson 
and other officers who fought alongside the Western Nations repeatedly promised the Western 
Nations that the British would not forget their sacrifices.
19
 Less than three years later, Black 
Hawk knew this not to be true.
 
 
 The process of claiming losses as a result of the War of 1812 solely focused on the 
destruction of private property and not the support of those injured and left behind. Anishinabe 
and Wyandotte peoples along with other private citizens contributed provisions and cared for 
refugees and injured soldiers and others without acknowledgement or compensation.
20
 Colonial 
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authorities settled “Indian claims” on the basis of a predetermined scale that valued fixed 
housing at half the price claimed, horses at £10 and hogs, cattle and bushels of Indian corn at £1 
each. Authorities replaced items considered presents and allowed other losses at a rate of sixty to 
seventy percent of the total. While Eurocanadian residents accused the Anishinabe of stealing 
their horses, the Ottawa and Chippewa lost theirs in enormous quantities.  In 1815, twenty 
Indigenous claimants lost thirty-nine horses in total with several individuals claiming three to six 
horses per person.
21
 Fields of Indian corn, “wigwams” and their contents and other unverifiable 
items went uncompensated. Shawnee Chief George Bluejacket, for example, could only claim 
£187 for the loss of his entire farm including three log houses, all his livestock and three acres of 
corn.
22
 Wyandotte Chief Adam Brown, for reasons that are inexplicable, did not receive any 
compensation for the 100 head of cattle he contributed to the war effort.
23
 Battle-worn and of 
advanced age, former chiefs and their families in the northwest who lived in sedentary villages 
often lost all of their worldly belongings. Most did not live long enough to recoup their costs. 
 The first payment was delayed by nine years and the remainder  no matter how small was 
divided into a series of three payments of thirty-three and a third percent. As late as 1844 a 
statement prepared by the Receiver General confirmed that more than £3000 in payments 
remained outstanding.
24
 The executive reported it had no knowledge of the distribution of any 
funds transferred from the colonial government to the Indian Department to pay the “friendly 
Tribes of Indians.”25  
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 A comparison of claims reported to the Sandwich Board of Claims by Western Nations in 
1815 and again in 1834 indicates that losses were underreported and then significantly reduced 
by officials.
26
 In 1815, 37 Huron, Chippewa and Shawnee had £1846 in claims approved by the 
Board. At the second installment in 1834, 46 appeared and claimed £2237 in losses but this 
amount was reduced to only £1490. George Ironside, the Superintendent at Amherstburg, paid 
them £295 or less than thirty-three percent.
27
 Nine of the 46 were Chippewa who claimed £282. 
Their amount was reduced to £196 and they received £38, a paltry thirteen percent of their 
original claim.
28
 These percentage amounts do not correspond to the instructions issued to the 
Sandwich Board  and the executive, by its own admission, did not monitor or accurately 
document the distributions. 
 Of the 37 who claimed in 1815 and 46 in 1834, only 20 attended both distributions and 
just nine of the original 20 Chippewa claimants did so, suggesting that a number of deserving 
claimants never received the compensation awarded to them. Because payments continued to be 
irregular and made on an ad-hoc basis, claimants missed distributions, relocated or died as years 
passed. Deputy Superintendent General H.C. Darling confessed to Ironside Jr. in 1827 that a 
payment of £1750 was then due on a total award of £5000, but admitted it would “be difficult to 
arrange a distribution of it with justice to all parties.” He further opined that there was “no 
probability” that the full amount, itself a fraction of the more than £8871 originally claimed, 
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would ever be distributed.
29
 Ironside did make another payment in 1837, but it is not known 
whether this included balances owing to the Western Nations or if he made any payments 
thereafter. 
 The number of Indigenous peoples potentially affected by the war is not well known. The 
1844 Bagot report estimated that two to three thousand who annually received presents were 
“only a small portion” of “those who fought on the side of the British” and that “considerabl[y]” 
more were entitled to claim them.
30
 Only 1600 of the 7000 British regulars stationed in the 
Canadas were allocated to protect Upper Canada against an estimated American force of 
13,000.
31
 In comparison, 1590 of the estimated 7410 Anishinabe warriors in the Western 
Confederacy resided in Upper Canada. As a whole, men of fighting age were believed to number 
about 8410, a significant and deciding factor in British victories in the northwest borderlands.
32
  
If  four family members resided with each warrior, potentially 30,000 to 50,000 Anishinabe 
peoples were affected in some way by war.  Considerably more suffered dislocation and damage 
to themselves and to their property than documented.
 33
   
 At a council held at Amherstburg in 1816, the Western Nations told the Commandant and 
Indian Department officials, “Father—When we were fighting for you against the Big Knives, 
you told us that if any of us got hurt or wounded…that…if any War or Village Chief should be 
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killed that his relations should be recompenced for his body…you told us not to mind…for that 
at a future day, we should be recompensed for anything we might lose~”34 The small number of 
claimants recorded obscures the fact that thousands of unrecognized Indigenous peoples suffered 
physically and materially, not only as a result of the War of 1812 but from displacement during 
and after the American Revolution and in the Northwest. Accordingly, Anishinabe, Wyandotte 
and Potawatomi peoples, some experiencing the first real peace in forty years, depended upon 
other sources of British assistance in the form of rations, presents, pensions and land payments 
while they rebuilt their communities. 
 Payments of pensions and rations, acknowledged by John Johnson to be “so important an 
aid,” recognized sacrifices made by Indigenous communities to the British war effort and helped 
compensate families for the loss of the labour of wounded men.
35
 British and Indigenous leaders 
shared command of combined forces of warriors, soldiers and militia. As long as Americans 
targeted Indigenous villages, British authorities had to promise to protect and feed women and 
children before their men would leave them.
36
 The Western Nations abandoned their “Property” 
to answer Brock’s personal appeal to fight and they believed that “the Master of Life would be 
charitable” and “show them kindness.”37  Indigenous leaders recalled that Prevost assured them 
in 1812 that he would “wipe the blood away”38 and provide the widows and their children with 
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pensions in the form of “money or goods according to the Rank of the deceased.”39 Indeed, a 
general order issued in July 1813 stated that upon losing an eye or suffering injuries equivalent to 
the loss of a limb, chiefs would receive annual pensions of $100 (£25) and warriors $70 (£17), 
and their widows, $200 (£50) and $140 (£35) respectively.
40
 The wounded, if unable to 
accompany their communities to their winter hunting grounds had to stay behind in summer 
villages. The government gave pensions to Indigenous warriors “for wounds received in action” 
and rations to the children of those “incapacitated from gaining their livelihood by hunting.”41 
However, in 1829, an interpreter for Mo-co-man-nish, a wounded Ottawa veteran told 
Lieutenant-Colonel Mackay; “he reminds you of your promise, he has a large family and can 
barely support them.” 42 While Chiefs and warriors did not receive amounts comparable to the 
average $80 (£20) pensions given to non-Aboriginal veterans and $200-$600 (£50-£150) in half-
pay paid yearly to officers and widows between 1783 and 1814, the burden of proof was onerous 
for everyone.
43
 Even so, the chance to receive a stable income, however small, was advantageous 
to Anishinabe and Eurocanadian families alike.
44
 For Indigenous peoples, whose subsistence was 
so dependent upon physical strength and agility, they were vital.  
 Peace widened the gulf between what Aboriginal people believed was promised to them 
and what the British understood their obligations to be. After explaining the terms of the 
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Proclamation of 1763, Johnson gave the Western Nations a “great Covenant Chain” belt bearing 
the date 1764, telling them to “preserve my Words in your Hearts… [and] look upon this Belt as 
the Chain which binds you to the English, and never let it slip out of your hands.” He 
symbolically affixed one end to the “Chippaweighs at St. Mary’s” and the other, to his house.45 
Figure 9: 1764 Covenant Chain and Twenty-Four Nations Wampum Belts
46
 
 
 
Source: Engravings made by Rev. George Hallen in 1852. A.F. Hunter, “Wampum Records of 
the Ottawas,” Archaeological Report, 16th Annual Appendix to the Report of the Minister of 
Education, Ontario (Toronto: Warwick Bros. & Rutter Printers, 1901), 52-55.  
 
It is believed that a “Twenty Four Nations Presents Belt,” portraying the interconnectedness of 
the nations to each other, and to the British through their interlocking hands, accompanied the 
1764 belt.
47
 (See Figure 9 above). Based on “promises of protection and sustenance” these belts 
assured the Western Nations that they would receive the “necessaries of life…as long as the 
world shall last” and should be considered “the foundation of the British-Anishinaabeg Treaty 
Alliance.
48
  
 Firstly, Anishinabe leaders expected that they would continue to receive quantities of 
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utilitarian goods or ‘presents’ like Covenant Chain gifts of goodwill, trade, and diplomacy. 
Secondly, British military and Indian Department officials (including Commanders of the 
Forces) made specific promises to assist individual chiefs and villages in exchange for 
provisions, military support and intelligence, and to support friends and relations. Thirdly, after 
1780, officials assured their Anishinabe allies that pensions and rations would be forthcoming to 
compensate them for losses suffered directly as a consequence of their loyalty. Lastly, nations 
who negotiated treaties became eligible for annuities or additional payments for their lands in the 
form of goods or money. In addition to the speeches of Black Hawk and Mookomaanish, 
petitions and speeches from Anishinabe leaders in the Western District reiterated these promises. 
They accused officials of combining these promises under the moniker of ‘presents’ in order to 
reduce and eventually eliminate them.
49
 The colonial government considered many of these 
agreements to be relics of a colonial past or promises made only for the duration of the war. 
Peace rendered most of them costly and unnecessary.  
 The British did not have a plan to demilitarize or provision Aboriginal people in the 
borderlands who found themselves unable to return to the United States and surrounded by 
devastation. Policy at the posts had always been to feed individuals while they waited for their 
presents and during the war, British largesse increased substantially to feed Anishinabe families 
camped around Malden and Amherstburg. By June 1815, William Caldwell wrote that the 
government was “feeding upwards of 1,900 [Indians]” daily rations consisting of bread, beef or 
pork, flour, and rum. But all soldiers, militia and warriors, once disbanded, were no longer 
entitled to army rations. That same year, Caldwell received instructions to disperse them.
50
 Many 
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of the 600 Chippewa at the Chenail Ecarté, 387 Ottawa on Fighting Island, and others in the area 
had fled their villages and hunting territories in the United States. The chiefs and Indian 
Department officials knew they faced violence if they returned.
51
  Lieutenant Colonel Reginald 
James protested this policy on strategic and humanitarian grounds arguing the prudence of 
retaining 1300 “British Indians at Detroit and this side [Canadian].” James also acknowledged 
that officers promised them provisions and ammunition until “grain could be raised by their own 
labour” or they could safely return home.52 It seems that others did too, as Lieutenant Governor 
Francis Gore approved Indian Department requisitions for 195,000 pounds of rations and 675 
gallons of rum for distribution at Amherstburg between Christmas 1815 and June 1817.
53
 
Compared to the 4500 pounds requested for Kingston and 9,000 pounds at York, Amherstburg’s 
ration estimates amounted to more than ten times the 18,000 pounds earmarked for Fort George 
and Drummond Island.
54
 According to Caldwell’s return, daily rations to feed the 1200 “Indians 
Dependent on the Post of Amherstburg,” and others at Sandwich, Moravian Town and the 
Thames and St. Clair actually exceeded the estimate cited above. Indian Department officials 
found it difficult to justify these enormous expenses, not only because their superiors believed 
that continuing to distribute rations encouraged “Idleness” but because the measure failed to 
solve the problems of a significant diasporic Indigenous population in the borderlands.
55
 In 1817 
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Black Hawk complained there were too “many widows and orphans in our village whose hearts 
are still bloody.”56 
 Aboriginal people in the borderlands continued to depend on presents and pensions 
distributed by the Indian Department and the Western Superintendency represented the largest 
portion of the budget.  In the late 1820s, 13,000 to 15,000 Aboriginal people received presents in 
Upper Canada and one third to one half of them came to Amherstburg. When the northwestern 
post of Drummond Island is included, the Western Great Lakes accounted for at least 75 percent 
of the goods distributed. Between January and October 1830, 5100 out of a total of 15,119 who 
received presents throughout Upper Canada received them at Amherstburg. They consumed 
12,962 pounds of bread, 14,273 pounds of beef, 90 pounds of pork, 1191 pounds of flour, and 
423 rations of rum in the process.
57
 While the Anishinabe viewed all of these promises as long 
term promises of goodwill and believed officials would not allow them to suffer, officials 
considered them to be merely temporary measures that would cease immediately once the border 
dispute with the Americans was solved. But as post records show, Anishinabe in the borderlands 
continued to frequent Amherstburg even after many returned to Michigan. Darling issued an 
order to reduce rations to wounded Indians and to widows of warriors in 1823 and the 
department continued to find ways to reduce the costs of their promises.
58
 
 In an effort to combat perceived “irregularities,” general instructions issued in 1821 
further violated the promises made to the Western Nations.
59
 Despite the fact that they 
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historically came to Amherstburg for all their communications with the Crown, officials 
proposed that medical boards at Fort George or Kingston examine Indian pension claimants.
60
 It 
appears that some disabled Aboriginal veterans were required to travel nearly four hundred 
kilometres (approximately 250 miles) from Amherstburg to Fort George and perhaps even 
further if they resided in Michigan Territory. To make matters worse, identical services in the 
form of a Commissary Officer and medical examiner were already available at Amherstburg. 
Johnson noted that a policy requiring a “poor” injured Potawatomi man to travel such a distance 
was a “serious inconvenience” and wrote to Darling asking to approve the request to appear at 
Amherstburg.
61
 Arguing that Indians in Lower Canada had to travel upwards of sixty miles 
(ninety-six kilometers) for their pensions, Johnson did not seem to be aware that the Western 
Nations often traveled up to four times that distance to receive theirs.
62
 Twenty years after the 
conclusion of hostilities, the department paid only £25 in “pensions to wounded Indians” in all of 
Upper Canada.
63 
  
 Despite mounting evidence of hardship and destitution, Darling remained certain that 
Aboriginal people engaged in widespread fraud. He believed that deserving warriors claimed 
multiple issues of presents, the wounded signed Powers of Attorney enabling others to collect 
their pensions, and all frequently exchanged goods for rum “or otherwise dispos[ed of them] 
…contrary to the wishes of Government.”64 Although Johnson wrote that he was not aware of 
any “irregularities,” requiring veterans to travel to Fort George certainly created difficulties.  
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Those who could or would not make such an onerous journey founded themselves compelled to 
sign their pensions over to merchants or traders to pay debts for goods received locally. Some 
Indigenous people wished to purchase alcohol, but the department’s own correspondence cited 
no evidence to support an epidemic of fraud or drunkenness. Selling or trading goods received 
from the government historically was one oft-used method of circumventing British policy when 
it was not attuned to their needs, but officials failed to report this as problematic.
65
 Even though 
the department had no accurate way of measuring the frequency of the practice, Darling told 
Commissary officials to have the goods marked to discourage trade or re-sale.
66
  
 Paternalistic policies requiring Aboriginal people to travel great distances worsened the 
problems pensions were designed to alleviate. Individuals required several months of pension 
goods ahead of time to reduce the burden of travel and enable seasonal hunting in Michigan 
Territory. Those unable to make the journey either had to have someone sign on their behalf or 
do without, a situation that increased suffering and encouraged hoarding.  Better equipped to 
prevent fraud, officers at Amherstburg knew local Indigenous peoples and understood their 
needs better than officials at Fort George.  
 Combining the various entitlements into one or two annual disbursements was one of the 
last cost-cutting initiatives. This expedited the distribution of goods and shortened the time spent 
at the forts consuming rations.
67
 When goods were separated by ceremony and distributed at 
different times, Indigenous peoples assigned the payment to the correct debt and could easily see 
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and recall amounts received for land and as presents.
68
 It became difficult to ascertain value 
when so many gathered in one place and goods were left in piles for the chiefs to distribute or 
handed in bundles to individuals. Combining goods for different purposes prevented Anishinabe 
leaders from visually assessing the payments for individual transactions and thus from keeping 
their own accounts year to year.
69
 When the department began commuting treaty annuity money 
to goods and changing presents from trade goods to agricultural implements and clothing after 
1825, measuring and accounting for various payments became even more difficult.
70
 The use of 
the terms “presents”, “pensions,” “disbursements” and “goods” inaccurately and interchangeably 
in their correspondence suggests that even Indian Department employees and staff in the 
Colonial Office did not really distinguish between the different entitlements.
71
 Commuting 
presents and annuities to goods and combining them into one lump payment enabled the 
department to gradually reduce and eliminate their overall quality and value.  They repurposed 
what remained for ‘civilization’ and settlement.72  
 By the late 1820s, recovery and survival in the post-war period for those who lived in 
Tecumseh’s shadow depended upon both goods and the attendant goodwill of settlers and 
officials. Most, including the Assistant Commissary General, believed that the government 
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treated warriors of the Western Nations “ranked as officers” or wounded in battle the same as the 
militia and paid them their full pensions.
73
 But this is simply not true. The estimated number of 
Aboriginal people recorded by British officials as veterans of the western theatre in 1812-14 does 
not align with current estimates or with the small number who later received compensation, 
pensions, rations and presents. The spectacle of present distributions created the impression that 
Aboriginal veterans and their families received better treatment than everyone else who had to 
reapply twice per year.
74
 But pensions along with other payments differed from “presents” and 
they were rarely, if ever, distributed in the form of currency. Though they were all sacred 
agreements and Covenant Chain obligations, Indigenous people understood reimbursement for 
losses along with rent, presents, pensions, land payments, rations and gifts to have been separate 
and distinct payments recognizing both ceremony and sacrifices the Western Nations made in the 
course of sharing their lands with Europeans. The British Indian Department simply distributed a 
set amount of goods according to a yearly budget approved in advance. Leaders like Black Hawk 
did not know that the British reduced the presents to a tenth of their former value at the end of 
the war, but they saw and felt the results in their communities. In 1816, the year before Black 
Hawk met the British on Drummond Island, they were reduced from £117,500 to £16,000.
75
 
After 1830, irrespective of promises or present needs, the British Parliament issued an annual 
grant of £20,000 for the cost of presents in both Upper and Lower Canada, an amount that could 
not be exceeded under any circumstances.
76
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 Goods and rations distributed by the Indian Department assumed such importance 
because the Anishinabe had lost so much livestock and food in the War. The government cut 
presents during the unseasonably cold and snowy conditions in 1816, “the year without 
summer.” A post-war recession, unpredictable weather, and intermittent crop failures delayed 
economic recovery in the Western District well into the 1820s.
77
 Indeed, Indigenous allies who 
survived the war were not distressed by the fact that they were no longer needed as allies after 
1814; they were devastated because the Crown failed to honour promises made by its highest 
ranking servants.  By 1818, these circumstances made the negotiation of the Huron Tract Treaty 
all the more important.  
The Huron Tract Treaty, 1818-1827 
 In the nineteenth century, Lieutenant Governors, military, civil and Indian department 
officials and Chiefs expected that Indigenous peoples would settle a portion of the Western 
District.
78
 By 1818 leaders of the Chenail Ecarté & St. Clair, Thames and Bear Creek understood 
that political and economic conditions were changing. John Askin Jr., Indian Superintendent at 
Amherstburg and son of the famed trader, merchant and speculator, proposed a surrender of land 
from the Thames River north to Lake Huron with some of the region’s chiefs in the fall of 
1818.
79
 Chawme told Askin that they would consent to the treaty in exchange for five reserves 
and the ability to purchase more land if needed, a cash annuity, a blacksmith and a farming 
instructor.
80
 While officials attempted to change the terms, it took nine years to finalize the treaty 
because the chiefs refused to acquiesce. In the words of an unknown chief, “we hesitated for a 
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long time before we were content to let our Great Father have [the land]…”81   
 Negotiations for the Huron Tract commenced in 1818 after the Colonial Office 
substituted payments of one-time distributions of goods with perpetual annuities.
82
 Chawme 
understood annuities as cash paid directly to them, and he requested annual payments for a term 
of fifty years, “half in hard money & half in cloathing.” These payments, Chawme specifically 
stated were to be separate and distinct from any other presents, pensions, goods or monies they 
currently received or might be entitled to receive in the future.
83
 Chiefs and officials were aware 
that lump-sum payments of goods they received in the 1790 and 1796 Treaties were gone while 
settlers continued to enjoy the use and accrued value in improvements made to the lands 
surrendered.
84
 Specie was scarce, and Chawme undoubtedly realized that cash payments allowed 
them the freedom to purchase articles they required. One year after the policy change, Askin 
presented the chiefs with a Provisional Agreement in 1819 stipulating that the entire payment 
would be made in goods.  The chiefs refused to sign it and were extra vigilant with every 
agreement put before them, demanding to know how much money they were going to receive 
before they signed.
 85
 However, as non-English speakers, they relied on the honesty and accuracy 
of translators and faced officials intent on substituting currency with goods whenever possible.
86
 
 That it took nine years to negotiate the Huron Tract treaty suggests the process was 
plagued with problems from the very beginning. Though only the 1825 Provisional and final 
agreements (Numbers 27 ½ and 29) are published in Indian Treaties and Surrenders, at least 
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three officials produced several agreements over the period.
87
 John Askin Jr. assumed the 
position of Superintendent at Amherstburg in 1815 but died in 1819. He was followed by George 
Ironside(s) Sr. and George Jr. in 1825. The dates of extant agreements indicate the 
superintendents often approached leaders in the spring and fall when they were away hunting and 
fishing. Some chiefs did not attend the first council and Askin admitted he had difficulty 
assembling them the following spring for this reason.
88
 This also created opportunities to 
approach leaders individually and on one occasion when Askin discussed the 1818 agreement 
privately, he did so with Tomego, and the reserve was never created.
89
 Private meetings created 
privileged understandings which over time, interfered with the collective memory of Anishinabe 
leaders. 
 Stationed at Amherstburg, Askin and the Ironsides possessed additional opportunities to 
isolate and harass Anishinabe leaders during the distribution of presents.  In October 1818, Askin 
wrote that he would ask them about surrendering their land “the moment the Chiefs & principal 
men” arrived for their presents.90  How many times he approached them is not known. However, 
in March 1822 the discussions were so objectionable that that two Anishinabe Chiefs were 
reportedly “poisoned by their own nation” for agreeing to it.91 In a petition to the Duke of 
Richmond in August 1819, Anishinabe and Wyandotte Chiefs had demanded Askin’s removal 
because they said he did not listen to them.
92
 As a consequence, the negotiations themselves 
caused considerable anxiety and discord among leaders long before an agreement could be 
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reached, and leaders held different understandings of the contents.
93
 
 In 1829, Peter Jones reported that thirty principal men resided on Walpole Island alone.
94
  
Researcher Joan Holmes determined that twenty-three chiefs signed the 1818 Provisional 
agreement, the highest number on extant documents in 1818, 1820, 1825 and 1827. (See Table 4 
below). By 1827 only eighteen totems appear and only seven chiefs signed all four agreements.
95
 
Most unfortunate is the loss of Chawme’s understandings of the earlier agreement. He died 
sometime between April 1819 and July 1823.
96
 As Table 4 shows, the agreement changed 
dramatically between 1820 and 1827 such that the chiefs who attended earlier councils agreed to  
a substantially different Treaty than those who signed in 1825 and 1827.
97
 In other words, while 
there were always some leaders present who had attended earlier councils, there were always 
new chiefs present as well. The conditions explicit in the various agreements must have been 
impaired by the varied attendance. 
 Prior to 1819, Askin met with leaders in the entire region, referring to them as the 
“Chippewas of Chenaille Ecarté, River St. Clair, Sable, Bear Creek and Thames.” That same 
year the treaty was split into two different agreements and the amount of land the Chippewas of 
Chenail Ecarté, River St. Clair and Sable were asked to surrender in the Huron Tract Treaty 
increased from 712,000 acres to 2,756,000 acres. (See table 4 below). The government pressed 
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Table 4: Variations in Four Huron Tract Agreements: 
 1818 Council to query chiefs 
about interest and terms of  
surrender 
1819 Provisional 
Agreement (voided) 
1825 Provisional 
Agreement (Treaty 27 ½) 
1827 Huron Tract 
Treaty (Treaty 29) 
Chiefs Totems 23 16 20 18 
 Chippewa of Chenail Ecarté, St. 
Clair, Aux Sauble, Thames 
Rivers, Bear Creek 
Chippewa of Chenail Ecarté, 
St. Clair, Aux Sauble 
(separate Longwoods 
Treaty for Thames) 
Chippewa of Chenail 
Ecarté, St. Clair, Aux 
Sauble 
Chippewa of Chenail 
Ecarté, St. Clair, Aux 
Sauble 
Indian Dept. 
Official 
John Askin Jr. George Ironside Sr. James Givins George Ironside Jr. 
Interpreter(s) John Baptiste Cadot George Wrapp [Rapp]  
J.B. Cadot 
George Wrapp 
Joseph St. Germain 
None Indicated 
Surrender Size 712,000 acres 2,756,960 acres 2,756,960 acres 2,182,049 acres 
Reserves Size Not measured 23,040 acres 23,054 acres 17,951 acres 
Reserve Location Lower Reserve (1 sq. mile) 
Sarnia (4 sq. miles) 
Kettle Point (2 sq. miles) 
Stoney Point (2 sq. miles) 
Bear Creek (2sq. miles) 
Tomago’s Reserve 
Lower Reserve 
Sarnia 
Kettle Point 
Stoney Point 
 
Lower Reserve 
Sarnia 
Kettle Point 
Stoney Point 
Lower Reserve (2575 
acres) 
Sarnia (10,280) 
Kettle Point (2446) 
Stoney Point (2650) 
Terms Chawme requests:  
•half hard money/half clothing 
for 50 years 
•blacksmith/farming instructor 
•augment reserves for hunting 
and fishing if population grows 
•payment separate from other 
entitlements 
•No reserves allowed where 
non-natives are already 
settled 
•Perpetual annuity of £1375 
($5500)  
• half money/half goods 
•payment to cease upon 
death of recipient 
•Perpetual annuity of £1100 ($4400) or £2.10s ($10) 
per person per year in goods 
•Limited to 440 (men, women, children) and their 
descendants 
•To be reduced by half if population of 440 declined 
by half (no allowance for increase) 
 
Sources: MG 19 F1 Claus Papers, Vol. 11, “Minutes of a Council”, 16 October, 1818, 95-96; LAC, RG 10/797, Prov. Agreement, 9 May 
1820, 216-24; Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders, Vol. 1, Treaties 27½ and 29, 65-7, 71-5; Holmes, “Ipperwash Report,” 12-18; Telford, 
“How the West Was Won,” 332-3. 
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Ironside thereafter to get leaders to accept low valued goods in lieu of an annuity limited only to 
the treaty signers and their descendants.
1
 Bargaining and discussion in any language did not 
appear to be part of Ironside’s mandate as he regarded the chief’s attempts to negotiate better 
terms as “ingratitude” towards “a Father who had treated them with the greatest paternal 
kindness.”2  The following month, the Chiefs told Ironside that “the white people” were entitled 
to interest when creditors did not pay their debts on time. Wondering why the government had 
not yet paid them for the land, they suggested it do so, or return it “and say nothing more about 
it.”3  
 Beginning in 1819, the decision to separate negotiations with the Thames and Bear Creek 
Chippewa into the Longwoods Treaty
4
 splintered the collective knowledge of the signers further, 
allowing the colonial government to later claim ignorance of the terms. For instance Chawme 
explicitly told Askin that they wanted a blacksmith and a farming instructor to “be 
“stationed near the reserves” but Ironside claimed to know nothing about those promises and the 
treaty made no mention of them.
5
  Similarly, though McKee promised them Shawanoe Township 
in 1796 and the Chenail Ecarté and Bear Creek reserves noted by Askin in 1818, parts of all 
three were granted to militiamen after the War of 1812 and settled without surrenders (Figure 10 
below). Askin and Ironside discussed the surrender solely in terms of land for settlement and 
neither it nor any treaty texts produced prior to 1827, mention anything about the inclusion of 
water, islands, inland rivers or  resources. The final treaty, however, includes “all…of the woods 
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Figure 10: Huron Tract Reserves and Indigenous Lands in Lambton 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and underwoods, ways, waters, watercourses, improvements, profits, commodities, 
hereditaments and appurtenances” on the land ceded.6 While petitions sent by the Anishinabe 
after 1827 suggest the leaders held varied understandings of the Huron Tract Treaty, the belief 
that Shawanoe was reserved in 1796 and that only the land was surrendered were universal. 
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Source: Adapted from Gilbert C. Paterson, Land Settlement in Upper 
Canada, 1783-1840 (Toronto: C.W. James, 1921), 199. 
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 The substance of the initial Huron Tract Agreement was a re-negotiation of the Covenant 
Chain designed to repair the mistakes of the past and move forward anew. Chawme’s speech 
epitomizes the balance inherent in two-eyed seeing. It outlined provisions to secure a land base 
and lay foundations for future social, economic and political cooperation, but also contains 
fundamental elements of the Two-Row-Wampum and Indigenous understandings of the 
Proclamation of 1763. Caught between expanding American and British settlements, the St. 
Clair Chiefs remained concerned about the future security of women and children and for their 
survival as distinct peoples.
7
 Their populations, already reeling from decades of warfare and 
broken promises, could not endure any more conflict.
8
 Anishinabe Chiefs vigorously negotiated 
with officials to secure the political and economic viability of their communities.  Reserves, 
goods and perpetual cash annuities along with agricultural and trades instruction could have 
provided them with the resources to be self-sufficient and develop what historian John Lutz calls 
a “moditional economy”: one that combined Western and Anishinabe strategies.9 Once 
established, income produced by interest on land sales would put them on equal footing with 
their Eurocanadian neighbours and give them opportunities to build and develop their own 
institutions and infrastructure.  Instead, the Crown received 2,182,049 acres of some of the best 
land in southwestern Ontario in exchange for a perpetual annuity of £1100 or $4400 paid yearly 
to the 440 men, women and children and their descendants enumerated at that time. While 
documents up to 1825 stress that the Chiefs wanted at least some of the payment made in “hard 
money,” the treaty provided for “lawful money…in goods” at Montreal prices. The Anishinabe 
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reserved 17,951 acres contained in four reserves located at Sarnia (Upper Reserve), Moore 
(Lower Reserve), and Kettle and Stoney Point (Ausable).
10
 Though it began with much promise, 
after a decade of harassment, and long and protracted negotiations, the St. Clair Chiefs relied on 
the good faith of the Crown and reluctantly acquiesced to the terms of the best deal they could 
secure.  
 Implementing the Huron Tract Treaty terms coincided with the American removal policy 
and more coercive attempts to “civilize” Aboriginal people on both sides of the border.  The 
Eurocanadian population of Upper Canada grew from 6000 in 1784 to 220,000 in 1830, and this 
number doubled in the early 1840s.
11
 Reserve populations also increased with the arrival of 
Indigenous people displaced by agricultural settlement in the new state of Michigan and passage 
of the Indian Removal Act in June 1830. Shawnee, Miami, Potawatomi and Ojibwa peoples 
crossed over in waves to Sarnia and Sault Ste. Marie, encouraged by British officials to come for 
presents and protection.  In 1837 for instance, after obtaining the agreement of Walpole and 
Sarnia Chiefs, upwards of six hundred Saginaw (Saginong) Indians permanently settled on the 
two reserves.
12
 In addition, Clifton estimates that more than 3000 Potawatomi, fleeing aggressive 
settlers and their governments followed in the 1840s.
13
 Between 1837 and 1842, the population 
of Walpole Island increased from 300 to 1,140 while Sarnia grew from 350 to 742.
14
 
Communities at Kettle and Stony Point also increased but officials interpreted the Huron Tract 
Treaty as narrowly as possible, denying these new arrivals a share of the benefits. The treaty 
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limited the annuity to the original 440 and their descendants, and in a spiteful and short-sighted 
manner only contained a clause to reduce the annuity by half should the population decrease in 
proportion. Acknowledging that some signatories were in the United States, Jones determined in 
1833 that only 375 were entitled to the annuity.
15
 As “Treaty” and “non-Treaty Indians” 
intermarried, and as reserve finances became more complex, differential treatment between them 
became extremely divisive.
16
 
 A heterogeneous generation of pioneers and loyalists were also parties to Indigenous 
Treaties in the Western District. Most of the longest-serving officers in the Indian Department 
and military, who perhaps understood Anishinabe peoples in a way that other settlers did not, 
died just when their advocacy and experience was needed most.
17
 Chief Superintendent James 
Givins, the lone surviving veteran of the Revolution, assumed management of the Western or 
Sarnia Superintendency in 1830, but the vast majority of assistants under his charge were part of 
a much younger generation who came of age after the loss of the Northwest.
18
 Though many 
were of mixed ancestry like George Ironside Jr., they lacked the concrete diplomatic experience 
of their forefathers and did not understand Indigenous sovereignty in the context of the Indian 
Territory outlined in the Proclamation of 1763.  
 The loss of collective knowledge resulting from the deaths of this older generation is 
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evident in the 1828 Darling Report. Though Darling opposed eliminating the Department 
wholesale, his report, the “founding document for the civilization program,” outlined the policy 
without reference to any Eurocanadian-Indigenous diplomacy before the War of 1812. The report 
did not discuss the Covenant Chain alliance, contributions the Western Confederacy made to 
British defense or even any of the treaties in detail.19 The transfer of Indian Affairs from military 
to civilian control in 1830 lent further credence to the fact that the past was no longer relevant in 
the peacetime administration of Indian affairs. This continued in the 1844 Bagot Report, 
cementing what historian John Leslie referred to as the “corporate memory” of the Department.  
Though a central part of its mandate was to provide “a documented record of previous policies,” 
it and all subsequent inquiries did so without reference to correspondence from the period before 
the American Revolution.20  The report reduced the entire period of diplomacy to a policy of 
bribery accomplished by the liberal distribution of presents. From the British perspective, such 
largesse in the absence of war amounted to gratuitous charity.21 To use Leslie’s words, George 
Ironside Jr., Joseph Brant Clench, William Keating, William Jones and others in charge of the 
Western Superintendency saw Indigenous peoples not as sovereign nations or Covenant Chain 
allies but as “an expensive social nuisance.”22 Between 1828 and 1841, these attitudes summarily 
guided the actions of four lieutenant-governors through some of the most difficult years in the 
administration of Upper Canada and the most crucial years for Aboriginal settlement.   
 Loyalists settled in the colony during a period when it was imperative to court allies and 
keep the colony firmly under imperial control. The British government estimated it paid more 
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than £6 million to settle displaced loyalist refugees in the 1780s alone. However, Wilson 
suggests that £30 million is a more accurate total.
 
The same storehouses that distributed goods to 
the Anishinabe, issued rations, clothing, ammunition, tools, seed and livestock to Loyalist 
refugees until they could support themselves.
23
 Without such support, it is estimated that close to 
half of the most desperate arrivals would have died.
24
  The Treaty of Ghent perhaps lessened 
Great Britain’s need to court allies for military purposes, but territorial expansion continued 
unabated through immigration and settlement. Increasing competition between settlers and 
Indigenous people meant that at the time the reserves were established, loyalties and identities 
gained renewed importance in Upper Canada.
25
 
 In contrast, the “civilization program” interested the British government at a time when 
the nature of empire changed to one focused on fiscal restraint and decentralization. The 
Mississauga of the Credit experienced this first hand.  Having settled of their own volition and 
expense in 1826, officials denied their requests for agricultural implements and other assistance 
to “settle…and embrace…the Habits of Civilized Life.” Only a few months before he officially 
introduced his report, Superintendent-General H.C. Darling suggested the Mississauga use their 
1812 claims payments to purchase the necessary supplies. Darling instructed Ironside to 
convince the Anishinabe under his superintendence to apply their losses payments collectively 
towards their settlement since, on an individual basis, their payments were “calculated to 
disappoint.”26 The entire community at the Credit River received less than £85 ($340)27 and the 
Anishinabeg never received support comparable to other Loyalists. Forty years earlier, the 
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average Loyalist claimant had received nearly £178 ($700), more than enough to establish an 
individual family on the land. 
28
 In 1829 Darling himself estimated that an entire family of five 
could be comfortably housed and supplied with rations, livestock, tools and seed for £100 ($400) 
outright or £44,000 ($176,000) for all of the signatories of the Huron Tract Treaty if they so 
choose, a mere fraction of the cost to settle Loyalists. While Kempt, Darling and Colborne were 
initially certain that fiscal concerns would not undermine the project, the bottom line became the 
only consideration once it was implemented.
29
 Chief Aissance (c.1790-1847), whose community 
had already settled near Orillia, expressed concern with what he perceived was a growing 
eagerness among Department Officials to appropriate their monies. Seeing this as a direct threat 
to their independence, Jones quoted Aissance, saying that he “wishes to have something always 
in his pockets…so that when he gets hungry, he may put his hands into his pockets and find 
something jingling to buy bread with.”30 Recognizing the utility of these policies, the Indian 
Department increasingly attempted to regulate Anishinabe behavior by controlling access to their 
money and goods. 
 By 1837, outstanding losses from the War of 1812 amounting to £400,000 along with 
unpaid loans for public works threatened to bankrupt the colony. The politics of non-payment 
played a significant part in the settlers’ broader discontent and officials became impatient with 
political uncertainty, and ultimately open rebelliousness.
31
 While similar actions would never 
have been tolerated by discontented Indigenous peoples, colonial administrators went to great 
lengths to appease settler demands. Permitted to use the funds and land grants as they pleased, 
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farmers, soldiers, merchants, and other recipients of compensation could sell their land and 
improvements. Many did, either returning to the United States or establishing themselves in 
business elsewhere in the Canadas or the Empire.
 32
 In contrast, Darling was completely 
unwilling to involve Anishinabe leaders in their own planning—even when the Mississauga of 
the Credit created policy initiatives on their own that he would introduce himself within mere 
months. Darling used Indigenous entitlements to compel the uncooperative to acquiesce to the 
British officials’ demands. Though leaders like Chawme and Aissance argued forcefully for 
access to their own monies, officials became convinced that “[t]he Indian would receive no 
benefit whatever from a small sum of money put into his own hand…”33 The advantages of this 
policy were immediately apparent and Darling and Givins were eager to find out how “a 
proportion of the monies now payable for losses during the War might not be advantageously 
disposed of …” 34 Loyalist refugees, given steady support and control of their own monies, were 
largely self-sufficient after 1781,
35
 whereas, Aissance observed, Anishinabe people could not 
even buy a loaf of bread on their own. Rather than alleviate the uncertainty associated with bare 
subsistence, the ‘civilizing policy’ of village settlement actually made it worse.  
Reserves or Removal  
 Civilization policy, crafted one year after the Huron Tract Treaty, violated its terms as 
officials attempted to remove and resettle the Anishinabe on one large interior reserve. While 
Anishinabe Chiefs negotiated the Huron Tract Treaty as a long-term blueprint for future 
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relations, government officials acted in the belief that such agreements were temporary.
36
 George 
Ironside Jr. received instructions in April 1830 to “persuade the Chiefs” to reside on one reserve 
in the interior near the Sable for the convenience of building housing, a church and schoolhouse 
in one central location.
37
 Congregating them in one location against their will naturally horrified 
the chiefs who, in varying degrees, expressed interest in aspects of the civilization policy but not 
at the expense of their lands and culture. They refused to entertain any notion of leaving their 
reserves. 
 The chiefs informed Ironside Jr. several times that a village would be better established at 
the Chenail Ecarté “where the land is already cleared” and where they routinely planted crops of 
Indian corn and squash.
38
  The chiefs also knew that the sandy dunes and “ponds of standing 
water” at the Sable, while ideal for small plots of corn and pumpkins, would not support a large 
agriculturally based settlement.
39
 Walpole Island Chief Bauzhigeeshigwashekum spoke for the 
chiefs who had gathered in council many times between Ironside’s visits. He told Ironside that 
the chiefs wanted assistance and tools to farm at the Chenail Ecarté, but houses or teachers were 
not necessary because they “opposed any change” to their “religion or customs.” They eventually 
convinced Ironside that Anishinabe families who remained unwilling to settle elsewhere might 
support a village at the Chenail Ecarté.
40
  
 William Jones disagreed and tried repeatedly throughout the summer of 1830 to convince 
the chiefs, through spokesman Shaweny-penince,
41
 to move behind the settled townships of 
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Sombra, Dawn and Zone. Shaweny-penince wanted the terms of the Huron Tract Treaty 
honoured and a guarantee that agricultural and trades instruction, a storehouse and an agent of 
their choosing would be stationed at the Chenail Ecarté. Wawanosh told Jones that when the sale 
of their lands was made “he had been promised by the agents of the Government, that the Indians 
should never again be disturbed from the reserves…” By the end of June, Jones could see that 
they would not move. He asked, “[w]ould it not be better to settle them on one of the reserves on 
the St. Clair for the present?”42 In 1831 the Department seemingly conceded defeat.  It hired 
Jones as assistant superintendent and instructed him to form a village at the Sarnia flats.
43
   
 Though they did not succeed in having the village located at the Chenail Ecarté, by 
refusing to cooperate as a whole, the chiefs staved off removal and prevented the intrusion of 
civilizing agents among them. The mere suggestion of removal tainted the relationship between 
the chiefs and the department, thereby thwarting Anishinabe self-sufficiency over the long-term.  
Land speculators and squatters exploited the situation, spreading rumours for years afterwards 
that the department planned to remove the Anishinabe regardless of where they located the 
village.
44
  
 Bauzhigeeshigwashekum assumed the role of spokesperson for dissenters and those who 
questioned department policy. Jones thereafter characterized Walpole Island and some of the St. 
Clair Chiefs as resistant and under the control of a “necromancer.”45 But Wawanosh also resisted 
attempts to move into the interior and though he eventually invited Jones to locate the model 
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village at Sarnia, he insisted on the same conditions articulated by Shaweny-Penince.  
Wawanosh instructed Jones to put his conditions in writing and send them to the Lieutenant-
Governor just to make sure they were understood.
46
 Only a month after receiving his instructions 
to build a settlement, Jones wrote that “the Enemies of my undertaking are very numerous, and 
their influence has produced much evil.”47 By resisting removal the St. Clair Chiefs ensured their 
reserves would stay intact, but refusing to place the village at the Chenail Ecarté limited the 
locations Jones now had at his disposal. Sarnia was possible but the War of 1812 had seemingly 
taught administrators little. The Chenail Ecarté was in a central location close to the towns of 
Detroit, Amherstburg, Baldoon and Chatham, and within reasonable distance to water 
transportation on the St. Clair, Detroit, Sydenham (Bear Creek) and Thames River systems. In 
contrast, the Sarnia Village was isolated from major settlement, dependent upon water for 
transportation and communication, and located at the furthest end of an enormously long supply 
chain.
48
 Success therefore depended upon the knowledge and cooperation of chiefs whom Jones 
had already succeeded in alienating.  This shortsightedness delayed the operation of the 
settlement until well after 1833.
49
   
 Despite his military experience and lengthy residence in the region, William Jones 
proved to be an inept manager and the community suffered as a result. A former Detroit resident, 
Jones allegedly operated as a spy for Tecumseh and Brock before crossing over and purchasing 
Lord Selkirk’s Baldoon farm after the War of 1812.50 He remained in Baldoon making periodic 
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trips to Sarnia to inspect the progress of construction and to visit Henry John Jones at his utopian 
colony at Maxwell.
51
 William Jones and the Maxwell founder’s eldest son, Henry John Jones, 
developed a friendship and corresponded frequently, as Henry Jones Sr. was related by marriage 
to Sir John Colborne.
52
  Henry John advised William on the location and layout of the Sarnia 
settlement, and gaining the cooperation of Chief Wawanosh  through “some small marks of 
distinction” in the design of his house.53 The settlements of Baldoon and Maxwell both 
floundered and ultimately failed to achieve the expectations of their founders.  Whether this 
speaks to the individual capabilities of Henry John Jones and William Jones or simply to the 
challenges of the environment they faced is subject to debate. 
 William Jones made several avoidable and unexplainable mistakes beginning with the 
location of the proposed village. Burwell’s 1826 survey noted substantial settlement at the 
location south of Point Edward and Jones himself was aware that poor squatters lived on the 
land.
54
 Their settlement violated the Proclamation of 1763 and the Huron Tract Treaty both of 
which reserved the land for Aboriginal peoples. If Jones initially thought the cleared fields and 
existing housing would be advantageous, he later described the houses as uninhabitable and the 
lands “much worn by continuous cultivation.” The squatters demanded and received 
compensation for what amounted to a few rudely constructed shacks before they relocated. The 
squatters proved difficult to remove, and Jones appeared reluctant to hurry them along. They 
were still on the reserve in 1834, and by arranging for compensation in the first place, he 
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encouraged further squatting on Indian lands.
55
 
 The presence of squatters did not seem to deter Jones from his belief that Anishinabe 
farmers would move into their new houses in the fall of 1830. By October, the houses were not 
completed, and Jones again predicted crops might be sown the following spring. He insisted that 
nineteen men go hunting to avoid starvation, as they waited with their six yoke of oxen to till the 
fields.
56
  Ultimately, builders did not finish the houses until late summer of 1832, and they did 
not plant and harvest regularly until the second half of the decade.
57
 
 Civilization policy ‘promised’ the acquisition of trades skills and education to enable 
Anishinabe people to manage their own communities within a growing Eurocanadian economy.  
In theory, a contractor should have been hired to teach construction and maintenance to those 
interested in settling. As paid labourers, men could have built their own housing as needed, 
maintained buildings in the village and been hired in the broader county as skilled contractors as 
occurred elsewhere in the colony.
58
 Instead, Jones took control of the entire process, 
communicating the design of the houses to the Royal Engineer, hiring a local contractor and 
conferring with local settlers instead of the people who were going to live in the houses. Between 
1830 and 1833, many delays could be attributed to exclusion of the Anishinabe from the process 
of their own settlement.   
 William McCrae, the contractor hired by William Jones, did not have funds to purchase 
supplies or hire labourers without continual advances from the Indian Department. The farmer  
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Figure 11: Plan for Indian Houses, Captain Phillpotts, Royal Engineers. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: LAC, RG 10/441, J.B. Clench Papers, Miscellaneous Papers, p. 66-
67.  
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and Justice of the Peace from Ralleigh Township had difficulty understanding the house plans 
and was forced to accommodate several unplanned changes in size and design, and rebuild 
shifted foundations after delays pushed construction into the dead of winter. 59  Making matters 
worse, in the midst of construction McCrae disappeared, and building at the village came to an 
abrupt halt. As the months went by, Jones steadfastly refused to hire anyone else, even when 
McCrae’s son wrote to tell him that his father was extremely ill and in all likelihood, would not 
complete the contract.60 McCrae eventually recovered in the spring of 1832 and finished the 
houses with another advance at the end of the year. The delay had lasted almost three years.61   
 At the time, fairly crude log cabin, twenty by twenty feet could be built in a few days at a 
cost of £10 ($40). More substantial buildings with finer details would take longer and cost 
approximately £30 ($120). Common log houses of the period were one and a half stories high  
with a central fireplace, two rooms on the lower floor, and sleeping lofts in the upper portion.62  
Houses on the Sarnia reserve followed this floor plan, but Jones did not consult the residents and 
changed the overall dimensions changed four times. He initially designed them to be twelve by 
fourteen feet, but potential residents complained that this was too small. Jones changed the 
specifications to fourteen by sixteen feet, but the engineer instead sent him a design for houses 
thirty feet wide and sixteen feet deep. Jones attempted to reduce the width back to twenty feet. 
However, each minute alteration required a confusing exchange of letters between Jones at 
Baldoon, Givins at York and Lieutenant George Phillpotts of the Royal Engineers in Quebec in 
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order to secure advice, permission, redesign and approval.63 After delaying construction for 
months, the final plans retained Phillpotts’ dimensions, and the houses were much larger than 
Jones originally intended.64 (Figure 11 above).  
 In keeping with the historic design of their villages, Sarnia Chiefs wanted double-family 
houses grouped together as closely as possible. This would have enabled them to establish 
communal farms with officials residing on the margins of the reserve. But Jones instead sought 
advice from McCrae and Henry John Jones and did the reverse, designing the village like a 
Eurocanadian town.  Sixteen houses belonging to officials and the chiefs as well as professional 
buildings like the schoolhouse were placed in the centre, “fifty paces of each other.” Single-
family ‘Indian’ houses were spread out on concession-style lots “six chains, fifty links wide” 
with road allowances between them. Jones confessed that Wawanosh reluctantly made “some 
sacrifices” in the design and execution of the village, but all it really did was alienate and 
physically isolate the Sarnia Chiefs from their own residents and the community from Walpole 
Island and the Lower Reserve.65 
 Jones promised the Sarnia settlement would be open to any Anishinabe on the St. Clair 
who wished to settle.  But when the houses were finally finished, Walpole Island Chiefs were 
furious to discover that there were not enough houses for everyone who wanted one. In 1830, 
Jones predicted that more Anishinabe families would be interested in settling once they had an 
opportunity to actually see the village and inspect the houses, but he only contracted for the 
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initial few who expressed interest. 66  By the time the last house was finished he immediately 
faced a housing crisis and had to arrange for more to be built.  The apportionment of housing 
also appeared to favour Wawanosh’s ‘band,’ and Jones made the crisis worse by assigning three 
more houses to the missionary, schoolteacher, and interpreter-farmer.67 Missionary Thomas 
Turner thought the house was too small, so he lived on the American side until 1833 when Jones 
let him move into the newly finished schoolhouse. Jones arranged to have a larger house built for 
him but as soon as it was finished, Turner was replaced by Missionary James Evans in August 
1834.68  Jones, who also occupied one of the houses for a time, displaced, inconvenienced and 
divided the Anishinabe to accommodate poor individuals with large families, who he said 
deserved his sympathy.69 These same people abandoned the settlement almost as quickly as they 
arrived, and as a consequence, it took until the second half of the decade for Anishinabe settlers 
to establish themselves in a village built for their purposes years earlier.   
 William Jones did not rehire McCrae and had difficulty finding competent local builders. 
While he complained that most of his tenders were American, he never once proposed to educate 
Anishinabe men in construction or supply them with materials to build their own. The agent was 
pleased with a fence built by men in the village for the distribution of presents, and their 
recommendations for larger houses were ultimately approved, but he did not apparently see them 
as competent enough to build their own houses.70 Contractors from Baldoon, and Kemp and 
Laliberty (Laliberté) of Amherstburg built subsequent houses in the village.71 This was not only a 
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missed opportunity but a failure to provide the promise of training made to the chiefs in 1818. 
When discussing settlement at the Chenail Ecarté, Shaweny-penince reiterated their demand for 
a storehouse and agricultural and trades instruction.
72
 In a few short years, experienced 
contractors, masons and labourers from Great Britain and the United States would find 
opportunities building houses, canals and railways while capable Anishinabe men largely stood 
on the sidelines. Instead of waiting years for their houses to be built for them, those wanting to 
settle at Sarnia could have built their own if given the supplies to do so. Though these were 
external factors unrelated to their abilities or intentions, delays in settlement exacerbated other 
problems affecting the district in the 1830s. Economic woes complicated by sickness, delays in 
the distribution of presents and the rebellions meant that, by 1840, locals and officials perceived 
Anishinabe farmers to be either resistant to or unable to succeed in a rural economy.  
“The Disturbed State of the Country” 
 In ideal circumstances it could take farm households several years to sell enough produce 
to purchase necessaries. Attempts by officials to focus Indigenous reserve economies on wheat 
farming occurred at time when export prices were low and harvests susceptible to loss. Between 
1832 and 1838 wheat prices fell as Great Britain relied less on colonial exports.73  Outright crop 
failures occurred in 1828 and 1829 with slight improvements beginning in 1830.74 Farmers in the 
Western District achieved very little surplus in this period and were able to manage only “a 
modified form of subsistence agriculture.”75  These were challenging times for Indigenous 
farmers to transition to ‘self-sufficiency’ through wheat farming. On all the reserves, historic 
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seasonal cycles of hunting, fishing, sugar-making and gathering continued, supplemented by 
fields of more reliable crops like potatoes and Indian corn. Bauzhigeeshigwashekum and the 
Walpole Island and St. Clair Chiefs were probably thankful they had not followed their brethren 
to Sarnia.  
 While Anishinabe farmers tilled their fields, Asiatic cholera appeared in Upper Canada in 
June 1832 and 1834 and again in the 1850s. Though malaria and smallpox probably caused more 
deaths per capita, the mortality rate of cholera approached 60 per cent, making it a serious human 
health risk.76 To prevent the spread of the disease, the Western District created a Board of Health 
and opened a cholera hospital at Sandwich which by 1834 provided care for those unable to 
pay.77 Despite these measures, between 17,000 and 20,000 people died of cholera in Canada.78   
 Cholera was first brought to the attention of George Ironside in a general order 
suspending presents on the 9th of July 1832.  Two days later, the disease was present among the 
troops across the river from Sarnia at Fort Gratiot.79 Understood at the time as a disease of 
immigration, psychologically, the district was thrown into panic at the thought of it crossing the 
border.80  It could not have arrived at a worse time for the Anishinabe village at Sarnia. In the 
Spring of 1832, there was still work to be done to complete the houses but three to four acres had 
been cleared and fenced and “twenty bushels of potatoes and Six to Seven Acres of Indian corn” 
planted.81 Soon after, however, “the Mechanics…so afraid to remain so near that dreaded 
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disease,” refused to work, and left. One week later everyone had “taken fright and fled into the 
interior.”82  By September, the situation became more serious and “a good deal of sickness, 
prevail[ed] in the Country…” With winter quickly approaching and difficulties hiring 
“Mechaniks in health,” construction was again delayed until the spring of 1833.83 Had Jones 
arranged for another contractor when the problems with McCrae initially surfaced, the village 
would have been completed in a timely manner and the Anishinabe would have weathered the 
epidemic in warm houses, with crops planted in their fields.  
 Housing delays combined with fear of disease convinced the community to disperse to 
their winter hunting grounds. Jones distributed presents and land payments in November, but by 
April they had not returned and Jones could not take a census.
84
 Clearing and planting were 
generally performed in the spring upon their return and in the fall before the hunt.
85
 Without a 
crop planted in the spring, there would be no harvest in the fall, and by November 1833, they 
depended upon rations. Jones reported they were “in the necessity of going on hunting 
excursions for 3 or 4 days at a time to keep from starving.” But one month later, the rations did 
not arrive, and he described them as out of ammunition and “really in a suffering condition.”86  
 A petty dispute between Jones and Deputy Commissary General Leggatt at Amherstburg 
concerning permission for transportation prevented the dispatch of the presents before the close 
of navigation in December 1833.
87
 Jones tried to get rations, but after waiting two months, the 
frustrated and starving Western Nations went to their winter hunt camps.  Some received their 
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presents in late spring 1834. However, a number of communities, including Walpole Island 
claimed they never received them at all between 1833 and 1835.
88
 The delayed arrival of rations 
and supplies again meant that the residents at Sarnia had to eat their seed potatoes and corn 
instead of planting them for the following year.
89
 In early June, Ironside reported that more than 
one hundred people in need of rations and ammunition made the journey from the St. Clair to 
Amherstburg.
90
  No one attempting to farm in this period could afford to be idle with winter 
approaching, yet Jones kept the residents at Sarnia waiting for two months to receive goods that 
did not arrive and then expected them to interrupt their spring sugaring to trek back to Sarnia 
when they did.  It appears that a significant number simply could not afford to take the risk.
 91
   
 The Indian Department executive in Quebec issued instructions in 1829 stating that the 
distribution of presents should occur in June and July. While consistent dates in the spring and 
fall were intended to prevent recipients from reciving multiple issues, correspondence between 
Leggatt, Ironside, Givins and Jones indicates that bureaucratic delays throughout the 1830s 
pushed these dates into late autumn and closer to the onset of winter freeze-up.
92
 This in turn 
increased the chances that the presents would be irregularly distributed or not issued at all, and it 
increased the risks Anishinabe people took to receive them. In these instances, the real harm was 
not caused by a dependency on European manufactured goods, but by the uncertainty 
surrounding their distribution. So long as the farmers at Sarnia could not plan a food-gathering 
strategy, and a good harvest remained elusive, a cycle of starvation and dependency on rations 
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often followed. 
 A challenging location, bureaucratic incompetence and disputes among administrators 
disrupted Anishinabe lifeways earlier than in other reserve communities. The inability to plan for 
the months ahead prevented them from either settling and planting crops or returning to their 
former seasonal cycle of hunting, fishing, sugaring and gathering in a predictable manner. 
Properly executed, the two economies did not have to be mutually exclusive and prior to the first 
outbreak of cholera, clearing the fields and planting were easily accommodated by them before 
and after they engaged in traditional economic pursuits.
93
 Once the integrated cycle was 
interrupted, they became caught in-between. Prevented from planting or procuring foodstuffs to 
survive the winter, they experienced prolonged periods of starvation and were physically 
unprepared to handle a second round of cholera. Similar circumstances as Daschuk suggests, 
preceded an outbreak of tuberculosis on the Canadian plains later in the nineteenth century.
94
  
Here, as in Western Canada, the effects of the second cholera epidemic were much more severe 
when it struck the region in late summer 1834.
95
 Jones indicates they buried nearly one person 
every day in the month of August on the Sarnia reserve alone, and survivors fled the settlement 
in September.
96
 As Ironside noted in his request for rations, families with even one case of 
cholera were denied “the assistance of their friends” and rendered “entirely dependent on the 
bounty of government for temporary support.”97  Until the threat of illness passed, both farming 
and seasonal economic pursuits were again thrown into chaos. 
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  Residents in the Western District blamed Americans, French and Anishinabe in one way 
or another for contributing to the spread of Cholera. Jones initially attributed it to 300 deserting 
American soldiers who “passed Baldoon on their way to the Thames.” In the summer of 1832, 
Wesleyan Missionary Thomas Turner reported that at least forty soldiers died at Fort Gratiot.98 
The notion that a hostile neighbour carried the disease into the District fed anti-American 
sentiment in the borderlands. Infected Americans according to Jones were “travelling through the 
country in all directions,” invading Upper Canada once again using other means. 99 But as 
Charles Eliot, a judge and chairman of the Western District Board of Health wrote, fearful 
settlers also blamed the Anishinabe and Wyandotte whose lifestyles it was believed, harboured 
and encouraged the spread of disease:   
 from the shoals of Indians daily arriving at Amherstburg for their presents. 
 Their d isgusting filth, their lamentable intemperance, their thoughtless and 
 inevitable exposure to the damps and dews of night, must eminently predispose 
 them to receive the disease in a most malignant form; and their roving and 
 careless habits tend to its fearful extension, be it contagious or merely 
 communicated by the less rapid process of infection.100 
 Though locals blamed Anishinabe people, cholera was not caused by environmental or 
living conditions but spread through contact with infected people and contaminated items. 
Inadequate housing and food on the Sarnia reserve resulted from failures in the implementation 
of government policy. The Anishinabe escaped sources of infection by fleeing into the bush, 
enabling them to construct adequate housing and source food on their own. The fact that they did 
not return to the community in the spring of 1833 indicates they believed conditions were better 
where they were and that nothing would be gained by waiting in their weakened state for food 
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and goods in the Sarnia Village.101  Though locals tried to blame Anishinabeg lifeways for 
contributing to the spread of the disease, the death toll might have been significantly higher had 
they stayed in its midst.102 
 Cholera had broader consequences in the surrounding community. It led to a marked 
decline in immigration and economic activity and a tightening of security and surveillance along 
the border.  It justified continuing prejudices against Aboriginal people and immigrants and led 
to efforts to raise standards of hygiene both in homes and in the environment by draining ‘putrid’ 
swamps to which people attributed so many ailments.103 Yet even prior to the arrival of cholera 
Jones had accomplished very little in the first few seasons he was in charge. His refusal to 
consult with Anishinabe Chiefs about the location and tolerance for squatters and incompetent 
locals made Sarnia residents more vulnerable to unpredictable events.  Farmers in the Western 
District experienced these same events over which they had no control and saw the economic 
ramifications reflected in their own pocketbooks,104 but their options were not constrained by a 
branch of the colonial government and mismanaged in the same way.   
 Taken together, civilization policy as discussed in theory by policy-makers, and its actual 
implementation under severe financial and logistical constraints at Sarnia determined its impact 
on Anishinabe peoples. Plans for settlement outlined by Kempt, Colborne and other 
administrators along with the instructions given to Jones included references to the construction 
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of “several workshops.” However, these facilities were never provided.105 In 1833 the chiefs 
complained to Jones that the government had not honoured the terms of the Huron Tract Treaty.  
Wawanosh stated they were promised a blacksmith, not a missionary and that the tools necessary 
to farm were not to come from their presents which they felt no longer sufficed. Jones agreed and 
told Givins “I confess it was, at the time, my impression, as I think it was that of Mr. Henry 
Jones, to whom I showed the letter.”  He quoted his instructions from 1831 which included 
provisions for “a carpenter’s shop, a Blacksmith’s shop and “artifices and Tools…to be furnished 
by the government.” 106 The Chiefs intended the reserves and assistance to be tools of 
independence, not dependence.107 Consequently, optimism faded quickly on both sides as 
‘civilization’ policy usurped the balance of two eyed seeing articulated in treaty diplomacy. The 
“desire to have Aboriginal people govern themselves” was the primary goal of the 1828 inquiry, 
but thereafter, reducing the expense of ‘Indian’ administration and eliminating the department 
altogether became the central purpose of policy.108 Indian department parsimony and 
incompetence provided a backdrop for the difficulties the Anishinabe experienced transitioning 
to village life. It also left them unprepared for uncertainties like cholera and the rebellions. 
Afterwards however, officials blamed the residents for the lack of preparedness and progress in 
their communities. 
 Rebellions and their Aftermath 
 While the Anishinabe petitioned to have their treaty honoured, simmering issues of 
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loyalty, origin and class already discussed became politicized with the emergence of the reform 
movement in Upper Canada in the 1820s.109 Controlling existing and future expenditures lay 
behind demands for popular control of the assembly. The arrival of Lieutenant-Governor Sir 
Francis Bond Head in 1836 provided the catalyst for what would be several years of rebellion 
and ultimately a reformed political landscape after 1840. Alan Greer has argued for a broader, 
holistic interpretation of the circumstances of rebellion in the Canadas and elsewhere. However, 
his challenge has only been accepted by a few historians of the period.110 The Rebellion affected 
Western Nations by virtue of the fact that they were borderlands peoples but also because a series 
of hostile or indifferent lieutenant-governors presiding over legislatures in stalemate ignored 
their affairs. The Rebellions themselves, as a lynchpin in the evolution of responsible 
government in the Canadas, bore little relevance for Indigenous peoples excluded from the 
political system.  However, the wider context in which they occurred and the issues and 
grievances that led to demands for political reform, did. Subject to the conditions that made 
rebellion possible, the Western Anishinabe, by 1841, only observed the processes facilitating the 
reconstitution of the Canadas. 
 If the bifurcated historiography of the rebellions in Upper and Lower Canada is 
problematic so too is a third prong of violence and retaliation in the Western District called the 
“Patriot War.” Throughout 1838, more than one hundred Americans and some disaffected 
Canadians occupied several islands in the Detroit River, burned a schooner and steamboat and 
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battled the local militia through the streets of Amherstburg.111 The decision to deploy all 
available British troops to Lower Canada placed pressure on Indigenous peoples in the Simcoe, 
Niagara, Detroit and St. Clair regions to aid in border defenses and their contributions were 
“extensive and important.”112 In November of 1838, William Jones received orders to secure a 
supplier for rations and indicate the number of warriors he could assemble if needed.113 
Anishinabe men from Walpole Island, the Sable and Muncey with an estimated 550 Kent 
militiamen, mustered at Sombra under Jones, at Amherstburg under George Ironside, and at 
London under Joseph Clench.114 Agents deployed them along the entire frontier to scour the 
woods for American and rebel “fugitives.”115 Continuous rumours of invasion in the region 
combined with enough real attacks to make them all plausible made residents in the district 
fearful. 
 Peter Jones wrote that it was “the duty of all the Indians” to “make the war whoop and 
drive away the enemy,” but not all leaders agreed.116 Wawanosh and the Sarnia council, who 
perhaps feared retaliation from reform-sympathizing neighbours, hesitated to engage in the 
conflict. They informed the Chiefs at Bear Creek that they preferred “to sit-down & smoke our 
pipes and to let the people who like powder & ball fight their own battles.”117 Inadequate 
compensation may have influenced their decision to stay home. Jarvis issued general orders that 
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warriors would receive clothing and “the same rate of pay…received by the Militia of the 
Province…”118 However, Jones convinced them to “reluctantly” accept rations for women and 
children instead of “militia pay and allowances.” Chiefs from Walpole Island were angry that 
they were asked to return from their hunting camps “for so small a remuneration” but Keating 
felt they would spend any cash they received on alcohol.119 Loyalty to the Crown may have 
motivated some, but Anishinabe leaders had to weigh all their options and decide what was most 
advantageous for their own communities.120  
 Though opportunities to augment meagre pay and rations with cash opened up as a result 
of the conflict, Indigenous peoples paid a higher price at its conclusion. Officials offered 
Anishinabe men £5 to catch deserting British soldiers and return them to a commanding 
officer.121 But the spectre of the uncontrollable, “uncivilized” Indian warrior was a weapon 
resurrected and deployed in the psychological war against potential Upper Canadian rebels, 
American patriot invaders, and British deserters.122 One man charged with treason testified he 
feared the government would “call out the Indians to Act against the Reformers.” He visited 
Clench at Muncey to ask that he keep the “Indians”  “quiet” should anything happen.123 Exciting 
such fears was exactly what the government wanted and in 1838, the Lieutenant Colonel of the 
34th Regiment praised warriors in the district for their actions “against a blood-stained band of 
Ruffians from the other side…who had not the courage to face the brave Indians in open 
fight.”124 But public opinion turned against Indigenous peoples as it had in the Revolution and 
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War of 1812. At the same time they praised their contributions, rumours spread that ‘Indians’ 
from Michigan robbed settlers of guns or covertly assisted patriots in the District. Others were 
certain that “American agents” were “seditiously attempting to seduce the Indians from their 
allegiance.”125 In 1840, Jarvis ordered Clench to make an inventory of all the guns issued to 
Indians under his superintendence between 1837 and 1840 and make arrangements to seize 
them.126 While some Rebellion-era hard feelings faded with time, neither Tories nor Reformers 
ultimately had Indigenous interests at heart. Anishinabe peoples negotiated treaties and 
agreements were with the British Crown who after 1840, slowly transferred expenditures for 
Indian Affairs to the disposal of an assembly where they had no voice. 
  In 1832 Viscount Howick, Under-Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, 
acknowledged Aboriginal peoples to be a “burthen” that could not “be thrown upon the 
inhabitants of Canada.”127 By 1838, British Parliamentarians believed that the promises made to 
Aboriginal people by previous administrators were in Glenelg’s words “an inconvenient debt” to 
be reduced not by payment but by gradual avoidance.128 Beginning in 1835, costs associated with 
the administration of Indian Affairs were criticized during debates concerning the transfer of 
Casual and Territorial Revenues from the Crown to the provincial legislature. In Upper Canada, 
the Military Chest paid salaries and pensions, and Crown Revenues (like customs duties) covered 
approximately £5500 ($22,000) in land payments. A parliamentary grant covered the cost of 
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presents in both provinces.129 After 1832, these expenditures were combined, allowing the 
Provincial Legislature to cover the costs of salaries, pensions and administration out of the casual 
and territorial revenue.130 In other words, Aboriginal people would pay for them out of their own 
land sales accounts. 
 It was difficult even for moderate reformers to view the cost of presents, treaties and 
settlement as anything other than part of the yoke of British colonialism. William Lyon 
Mackenzie’s Report on Grievances incorrectly suggested that the Indian Department, along with 
the Civil, Judicial and Ecclesiastical expenses would be “paid [entirely] from the Revenues 
derived from the people of the Province...on a scale of extravagance far surpassing any other part 
of the North American Continent.” 131 Treaty land payments estimated at £5947 represented the 
single highest expenditure on the Crown Revenues ahead of the Lieutenant-Governor, amounting 
to nearly as much as the salaries of the ministers of the Church of England, Scotland and Roman 
Catholic Churches combined (£6303).132 Despite the fact that the pariliamentary grant continued 
to cover the presents, promises made to the Anishinabe and other Indigenous allies of the Crown 
appeared as an enormous and unpalatable expense to be charged to the provincial treasury.133 
Mackenzie considered the promises another example of colonial mismanagement. He saw little 
value in their continued payment and used them to his political advantage in his rebellious 
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rhetoric.  
 In 1838 Glenelg admitted that no data existed on “the actual State of the Indians in Upper 
Canada.”134 This fact however did not stop him from abandoning Aboriginal people “to the 
Justice and Liberality of the local Legislature” and ultimately to Lieutenant-Governor Sir Francis 
Bond Head. In less than five short years Anishinabe peoples transitioned to a settled or partially-
settled existence in the western portion of the province but the administrator deemed the 
civilization program a failure, postulating that ‘Indians’ now “imped[ed] the progress of 
civilization in Upper Canada.”135 On this basis Bond Head negotiated several suspect surrenders 
of large swaths of land at Saugeen and Coldwater Narrows and for parts of the Moravian and 
Anderdon Reserves in the fall of 1836. Colonial administrators, humanitarians, missionaries and 
teachers vigorously protested his cessions, responsible for displacing more than two hundred 
successful Indigenous farmers and sixty school children.
136
 The treaties, as a prelude to Bond 
Head’s plan to remove all Indigenous peoples to Manitoulin Island, stood nonetheless. In a short 
time, Bond Head postulated, the few remaining ‘Indians’ in Upper Canada would die out. Head’s 
eyes were, in fact, squarely focused on the economic interests of the province as he proudly 
proclaimed the newly acquired lands to be “the first Fruits of the political Tranquility which had 
been attained.”137 Proceeds from large land surrenders would pay for presents and settlement 
until such time as the ‘inconvenient debt’ and Aboriginal people in Upper Canada, could be 
conveniently eliminated.
138
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Conclusion 
 Peace in 1814 could not ameliorate the economic, social and political problems plaguing 
the colony throughout the 1830s and 40s. Crops suffered from bad weather, markets from little 
or no growth, and as the population stagnated and the military cut back the colony remained on 
the verge of bankruptcy.
139
 This was a crisis aggravated by the arrival of cholera, continual 
border troubles, political instability and ultimately Rebellion. In the Western District, the legacy 
of the War of 1812 inspired continued fears of difference and sedition which gripped the region 
throughout the 1830s. Errington and others have shown that these same circumstances inspired 
attempts to impose social stability and a uniform identity on what was then a disparate 
population.140 To that end, the development of suitable province-wide institutions and 
infrastructure could only be made possible by massive immigration from the British Isles and the 
union of Upper and Lower Canada in 1840.  The civilizing of Indigenous peoples should be 
understood as one of these projects. 
 While it is true that after 1814, Aboriginal people were not required as allies on a scale 
congruent with the past, the promises of Brock, Prevost, Askin and Ironside, laid the groundwork 
for a potentially prosperous future. When asked to assist the British, the Anishinabe repeatedly 
expressed concern for the care and safety of their women and children, a reference to Covenant 
Chain commitments of mutual support.141 But where Anishinabe peoples looked to relationships 
of the past to formulate plans for development and assistance in the future, Commissions of 
Inquiry into the affairs of the department created a corporate memory that refused to 
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acknowledge any period of mutual interdependence. Past promises interpreted as temporary 
forms of charity and not long-term negotiated entitlements made communities increasingly 
vulnerable to the political and social instability around them. The Huron Tract Treaty was a 
subsequent attempt to make the British honour these promises of assistance, but they were 
broken again by the imposition of civilization policy.  
 As the following chapters will demonstrate, civilization policy differed markedly from 
the concept of assistance as understood by Anishinabe people. This is all the more surprising 
given that beyond the loyalist migrations, well-connected individuals including Lord Selkirk, 
Thomas Talbot, Henry Jones Sr. and Peter Robinson along with surveyors, registrars and office 
holders all received substantial assistance from the Colonial government in the quest to develop 
self-sufficient agricultural communities in the ‘wilds’ of Upper Canada, and that most failed to 
achieve their objectives. To a large degree, these groups were vocal and demanding and directly 
influenced the amount and kind of assistance they received “free of charge.”142 In comparison, 
officials assisted in a scheme of settlement which in the case of Sarnia and St. Clair was foisted 
upon Anishinabe peoples without their consent or assistance.
143
 The costs of Aboriginal 
settlement further amounted to a trifling expense even if Great Britain had expended £100 ($400) 
on every Indigenous family in Upper Canada. And unlike Loyalists, in violation of the Huron 
Tract Treaty, Aboriginal people paid for their own settlement through the commutation of their 
presents, pensions and annuities and sale of their lands.  
 Correspondence in the 1820s from Darling, Kempt, Colborne and others all 
recommended that the department hire resident ‘experts’ to advise and teach. Wherever possible, 
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Aboriginal people would negotiate their own contracts, construct their own settlements and 
eventually teach their own children and minister to their own residents. This was certainly not 
the way William Jones and subsequent Indian agents implemented policy. Sarnia residents did 
not receive blacksmiths to manufacture and repair their tools, nor did they receive skills training 
or the opportunity to apply these skills to the design and construction of their own community. 
Colborne and Bond Head implemented policies enabling the department to appropriate treaty and 
other entitlements and use them to civilize Aboriginal people without their consent. Prohibiting 
communities from controlling their own funds, and refusing to give individuals cash payments, 
set the stage for adjacent Eurocanadian communities to profit from the loss of control of reserve 
economies. 
 In contrast to the optimism of Kempt and Colborne, Bond Head changed the trajectory of 
the department. Though his detractors embarked on a campaign to champion the successes of 
Indigenous communities in Upper Canada, they could not overcome the hopeless “pessimism” 
Head introduced in the minds of officials in the department and the colonial office.144 As soon as 
residents on the Sarnia reserve began to see some return on their investment, Bond Head 
condemned them as failures and introduced the concept of removal anew. 145  Though he claimed 
he “minutely and personally…investigat[ed] the real State of the Indians in this Province, 
and…judged of their Situation with” his “own Eyes,” Head only saw what he wanted to see and 
took the Department on a path that was blind to the needs and concerns of Anishinabe peoples in 
the Western District. Bond Head’s successor Sir George Arthur concluded that the social and 
political tensions plaguing the colony throughout the 1830s were really economic problems in 
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disguise.146 In the coming decades, the antidote would come from population growth and 
progress brought about by the “full development” of the province’s “vast natural resources.”147 
But Arthur’s plan would be contingent on the control of Aboriginal lands and resources. If Bond 
Head’s treaties were the first step towards achieving these goals, the second would be the 
introduction of legislation in 1840 to unite Upper and Lower Canada into one province. 
Prophetically, the terms of the Act of Union failed to mention Indigenous peoples entirely.148 
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Chapter 3: “Whence all this misery?”: Settlers, Squatters and Speculators, 1 1830-1860 
 Anishinabe peoples surrendered thousands of acres of land, yet it was never enough. In 
1843 the Chiefs and Council on Walpole Island met with their Indian Agent William Keating. 
Conflict over lands and resources had soured their relationships with neighbouring settlers.  They 
explained it as follows: 
 Some white man full of deceit would come to the lodge of our old men with 
 some presents in his hands and fire water in his canoe and would say ‘brother, 
 I am tired let me come and sit by you for one or two winters until I can get a 
 place from our Great Father.  See all that you shall have.  I shall build a good 
 house which you will also get when I leave, and we shall be friends.  The poor 
 red man he is deceived, he drank of the maddening cup and signed away his land 
 not for one but for many years. The white man asked for a little land to settle on 
 soon he took the whole, called his friends around him, sold it to them & thus a  
 few bad men got possession of nearly the whole Island.  If you ask “way back  
 your fathers [were] fools,” we can only say, the fire water your people brought  
 among them made them do [it].
2
 
 
As Bauzhigeeshigwashekum asked, “whence all this misery?” How could it be that less than 
twenty years after the treaty, there was not enough land?
 3
 Between 1818 and 1827, Upper 
Canada “acquired” “7,000,000 acres.”4 Of this amount, Anishinabe territories in the future 
County of Lambton, included in the Huron Tract Treaty, accounted for nearly 2.2 million acres. 
According to legal historian Sidney Harring, by the time the 1839 Macaulay Report came out, “it 
was clear that Indian policy was in shambles: all of the Indian reserves were overrun with 
squatters, thousands of dollars of Indian trust funds were missing and unaccounted for…and the 
government was besieged with Indian complaints.”5  
 If Anishinabe people in southwestern Ontario had little land left, they also did not reap 
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the benefits of the lands they did surrender. As the previous chapter discussed, Sir Francis Bond 
Head’s treaties and the restructuring of government after the Rebellions left Indigenous peoples 
in a precarious position. Many had just begun to settle and reap the benefits of their harvests 
when Bond Head coerced them to exchange “3,000,000 acres of the richest Land in Upper 
Canada for 23,000 barren unproductive Islands.” If he could not take Aboriginal lands by turning 
them into farmers, perhaps Bond Head thought he could accomplish the task by driving them off 
their fields to hunt and fish in the north.
6
  Though not acted upon in terms of policy,  Bond 
Head’s proposed plan to remove  Indigenous peoples to Manitoulin Island set a precedent and 
created a remote place for displaced Indigenous peoples to go , whether they wanted to or not.
7
 
Anishinabe communities clinging to the lands that remained found it increasingly difficult to 
resist the mounting pressure to surrender them. 
 After 1841, potential settlers viewed restrictions against the acquisition or settlement of 
government lands with disdain. An uncertain legal status plagued Indian reserves. Settlers did 
not distinguish them from Crown or Clergy Reserves, and did not understand that the province 
administered them separately from other lands.
 
If officials had recognized that Indigenous 
peoples had the right to police their lands, trespassing might not have been so advantageous. 
Instead the 1839 Crown Lands Act empowered commissioners to eject trespassers from reserve 
communities irrespective of the will or wishes of the people who lived on them.
8
  Further, under 
the Act, reserves appeared no different than other uncultivated “Waste Lands” of the Crown 
which simply encouraged settlers and municipal officials to see them as useless in their wild 
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state and an impediment to settlement. Alienating and settling them as quickly as possible was 
not only desirable, it served the public good.
9
  
 In Upper Canada, land policy favoured farmers, speculators and squatters alike and the 
Western District contained swaths of undeveloped land. While this allowed Anishinabe in the 
interior to avoid wholesale change to their lifestyles until the second half of the nineteenth 
century, by the time the imperial government realized the value in carefully regulated settlement, 
changing from a policy of free grants to sales in 1825, settlers already occupied most of the good 
land on the St. Clair shoreline.
10
 Granted and sold for a fraction of its actual value, neither 
Anishinabe people nor the government realized the profits from some of the best and most 
valuable lands in southwestern Ontario.
11
  
 Based on his examination of the Haudenosaunee in upstate New York in the post-1784 
period, Taylor surmised that Aboriginal peoples used three methods to manage European 
settlement on their lands. Leasing or renting remained the first choice but when this failed, chiefs 
intervened in the choice of settlers to create a “mediating buffer” between themselves and others 
of unknown origin and motive. Lastly, if neither of these were possible, Indigenous peoples 
reluctantly surrendered lands over which they had lost control in the hopes that money would 
assist them to settle elsewhere.
12
 Anishinabe Chiefs in the northernmost region of the Western 
District used all three methods and while they slowed the impact of settlement, they failed to 
achieve the anticipated results in the presence of settler complicity and absence of government 
enforcement. 
 According to historian Douglas Leighton, Aboriginal peoples suffered a particularly 
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brutal form of disposition in the American northwest because widespread settlement occurred in 
the advance of territorial authority and administration.
13
 A similar situation existed in the 
Western District where, as early as 1792, surveying and settlement ‘officially’ occurred in the 
southern townships of Essex and Kent. However, by 1820, farms and houses could be found 
north to Port Huron, along the St. Clair River shoreline, and inland at various points along rivers 
and streams. The Western District Council and courts sat at Sandwich, serving residents in the 
southern County of Essex while settlers east and north of Lake St. Clair, in the County of Kent, 
found they had difficulty accessing legal or government services the closer they lived to
 
Lake 
Huron. In the absence of an established centre of authority in the northern region, a small number 
of civil officials amassed considerable power and controlled the flow of information well into the 
1850s. Anishinabe communities, as a consequence, depended on their agents to behave 
honourably and dutifully towards them and to protect them from local officials, merchants and 
farmers, whose interests and aspirations might be contrary to theirs. Despite their concerns, the 
seat of government moved even further east to Kingston after 1841.
14
 If Indian agents failed in 
their duties, the chiefs had nowhere else to turn.  
 Though Indigenous-newcomer relationships are often discussed in terms of conflict and 
opposition, Haudenosaunee-Mississauga scholar Catherine Longboat believes it is important to 
deconstruct the term “settler” and acknowledge that Eurocanadians behaved differently over time 
and space.
15
 Historiographically, settler consciousness is analyzed in terms of two rather distinct 
phases. One, beginning in the 1780s was carried to Upper Canada by Loyalists and Late 
Loyalists who came of age in an era of American frontier expansion. Grounded in notions of 
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superiority and domination over the natural world,
16
 these ‘republican’ ideals began to give way 
in the mid-nineteenth century to “settler colonialism,” a second phase brought by waves of mid-
century emigrants from Great Britain who tend to be broadly characterized as English, protestant 
and imperialist in sentiment. Throughout, the nineteenth century “American” and “British” 
traditions coalesced into a philosophy of civilization in which Eurocanadian expansion and the 
reform of Aboriginal peoples became mutually reinforcing endeavors.
17
 But important too are 
varations within these larger movements brought by Scottish and Irish victims of ‘British’ 
demobilization, enclosure, and famine.
18
 As a consequence, the Western District became a 
product of cultural forces emanating from the Indian Territory, the American borderlands and the 
British Empire. Not all who settled brought with them an imported hostility towards the 
Anishinabe or wished to reform them.  However, the numbers of those who did seemed to 
increase substantially over time.  
 In the late eighteenth century, expanding the empire was furthest from the minds of most 
people. Many Eurocanadians and peoples of mixed ancestry fled alongside Indigenous peoples, 
and they arrived together in Upper Canada as refugees.
19
  The Walpole Island community 
sheltered Baldoon settlers during the War of 1812, and together, Anishinabe peoples, soldiers 
and the Essex and Kent Militias worked together to repel rebel invaders in pockets of the District 
in 1838. Indigenous leaders invited many of these ‘settlers’ to establish farms on Walpole Island 
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and along the St. Clair shoreline. Loyalists, retired half-pay officers and other officials resided in 
the district, some with the permission of Anishinabe leaders, others with grants from the 
government and some with both.  As this generation fell into decline, waves of elite and 
impoverished Scots, Irish, English and Americans came in the 1830s and 1840s, largely removed 
from the experiences of colonial warfare and somewhat socially distanced from local Anishinabe 
people.   
 As good ungranted land became scarce, Keating and Jones, in their dual role of 
Superintendents and land agents began to negotiate land and resource leases on the Huron Tract 
reserves. Some of these agreements excluded the chiefs, and deed holders exchanged them 
thereafter without the knowledge of the agents. By 1840, long-time residents living in relative 
harmony with local Indigenous populations sometimes found themselves surrounded by “very 
troublesome” neighbours.20 For these reasons, the term ‘settler’ represents a complex spectrum 
of individuals in the Western District possessing diverse views, backgrounds, origins and 
motives. It is fundamentally important to the history of Indigenous-European relations and 
development in the Western District to understand the processes by which this cooperative phase 
of settlement was undermined. 
  As historical geographer John Clarke writes, in an era without any form of social safety 
net, land became “the basis of life and of economic and social prestige”.21 Farmers aspired to 
own land because it provided financial security, inheritances and care in old age, but many others 
settled on land they did not own or owned more land than they could ever use.
 22
  Though the 
terms ‘squatter,’ ‘speculator’ and ‘settler’ are frequently used in the literature to describe such 
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behaviors, they often lack clarification and are difficult to define. In the absence of motive, 
speculators in this period are typically identified by three behaviors: “brokering,” “investing,” 
and “quick-flipping.” Brokers, like John Askin Sr. conducted transactions on behalf of others 
while investors held large blocks of land in particular areas for long periods of time. “Quick 
flippers,” acquired many small, scattered parcels and sold them as fast as profits could be 
made.
23
 Clarke defined speculators in Essex County as individuals possessing more than 400 
acres of land and who engaged in three or more transactions with their holdings. Most studies 
offer variations on this theme.
24
 Nineteenth-century documents also reveal that ‘speculating’ was 
a socially constructed term based on contemporary views of morality and excess.   
 Speculation rested on the idea that individuals should own no more land than they could 
reasonably use. ‘Reasonable’ amounts of land varied from 50 to 100 acres or more, but anyone 
who could take unfair advantage of their positions, like surveyors, registrars and other land 
officials became easy targets for accusers. Critics also singled out those with unique access to 
Loyalist or military free grants, blocks of Canada Company Crown grants or Indian lands.
25
 
Conversely, letting the land go to waste, not using it to its full potential and preventing others 
from doing so also raised suspicion.
26
 Councilors of the Western District described speculators as 
“a wealthy class of absentee proprietors” who did not perform settlement duties on the lands they 
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held.
27
 Thus farmers and council officials alike targeted large landholders for disdain because 
“wild lands” not only impeded the movement of others but their owners did not contribute to the 
operating costs of the district. Thus as Clarke proposed, “speculation is…an attitude of mind,” 
and there are many “aspects” of land speculation, each offering its own challenges to Indigenous 
populations.
28
  
 If district councils found a small number of large landowners troublesome then the 
swarms of ‘squatters’ who occupied land illegally, drove them to distraction. Defining the 
squatter is the most problematic of all the terms used to describe methods of land settlement 
simply because lawmakers rarely defined ‘illegal’ and officials seldom enforced the law. Though 
squatting is acknowledged as a fact of Upper Canadian settlement, it is extremely difficult to 
quantify using traditional sources. For instance, Crowley identifies 42.7 percent of the Upper 
Canadian rural population as tenants and 57.3 percent as proprietors. While the presence of such 
a large percentage of tenants is an important aspect of land use and settlement in 1848, these 
figures are also deceptive because they cannot account for the diverse kinds of tenure under 
which individuals occupied land in Upper Canada nor can they measure local squatting 
problems.
29
 As this chapter discusses, ‘squatting’ is not necessarily settlement in the absence of 
title, payment, or the performance of settlement duties. Instead it requires a broader definition 
encompassing undesirable settlement that contravened policy or violated local norms at a 
particular time or place. Harring, for instance, simply identifies “squatting” as any habitation 
deviating from the “juridical ideal.”30  
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 But what was the “juridical ideal”? While Reformers and Tories debated whether 
settlement was best achieved by the cultivation of a “landed gentry” or by the “yeoman farmer,” 
a portrait of the ideal settler can be deduced using council and other township documents.
31
 The 
“ideal inhabitant was a farmer” who arrived in a surveyed township in Upper Canada with a 
small grant or sum necessary to locate himself on 100 or 200 acres of land. The settler registered 
the intent to purchase and bought the land outright or paid promptly in a series of annual 
installments.
32
 The ideal “settler-citizen,”33 built a log home, planted as many acres per year as 
possible, built suitable fencing and cleared and maintained the section of road fronting his 
property. Each year the ideal settler cleared, planted and fenced up to five additional acres and 
ultimately became a law-abiding, church attending member of the community.
34
 But ideal 
settlers never seemed to be in sufficient quantity and officials most often confronted difficult 
individuals who defied regulations.  
 Performing settlement duties and otherwise appearing to follow the rules did not 
guarantee settlers would continue to be ‘ideal’ farmers. Even with the best of intentions, 
completing all required settlement duties in remote areas of the district was difficult and onerous. 
“Professional” and accidental squatters, who deliberately, or by ignorance or misfortune 
occupied land without ever receiving their patents, caused unique problems.
35
 The longer 
squatters stayed on the land, the stronger their claim became,
36
 and officials found it counter-
productive to remove and penalize individuals in the process of improving the land, even when 
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they knowingly settled on Aboriginal lands.
37
  Officials found it easier, less costly and more 
socially palatable to assist them to legitimize their possessions, than to forcibly remove and 
compensate them.
38
  
  Local social and political conditions often influenced the identification and persecution of 
squatters. While cost, distance and bureaucracy were contributing factors, squatters sometimes 
did not understand or claimed to not understand the purchasing process. Settlers often operated 
under the popular misconception that they could occupy and legally claim reserve land in 
anticipation of a surrender.
39
 In other instances, aggrieved parties in contract disputes accused 
each other of squatting when they believed land was acquired at an unfair advantage. Linked to 
cultural, anti-social or undesirable behaviors, quarrels over land acquired racial and class-based 
undertones as property increased in value. In Moore and Plympton Townships, officers, 
merchants and professionals settled along the waterfront while farmers took up less valuable lots 
in the interior. Individuals described as speculators tended to come from the former class and 
“squatters” from the latter even though both in many cases sought to acquire more land than they 
could reasonably farm.
40
 Baldoon Scots on the St. Clair were part of a larger diaspora of 
discharged soldiers, and farmers and labourers rendered landless in the highland clearances. Firm 
believers in the rights of pre-emption and improvment, many Scots like the McDonald family 
became active reformers and formidable opponents as they sought out civic positions to advance 
their interests.
41
  Similarly, though they were outnumbered by Canadians and settled in equal 
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numbers with English, Irish and Scottish immigrants, Americans by birth were viewed with 
suspicion and associated with a transitory element that poached or hoarded resources and fled 
across the border (Table 5 below). Correspondence from Indian Agents like William Keating 
characterized “venal” squatters as “the most abandoned characters…of questionable loyalty, 
utterly underserving of consideration.” By contrast, the “deserving,” tended to be resident, 
industrious and British or Canadian in origin.
42
 
Table 5: Western District Birthplaces of the People, 1842 
 
 
Source: Censuses of Canada, 1665-1871, Statistics of Canada, Vol. IV. (Ottawa: I.B. Taylor, 
1876), Census of 1842: Table III, 136. 
 
 Behavior rather than class or ethnicity is a better indicator since squatters often cleared 
and improved the land, while United Empire Loyalists and other ‘legitimate’ holders of Crown 
grants frequently sold out to speculators.
43
 In this case, the “ideal settler[s],” who cleared, 
planted and fenced their land caused more damage to Indigenous economies than “absentee 
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owners” who deliberately thwarted development.44 Unfortunately, in either case the land was 
taken off the market
45
 placing pressure on Aboriginal peoples to surrender what remained.  
Regardless of the methods of land acquisition utilized by individuals, the government wished to 
facilitate settlement, not impede it. As a result, Eurocanadians could not see Aboriginal people as 
anything other than temporary occupants, and squatters did not understand that their behavior 
was criminal.
46
 As Hele found at the Sault, kinship may ultimately play a larger role in 
settler/squatter discourse here than is immediately apparent. Further geneaological research 
would likely reveal that a number of the French and English Canadians in Table 5 identified by 
officials as ‘squatters,’ are likely related to local Anishinabe communities.47 Whether blood-
relations or not, individuals stragically placed on the land initially with the permission of the 
chiefs. 
Indian Deeds 
 Though the Crown attempted to regulate settlement through the Proclamation of 1763, 
Indigenous peoples managed their relationships with Europeans through their own customary 
means. After 1701, Ojibwa, Odawa, Potawatomi and Wyandotte leaders permitted the French to 
build Fort Detroit and thereafter made agreements with families to occupy certain lots on the 
Detroit River and its tributaries. Following the Detroit Conference in August 1765, George 
Croghan, Major Robert Rogers and other officials met with Pontiac and sixty chiefs to renew the 
Covenant Chain. Pontiac told the officials that “their Country was very large and they were 
willing to give up such part of it as was necessary for their father the English to carry on trade at, 
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provided they were paid for it and a sufficient part of the Country left them to hunt on.”48 During 
the council they negotiated and approved a series of land transactions between First Nations and 
private citizens.
49
 Pontiac invoked the principles of two-eyed seeing. His vision was one of co-
existence and fairness, and it is from this perspective that Anishinabe peoples negotiated later 
agreements with British officials. Into the 1830s, settlement proceeded on the basis of these 
‘Indian Deeds’ in much of what would become Michigan Territory, Essex, Kent and Lambton 
County.   
 As Western Nations moved to avoid European settlement, squatters targeted their former 
village sites and cornfields because they were cleared.
50
 Anishinabe Chiefs placed Indian 
department employees, merchants and former soldiers and officers on these lands to protect 
them. In 1786, for example, the Potawatomi deeded “lands…long left uncultivated” at the River 
Raisin (Monroe) to J.B. Réaume.
51
  Such actions fit into the plans of administrators like Simcoe, 
Haldimand and Russell who welcomed a resident elite population allied with local First Nations 
that was both genteel
52
 and battle-ready. 
 Initially, farms like Réaume’s were not antithetical to Indigenous land usage. As fur trade 
profits declined and promised pensions and presents failed to materialize, cash and goods 
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provided by agreements for land filled some of the gap.
53
 Pontiac demanded “proper 
satisfaction” of deed holders, meaning that he expected to cultivate ongoing relationships of 
support and assistance.
54
 Deeds with traders and merchants like Jaçques (Dupéron) Baby, 
Charles Réaume, John Askin, James McGill and Thomas Forsyth enabled Anishinabe 
communities to acquire the kinds and quantities of fur-trade merchandise from Montreal and 
New York suppliers that they were accustomed to receiving. For instance, in May 1796, “at 
divers times,” John Askin paid nearly two hundred dollars in goods for lands located on the 
Huron River.
 55
 Through such agreements, Anishinabe communities received one-time payments 
or yearly installments of rent in the form of goods, furs and money. Payments made on an as 
needed basis, for “presents made time to time,” “past and future presents” and “other diverse 
causes” appear in other agreements. The Chippewa also retained for themselves, the right to 
hunt, fish, fowl, plant corn and make maple sugar on any unsettled lands.
56
 In this context, the 
agreements should be viewed as reserves and not surrenders. They were the nexus of a symbiotic 
relationship balancing the exchange of products and knowledge over extended periods of time.
57
 
As the Colonial Office cut costs and settlement interfered with the reliable procurement of 
foodstuffs in the Western District, Anishinabe Chiefs negotiated lease agreements for similar 
purposes in the first half of the nineteenth century. Knowing their land possessed great value, as 
part of the Covenant Chain protocol of reciprocal responsibility, Anishinabe people could 
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approach deed-holders for “rent” or assistance in times of need. 58  While leases extending over 
long periods of time were European in origin and later exploited, in their original incarnation 
they were valuable tools to Anishinabe peoples for keeping the land in the hands of their 
descendants. Ideally these offspring, who were often of mixed-ancestry, would have kept and 
transmitted the terms of the agreements to successive generations.    
 Cementing alliances with influential Europeans, protecting the land from squatters and 
engaging in trade were the fundamentals of the Covenant Chain and help to explain why 
Anishinabe leaders negotiated so many of these agreements. Even so, cuts to presents, pensions 
and other sources of assistance made Anishinabe Chiefs vulnerable to larger, speculative 
agreements like the Cuyahoga Purchase.
59
 With greater frequency, they exchanged land to 
alleviate the suffering of their people and to settle their accounts with merchants.
60
  Indian Deeds 
became highly sought after and scarce amounts of currency and high debts resulted in their 
almost endemic exchange. A “Shopkeeper Aristocracy,”61 epitomized by John Askin, combined 
both speculation and quick-flipping to build personal fortunes on their purchase and sale.   
 Where “Land” was “Power,” conspiracy eclipsed cooperation as the deeds themselves 
and the ability to accumulate them, acquired greater value than the actual land they represented.
62
 
Sometime in the 1780s, for example, Askin became indebted to Montreal merchants Todd and 
McGill, and his personal papers indicate that he made a partial payment on the more than twenty 
thousand pounds he 
 
owed them using deeds to land along the St. Clair River.
63
  He and others 
acquired even more deeds by securing privileged positions on the District Land Board, a body 
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created in 1789 specifically to regulate land transactions and prevent speculation.
64
 The presence 
of fur traders, merchants, surveyors and Indian Department officials on the Western District 
Land Board elicited suspicion, particularly since Askin and most other board members were 
related by marriage and maintained social and commercial ties to each other. As Justices of the 
Peace, they issued grants of 200 acres upon administering an oath of allegiance to loyal settlers 
of good character. Accused of issuing certificates under false names or in the name of associates 
who would then transfer them back, Land Boards became repositories of corruption and 
patronage. Creating the impression that Indian deeds might become legitimate sources of title, 
Land Boards undermined the Proclamation of 1763 and deeds became highly sought after as a 
result.  Though Askin lost the majority of his deeds to debt, along with the Baby family, he 
amassed enormous quantities of land in the district.
65 
 Reliant as they were on personal, 
professional and kin relations, the behavior of these ‘shopkeepers’ placed deeds in the hands of 
individuals unwilling and unable to abide by the terms.
66
 
 Chawme’s demand to purchase more land if needed and the utilization of deeds in this 
manner tell us that the St. Clair Chiefs intended to continue to manage their own lands. At the 
same time however, political and environmental circumstances adversely affected Indian deeds 
and lands in the St. Clair. First, after 1800, officials prohibited Late Loyalists, and Americans 
who immigrated after 1783, who were not British subjects and not Loyalists, from voting, 
holding office or owning land. But stripping Americans of title to land they purchased before the 
war meant that any who arrived in the region afterwards could only lease or squat.
67
  By the time 
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the chiefs agreed to the 1825 provisional treaty, a number of Americans had sought out Indian 
deeds along the St. Clair. A fierce competition for land erupted that same year, as a 
Naturalization Bill ended the prohibition for individuals who arrived prior to 1820. By this time, 
many possessors of Indian deeds had been on the land for ten years or more.  They did not want 
to give up their improvements and expected to receive the right to purchase their lots.
68
 
 Secondly, instability returned to the region a decade later as rebellion in Lower Canada 
and the subsequent fear of frontier raids in 1838 created an absence of male authority in the 
district. Many farmers in the Walpole Island-Baldoon vicinity evacuated with their entire 
families to Sombra. Members of the Kent Militia, Anishinabe Chiefs and Warriors, and the 
majority of males over sixteen years of age, were deployed throughout the borderlands.
69
 Though 
many returned to their communities less than a year later, officials did not dismiss some warriors 
until 1842 and Keating reminded them that “they should always be on the lookout and ready to 
form their patrols.”70 Few, in the interim remained to protect Anishinabe communities on 
Walpole Island, at Sombra, St. Clair and Bear Creek. Their lands, as well as the improvements 
made by their lease-holders, remained vulnerable to squatters.   
 Lastly, Burwell’s 1826 notes also reveal that it rained heavily a quarter of the time he was 
surveying the Huron Treaty reserves. The following year, the weather combined with the effects 
of concentrated land clearing led residents and officials to complain that water levels in the 
Detroit and St. Clair Rivers swelled to the highest they had been in recent memory.
71
 The 
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fledgling community of Baldoon subsequently became uninhabitable, and its malaria-infected 
inhabitants sought drier lands in Sombra, Bear Creek and on the several islands that made up the 
Walpole Island community.
72
 Throughout the first half of the century, increased precipitation and 
low temperatures in the Great Lakes basin caused flooding in low-lying areas. Until technology 
improved to the extent that large areas could be drained, these higher water levels increased 
competition for the remaining good land.
73
 
 For all of these reasons, complaints from the chiefs in the 1830s and 1840s suggest that a 
new and very different kind of squatter exploited the lack of authority, and environmental and 
political instability in the region, to grab land. Jones blamed the chiefs for “selling pieces of the 
land to Americans and sending them over to settle,” but 27 identified by Keating suggest that 
British and Canadian residents were just as culpable. While nine were indeed American, five 
particularly troublesome squatters were Scots, formerly from Baldoon; three were Canadians, 
three were English, two were French [Canadians] and one was identified as a “half-breed.” As 
suggested earlier, some “Canadians,” “English” and “French” may also have been of Indigenous 
ancestry and the origins of four of the persons remain a mystery.
74
 Some rented or acquired 
loyalist and veteran grants, but others seemingly materialized without the knowledge of anyone. 
Keating claimed these latter settlers held deeds “transfer[ed] from previous holders” or “extorted 
[them] from the chief by false promises and whiskey.”75 As the deeds continued to change hands, 
the chiefs and agents (William) Jones and Keating, found it increasingly difficult to determine 
their exact provenance. In petitions to the government, settlers cited their possession of Indian 
Deeds to claim title, appealing to the breadth of their improvements, wartime service and loyalty 
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in 1812 and 1837.
76
 Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Loyalists once again possessed competing 
claims, and because the chiefs had the temerity to lease their own lands, the agents blamed them 
for their own misfortunes. 
 These circumstances represented a radical departure from the period before the 1820s, 
when Anishinabe Chiefs regulated the occupation of their territories through the use of their own 
customary law. In 1820 for instance, some Anishinabe at Big Bear Creek approached a squatter 
to remove him from their territory. Until the government negotiated a treaty and paid them for 
the land, he would pay rent in the form of livestock and foodstuffs, exacted by force if 
necessary.
77
 According to British law, once the provisional agreement was agreed to in 1825, 
squatters should have simply been removed from reserves as necessary. The Proclamation of 
1763 placed the Crown “between Indian and settler as the source of justice and fairness for both 
communities, and as the sole source of title for settlers.”78 However after 1830, Keating and 
Jones acted on the Crown’s behalf and enforcement of the Proclamation remained entirely 
dependent upon their own sense of duty and obligation. In 1833, a number of merchants and 
future speculators arrived in Chatham, including Richard Vidal and Thomas Fisher, hoping to 
purchase the remaining unoccupied land in Sarnia and the St. Clair when it went up for auction.
79
 
They formed influential alliances and invested in significant amounts of property alongside 
retired officers, soldiers, farmers and squatters.  
 A growing number of residents possessing attitudes of indifference and outright hostility 
towards Indigenous land rights, prevented Anishinabe peoples from policing their lands. By 
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necessity, chiefs relied on their agents, local authorities and petitions for assistance. While 
officials could eject squatters and deny them future grants of Crown land, trespassing was a 
relatively minor offense.
80
 To protect Indian reserves, ungranted and unsurveyed lands, the 
government passed the Crown Lands Act in 1839. The act empowered commissioners to issue 
thirty-day removal warnings to squatters or poachers on Crown or Indian Reserves. Subsequent 
offenses were punishable by thirty days in jail and a “fine…not exceeding twenty pounds.”  The 
removal of timber or other resources was also subject to fines “not exceeding twenty pounds” or 
three months in jail.
81
  But a lack of enforcement rendered the law ineffective and squatting and 
poaching became ingrained in the local community as acceptable behaviors.
82
 Potential settlers, 
instead of viewing Indian deeds and leases as rental agreements for various terms, saw them as a 
stage in the purchasing process. If they behaved like ‘ideal’ settlers and cleared and improved 
some of the property, they increased their chances of asserting a right of preemption.
83
 If they 
were not successful, they would most likely receive compensation, as the squatters on the Sarnia 
reserve did. Legal historian Sidney Harring describes this failure to enforce the 1839 Crown 
Lands Act as “the complete political and legal abandonment of Indians in Upper Canada.”84 
A Trying Case of Squatting   
 Intermittent access to justice consistently plagued the northern townships. These 
circumstances, though not unusual in early years of colonial administration, affected Anishinabe 
peoples in ways that are important to consider.
85
 Throughout the 1830s, divisional courts could 
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only sit after magistrates were brought in from Sombra and Moore.
86
 A dearth of literate and 
capable personnel meant that most officials held multiple appointments and shared relations of 
blood, marriage and class to others in similar positions. Indian Agent William Jones and his 
long-time friend Henry John Jones for instance were both land registrars.
87
 In 1836, Walpole 
Island and the St. Clair Chiefs succeeded in having the annuity divided between themselves and 
Sarnia, Kettle Point and Stony Point, and separate agents were hired to administer to them. 
William Keating, a surveyor by trade, became Indian Agent for Walpole Island and the St. Clair 
in 1838, and the following year both he and William Jones were appointed commissioners under 
the Crown Lands Act.
88
 Surveyors in the district sought out William Jones to differentiate 
between ‘squatters’ and settlers they encountered in the townships. Furthermore, as magistrates, 
Jones and Keating wielded great power and authority in the petitioning process and 
administration of local justice.  Through their condemnation or approbation of particular 
individuals, they shaped the course of settlement in the Western District. 
 A reactionary response to the pervasive squatting problem plaguing Anishinabe 
communities lay behind much of the authority granted to Keating and Jones. In 1839, 
Bauzhigeeshigwashekum told Superintendent Jarvis, “Father…There is hardly a foot of ground 
that we can call our own or tread secure from the threats & ill deeds of these men. One Hundred 
of our pigs have been destroyed, our dogs have been shot at the very doors of our Lodges, our 
Horses have been stolen from us. Father we have become slaves & we are unhappy.”89  A 
number of non-Aboriginal settlers living on Walpole Island occupied farm lots based on deeds 
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agreed to by the chiefs.  However, others arranged leases with Keating and Jones or transferred 
their leases to third parties without the knowledge of the island’s leaders. In some cases 
unfortunate purchasers bought land “in good faith” without “knowing that these people had no 
title.”90 The Chiefs repeatedly made complaints against Robert Little, Jacob East and members of 
the McDougall/McDonald family for not paying rent and otherwise abusing the privilege of 
living on their lands, but they could neither prove nor act on them.
91
 The Indian Agents 
concealed their own involvement in the leasing fiasco, and the courts failed to protect Aboriginal 
peoples and enforce legislation designed solely for the purpose of removing unlawful settlers 
from their lands. 
 While the 1839 Act provided Keating with the means to evict squatters on the Island, he 
acted not because the terms of the leases had been broken, but on the premise that the chiefs 
caused their own misfortunes because they acted without the permission of the department. 
Keating began ejecting squatters from Walpole Island in 1840 and they responded by suing him. 
Chief Justice John Beverly Robinson, who along with William Jones was a former Kent County 
Registrar, tried the most notable test case of the 1839 legislation known as Little et al v. 
Keating.
92
 The court focused on deficiencies in the law and the manner in which it was applied 
and not whether the leasee, Robert Little lawfully resided on Walpole Island. Robinson ruled that 
Jones and Keating did not establish their case because they did not conclusively prove that 
Walpole Island was Indian land under the Act or that Little’s leases were illegal. The potential 
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for “impropriety” in the agent’s dual roles as representatives of the Indians and prosecutors of 
the Crown particularly troubled Robinson.
  
Harring suggests the Chief Justice made impossible 
evidentiary demands,
93
 but Robinson likely knew that Keating and Jones involved themselves in 
leasing. In this respect, Keating’s eviction of the squatters was not without a scent of 
‘impropriety.’ 
 While no one wishes to defend those evicted, these prosecutions occurred under the 
authority of poorly written law selectively enforced by Indian agents.
94
 How else can one explain 
the fact that Jacob East, a man possessing two leases, found himself ejected, while two men 
without leases, the “very troublesome” John McDonald and “good man” [François] Xavier 
Cadotte, were both allowed to stay? Nationality rather than documentation certainly played a role 
in Keating’s actions as Americans overwhelming formed the number expelled from the Island, 
whether they possessed leases or not.
95
   
 François Xavier Cadotte (F.X.Cadotte, Jr.), described as the ‘half-breed,’ in Keating’s list 
exemplifies the complexities inherent in the settment of the Detroit-St. Clair River Region. 
Cadotte was an interpreter for the Indian Department and lived on Walpole Island. Jones also 
hired him as the farming instructor at the Sarnia Village. He is likely a son of John Baptiste 
Cadotte, interpreter for the 1818 Council and 1820 Huron Tract Provisional agreements and 
descended from the Sault Ste. Marie trading family. Cadotte figures prominently in the petitions 
of St. Clair settlers as an interpreter in the negotiation of Indian Deeds. He appeared to act 
independent of the chiefs but it is unclear whether they also saw his behavior as problematic. By 
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1836, the United States embarked on an aggressive plan to remove the Saginaw Ojibwe.
96
 The 
Sixth article of Treaty of Washington, which covered the northwestern portion of the Michigan 
peninsula, included provisions for payments to their mixed-blood relatives. F.X. or François does 
not appear among the ‘Cadottes’ on the 1836 “Mixed-blood” Census Register which recorded 
individuals eligible to receive payments and he is not shown as occupying a lot or residing with 
other Cadottes at the Sault. John Bell, a name also associated with Walpole Island, and an 
unknown Cadotte protested what they believed was “favouritism” in the distribution of moneys 
in the treaty.
97
 Cadotte likely had prior familial connections entitling him to settle on Walpole 
Island and  this may explain his prominent role as a mediator in the leasing process, as well as 
the absence of complaints from the chiefs.  
 From Robinson’s perspective, the leases on Walpole Island must have appeared to be an 
illogical mess; a number were sub-leased to several parties at once, and few could be described 
by any parameters as “legitimate.” Within the boundaries of the legislation as it was written, 
Robinson had neither the tools nor the authority to evaluate the validity of leases on an individual 
basis—regardless of kinship, bloodlines or the wishes of the Chiefs.98 In reference to similar 
circumstances at Grand River, Harring concludes that “the complexity of…land-holding 
arrangements…was almost beyond the capacity of the law to adjudicate.”99 
 Indigenous peoples historically leased their lands as they thought proper.  However after 
1839, authorities denied them the legal tools to enforce the terms. The extra-legal nature of 
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Indian leases allowed agents to blame the Island’s leaders and residents.100 Petitions from those 
fighting their evictions reveal that it was not shady Americans, but the Indian agents themselves, 
who manipulated the leases on Walpole Island and took them away from the control of the 
chiefs. Keating, lauded for his uncharacteristic pursuit of squatters, allowed some of the most 
notorious squatters to remain on the Island.  George Jasperson, Jacob East and the McDonalds 
claimed to possess leases authorized, not only by Keating, but by William Jones, his son 
Alexander Jones and the interpreter, Cadotte.  According to Robert Little, Keating interfered in 
the leasing process and turned the chiefs against them.
101
 
 While Keating admitted that all the “claims [were]…equally bad,” he only ejected “the 
most obnoxious.”  As a temporary reprieve, he allowed “those who had behaved well during the 
Rebellion” to stay.102 Lawfully, Robinson could not evict of some “squatters” and not others, 
when the contradictory testimony of Keating and Jones formed the only evidence he possessed of 
guilt or innocence. Even so, Robinson did not explore the role of Indian Agent complicity as a 
factor in the Little case. Had he allowed the chiefs to testify, instead of the agents on their behalf, 
Robinson would have known immediately who the squatters were. For example, the chiefs 
specifically named Robert Little, but one of his leases came from Archibald McDonald, and he 
claimed to hold his lease from William Jones.
103
 While Jones went to great lengths to convince 
his superiors that these transactions occurred before he entered the Indian Department, a number 
of them were negotiated prior to the Rebellions, and though he told Givens in 1837 that he 
discouraged the chiefs from agreeing to them, he also complained that settlers continually 
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harassed him to arrange them.
104
 Jones continued to live in Baldoon in the 1840s even though he 
was assigned the superintendency of Sarnia and the Department never inquired why he involved 
himself in Walpole Island’s administrative affairs. Jones finally admitted that several Walpole 
Island squatters possessed “a few Leases…in my handwriting made before I was appointed to the 
Indian Department…when I was totally ignorant of the nature of the Indian claim to the land—
some of these should, perhaps not be held more valid than others.”105  
 The possession of any leases or agreements not approved by Keating constituted evidence 
of an offense under the Crown Lands Act. Advantages could be gained by making oral 
agreements in a system where “impropriety” determined the validity of deeds.106 For that reason 
it actually made sense for leaseholders to conceal their written copies.
107
 Enforcement should 
have been simple and the law as written was quite clear—in the absence of a cession, an 
unauthorized individual found to be engaged in “unlawful occupation” or “illegal possession” of 
Indian land was subject to prosecution.
108
 A notion popularized by individuals charged under the 
act, particularly on Six Nations, accused ‘Indians’ of consciously luring non-Aboriginal settlers 
onto their reserves. Once engaged in land and financial transactions, community leaders would 
agitate to have them removed and claim their improvements.
109
 But Eurocanadians could not 
have been ‘lured’ onto a reserve under any circumstance because their very presence, if not 
sanctioned by a Crown Lands Commissioner, the transaction itself, and any evidence of 
occupation, were all against the law. Keating’s failure to apply the law equally to individuals in 
obvious violation of a prohibition and Robinson’s consideration of extenuating circumstances 
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cost Walpole Island residents their lawful right to eject squatters until an 1849 amendment to the 
Crown Lands Act. This simplified proceedings by making it an offense for anyone to reside on 
any lands held by the Crown without a proper grant, lease, location ticket or licence of 
occupation.
110
 Applying the amended legislation enabled the courts to disallow many of the 
loopholes formerly used by squatters but it was much too late to have any real effect in southern 
Ontario.
111
 
 Under the 1839 Crown Lands Act, Keating was able to eject only nine people in 1841. 
Citing extenuating circumstances, two years later, a staggering thirty-one people petitioned the 
Indian department claiming a right to reside on Walpole Island.
112
 Many of the original evicted 
squatters, continued to use their properties as they fought for the recognition of their leases. The 
infamous Robert Little occupied at least eight lots on the Island and though he had not paid “rent 
for the last 10 years” was still reported to be living there in 1844. While Keating described Little 
as “an old man of the most violent disposition,” the agent still gave him and several other 
squatters, additional “time to remove their crops.” In 1845 they secured another forty days so 
they could drag their possessions across the frozen Chenail Ecarté River.
113
 That year, Keating 
compensated squatters Drouillard and Hoffman £50 each from Walpole Island’s annuities, more 
than the £30 average he offered to the others for their improvements. Accusing him of playing 
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favourites, squatters harassed Keating for even more for concessions.
114
  
 While the legislation protected commissioners against malicious prosecution, defects in 
the case proved so substantial that Keating’s adversaries were ultimately successful.115  The 
courts convicted Keating of unlawful trespass and him to pay Robert Little $40 (£10) plus 
costs.
116
 Keating, the Sheriff and the lawyer were never paid for their costs and throughout the 
1840s, constant hounding and petitions from aggrieved squatters compelled Keating to abandon 
prosecutions under the Act.
117
 Even if they wanted to, local residents would not risk prosecution 
in the courts or persecution in the community to assist the St. Clair Chiefs.
118
 Robert Little told 
the Civil Secretary that the Walpole squatters held Indian deeds and always paid their rent.
119
 
Unfortunately his word is no more reliable than that of Keating or Jones. The insurmountable 
task of sorting out the claims overshadowed the need to remove unauthorized settlers on Walpole 
Island. Keating turned a number of squatter farms over to Island residents but the chiefs 
continued to battle unauthorized settlement on their lands. Though the 1839 Crown Lands Act 
gave officials the tools to accomplish that task, the decision in Little et al v. Keating made it 
impossible to achieve until after 1850.
120
 
The Lower Reserve in Moore: A Case of Deserving Squatters 
 If officials could or would not eject ‘venal’ squatters from Walpole Island, squatters in 
Moore presented an even greater problem. These Loyalists, veterans and their widows and 
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children settled with the permission of the chiefs and improved their farms: they epitomized the 
‘ideal settler.’ But through misfortune and bad-timing they found themselves living on a reserve 
after 1843, and here too, Jones actively inserted himself into the land granting process, tainting 
existing relationships between the Anishinabe and their deed holders.
 
 
 By 1836, 573 non-Aboriginal people lived in Moore Township
121
 under a mixture of 
tenures that blur settler-squatter binaries traditionally used to describe Upper Canadian 
settlement. Loyalist families and 1812 veterans held 100 to 1200 acre free grants to “privileged 
persons,”122 a procedure sanctioned by the government at the turn of the century. People of 
American, French and British origin had long possessed Indian deeds and paid rent to 
Bauzhigeeshigwashekum, Shaweny-Penince, Gayoshk, Wawanosh and other St. Clair Chiefs to 
farm on Walpole Island and in Sombra and Moore.
123
  Local lore states that the first non-
Aboriginal settler in Moore was John Courtney, a sailor and fur trader who held a deed to Lot 39 
from Bauzhigeeshigwashekum. Chief Peterwegeshig told an interviewer at the turn of the 
century that this agreement was drawn by his father on “buckskin and done in figures… 
Courtenay, being a tall man, was pictured as a grasshopper.”124 
 Local histories suggest these early settlers and a thriving French-Canadian community, 
maintained good relations with the ‘Indians;’ they spoke Ojibway and possessed useful skills. 
Blacksmith Francis Bertrand for instance held an Indian lease for Lot 69 in Moore. He supplied 
the Anishinabe with metal and iron and repaired their tools.
125
 In the 1830s, the chiefs asked an 
                                                          
121
 Elford, Canada West’s Last Frontier, 59. 
122
 Gates, Land Policies of Upper Canada, 305. 
123
 Curnoe, Deeds/Nations, 50 & 53. Gayoshk  is likely “Kiyoshk [fl. 1843-1857] or “Gull”. His descendants settled 
on Walpole Island.  
124
 Finlayson, A Brief History of Moore Township , np.;  William Lionhardt, Interview with Pe-to-e-kie-sic, The 
Sarnia Canadian Observer, printed on July 29, 1936, p. 14, reprinted in Bob McCarthy, Voices From the Past, 
Lambton Shield, 17 December 2010,  http://www.lambtonshield.com/new-feature-voices-of-the-past-begins-on-
lambtonshield-com/   
125
 Elford, Canada West’s Last Frontier, 54; McDougall and Valentine, “Treaty 29: Why Moore Became Less,” n. 
 196 
Figure 12: Owners of Lots in Moore  
  
 
 
Sources: LAC, RG 10/570, Schedule of Lots Occupied, 3 February 1851; RG 10/442, Particulars 
Relating to Lot No. 4, 172-5; Map of Moore Township, Beldon’s Illustrated Historical Atlas of 
the County of Lambton, ed. Edward Phelps (Sarnia, ON: 1973) and various petitions cited herein. 
 
Irishman, Captain William Gurd, to occupy a lot as they were “in want of a person of his 
trades.”126 The 1812 veteran and gunsmith who originally located in Kingston, recognized that 
lots on the St. Clair were extremely valuable and demanded a very long lease. The chiefs sought 
the advice of the Lieutenant-Governor, and Gurd eventually settled on waterfront Lots 16 and 17 
north of the reserve (Figure 12 above). Gurd’s case is troubling because it suggests that the 
nature of leasing began to change in the 1830s.  Potential settlers from outside the area, attracted 
by the opportunity to acquire land of substantial value, became more demanding and less 
inclined to deal with the chiefs. Gurd became the collector of customs at Sombra and because of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
10, 254. 
126
 WJLB, Jones to Givens, 21 December, 1835. 
Lower Reserve (Moore) 
 197 
his extensive land holdings and military service, a member of the local establishment as well.
127
 
 According to the 1825 Provisional Agreement, the chiefs chose 2575 acres immediately 
north of Sombra Township to be called the Lower Reserve (see Figure 12 above). Between 1826 
and 1833, the government conducted four surveys in anticipation of settlement. Surveyors Mount 
and McIntosh consulted William Jones to evaluate the legitimacy of claims and identify 
squatters.
128
 In law, settlers holding leases from the chiefs only possessed “squatter’s rights,” and 
they feared they would be ejected.
129
 Surveyor-General Thomas Ridout posted notice to that 
effect on the 31
st
 of January 1826 and the Inhabitants of the Township of St. Clair followed with 
a petition addressed to Sir Peregrine Maitland that March. Some, living on the land for upwards 
of twenty years, had invested considerable money and effort in improvements now within the 
boundaries of the reserve. Their agent, James Baby, made a compelling case for “paternal 
benevolence,” citing their prompt payment of rent to the “Indians,” and loyalty and sacrifice in 
the late war.
130
 Petitioners outside of the reserve boundary were allowed to purchase their lots by 
Orders-in-Council issued in April and May 1826, reportedly at one dollar or five shillings per 
acre.
131
 Conversely, residents on the Lower Reserve and settlers occupying the seven waterfront 
lots in particular did not understand why their lots were different from the rest of the township or 
why they could not purchase them. 
 Occupants of lots on the reserve found themselves in an extremely difficult situation after 
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1826 as their land increased in value at the same time the security of their tenure weakened. A 
large portion of land near the north and back boundaries of the reserve sat on a floodplain and 
remained uninhabitable for much of the year. In contrast, lots along the sloping St. Clair River 
shoreline and banks of the Talfourd, Baby and Bear Creeks were better-drained and most sought 
after.
132
 Occupants of waterfront lots earned additional income by providing docking or wharf 
facilities and “selling Cord wood to the Steamers at their doors.”133 Granting title to some in 
1826 gave squatters on the Lower Reserve hope that they could also purchase their lots.  At the 
same time, the land was some of the best remaining waterfront real estate in the district. It did 
not escape the notice of speculators.   
 Four families with long-standing ties to the Detroit region and the British military and 
Indian Department occupied the seven most desirable waterfront lots (see Figure 12 above). In 
some respects, it is inaccurate to describe them as squatters because they settled with the 
permission of the chiefs and appeared to have good relations with them. No doubt on the premise 
of securing their claims, William Jones involved himself in the renegotiation of their Indian 
deeds both before and after he entered the employ of the Indian Department.   
 Under his auspices, oral agreements formerly made between the residents and the chiefs 
represented by pictographs on buckskin became written documents couched in legal language.
134 
John Reynolds originally settled on lots one to three in “the mode and custom exercised by that 
Nation at that period of time.”  By 1834, he held an Indian lease agreed to by the chiefs and 
witnessed by William Jones.
135
  Alexander Hamilton, who originally came to the Maxwell 
Settlement as an assistant to Henry Jones Sr. resided on lot four.  He held a twenty year lease 
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from Gayoshk, Shaweny-penince and Natournee made in 1832.
136
 Louis Sayer(s), likely a 
mixed-blood descendant of Irish merchant John Charles Sayer and Obemauunoqua (Marie), was 
granted one hundred acres as a veteran of the War of 1812 and settled on lot five. The Sayers, 
related by marriage to the Cadottes, also possessed a lease agreement from Gayoshk and Jones 
dating from 1833.
137
 From 1826 onward, lot six was held by Rufus Henderson who came from 
Detroit sometime after 1812, and lot seven by James Fraser, the former Indian Department 
storekeeper on Drummond Island.
138
 By the early 1830s, Jones possessed documentation and 
departmental authority to collect rent and manage leases on behalf of the chiefs.  With three 
parties to these agreements, leaseholders sometimes paid rent to both Jones and the chiefs, and 
the renter, the chiefs or Jones, could not prove the agreements were honoured in their entirety.  
Opportunities for financial impropriety and evasion were created in Moore as on Walpole 
Island.
139
 The off-reserve Order-in-Council together with the recording of the Indian Deeds 
further weakened Aboriginal title to the lots. These decisions encouraged speculation, adding 
another degree of legitimacy to the settler’s claims and fuelling hope that they would eventually 
be acknowledged.   
 Though the chiefs did not intend to surrender the Lower Reserve at that time, the 
behavior of locals and officials made this stance increasingly difficult and impractical to 
maintain. From 1826 onward, residents seemed to be under the impression that the surrender of 
the reserve was imminent. One petitioner enclosed a memorandum from the surveyor in 1826 
promising “that their claim would be acknowledged as soon as the saide reserve” became “the 
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property of the Crown.”140 In the 1830s, existing leaseholders fought to hold onto their lots as 
offers to purchase Indian leases increased. Rufus Henderson sub-leased his three lots on the 
premise that the reserve would be eventually surrendered and he could acquire title.
141
 One of 
Henderson’s tenants, William Leslie, was encouraged by his son to keep his lease on the reserve 
as long as he could because “the property will become more valuable on account of the 
railroad.”142 The chiefs attempted to negotiate with newcomers like Leslie but as time went on, 
leaseholders became less aware of the earlier agreements and those who did were less inclined to 
honour them. By the late 1840s, settlement on the St. Clair changed radically as a result. Instead 
of cultivating relationships of friendship and exchange, Gayoshk and the St. Clair Chiefs accused 
a number of troublesome squatters and speculators of abuse and fraud.
143
  
 More strangers appeared on the land in the 1830s because leases no longer originated 
with the St. Clair chiefs. In their capacity as land agents, Keating and Jones actively interfered 
with the leases to place people of their choosing on the reserves. In the fall of 1833, Jones 
received word from Givins that a man named Alexander McMartin proposed to lease the entire 
Lower Reserve. McMartin originally hailed from Charlottenburgh and was acting as a land agent 
for members of the Glengarry and Stormont militia who possessed unlocated grants. He 
attempted to lease the Lower Reserve for a period of 21 years in exchange for £20 per year in 
produce or money.
144
 The existing settlers would have to be removed and offered compensation 
for their improvements from Anishinabe annuities. Jones held a council with the chiefs where 
they were told that McMartin had already approached the leaseholders and where they were 
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asked to sign an agreement dated eight days earlier.
145
 Jones then confronted James McKenna 
and told him he would have to leave. McKenna, purchased lot number four from Alexander 
Hamilton just one month earlier and he claimed to possess documents tracing the provenance 
back to an original agreement signed by Wawanosh in the 1820s.
  
At the time, McKenna agreed 
to pay Hamilton £9 and Gayoshk $6 per year in rent.
146
 But Jones told McKenna that if he did 
not willingly give up his lease, he would be forcibly removed.
147
 The angry leaseholder 
petitioned the Lieutenant-Governor for consideration.  In the interim, Jones informed his 
superiors that McKenna did not have the permission of the chiefs to reside on the lot. Accusing 
McKenna of mounting a failed attempt to settle on Walpole Island, Jones wrote that he was one 
of those American squatters, “in the habit of making the Indians drunk and then getting them to 
sign any kind of Instrument they think proper to write.”148 Frustrated that he was 
“misrepresented to your Excellency as a squatter and troublesome person,” McKenna was 
powerless to correct the impression left by Jones. In 1847 he sold the lease to David Bowen and 
moved to the United States.
149
  
 McMartin never followed through with the deal for the Lower Reserve. Nonetheless, the 
authority given to Indian agents as final judges of character in the petitioning system combined 
with powers granted to them first as land agents and then commissioners under the 1839 Crown 
Lands Act allowed them to usurp control of Indigenous leases and evict people seemingly at will. 
There is little evidence to suggest that McKenna’s character and motives were as Jones described 
them. Instead, Jones’ machinations enabled Bowen, the very kind of ‘squatter’ the department 
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claimed to discourage to gain possession of the lot. Wasting considerable Indian Department 
time and resources, Bowen refused to pay McKenna the agreed price for the lease and the two 
engaged in legal battles that continued into the 1850s. Despite a legal judgment in McKenna’s 
favour and complaints that Bowen was stripping the lot of timber, the department allowed him to 
purchase the lot. While Jones gave the chiefs no opportunity to refuse McMartin’s offer, the 
older leaseholders could have only viewed them as complicit in their dispossession. 
Demonstrating the tenuous nature of Indian leases, the allowances granted to McMartin incited 
panic among the established occupants compelling them to aggressively seek permanent title to 
their lots. Elizabeth Reynolds petitioned the Lieutenant-Governor fearful that “certain rich and 
influential persons are tampering with the Indians… endeavouring to agitate them to acts of 
injustice towards your petitioners…”150 
 The McMartin lease was simply another prelude to the surrender of the reserve. In 1843, 
Keating expressed concern that the Anishinabe on Walpole Island and the St. Clair lacked the 
kind of “moral and religious improvement” benefitting other communities like Sarnia. Though 
some farmed, the majority on the St. Clair continued to subsist by hunting and fishing and lacked 
access to a school, church or resident missionary.
151
 As the non-Aboriginal population around 
them grew, conflict with these newcomers for resources increased.
152
 Jarvis recommended the 
surrender and sale of the Lower Reserve specifically to provide facilities to settle the Anishinabe 
on Walpole Island. The chiefs reluctantly agreed, and the Lower Reserve was surrendered “for 
their benefit” on 18 August, 1843.153  
The Female Squatters of Moore 
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 If it was unjust to dispossess the tenant of any reserve (Crown, Clergy or Indian) after 
years of labour, then the removal of a woman, and more particularly a widow and her children, 
was an act of unparalleled cruelty. Large families headed by women exemplify the settler of 
unfortunate circumstances, yet a lack of sources means that gender and women in particular 
remain unstudied in the literatures of squatting and landholding in Upper Canada.
154
 By the mid-
1830s, the Loyalist and 1812 veterans who originally settled on the Lower Reserve were dead 
and the waterfront lots occupied by their widows and children. The only males were newcomers 
William Leslie and James McKenna, occupying two waterfront lots under leases from 
Henderson (Lots six and four on Figure 12 above). Widow Elizabeth Reynolds and her eldest son 
Francis managed the first two lots while her daughter, Maryanne McBride, abandoned by her 
husband George, resided on the third.
 
 Widows Amelia Sayer and Isabella Fraser lived lots five 
and seven respectively.
155
  Reynolds, Fraser and Sayer were wives of low-ranking officers and 
soldiers in the military and Indian Department. In the 1840s, locally established land speculators, 
businessmen and members of the judiciary and legislature  began to eclipse this older upper class 
traditionally associated with the British Military and Colonial Government. As women living 
alone, their gender combined with a decline in social status rendered them vulnerable to both a 
powerful speculating professional-merchant class, and a pseudo-criminal element of squatters 
and poachers.
156
 While their location and substantial improvements made these lots attractive, 
the women nonetheless exhibited a surprising degree of confidence and a fierce determination to 
protect their properties.  
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 Whether they realized it or not, the female “squatters” of Moore were part of the same  
broader strategy of land protection utilized by the Anishinabe for hundreds of years in the Great 
Lakes Basin. At the funeral for John Reynolds in 1830, Anishinabe and Eurocanadians alike 
gathered by his graveside on lot three.  The negotiation of leases with useful and sympathetic  
Figure 13: Copy of Lease to Isabel Fraser with the totems of the St. Clair Chiefs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
individuals mitigated the impact of settlement on their lands. The chiefs did not want these 
families ejected, and they came to their defence a number of times. In 1834, Gayoshk and 
Notawance petitioned on behalf of Elizabeth Reynolds and her children who they said had 
 
 
Source: LAC, RG 10/442, Copy of Indian Lease to Isabel Fraser, 24 August, 
1833, 183-186. 
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always “treated” them “with great hospitality” and “in every respect…delt justly by us.”157  
Widow Fraser’s 1833 lease signed by five principal St. Clair Chiefs contained a promise that she 
should receive a grant of the land she occupied in the event they surrendered the reserve (Figure 
13 above).
158
 But the chiefs relied on the department to honour the promises they made to these  
women and as events unfolded, the very success of their longstanding relationship worked 
against them.   
 The absence of provisions for governance in the Proclamation of 1763 left the 
sovereignty of Indigenous peoples in the Indian Territory untouched. The document was not 
concerned with leasing, renting or other non-permanent land or resource use agreements between 
Indigenous peoples and settlers. Only those seeking to acquire land permanently and exclusively 
inspired the passage that expressly forbade “loving Subjects” from purchasing or settling land 
without “leave and Licence.” Because Indigenous peoples actively policed and protected their 
own territories, enforcement or punishment could only consist of the Crown’s “displeasure.”159 
The presence of settlers on what was the Lower Reserve represented by 1843, the culmination of 
successive breaches of the Proclamation and interference in the settlement and management of 
Indian lands. Whether they possessed government grants or Indian leases, the women on the 
Lower Reserve occupied land formerly in the Indian Territory and now Crown Land, and should 
never have been there in the first place. But their presence was tolerated because they behaved as 
‘ideal’ settlers in terms of the government’s own objectives, and proved to be advantageous to 
the St. Clair Anishinabe.
160
 Though the rents paid were often below market value and some of 
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Henderson’s leasees, like those on Walpole Island, became troublesome over time, Keating and 
Jones could have used their authority bolstered by the 1839 Crown Lands Act to support the 
chiefs in policing their own agreements. Instead, the 1839 Crown Lands Act empowered the 
agents to subvert the will of the chiefs. Completely removing their voices from decision 
concerning their own reserves, the act undermined a fair amount of their own sovereignty. Jones 
and Keating presented evidence of conflict, non-payment of rent and the use of alcohol to obtain 
leases as justification to force a surrender of the reserve.   
 The 1839 Crown Lands Act severed the particular distinction given to land in the Indian 
Territory by making Indian Reserves Crown Land. The further appointment of commissioners of 
Eurocanadian origin with the authority to approve or remove trespassers prevented Indigenous 
peoples from taking direct action as they had formerly. Indian policy in this period rested entirely 
on the notion that proceeds of lands surrendered for sale would be converted into a fund to cover 
all future expenses, making the department self-financing.
161
 The Lower Reserve is an ideal 
example of why this policy failed and why Anishinabe peoples failed to realize the profits they 
should have through its sale. Settlers on the Reserve, moreover, did not appreciate or understand 
the confusing and changing legal status of their lots and neither did the department. The 
transformation of the reserve from Indian land to Crown land in 1843 made it incredibly difficult 
for the department to alienate the reserve lands for the ‘benefit’ of the Indians.162  
 Charged with the responsibility to act in the best interests of the Anishinabe, the Indian 
Department and its agents were supposed to ensure that lots on the former Lower Reserve sold 
for the highest price possible.
163
 As land agents they were also beholden to the Crown to 
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facilitate settlement and to attract prospective ‘ideal’ settlers. Petitions and reports in files 
concerning the Lower Reserve demonstrate that in nearly all cases, “for local matters” the 
Lieutenant-Governor depended entirely on the reports of Keating and Jones and rejected or 
accepted petitions based upon them.
164
 Though they all pretended otherwise, the interests of 
these three parties, the Anishinabe, the Crown and the settlers on the reserve, were diametrically 
opposed.  
 While the Moore settlers sympathized with plight of the Anishinabe and maintained good 
relations with them, they did not want to pay for the privilege of staying on their land. As early 
colonists, they felt they had paid the price in their duty, loyalty and sacrifice to the Crown. 
According to their estimation, if they squatted in the past, after the surrender they were on Crown 
land no different from anyone else who received the right to purchase under the 1826 Order in 
Council. In the interest of fairness, they demanded the same right and petitioned Jones, Indian 
Department Headquarters and the Lieutenant-Governor asking to purchase their lots by right of 
preemption and claiming they possessed documentation entitling them to pay five shillings or 
one dollar per acre,
165
 the same amount paid in 1826 by those living outside of the reserve 
boundary. Indian agents in this position could not act in the best interests of the Anishinabe, and 
it is here that the conflict of interest raised by Robinson in Little et al v. Keating and at the core 
of all Indian Department policy is most evident. 
 In general, successful petitioners argued that they were loyal and of good character and 
that their actions furthered the aspirations of the Crown in some measurable way. Males 
commonly called attention to exemplary military sacrifice, public service or business acumen. 
Petitions from women represent an interesting departure from the scripts of men because they 
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lacked access to these traditional avenues of prominence.
166
 The women of Moore highlighted 
the extraordinary length of time they had occupied the lots in relative harmony with the 
Anishinabe and the fact that the chiefs supported their claims.
 167
 Reynolds, Fraser and Sayer in 
particular felt that they were entitled to their lots by virtue of their husbands’ military and Crown 
service.
168
 The character of loyal officer John Reynolds was contrasted with that of George 
McBride, who not only abandoned his wife (Reynolds’ daughter) and family but became 
American by choice.
169
 The women made further appeal to the physical and monetary cost and 
hardships involved in establishing a farm in what was once “a perfect wilderness.” The Reynolds 
family cleared forty acres, Fraser claimed twenty-five acres and McBride twelve acres and 
though they were not fenced, she could be proud of the fact that five acres were cleared after her 
husband left. In addition, they all lived in log or frame houses, and Fraser boasted of an 
additional barn, stable, wharf, and storehouse.
170
 Though the women were proud of these 
accomplishments, now maintained with the assistance of their elder children, at the same time 
they headed large families rendered helpless and vulnerable by the death of their husbands. 
Elizabeth Reynolds had nine children but only two boys, John and Francis, and her separated 
daughter appeared old enough to assist her. When her husband left, Maryanne McBride returned 
home to her mother and it appears the family communally worked all of the lots. In 1835 her 
husband returned and attempted to claim the lot.
171
 Sayer wrote that since 1832, she was “a 
widow left destitute with a large family,” and Fraser pleaded, “if I receive no assistance from 
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Government, I must be turned upon the world in my old age, without a home, or the means of 
subsistence.”172 In their declining years and unable to start over, these women truly believed they 
would be granted the right of pre-emption once the reserve was surrendered.
 173
 It was not 
difficult to see them as the wives of hardworking and loyal subjects as well as victims of bad 
luck and unfortunate circumstances. The department did not want to be seen as dispossessing 
them.  
Compensation and Accommodation  
 The predilection to accommodate non-Aboriginal land acquisition over the preservation 
of Indigenous land rights coerced chiefs into surrenders for the collective benefit of their people 
while denying them the profits from their sale. The chiefs consented to the sale of the reserve 
because Jarvis convinced them they “derive[d] no benefit” from it in its current state.174 Jarvis 
was swayed by the correspondence of Jones and Keating who characterized the system of Indian 
leases as nothing more than an opportunity for designing Americans to ply them with alcohol 
and take their land. The agents, ignoring their own involvement and the fact that legislation, 
incorrectly applied and enforced, was a bigger problem, convinced the chiefs that their “foolish 
ancestors” were culpable.175 Jarvis estimated that it would cost less than £300 to settle the 
Anishinabe on Walpole Island and that the lots would “yield a larger sum than required.”176 
While they did not receive market-value rent according to the original lease agreements they 
made even less from the sale of the Lower Reserve.
177
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 Pre-emption rights stemmed from a number of sources, and as this chapter discusses, 
nepotism, custom, class, social preference and other advantages enabled some to purchase land 
before it was made available to others.
178
 These behaviors were not limited to land granting or 
even to the Indian Department; however Indigenous peoples suffered disproportionately from its 
effects nonetheless.  In 1833, Crown land in the area sold at auction for ten shillings per acre, 
and in 1834, Kiyoshk and another St. Clair Chief agreed to grant the Reynolds family their lots 
(amounting to 600 acres) for approximately three and a half shillings per acre or £100 ($400).
179
 
Though the price was below market value, “goodwill and affection” shared between the two 
parties was worth a great deal more than money. The agreement was subsequently disallowed on 
the basis that Aboriginal people could not privately deal for their own land because they would 
be cheated. Nevertheless, in 1853, the department permitted William Renwick to purchase the 
seven interior reserve lots for six shillings per acre even though land in Moore had sold for eight 
shillings several years earlier in 1846.
 180
  
 Devaluation of the waterfront lots cost Anishinabe peoples significantly more.  In 1843, 
Keating estimated that Leslie’s lot (No. 6), was worth more than £400 ($1600) or nearly £4 per 
acre.
181
 In 1850, Clench declared their “true value” to be half of this estimate but set the upset 
price at £1 per acre.
182
 Despite this deep discount the seven waterfront lots, valuated without 
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consideration of any improvements, were sold to the existing residents in 1851 for fifteen 
shillings per acre or £75 to £79 each. The £540 exclusive of interest and arrears amounted to less 
than one-quarter of their market value.
183
 Ultimately, for their trouble, inconvenience and “for 
their benefit” the Anishinabe of the St. Clair earned slightly more than £1000 for more than 2500 
acres of some of the most valuable land in southwestern Ontario.
184
  
 In 1826, Thomas Fisher and his partner, Alexander Sinclair, paid £75 each for their 
undeveloped waterfront lots in Corunna.
185
 Twenty years later, residents on the Lower Reserve 
paid just slightly more for their waterfront lots and by 1850, profits from the sale of wood 
combined with “the nominal rent paid in kind” to the chiefs over many years had subsidized the 
maintenance and expansion of their farms. Despite these advantages, individuals on the former 
reserve had difficulty making the three annual £25 payments to purchase their lots.
186
 Pointing to 
large investments made in their improvements the women appeared more deserving of the right 
to purchase but also justified in their inability to pay large sums for the property. By 1854 for 
instance, Sayer had not made a single payment, she was three years in arrears, and owed £80 in 
interest alone, more than the purchase price of the lot.
187
 In 1855 Fraser still owed £10 on her lot, 
and as late as 1874, McBride had not made any of the required payments on hers. She eventually 
made a deal that waived twenty years of interest on her unpaid balance in exchange for timely 
payment of the principal.
188
 William Leslie refused to believe that anyone would prevent them 
“from the advantages of cheap land,” but these lots had appreciated in value to such a degree that 
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by 1843 no one could afford to purchase them for what they were truly worth.
189
 The residents 
instead built claims based on the value of their settlement suggesting that they had already ‘paid’ 
for the land with time, loyalty, and the effort it took to be ‘good’ settlers. The acceptance of non-
monetary ‘payments’ served as a mechanism of pre-emption, rewarding existing settlers with 
price reductions and consideration ahead of the Anishinabe and their right to receive fair value 
for their lands. The right of pre-emption was a form of monopoly or combination which forced 
Indigenous peoples to take what they could get rather than force settlers to pay what the land was 
worth.
190
 On the one hand, these circumstances prevented the Anishinabeg from retaining the 
reserve while on the other, they denied their communities the proceeds to fund the schools and 
churches deemed so critically important by officials like Jarvis. 
 It was difficult for Aboriginal people to profit from the sale of their lands when they were 
considered to have no value to them.
191
 Bond Head explained that only “the presence and 
industry of the white settlers” added value to the land. In contrast, its worth for the ‘Indians’ 
“consists of the Game it Contains: he is in fact Lord of the Manor, but it is against his Nature to 
cultivate the Soil.”192 The market price of land is determined by balancing value (quality, 
contents, location and potential) with the amount a purchaser is willing to pay. It may be affected 
by extenuating circumstances, such as need or by social relationships, but it is not based on the 
value of the object to the seller or his or her ability to use it.
193
 Cultural determinants, like those 
made by Bond Head were repeatedly used by officials to justify the sale of Aboriginal lands at 
low or upset prices, making them doubly profitable because they could be sold later at market-
                                                          
189
 LAC, RG 10/120, Petition, William Leslie to Purchase Lands in Moore, 27 March 1843, 4800-3.  
190
 Taylor, Divided Ground, 404.  
191
 JLAPC, 1844-5 Bagot Report, np.  
192
 BPP, No. 323 (1839), Bond Head to Glenelg, 20 November 1836, 126. 
193
 This is known as “fair market value” or a price negotiated by two willing parties. “Fair Market Value, Cambridge 
Business English Dictionary, Cambridge University Press, 2013., accessed 19, February 2014, 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org  
 213 
value. If Aboriginal lands had no value, then any amount offered was profit, and officials told 
them to be thankful they received anything at all. In the nearly 200 years since the Huron Tract 
Treaty was signed, this policy deprived Anishinabe communities of the true “value” or principal 
profits of their land sales and untold amounts of compounded interest, penalties and resale based 
on forfeitures. Wyandotte Chief Isadore Chene [fl. 1812-1828] conceded that; “[t]he White man 
sets his price and the…[Indian] has to take what he is offered, or get nothing at all.”194 Chawme 
and the St. Clair Chiefs negotiated the Huron Tract Treaty to provide for their future yet as we 
have already seen, this legacy was stolen from them. By 1847, after subtracting ”payments for 
special purposes, and also the charges for management,” the St. Clair Anishinabe realized about 
£250 ($1000) from the sale of the entire Lower Reserve. Jones not only ruined any positive 
relationships the chiefs had with neighbouring colonists but settlers owned the reserve, and 
Anishinabe accounts sat empty. At that time more than £750 plus interest remained 
outstanding.
195
 Only a few years later, at the Chief’s urging, officials would discover that 
Superintendent, Joseph Clench pocketed the meagre proceeds.
196
 
The Value of Squatting 
 Aggressive squatting and the abuse of Indian deeds on the Walpole Island and the Lower 
Reserve in Moore were not isolated events. Fifty years earlier, leaders like Joseph Brant 
demanded title to reserve land and the right to manage their own leasing and sales.
197
 In 1828 the 
Darling inquiry conceded that Aboriginal lands were “clearly plundered by their designing and 
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more enlightened neighbours.” Still, nothing concrete in either law or policy was enacted to this 
end for more than a decade.198 Squatters had already invaded the reserves when the Crown Lands 
Act passed in 1839, and agents, instead of preventing the occupation, facilitated the process.  
Aboriginal people were not only denied the right to protect themselves but legally placed at the 
mercy of the people who failed them.199 For much of the 1840s, chiefs Peterwegeshig, Gayoshk, 
Shaweny-Penince and others could only watch as their lands were squatted upon with abandon 
and dealt away by Keating and Jones often to settlers they did not choose. Though the 1839 Act 
empowered Keating and Jones to remove squatters, the legislation was tested in courts stacked 
with locals who refused to convict their neighbours and in some cases, were involved in 
questionable land deals of their own. In the midst of the chaos created by his leases William 
Jones died and his personal papers went missing for several years.
200
 Blame for the 
mismanagement of Indian lands was not placed on the shoulders of squatters, but characterized 
throughout by Jones and Keating as the fault of the chiefs themselves.
201
 The Bagot Report 
published in two parts in 1844-5 and again in 1847 echoed their sentiments.  The commissioners 
conceded that government indifference and insufficient enforcement created the problems First 
Nations now faced but blamed the communities for facilitating Eurocanadian encroachment 
through “their own cupidity and love of spirits.”202 In an understatement of monumental 
proportions, the Bagot Report concluded that Aboriginal people had experienced some 
“difficulty in realizing the proceeds” of their land sales.203  
 The best lands in Upper Canada were surrendered for goods and annuities worth a 
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fraction of their actual value.
204
 For the 7,373,000 acres surrendered in the London and Western 
Districts, the Islands of Michilimackinac and St. Joseph, and in Orillia, the Anishinabe received 
or an average of 2 ½ pennies per acre. These lands often re-sold in an unimproved or marginally 
improved state for an average of 8 to 15 shillings.
205
 Rents paid to Anishinabe Chiefs, even if 
slightly below market-value, gave them a steady and predictable source of income while forging 
positive connections with their Eurocanadian neighbours.  
 Over the long term, improvements such as clearings, houses and outbuildings should 
have increased the value of Aboriginal lands, earned them more money and kept the reserves 
intact. English Common Law entitles landlords to all property improvements upon the expiry or 
termination of a lease.
206
 It was absolutely imperative that lands be sold for the maximum the 
market would bear because the funding model adopted by the department was wholly dependent 
on land and resource revenue. But Commissioners realized when it was too late that land 
payments should have been made in one lump sum at the time of purchase rather than in 
installments.  Sales, annual payments and accruing interest should have been monitored by the 
Crown lands department with extreme vigilance; defaulters had to be caught, and their lots re-
sold for non-payment.
207
 As events along the St. Clair shoreline demonstrate, it did not matter 
whether settlers behaved in a criminal or ideal manner because they were given preference at 
every stage of the settlement process, and Anishinabe people compensated them for the trouble. 
Shockingly, even attempts to co-exist in the borderlands and on the Lower Reserve undermined 
Anishinabe title to their lands.  
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 As Table 6 below shows, communities who signed early treaties for goods or who did not 
want to surrender resources had few options to make money as a collective. By the 1860s,  
Table 6: Reserve Accounts 1864 
 
 Revenue  
Land & Timber $ Interest 
Paid 
Treaty 
Annuity 
Expenses Account 
Balance 
Sarnia 1050.15 1317.06 1500.00 2962.46 45,000.00 
Walpole 0 84.66 700.00 730.53 3100.00 
Source: Province of Canada. Indian Affairs Annual Report for the Half-Year ended 30 June 
1864 (Quebec: Hunter, Rose & Co., 1865), E. Statement of Receipts and Expenditure Account of 
the Several Indian Tribes; G. Statement Shewing the number of Acres of Indian Lands Sold, 16 
& 18. Sarnia includes Kettle and Stony Point. 
 
Sarnia, Kettle and Stony Point could at least depend on some of the proceeds of land and timber 
sales, but Walpole Island, whose lands were unsurrendered, received a much smaller and 
unreliable income. By the late 1830s, Annuities and accrued interest were insufficient to meet 
community expenses, particularly once Keating and Jones co-opted their leases and certainly 
after the surrender of the Lower Reserve. In 1849, Shoogemah complained that some renting 
with the permission of the department on Walpole Island had not paid rent since 1843 and 
refused to pay when confronted.
208
  By 1856, in addition to the shared treaty annuity, Sarnia 
received £279 in additional land revenue while Walpole Island received nothing.
209
  Without 
continual surrenders of land or resources, many reserves saw their balances steadily decline as 
the exorbitant expenses of the department depleted them.  
 In many ways, monies received from the sale of Aboriginal lands were not treated any 
differently than war losses payments, presents or pensions—officials still sought to appropriate 
as much as they could to cover expenses related to the administration of their affairs. The Bagot 
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Report offered a scathing indictment of land management practices stating that “[n]either the 
Commissioner of Crown Lands nor the Chief Superintendent, has hitherto kept any account of 
sales” or tracked the apportionment of monies received. Until this point all payments were 
lumped under “Sundry Tribes,” and no community had their own annuity account.210 Under the 
notion that the responsibility for land sales was some form of charity or service performed for 
Indigenous communities, Crown Lands justified charging exorbitant amounts for surveys, 
appraisals, auctions and fees, including $400 per year to the Receiver General alone to manage 
the Indian Fund.
211
  In the 1840s, these were deemed “excessive,” and in some years the account 
was in deficit, the charges having “exceeding the whole receipts.”212 Accounts of the Six Nations 
bore the brunt of these charges because the lands in the St. Clair were long gone. This “system of 
mismanagement” was described as “defective and injurious to the interests of the Indians.” 
However, measures introduced to improve recordkeeping and accountability thereafter were “too 
little, too late” and resulted in little change.213 Aboriginal people funded the operation of the 
Department until about 1913.
214
 
 Financial accounting for Aboriginal communities became even more complex as the 
Imperial Government gradually transferred departments, including Indian Affairs, to the colonial 
government the 1850s.  This process was completed in 1860 when the Department was removed 
from the authority of the Crown’s representative in Canada (the Governor General) and merged 
with the Department of Crown Lands. The Commissioner of Crown lands, Philip Vankoughnet, 
simultaneously became the Superintendent of Indian Affairs. Unable to justify two departments 
in an age of rigorous economizing and civil service streamlining, in 1862 it was made one 
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department overseen by a deputy minister. Confusion ensued as moneys intended for the General 
Indian Fund were, until the 1860s ‘accidentally’ deposited into the Crown Lands account.215 
After 1867 Indian Affairs continued to be paired with departments whose mandates were 
incompatible with the goals of the Department and contrary to the maintenance of Indigenous 
lands and resources.
216
   
Conclusion  
 In the absence of mechanisms to control the advance of settlement, Anishinabe peoples 
used a system of deeds and leasing carried over from the colonial period. These agreements 
created a symbiotic economic relationship whereby Indigenous subsistence hunting and fishing 
complemented Eurocanadian agricultural settlement.
217
 Taylor called this strategy as it existed in 
colonial America, “farming the farmers” and it represented a deliberate strategy on the part of 
Indigenous peoples to create working relationships with the settlers around them.
218
 Rent, goods 
and produce paid in conjunction with or in lieu of money mitigated the effects of retrenchment in 
the British military and parsimony in policies governing presents and pensions. At the same time, 
these cuts made Aboriginal people extremely vulnerable to both large-scale treaties and smaller 
private arrangements for land. In an 1846 petition, Walpole Chiefs told the Governor General 
“[w]e are not receiving what our fathers did, nor what we ourselves once did.”219 As early as 
1825, persons in authority like the Askins braided various agreements, payments, presents and 
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diplomatic ceremonies into a single treaty process in which public and private became largely 
indistinguishable to First Nations.  Following the Rebellions, the Crown slowly disentangled 
itself from the management of Indian lands, shifting monies and power to the colonial 
assembly.
220
  
 Initially, a cash-strapped Colonial Office used land as a substitute to compensate and 
placate officials.
221
 “[B]eing early and long in the province” as historian J.K. Johnson writes, 
gave loyalists, officials, 1812 veterans and their descendants a distinct advantage as they could 
acquire Aboriginal lands “either cheaply or free, as grants from the Crown.”222 Thereafter, 
merchants, traders and those with connections to the Indian Department bought up earlier grants 
or negotiated new lease agreements with the chiefs they supplied. These connections were a 
significant factor in the wealth of well-connected persons in the province. The Baby and Askin 
families, William Keating and as the next chapter will show, Malcolm Cameron, combined 
commercial, social and political connections to acquire land and resources, formerly in the 
possession of Anishinabe people.
223
 The use of totemic deeds well into the early nineteenth 
century meant that documents without names or dates transferred easily and remained difficult to 
authenticate.
224
 The development of an informal system of exchange among local compacts 
allowed deeds to be used as de-facto currency. Consequently, Askin and other merchants and 
officials negotiated, used and transferred deeds in ways not anticipated by the original 
Anishinabe and Wyandotte grantees. Efforts to legitimize their holdings, as Hatter surmizes, led 
to the formalization of administration, survey and settlement that the Anishinabeg around Detroit 
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tried to prevent.
 225
  These circumstances threatened the oral component of these deeds contained 
in the day-to-day social and economic relations between Anishinabe peoples and families like 
the Reynolds, Sayers and Frasers in the region. In contrast, being “early and long in the 
province” did not benefit Indigenous peoples. Early surrenders made in exchange for goods 
combined with agent impropriety and concessions given to squatters denied Anishinabe 
communities long-term support from the compounded interest of their investments. Ultimately as 
the Lower Reserve illustrates, surrenders were not used for “the benefit of the Indians” but to 
legitimize already existent settlement and make bad titles good. 
 Challenging simplistic definitions of ‘illegal’ settlement, the Moore ‘squatters’ behaved 
both as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ settlers. Improvements symbolized the value of labour expended on the 
land. Depriving settlers of this through removal, especially when the original holders of deeds 
were loyal military men and helpless women and children, was unpalatable and ultimately cruel. 
But cruel too were the advantages given to them that denied Anishinabe communities their value 
in the land and the value of the relationships they cultivated with their neighbours. Even though 
English law entitled Anishinabe communities to their renters’ improvements, this seems to run 
contrary to policy and practice in Upper Canada.
226
 Forcing Anishinabe communities to either 
compensate squatters or permit the removal of movable property served to punish them for 
allowing Eurocanadians on their land in the first place. 
 Rather than assist the Anishinabe to remove “bad” squatters, the 1839 Crown Lands Act 
enabled corrupt agents like Keating and Jones to profit from the system they ultimately 
condemned. As in the United States, Indian Agents allowed deeds to be used to transfer lots from 
original deed holders to third parties and ultimately for the exercise of pre-emptive rights in the 
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purchasing process. Deeming the documentation of some to be ‘more valid’ than others involved 
agents in conflicts of interest and irreparably harmed relationships between the Anishinabe and 
their tenant such that by 1843, officials could only see the surrender of the reserve as a solution.  
Denied the profits of lands surrendered, Anishinabe Chiefs had to protect what remained and 
forge new economic and commercial relationships with people around them. As the next chapter 
will discuss, growing populations and declining economic options made conditions on the 
reserves extremely challenging.  
 222 
Chapter 4: Inconvenient Neighbours: Economies of Confinement, 1839-1867 
 “Seeing with two eyes,” rested on the assumption that mutually beneficial economic 
relationships with non-Aboriginal settlers would be cultivated. In Milloy’s words, it was a 
request for a “senior partner.”1  While we tend to think of reserves as separate from the 
community around them and the Anishinabeg residents unable to adapt to the nineteenth century 
political economy, this is simply not true. The Anishinabeg had been successful farmers and 
traders for centuries until the 1840s and in spite of many obstacles put before them, continued to 
incorporate agriculture along with other activities into their household economies. But unlike 
Eurocanadians, the Anishinabe in Lambton County had limited control over the formation of 
policy affecting reserve economies. Department policies implemented in an ad hoc manner 
siphoned annuities out of their communities, restricted their access to credit, stifled innovation 
and stunted economic growth on reserves.    
 As the last chapter noted, attempts by the St. Clair Chiefs to co-exist with settlers in 
Moore actually undermined the profitability of reserve lots when “surrendered for their benefit” 
in 1843. The fact that Aboriginal people did not profit from the sale of their land cast new 
importance on available sources of food and income. While Indigenous peoples in Lambton 
County maintained access, control and management of their resources into the nineteenth 
century, these were extremely localized phenomena dependent upon time and space. In the 
heavily settled St. Clair River shoreline, lands were targeted with a ferocity reminiscent of 
colonial America, and the Anishinabeg very quickly became “inconvenient neighbours.”2 
 The sale of land below market value combined with mismanagement of their funds by 
some of the most trusted and powerful members of the Indian Department sabotaged the efforts 
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of Anishinabe communities to establish themselves in Upper Canada. Indian agents pocketed 
presents here and there prior to 1828, but once goods and land were converted to money, and the 
sole arbiter of access and disbursement was the Indian agent difficulties ensued.
3
 A complex and 
invasive bureaucracy developed around the tendering of contracts, requisitioning of goods and 
receipt of land payments, enabling corrupt and incompetent “sycophants”4 to steal the financial 
futures of Aboriginal communities. By 1850, minimal funds in their band accounts combined 
with the behavior of their agents, contributed to the impression that Anishinabe people were 
impoverished as a result of their own idleness and irresponsibility.  
 These circumstances occurred at a time when both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
communities experienced unprecedented growth.  The total population of 60,000 people in the 
province before the War of 1812 doubled between 1828 and 1833, and the population reached 
427,000 by 1840. Irish famine and British emigrants who came into the District after 1840 
strained available resources, highlighting inadequacies in infrastructure and local government. 
The 952,000 Eurocanadians resident in the colony in 1850 became more than one and a half 
million at the time of Confederation.
5
 Of this number, 10,815 resided in Lambton County.
6
  Until 
the 1844 Bagot Report, First Nations inhabiting the borderlands of the Western District and 
former Northwest were estimated to number between 10,000 and 18,000 people. In 1828 only 
1500 were thought to reside in Upper Canada.
7
 After 1844, the combined populations of Walpole 
Island, Moore, Sarnia, Enniskillen and Kettle and Stony Point fluctuated between 1300 and 2000 
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people.
8
 The proximity to the American border and close connections with Chippewa in 
Michigan suggests that these numbers should be considered approximations only. The arrival of 
Saginaw Chippewa and Potawatomi swelled reserve populations in the 1830s and 40s just as 
land losses peaked. Populations declined to their lowest levels following the surrender of the 
Lower and Enniskillen reserves as the displaced residents located themselves elsewhere. Greater 
numbers of people on smaller plots of land confronted with declining resources caused some 
Anishinabe in the 1850s and 1860s to move further from settlement and to seek paid labour in 
Michigan, Kansas, Saugeen and Sault Ste. Marie.
 9
 
 The assumption that government revenues increased with population density is not borne 
out by data from Lambton County. Land granted ‘free’ to loyalists, militiamen and other Crown 
favourites did not pay for infrastructure that settlers and commercial interests later demanded.  
Petitions for roads, railways, schools and other improvements occurred in an environment where 
freeholders resisted almost all municipal attempts to tax them.
10
  Population growth did not 
benefit the Western District treasury and revenues began a sharp downward trend that continued 
throughout the rest of the decade.
11
 These circumstances combined with a remote and 
challenging landscape far from Montréal and Toronto, made the prospects of financing 
infrastructure in Lambton particularly dire in the second half of the century. 
The period after 1841 is marked by increasing “Canadianization, urbanization, 
professionalization and commercialization.”12 Though “nation-building’ justified the investment 
of large amounts of private and public monies into development, this largess did not extend to 
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Indigenous communities. Cutbacks to the department meant that Anishinabe communities; in a 
desperate need to acquire funds, became vulnerable to local pressure to surrender remaining 
lands in their possession. Settlers and their governments not only believed these communities 
possessed valuable lands and resources that were going to waste but benefitted from the 
infrastructure paid for by others without paying taxes themselves. 
 For the first half of the century, the distance from the seat of government in Sandwich 
created a feeling of disenfranchisement in the north. This changed when Kent separated from 
Essex in 1847 followed by the “Ten Northern Townships” in 1849.  Commercial interests in 
Sandwich, Chatham, Port Sarnia and London conceived of the northern portion of the district as 
a resource hinterland ripe for exploitation, and Township councils in 1851 provided the means 
by which “regionally powerful patrons” accumulated the political will to finance development 
projects.
13
  A well-connected ‘compact’ of individuals including Malcom Cameron, Alexander 
Vidal, the Mackenzie family and others used local Indian Department connections to build 
fortunes and political careers from what remained of Indian lands and resources.  
 While The Proclamation of 1763 instituted a system of licensing to regulate trade, this 
policy was not adhered to in Upper Canada.
14
 In 1839, Keating recommended licensing traders 
and having them post bonds that could be forfeited for illegal behavior. Punitive restrictions were 
instead placed on Aboriginal people in the mistaken belief that this would protect them from 
unscrupulous merchants. This policy stunted reserve development and created a closed system 
where small amounts of annuity money trickled into the reserves only to be transferred to 
neighbouring communities. The construction of buildings as well as sawmills, wharves and the 
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supplies and labour associated with them were contracted out and leased to Eurocanadians. 
Blame was placed on Aboriginal people who, according to the 1844 Bagot Report, had not taken 
advantage of “opportunities which they have possessed of raising themselves from the state of 
dependence to the level of the surrounding population.” By 1858 it was recognized that “a 
different system” was needed, but the recommendations of additional cessions did not deviate 
from the failed policies of the past.15  If until 1814 Aboriginal people were a benefit to the 
British as allies, afterwards they benefited Canadians as impoverished people. 
“We are travelling in the Dark” 
 Anishinabe leaders in the St. Clair region-at Walpole Island, Sarnia, Bear Creek and 
Kettle and Stony Point spent their childhoods in Aboriginal villages away from sustained contact 
with Europeans and steeped in their culture and language. While their adult years were marked 
by some of the greatest changes that Northeastern North America has ever seen, this strong 
cultural base enabled them to survive and guide their communities through the rapidly changing 
circumstances around them. They exemplify “two-eyed seeing.” Throughout their lives, they 
mitigated the worst aspects of colonial policy by balancing Indigenous and European ways of 
knowing and doing. Despite continual references to their decline, most of these individuals lived 
long, healthy lives, learned to navigate the bureaucracy of the department and built strong 
relations with individuals in neighbouring communities in most cases without ever learning 
English.
16
 These leaders, who last fought the Americans, found a new sense of purpose fighting 
those in positions of power who sought to deny them even the smallest role in an evolving 
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polity.
17
 In 1838, the Chiefs in Council on Walpole Island sent a petition to the Governor 
General asking to meet with him. They had not received annuities in three years and were 
concerned that something was very wrong with their accounts. Anishinabe Chiefs in a number of 
communities expressed similar sentiments: they had not received what they had been promised 
and wanted to ‘see’ detailed statements of their land sales accounts. Until this occurred, they 
were, in Peterwegeshig’s words, simply “traveling in the dark.”18 
 The generation of Indian Agents, born after the American Revolution could appeal to the 
mythology surrounding their past service in the War of 1812, but military service as a path to 
prominence in Upper Canadian society was eliminated after 1840.
19
 At the same time, employees 
of the Indian Department faced greater responsibilities without corresponding increases in 
remuneration.
 
 As land agents, Keating and Jones complained that non-Aboriginal people 
seeking land and resources repeatedly harassed them, and they were summoned almost daily to 
mediate disputes in their role as magistrates.
20
 Joseph Clench, a magistrate and inspector of 
tavern and other licences was after 1845, expected to manage the land sales and commercial 
transactions of all reserves in the Western District.
21
 Designed to curtail the power of resident 
agents like Keating and Jones, centralization accomplished this task too well by virtually 
eliminating oversight.
22
 Though most of the problems were of his own making, thousands of 
letters and petitions in his files show that like other agents, Clench was “constantly plagued by 
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awkward contested claims,”23 for land and inquiries and complaints from chiefs about 
trespassers. Even if he had devoted himself to reserve affairs, in such an environment, it would 
have been impossible to act in the capacity of a ‘partner.’ 
 A general culture of entitlement and bureaucratic structure lacking oversight created “a 
rather loose code of public morality” in most government circles.24 Anishinabe people in 
southwestern Ontario in particular suffered from an inordinate number of officials including 
Keating and Jones, Clench and Superintendent Samuel P. Jarvis who abused their power and 
stole thousands of dollars from their accounts. At the same time, Aboriginal leaders made great 
gains in the Methodist Church, but their promotions stopped just shy of positions of influence. 
Officials “passed over”25 competent Indigenous leaders like Peter Jones at the Credit when their 
assistance was needed most. In 1855, Jones was considered the best-suited candidate to replace 
Clench as the Visiting Superintendent but Froome Talfourd was hired instead. Talfourd, a British 
emigrant with no experience in Indian Affairs seems to have genuinely tried to restore honour 
and respect to his position but it was too late. “[A]ttacks” of a serious illness limited his 
effectiveness and
 
he was forced to retire in 1863.
26
 Walpole Island and Sarnia Chiefs and 
Councils petitioned to have Dr. Thomas W. Johnston; their physician and Talfourd’s brother-in-
law appointed district Superintendent but their wishes by this point no longer mattered. Robert 
McKenzie was chosen instead, symbolizing the last change in administration when politicians 
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representing the Dominion gained control of Indian Affairs.
27
 In the years leading up to 
Confederation, First Nations’ interests took a backseat to Macdonald’s broader nation-building 
vision and a bureaucracy antithetical to their culture and interests developed around them .   
“A kind of mixed farming”28  
 Aboriginal people in the Great Lakes Basin can all be described as agricultural people. 
Even in the northern Boundary Waters region, Waisburg and Holzkamm note that Indigenous 
peoples supplied fur trade posts with significant quantities of corn, pumpkins and root 
vegetables.
29
 Southern nations like the Haudenosaunee, Shawnee, Huron and Moravian 
Delaware (Leni Lenape) settled in more permanent villages and thus farmed more than the 
Potawatomi and northern Algonquian groups but agriculture was certainly not foreign to any of 
them.
30
 While touring the Saginaw area of Michigan in 1718, M. de Sabrevois wrote that the 
Chippewa farmed on the mainland and Mackinac Island to supplement their diet of meat and fish 
and to act as a hedge against the failure of any of these resources.
31
 The Detroit Gazette reported 
in 1821 that “Indians” in the Saginaw Bay region engaged in “considerable agricultural 
activities.”32 The characterization of Anishinabe peoples as wandering ‘hunter-gatherers’ was a 
myth created out of the description of non-invasive techniques of Anishinabe horticulture as 
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“gardening” rather than ‘farming.’33 Prior to 1828, British officials encouraged the Anishinabe to 
abandon their cornfields to provision, trade and assist in colonial conflicts. It was only with the 
implementation of Colborne’s ‘civilization program’ that a transition to full-time agriculturalists 
became policy.
34
  
 Anishinabe peoples in Lambton County did become successful farmers, but not by 
growing wheat. In 1823, a settler in Saginaw Michigan noted the Chippewa raised “60 bushels of 
corn from an acre, notwithstanding their imperfect cultivation” at a time when “[s]eventy bushels 
of shelled corn to the acre was no uncommon yield.”35 Residents on the Sarnia Reserve and on 
Walpole Island grew small amounts of spring and fall (winter) wheat but in the 1850s, the latter 
became subject to midge. Indian corn and potatoes were better suited for the climate and less 
subject to disease. Data from the 1850s shows that of the 2439 acres cleared on Walpole Island, 
6388 bushels of corn and 3965 bushels of potatoes were complemented by harvests of 1517 
bushels of wheat, 547 oats, 418 beans, 377 peas, and 294 tons of hay.
36
 By 1860, on Walpole 
Island harvests of corn and potatoes alone amounted to approximately 5000 and 3000 bushels 
respectively
37
 and the community supported itself  and resisted pressures to surrender land by 
selling their agricultural surplus “on the American side of the river.”38 With half the population 
of Walpole Island , the SarniaVillage  in the same period cleared 608 acres and harvested 1804 
bushels of corn, 1187 of potatoes, 608 of oats, 526 of wheat, 377 peas, and 74 tons of hay.
39
 Like 
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Eurocanadian towns, reserve economies evolved according to available local resources and 
opportunities. Some residents on the Sarnia and Sable reserves focused on farming while others 
farmed “a little” to supplement hunting and fishing. The majority in Bosanquet Township did not 
farm at all.
40
 
 Farming, when practiced was integrated into their historic seasonal round. As a result, the 
amount of land Anishinabe families placed under cultivation remained relatively stable. A 
sample of 20 families from the Sarnia reserve holding between 25 and 80 acres reveals that 
families with access to more land did clear or not plant any more than families who held 
significantly less. Farmers with 25 to 30 acres cleared one-third to one quarter of their lots while 
those holding between 33 and 66 acres cleared approximately one-fifth. Six families who held 80 
acres of land each cleared less than one-tenth of it on average indicating that the percentage of 
land under cultivation actually declined in proportion to the amount of land held.
 41
 Because of 
this, Sarnia residents kept less livestock which in 1858 included 38 cows, 26 yokes of oxen, 96 
horses and 79 pigs. By comparison, farmers on Walpole Island kept 75 cows, 41 yokes of oxen, 
132 cattle and 514 pigs.
42
 Regardless of acreage, the Anishinabe grew hay and left significant 
amounts of their lots in a wild and wooded state, refusing to risk their economic well-being on 
one activity. Farming remained only part of a broader Anishinabek economy strategically 
attuned to the local environment and markets and varied to mitigate risk of scarcity. 
 While farming was to be imposed on the reserves, along with education and Christianity 
as a civilizing endeavour, it was done so in an ad hoc and inconsistent manner. Reserve farms 
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were to be a “place of probation, a training ground in the lessons of civilization and 
citizenship.”43 Thus, the Department did not take interest in the proclivities, talents or aptitudes 
of individuals, nor did officials entertain the transformation of Anishinabe peoples into anything 
other than full-time subsistence farmers.
44
 Even so, the absence of support and assistance 
promised in the treaties, neglect and malfeasance by their agents, and the behavior of their 
Eurocanadian neighbours, delayed the implementation of reserve agriculture on the St. Clair until 
the second half of the 1840s. In spite of this, less than five years later, some Anishinabe families 
at Sarnia farmed individual lots and planted a variety of crops including Indian corn, potatoes, 
oats and peas. But options other than farming were available and reports by 1858 suggested that 
less than one fifth of Sarnia’s farmers produced harvests sufficient to feed their families.45 
Historian John Lutz focuses on late nineteenth and early twentieth century examples of what he 
characterized as a “moditional economy,” in which B.C. First Nations “exchanged their labour in 
different combinations…as opportunities presented themselves.”46 Earlier manifestations of 
similar economic strategies are evident in Lambton County, where Anishinabe peoples combined 
cottage industry, wage labour, farming, hunting, fishing and gathering, at various times, to 
survive in an era before industrial capitalism took hold in the region.
47
   
 In spring and fall, it only made sense that agricultural activities would take a backseat to 
the “fisheries…at their door.”  The Sarnia Reserve was also very close to the town of Sarnia, and 
wage labour at one dollar per day in the sawmills or twelve shillings per day on the farms of 
“neighbouring whites” was an attractive option for those who did not want to farm.48 Irrespective 
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of the creation of the model village and the presence of a resident missionary and schoolteacher, 
like their neighbours, Anishinabe on the Sarnia reserve adopted economic strategies suitable to 
the community and available to them from the surrounding area.
49
 The fact that farmers did not 
produce enough to feed their families and did not continue to clear more land is not indicative of 
failure, but of success in other economic endeavours which went unknown or unmeasured by the 
department. 
 In western Canada, policy had very little to do with the decision to engage in farming. In 
some cases policy actually “discouraged” individuals while others adopted successful strategies 
in spite of it.
50
 Low prices received for flour in the 1840s, did not always make wheat farming a 
profitable venture.
51
 Though Kettle and Stony Point were admittedly “almost entirely 
neglected…for many years,” Missionary E.F. Wilson concluded in the 1860s that Kettle Point 
“seemed…to have advanced more in their farming operations than the Sarnia Indians.”52 Some 
of the one hundred people resident on Kettle Point lived comfortably and small amounts of 
Indian corn, potatoes, wheat and oats but Chief Ashkebahgahnequod, “had a capitol house with 
several rooms in it. He, along with several others, cultivated fruit trees. One of the few detailed 
accounts from 1858 indicates that they had 446 trees in their orchards including 206 apple trees, 
154 peach trees and 86 cherry trees.
53
 The decision to grow fruit appears to have been executed 
entirely by Kettle Point residents. Serviced by Sarnia’s interpreter Henry Pahtahquahong Chase, 
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as late as the 1860s, the reserve had little if any contact with the department or Clench.
54
  In 
Wilson’s words “[n]ot a single individual, man, woman, or child, could read or write.” In 1861, 
most individuals over the age of twenty were identified as unable to read or write in English, 
there was no church or school until Wilson ventured there after establishing his mission at 
Sarnia.
55
  Echoing the words of Wawanosh and Bauzhigeeshigwashekum, Ahbettuhwahnugund 
also demonstrated that self-sufficiency; political independence and Anishinabe values were not 
mutually exclusive. 
 Reserve communities maintained their own distinct community values and attracted 
residents of similar ‘mind.’ On the outskirts of the Sarnia reserve and in the remote and sparsely 
populated Kettle and Stony Point reserves, small camps of ‘wigwams’ inhabited by interrelated 
kin groups could be found.
56
 Aside from a fractious relationship with a Jesuit priest, neither a 
church nor a school was accepted on Walpole Island until Jamieson earned their trust in the 
1840s.
57
 Though Peterwegeshig wanted to be taught English and arithmetic, the chiefs refused to 
accept the Christian proselytizing that would come with a mission school. While non-Aboriginal 
settlers continued to occupy some farms on the Island, Odawah, Ojibwa and Potawatomi families 
divided the properties of ejected squatters. According to Keating, “[e]ach separate band 
cultivates in one vast enclosure, each person according to his means of industry.” He compared 
this to agricultural methods used in France although he admitted they developed it on their own. 
                                                          
54
 The Anishinabe Methodist minister was the interpreter at Sarnia from 1843-1856.  See Donald B. Smith, “Chase, 
Henry Pahtahquahong,” DCB,Online, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed 28 June, 2010, 
http://www.biographi.ca 
55
 Wilson, Missionary Work Among the Ojebway Indians, 27.  LAC, RG 31, 1861 Census Canada West, Lambton 
County,  Chippewa Indians belonging to the Sarnia Band residing in the Township of Bosanquet, 47-48. 
56
 LAC, RG 31, 1861 Census Canada West, Lambton County, Chippewa Indians belonging to the Sarnia Band 
residing in the Township of Bosanquet, pg. 47-48. 
57
 Denys Delâge, HeIen Hornbeck Tanner and Pierre Chazelle, "The Ojibway-Jesuit Debate at Walpole Island" 
Ethnohistory, No. 41, Vol. 2(Spring 1994): 295-321; Krasowski, “’A Numiany’ (The Prayer People) and the Pagans 
of Walpole Island First Nation,” 14-15. Father Dominque Du Ranquet appeared on the Island in 1844 with the 
support of Keating and a few families. Without permission he cut oak trees and proceeded to build his church on a 
sacred burial mound and cemetery.  Peterwegeshig and the other leaders actively resisted his presence and burned 
the church in 1849. The priest left the following year. 
 235 
Shared fields were extremely efficient: they required less fencing
58
 and fully utilized the labour 
of each person capable of working without burdening them with an entire farm. Walpole Island 
farmers grew similar items to Sarnia with the addition of large amounts of buckwheat and hay. 
Both reserves raised a substantial number of cattle and pigs and the sale of ponies on Walpole 
Island provided a significant source of income. Just as fishing and wage labour were options at 
Sarnia, Walpole Island residents devoted considerable time in the winter for hunting in 
Michigan, and maple-sugaring in the spring.
59
 But as settlement increased, they had to go farther 
afield to do so.   
 Despite smatterings of praise in many reports and an acknowledgement that wheat 
monoculture was impractical in most instances the myth of the yeoman farmer persisted in 
department correspondence and continued to influence policy.
60
 Settlement in some areas only 
became viable when governments created markets for produce, and farmers could hire seasonal 
labourers. In many cases success was only achieved with “mutual helpfulness” in communal 
activities like bees, barn-raisings and agricultural fairs.
61
 In contrast to recommendations made 
by Alan Salt and the Rev. W. Scott, much effort was devoted to coercing Sarnia’s farmers to sub-
divide the reserve into individual lots. In 1847, echoing the words of the ancestral chiefs, Salt 
and Scott suggested that agricultural instructors and a model farm be established at Sarnia, even 
though one should have been operating for the last twenty years.
62
 The department eliminated 
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resident agents in the mid-1840s, forcing missionaries to manage reserve economies alongside 
their other duties.
63
 Though they held bees and helped each other, Anishinabe reserve farmers 
did not benefit from shared membership or camaraderie in Sarnia’s agricultural or fraternal 
societies, nor is there any evidence that publications on such topics were translated or transmitted 
to them. Some attended fairs in the 1850s but they competed within their own categories or held 
agricultural “shows” on the reserve judged by “white persons” from the neighbourhood.  Items 
entered in the 1854 Provincial Exhibition such as canoes, peace pipes, moccasins, snowshoes and 
baskets were of “Indian manufacture” only and did not showcase their accomplishments in 
agriculture, livestock breeding or domestic manufactures nor did they allow them to compete as 
equals with non-Aboriginals.
64
  By the late 1840s, the technological gap grew as mechanization 
and specialization threatened to undermine some of their progress. Initially, fanning mills, 
ploughs, harrows as well as Massey mowers and reapers in the 1850s, could all be purchased for 
less than one hundred dollars each. By the 1860s, steam power provided greater efficiency with 
less effort, but it also pushed the price of items like threshing machines to $200.
65
 While twenty 
farmers on Walpole Island were able to purchase one together, communities in less fortunate 
circumstances could not or had to rent or hire them out to cover the expense.
66
 These investments 
would not have been an issue had the communities profited from their lands as they should have. 
 Anishinabe communities in Lambton County built their economies based on the use of 
available resources. Like their Eurocanadian neighbours, they tended to grow hardier crops 
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suited for the climate including corn, oats and potatoes. In agricultural terms this has been 
described as “a kind of mixed farming.”67 Ahbettuhwahnugund had “an orchard full of apples 
and cherries, and well-cultivated fields.” By the 1850s, officials noted that on Walpole Island, 
they “[n]ot only have…enough for home consumption, but they also manage[d] to export, in 
considerable quantities, potatoes, beans, corn, and even butter.”68 As this chapter has shown, a 
great deal of labour and learning on reserves in the Western District was performed and acquired 
informally by Anishinabe for themselves. On the lands purchased in Enniskillen for example, 
five families cleared and planted “about forty acres” and built “two good log houses and two 
small log barns” without any government assistance.69 Here, the Bear Creek lands contained 
more than 400 acres of sugar bush which Keating himself estimated produced 2000 pounds of 
maple sugar annually.70 This is a substantial amount given that all of Lambton County produced 
5901 pounds in 1851 and more than 100,000 pounds were produced annually in the Western 
District between 1842 and 1850.71 The spring sugaring season lasted four to five weeks until the 
middle of April when the Anishinabe returned to fish and plant their fields.72 Keating’s report 
suggested that the maple sugar was “wasted” and never lasted the winter but this seems rather 
disingenuous for a valuable product of so much time and labour.
73
  The Anishinabe factored the 
hunting and sugaring land of Bear Creek into their economies as early as 1818 when Chawme 
pointed the area out as one they wished to reserve in the Huron Tract Treaty.  When the chiefs 
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realized the land had not been set aside, they immediately began petitioning to purchase similar 
lands in the area and proceeded to do so in 1841. For consumption, sale or trade, maple sugar 
formed an important part of the household economy, helping us understand why the chiefs 
wanted to protect the sugaring lands in the first place, and why the gradual loss of the Enniskillen 
reserve to unauthorized settlement in the 1840s was such a blow their economy.
74
  
 Experience taught Anishinabe peoples that success came with risk, and doing too well 
attracted speculators and squatters to their lands.  A report from 1839 indicated that in one area, 
twenty Anishinabe families living in log houses cleared one hundred and forty-six acres.  Of this 
amount, one hundred acres were under their cultivation. They had two oxen, three cows and two 
pigs and worked the land with three ploughs, two harrows and nine sleighs.  By the 1840s, thirty-
two families now cleared almost double the amount of land, and a few individuals had cleared 
thirty acres themselves.75  These Anishinabe farmers lived alongside the Reynolds, Sayers and 
others on the Lower Reserve prior to 1843, and they were displaced when it was surrendered and 
sold “for their benefit.” William Renwick not only under-paid for the land but reaped the benefits 
of these improvements and clearings, while the Anishinabe residents started over on the other 
reserves. As late as 1858, official acknowleged that “[t]he transfer of improvements on land by 
an individual Indian for valuable considerations to a white squatter was an affair of frequent 
occurrence.”  Without protection of the law or title to their lands, Indigenous peoples feared the 
loss of their land with every improvement made upon it.76  
 The system of requisitioning also impeded reserve agriculture and infuriated merchants.  
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To plant in the spring, quantities of all necessary supplies including the various seeds and any 
tools had to be estimated the previous winter. With so many links in the bureaucratic supply 
chain, errors, changes and delays could easily ruin an entire season of planting. In the 1850s for 
instance, it was intimated that Clench kept requisitions “detained at London for weeks and 
months” before sending them for approval. In the winter of 1852, Joshua and David Wawanosh 
estimated their requirements for the following spring planting season and sent in their 
requisitions. The much-needed seed and supplies arrived in July, more than two months too late 
to sow them.  It was the need to “make some other arrangements to get their Annuity in a more 
convenient way” that compelled frustrated chiefs to consider land surrenders and covert deals 
with merchants like Malcolm Cameron.
77
 Reserve economies held great potential in these early 
years as suppliers of goods to neighbouring towns. Though they complained about the lack of 
opportunities available to the Anishinabe, no one in the department displayed much interest or 
took any serious initiative towards helping Indigenous entrepreneurs establish themselves in 
farming or commercial enterprises. 
They “come with smooth words, hoping to get our money for nothing”78 
   Anishinabe people were once central contributors to the colonial economy. The loss of 
the Northwest and declining resources in localized areas forced Aboriginal people to seek many 
creative ways of adapting to these changing circumstances. Initially, goods and money received 
from renters in Moore and on Walpole Island; supplies acquired on credit and the sale of 
utensils, crafts, fish and fur bridged this gap. In the 1840s and 1850s, exports of farm products 
and maple-syrup enabled them to be relatively independent.
79
 At the same time that options in 
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the old economy declined, Anishinabe peoples found themselves pushed to the periphery in the 
new.
80
 Instead of suppliers, they transitioned to consumers in the peacetime markets of 
Eurocanadians.
81
  
 Much remains to be explored about Indigenous peoples, commerce and economic 
development in the post-fur trade period.
82
 Department officials and reformers ignored their past 
economic relationships with Indigenous peoples, and resisted any idea that reserve communities 
could supply themselves in even the most basic ways. Yet, reserve culture in the nineteenth 
century was infused with a positive, good-natured sense of competition driven not necessarily by 
profit but by the desire to benefit the community, earn “an acceptable livelihood,” and have a 
sense of purpose in life.
83
 
 The civilization program initially designed model villages like Sarnia along the lines of 
the European village centre which, according to observers, began with “the erection of a saw-
mill and grist-mill…then a few shanties or loghouses…then a grocery-store…a tavern…a 
chapel…[and] a school-house…”84 Though the government initially built sixteen log homes on 
the Sarnia reserve, virtually every structure thereafter was constructed either partially or 
completely by Anishinabe people with their own funds and labour.  In the 1861 census, the 
sixteen log cabins had grown to forty-seven, and another four frame houses, thirty shanties and 
eleven camps housed four hundred people.  In 1847, Walpole Island residents had built twenty-
five log houses, three frame houses and four barns made of logs. Over the course of the next 
year, Keating expected a dozen more houses to be built using proceeds “from the produce of 
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their industry and the sale of their horses” to purchase the necessary building materials.  By 
1861, more than five hundred people lived on Walpole Island in one hundred log cabins, four 
frame houses and seventeen camps.
85
 While chiefs often lobbied their agents for improvements 
and the supplies to build them, projects proceeded in an unorganized and haphazard way in the 
absence of a uniform policy to fund and develop infrastructure and services. 
 Irrespective of community interest, requisitions show that labourers and tradesmen from 
Sombra and Sarnia were hired instead of residents to construct churches and schoolhouses, and 
to do simple maintenance and repairs like masonry and whitewashing.
86
 Moreover, in the 
absence of local tradesmen skilled laborers often came from as far away as Detroit. This 
unnecessarily increased costs and delayed completion particularly since many Anishinabe 
residents needed only to be properly supplied to do the work. The number of competed houses 
Keating and Jones refer to on the reserves suggests that individuals often found the means to 
complete projects themselves while they waited.  Additionally, an 1847 report from Reverend 
James Coleman, who preceeded Andrew Jamieson on Walpole Island indicates that contractual 
work performed by colonists contributed to a host of other social problems. Strangers entering 
the community brought unwanted items like alcohol and Anishinabe builders and farmers 
constantly had to go to town for supplies and services. Coleman argued that the department could 
alleviate a great many issues simply by approving the construction of a mill so the reserves could 
grind their wheat locally.
87
 The mill, along with the general store was “the universal institutional 
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basis” of the Upper Canadian economy before 1850.88 In the 1830s, Shaweny-Penince 
recognized that an Indian village needed a storehouse as did the sixty inhabitants in the 
neighbouring town of Wallaceburg. In the 1840s the tiny population supported one store, one 
tavern and a blacksmith.
89
 The development of small reserve businesses and potential to supply 
some of their own needs at cost, in particular, would have perhaps eliminated the need for an 
onerous system of advanced requisitioning, put in place after 1845 to monitor expenses. Instead, 
as a missionary on the Sarnia reserve observed, “no special interest” was “taken in the 
improvement of Indian lands” in southwestern Ontario.90  
 Farming alone in the “backwoods” was not an easy endeavour.91  Diversification and the 
ability to build connections with influential and like-minded individuals were necessary for 
financial success. Trading, buying and selling land and goods enabled John Askin to invest in 
many small projects at an early date. He had a ferry licence, owned a distillery, invested in 
shipbuilding, and grew hemp. He operated a store and supplied merchants, inns, taverns, as well 
as the Moravian Village on the Thames with all manner of goods. Amassing large quantities of 
land at low cost or through grants freed up capital that the average settler did not have.
 92
 Askin 
and other traders transferred their early fur trade and supplying knowledge into the 
monopolization of emerging domestic markets. Aboriginal Chiefs recognized the same but 
needed a ‘senior partner’ and access to the funds owed to them out of the Huron Tract Treaty to 
invest early in small projects. Before widespread settlement, cottage industries, mills, and stores 
and trades like blacksmithing and carpentry had low-startup costs.  Investment here would have 
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enabled communities to supply neighbouring settlers with services they required themselves. 
Instead, local businesspeople and merchants charged the Anishinabe to provide goods and 
services for them. While the Department’s own parsimony and neglect forced individuals to 
engage Eurocanadians to supply and service their communities, they were chided for doing so. 
Keating concluded that “[t]heir ignorance of business causes them to be made dupes.”93 Perhaps 
Keating thought Anishinabe individuals would become entrepreneurs through osmosis since he 
offered no solution to rectify this ‘ignorance.’ Oblivious to reality, appraisals like Keating’s 
carried great influence and contributed to the widespread belief that Aboriginal people remained 
incapable of participating in the economy in any way other than as passive consumers of goods.   
 The government regulated all mill sites and Indian Department officials viewed them as 
key components of experimental villages on Manitoulin Island, at Coldwater Narrows, Quinte, 
Muncey and the Credit.  The Credit village had two sawmills in the 1830s that could cut five 
thousand board feet of lumber in twenty-four hours.
94
 But in the Western District, good mill sites 
were assigned to loyalists and Crown grantees before the Anishinabe could acquire them.  
Burwell’s diary suggests that Wawanosh attempted to secure sites near the mouths of at least two 
rivers when the reserves were surveyed. In addition to the Sarnia Reserve, Wawanosh requested 
one mile “at the River aux Perche,” another mile “at his Wigwam, on Lake Huron…and the 
remainder opposite the Island in the River St. Clair, 5 or 6 miles below the Rapids so as to 
embrace the mills & some large clearings.” 95 All three of these were mill sites and none of them 
were reserved for the Huron Tract Communities. In later years, Froome Talfourd operated a grist 
and sawmill on Commander’s Creek in Moore and Henry Jones owned a sawmill on the Rivière 
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aux Perches.  Malcolm Cameron ran several mills in Sarnia that by the 1850s were steam-
powered, fed from a canal carved out of the Rivière aux Perches -Lake Wawanosh river 
system.
96
 By 1851, eight grist mills and thirteen sawmills employing nearly thirty people 
operated in the county.
97
  While many of these sites were identified on Bear Creek and rivers in 
Plympton in the 1830s, no one in the Indian Department thought to acquire them for anyone but 
themselves.
98
 Even if they did not specifically recognize them as mill-sites, the St. Clair Chiefs 
understood these rivers and the points where they intersected Lake Huron and the St. Clair River 
to be ecologically and economically important, and they sought repeatedly to reserve them in the 
Treaty and purchase them afterward. Eclipsed by the controversial plan to remove them to the 
Sable, the locations chosen by Wawanosh as well those on Bear Creek and elsewhere in 
Enniskillen were never officially reserved.  By the time Reverend Coleman made his 
recommendation in 1847, all of the properties were in the hands of non-Aboriginals. 
 Department policy did not regulate the operation of mills and once constructed, there was 
no guarantee that the community would benefit.  Some reserves built mills themselves but 
required outsiders to repair them while others did build, operate or repair their mills at all. The 
government built mills at Coldwater Narrows but leased them to non-residents, and hired 
incompetent locals at New Credit to fix the mill.
99
  The community at Munceytown hired a man 
for fifty pounds to build a dam for their sawmill, but he hired cheaper labourers to do the job.  
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Several times, men “appeared and agreed to do work, only to “disappoint…”100 Though the 
entire mill should have been operational by March 1847, the chiefs wrote Clench to complain 
that the work had not even begun.  Incidents such as these must have had a terrible effect on the 
morale of the community. Chiefs and councils were repeatedly told that they were incapable of 
negotiating their own contracts, but many people hired by superintendents and interpreters were 
wholly incompetent. Forced to pay for sub-standard work but unable to compel them to honour 
their contracts, chiefs could only write and wait until other workmen arrived.  As they 
complained to Clench, “[o]ur words to these men are of no value.”101 Mills in particular, but 
other small businesses, represented easy, low-cost ventures that could have helped to bridge 
declines in fish and game but also to build positive relationships between the Anishinabe and 
their neighbours. 
 On the Credit Reserve, Peter Jacobs “made a comfortable living by selling things” in his 
store and George Wrapp [Rapp] operated a dock and tavern on Walpole Island.
102
  “Industry on a 
large scale otherwise was not attempted”103 nor were they offered assistance to supply 
themselves. Small, local businesses operated by “artisans and shopkeepers” built the towns 
adjacent to the reserves as historian David G. Burley discovered when studying Brantford, 
Ontario’s business sector after 1830.104 In Sarnia, by the 1850s Malcom Cameron was described 
as having “a very good store here…he has…some good mills, which…constitute the chief wealth 
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of this very beautiful town.”105  In terms of settlement and environment, Brantford and Sarnia 
share quite similar histories including the fact that Aboriginal peoples were not accepted in either 
location as entrepreneurs.  After 1841, as the economy became more complex, many of the 
earlier opportunities vanished.
106
 It became more expensive to enter the market and difficult to 
secure credit from financial institutions after the economic downturn in 1857.  Loans now 
backed by “collateral security” instead of character and potential were especially problematic for 
Aboriginal communities and individuals whose lacked mortgageable assets. Lumber and grain 
exporting as well as speculation in land enabled a small number of men with capital to expand 
into manufacturing in the second half of the century.  John Richardson, the observer of 
Cameron’s business ventures, felt compelled to note that the development of the town of Sarnia 
was “retarded by reason of the Indian reserve—a fine tract of land…”107 With increasing 
frequency, businessmen described Aboriginal communities as impediments to their success.  
 This about-face ignored the presence of many Aboriginal craftsmen and women 
responsible for manufacturing goods valued by Europeans including canoes, snowshoes, 
moccasins, implements and household items. The notion that these activities could become 
commercial endeavors on a larger scale or that the skills could be transferred to the manufacture 
of European goods, were not considered.
108
 At the very least, the ability to grind grain or 
manufacture and repair some of the goods they required, irrespective of profit, would have been 
a tremendous advantage.
109
 Merchants in Wallaceburg and Sarnia did not grind grain for free and 
wagons, oxen, shingles, clothing and even coffins purchased at marked-up prices could have 
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easily been made by the residents for themselves or by some for sale to others. By the late 1840s, 
Anishinabe farmers sometimes procured oxen from each other at a fixed price of £12.10s but 
frequently agents purchased them from neighbouring non-natives for £13 to £21. In 1852, 
Walpole Islanders spent £90 on six yoke of oxen.
110
 Pioneers in Kent County like most other 
rural householders possessed spinning wheels or looms and made their clothing from homespun 
cloth.
111
 In 1842 the Western District’s domestic manufactures included 36,585 pounds of wool, 
4361 yards of home-made cloth, and 8231 yards of linen and 33,024 yards of flannel.
112
 A very 
limited “cottage industry” evolved on the reserves, but this did not provide them with the goods 
they needed on a daily basis.
113
 With the decline of game, access to warm clothing in particular 
was a persistent problem.  Walpole Islanders raised sheep specifically to sell the wool for ready-
made clothing, but were not given the opportunity to make the items themselves. Some 
missionaries tried to get spinning wheels for reserve communities
114
 and Missionary E.F. 
Wilson’s wife started a Mother’s Sewing Club at Sarnia and taught knitting and needlework, but 
little seems to have materialized from their initiatives.
115
 Even so, while women and men 
continued to make snowshoes, canoes, baskets, brooms and moccasins, and sold them in town, 
attempts to start businesses were rare. Jameson lamented that, “[w]e have clothed them in 
blankets – we have not taught them to weave blankets.”116 Anishinabe women still purchased 
most of their cloth from merchants in Sarnia and a lack of support and eventually legislation 
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rendered these opportunities non-existent after 1850.
117
  Clothing could be bought when funds 
were available but by the 1870s, poorer residents received donated clothes from religious and 
charitable societies.
118
 
 While report after report commented on the aptitudes of children towards learning and 
the proficiency of adults in the performance of various activities on the reserve, apprenticeships 
in the trades or the acquisition of artisanal skills were neglected. The village of Manitowaning on 
Manitoulin Island for instance apprenticed ten boys in various trades and two shoemakers from 
the Credit reserve “worked as journeymen with much satisfaction round the neighbourhood. By 
1847, New Credit also had a blacksmith, carpenter and cooper and three shops located on the 
reserve.
119
 Chawme requested a blacksmith in 1818, and subsequent petitions asked for skilled 
tradesmen to apprentice youth at Sarnia, yet in 1842 Jones reported that not a single “regular 
tradesman” of Indigenous descent resided on the reserve.120 Keating “purchased…a complete set 
of Carpenter’s and Blacksmith’s tools” for Walpole Island and suggested they maintained their 
own tools and guns. However, receipts show that they and Sarnia residents still paid local 
farmers, artisans and tradesmen exorbitant amounts of money to fix their ploughs and guns; 
mend their clothes and repair their houses.
121
 Keating hired Sombra resident John McDonald to 
build a chimney at a cost of six dollars and Archibald McDonald to do two days of masonry 
repairs for three pounds. Together, their wages would have purchased a cow and calf.
122
 In 
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contrast, the department paid Anishinabe carpenters on the Sarnia Reserve only 2s. 6p. per day.  
It took one man twelve days to earn £1.10s., half of what he could earn as a farm labourer and 
less than one third of Archibald McDonald’s daily wage.123 When Anishinabe tradesmen were 
employed in their own communities, they often earned a fraction of what their neighbours did for 
similar work. Individuals could only earn more money at the expense of their reserves, as their 
pay came out of communal funds. Moreover, the substantial wages paid to non-resident 
labourers left the reserve and could not be re-invested in the community. 
 Purchases made in Eurocanadian towns and labour performed by non-Aboriginal people 
slowly drained money out of reserve communities. The McDonald men no doubt spent their 
wages in the stores and taverns in Wallaceburg, Chatham or Detroit. Merchants had to profit 
from the goods they sold, and while I did not find evidence of deliberate price-gouging, local 
businessmen were less inclined to do Anishinabe communities any favours while relations 
between them continued to deteriorate. Jacob Harsen a resident on the Island that now bears his 
name, charged a dollar to Walpole Island’s account just for the “Trouble & time spent at their 
request and for their Benefit.” Harsen’s dollar fee was in addition to eleven dollars interest levied 
for the six months the account remained unpaid.
124
 Some merchants charged the Anishinabe 
upwards of ten percent interest on their outstanding accounts which, through no fault of their 
own often went several years into arrears.
125
 Under the circumstances, Walpole Island and to a 
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lesser extent Sarnia managed to control a great deal of their own building and maintenance 
projects. But malfeasance on the part of department officials combined with restrictions on debt 
introduced in 1839, and a lack of training had enormous ramifications for reserve communities; 
the least of which was the loss of even more money from their accounts for very little in return. 
“This Baneful Practice” 
 By the 1840s, unfulfilled promises of pensions and assistance combined with meagre 
annuities created economic inequity formerly unheard of in Indigenous communities.
126
 The 
acquisition of debts by Aboriginal people was a natural byproduct of the department’s own 
policies and behaviours. Though Walpole Chiefs petitioned to control their annuity separate from 
Sarnia, the seeds of future conflict were planted in the somewhat arbitrary method used to 
calculate the appropriation. Beginning in 1836, Walpole Island and the St. Clair (Moore) 
received $1400, while Sarnia, Kettle and Stony Point received $3000.
127
 After 1845, against the 
wishes of Walpole Island Chiefs, one-quarter of this amount went to fund the Mount Elgin 
Industrial School on the Muncey Reserve. While the communities welcomed Pottawatomi from 
Michigan and Chippewa from Anderdon, their threadbare annuities, limited to the descendants of 
the 440 original treaty-signers, would not increase. Thus by 1858, 442 people on Walpole Island 
received their annual payment of $3.15 each while 313 Potawatomi, who resided among them, 
received nothing.  Similarly 444 Chippewa on the Sarnia, Kettle Point and Bear Creek Reserves 
received $6.76 per person, but 28 Potawatomi and 40 Ottawa were not entitled to a share at all.
128
  
Keating complained such small amounts were “squandered in drink” or wasted on “superfluous 
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articles.”129  Making matters worse, the interference of Jones and Keating in lease agreements 
between chiefs and residents on the Lower Reserve, and its surrender in 1843 eliminated another 
valuable source of goods and provisions.
130
 Nevertheless, the accumulation of debt unfolded at 
the same time that Walpole Island, Sarnia and Bear Creek Chiefs complained regularly that they 
were not receiving their presents and that persons in authority misappropriated their annuities.
131
  
 In an economy almost wholly based on credit, merchants extended credit to farmers in 
anticipation of their harvests, and it was often required to enter or expand into various aspects of 
the market.
132
 According to Gourlay, “[m]uch of the trade of the country is a species of indirect 
barter.  The merchant trusts his customers with goods, and …receives their produce in payment, 
and forwards it…to the importer.133 Anishinabe peoples were accustomed to a revolving credit 
system whereby merchants advanced seasonal goods on the promise that the debtor would return 
with furs or other marketable goods to exchange. This relationship was gradually abandoned in 
favour of monetized system of loans managed by financial institutions where transactions 
awaiting payment earned interest until paid with cash.
134
 While it can be argued that the former 
relied on monopoly and trapped Aboriginal people in a cycle of debt, the likelihood of continued 
business functioned as collateral. A monetized system allowing individuals to purchase where 
they pleased required more stringent sureties, and guarantees that the debt would be repaid. 
Moreover, the Anishinabeg operated within a power dynamic not experienced by Eurocanadians 
and were forced to seek goods on credit from local merchants when their presents did not arrive 
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and when they could not access their own annuity monies in sufficient amounts. While Indian 
agents were later found culpable in “this baneful practice,” by an Order-in-Council dated June 
27, 1839 the government stated that it would no longer pay the debts of “Indians.”135 
 The 1839 Order-in-Council (OIC) arrived at the same time that Upper Canadian 
insolvency laws and particularly the imprisonment of debtors owing small sums were 
contentious issues in the district and legislature.
136
 Debtors were held in terrible conditions in the 
Sandwich Gaol and in the Chatham jail after 1850. In 1842 the Warden and Councilors of the 
Western District petitioned the Assembly to have the law abolished, and by 1835, an act to 
abolish imprisonment for the “debtor willing to pay” was before them.137 As legal historian Peter 
Oliver notes, backlash against incarceration for debt was part of a broader discourse of social 
justice and prison reform spreading throughout the Empire.
138 
If they were not deemed a flight 
risk, unless a debtor was virtually insolvent (possessing less than £5 plus minimal personal and 
household items), imprisonment for debt could only be obtained by creditors for sums of more 
than £10. Yet, petitions and appeals from prisoners like Mary Young, who owed her lawyer 
fifteen shillings, made it painfully apparent that writs of capias (for debtors at risk to flee) were 
frequently abused.
139
 Because proof of flight was not required, a writ of capias enabled men and 
women to be imprisoned for very small sums while denying them the ability to earn money to 
pay it.  As a result, they were often kept in solitary confinement for long periods of time and 
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forced to pay for their own housing and support. Reforms after 1835 gradually shifted focus from 
punishing the debtor to remedying the creditor but bankruptcy and insolvency laws remained 
elusive until after Confederation. In the meantime, merchants had a legitimate interest in 
protecting themselves from a perceived increase in the number of “fraudulent debtors” who had 
the means, but not the inclination, to honour their debts.
140
 Aboriginal people were in a 
particularly difficult situation in this respect because their finances were little understood, and 
the line between the individual and the collective was often blurred. One merchant simply 
suggested that “perhaps the best plan would be to instruct the Indians to pay.”141 While 
Peterwegeshig and the Chiefs approved payments to their creditors, they did not have actual 
access to their own annuities and could not understand why angry merchants continued to bother 
them for money.
142
   
 The 1839 OIC did not stop Aboriginal people from purchasing some goods on credit, and 
it did not stop merchants from extending it to them. In 1844 for instance, Keating requested an 
advance on behalf of the Walpole Island and Chenail Ecarté communities in the amount of £405 
“for the purpose of paying off all our Public debts…”143 In 1843, Malcom Cameron had assisted 
the St. Clair Anishinabe to lodge a complaint against Keating for the “unauthorized application” 
of £200 from their accounts.
144
 Believing he was targeted because he was “a man of low birth,” 
Keating blamed the “Indians” who he said “did not fully understand what they signed.” Only a 
few years later, three questionable transactions involving cash disbursements to Jones, Keating 
and Clench totaling £1150 were discovered during the auditing of Superintendent Samuel P. 
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Jarvis’s accounts. 145 Though Keating also failed to mention the problem of debts in his 
submissions to the Commissioners of the Bagot Report, Aboriginal debts with merchants in 
violation of the 1839 OIC, continued to be a problem and a preoccupation of the Indian 
Department executive.  
 As part of the massive reorganization that followed the 1844 Report, Keating and Jones 
were removed. On the 26 of August, 1844, all newly appointed Visiting Superintendents 
received a circular expressing “His Excellency’s displeasure that this custom [of contracting 
debts] should be preserved, in defiance of so many regulations to the contrary.” Once again, 
Clench was reminded that goods had to be requisitioned and approved several months in advance 
as “neither the debtor nor the Creditor” would be able to access annuity monies for payment. 
Exceptions might be made for superintendents in extreme circumstances. On the whole, 
however, the order prohibited individual “Indians” from receiving credit of any kind.146 
 Despite the fact that Keating misappropriated community annuities and did not pay the 
merchants, the Department banned merchants from dealing with ‘Indians,’ not agents. Merchants 
from Sarnia, who remained unpaid several years after the 1839 order-in-council and 1844 
reminder, retaliated by seizing goods they had sold to the Department.
147
 In the fall of 1846 
James Stewart repossessed a yoke of oxen purchased by Keating for Kahageshk. Though 
Jamieson requested another yoke on the man’s behalf, nearly three years after, Kahageshk had 
not received anything. He eventually purchased his own team of oxen from a local man for forty 
dollars.
148
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 Relations between the communities and local merchants continued to deteriorate even 
after Keating’s removal in 1845. Appointed Visiting Superintendent for all reserves west of 
London, Clench’s files contain letters dating from the late 1840s from chiefs, individuals, 
merchants and local citizens complaining that he was not doing his job.
149
 In 1846, Thomas 
Fisher, the Reeve of Moore Township wrote on behalf of “a number of persons” owed money by 
the department for goods supplied to local Anishinabe communities. As months passed without 
payment, Fisher wrote hostile and angry letters to Clench, protesting his “gross indifference” 
towards merchants who suffered for “Keating’s actions as Agent.”150 In 1848 as the debts were 
going on four years in arrears, Fisher informed Clench that he would bring the issue to the 
Governor General.
151
 By 1850, merchants like Fisher, Archibald Young and Alexander Leys, 
who supplied agricultural implements and oxen to Anishinabe communities, were still without 
payment. They led social and fraternal organizations and acquired important positions on 
Sarnia’s Township Council. In the years to follow, many who began their careers in the merchant 
trade would make important decisions about the expansion of the town and the future of the 
reserve.
152
 Third-party debts owed by these individuals to others awaiting payment expanded the 
circle of those frustrated by Indian Department business practices, contributing to the belief that 
Aboriginal peoples were simply reluctant rather than unable to pay.
153
  
 Though it was an economic transaction, credit was based on social relations, and the 
amount of credit extended to an individual was based as much on trust and character as 
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wealth.
154
 Credit extended for excessive periods of time to the Indian department may have 
proven itself worth the effort to established merchants, but smaller storekeepers like the Waddell 
Brothers were unable to stay solvent with accounts outstanding for years at a time.
155
 The 
inconsistent and sometimes illogical application of the OIC meant that some accounts were paid 
and others were not, even when the work was satisfactory.
156
 In addition to “old accounts…of 
long standing,” “numbers of small accounts” for vital services like medical attendance; 
blacksmithing and agricultural implements remained in arrears.
157
 Aggravating merchants and 
refusing to pay accounts on the part of the department reflected badly on Anishinabe 
communities, particularly since non-Aboriginals could be jailed for similar behavior. 
 Merchants continually harassed the chiefs to settle their accounts
158
 and some likely 
stopped giving them goods on credit. The ban forced the Anishinabe to seek merchants with 
poorer product and reputations, increasing their chances of being misled while reducing their 
options for restitution. Purchasing through the department required that chiefs and missionaries 
anticipate their needs months in advance to allow time for their requisitions to work their way 
through the bureaucracy and for their much-needed goods to arrive. The chiefs who continually 
requested annuity funds to purchase items they needed and to pay their debts on time also 
realized that circumstances as they were threatened “to incur the ill will of the white people by 
whom they are surrounded.”159 
 Anishinabe people relied on familial relations with each other and familiar relations with 
Eurocanadians to acquire goods, foodstuffs and money they needed. Walpole Island bred ponies 
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and individuals pawned or sold crafts and utilitarian items like baskets, bowls, ladles and brooms 
to local farmers and tourists.
160
 The profits enabled them to deal directly with merchants or 
sometimes local businessmen came to them. A storekeeper sent a letter to Joshua Wawanosh 
notifying him that fine barrels of flour were available for $5.50 if he wanted them.
161
 Wawanosh 
and members of the Saugeen First Nation also wrote to each other surreptitiously in Ojibway and 
English about their “fishing affairs.” Wawanosh’s friends and relatives “exported” barrels of 
salted whitefish and herring to Sarnia, and Chief Jacob Metigoob told Wawanosh that he stood to 
“profit” if he could arrange a boat loaded with a seine, salt, barrels and goods to sell at 
Saugeen.
162
 Goods could also be acquired by submitting requisitions for approval and then 
exchanging them for other articles before delivery.
163
 Though Jameson thought such actions 
were “rather like practicing a fraud upon the Gov’t.,” even he recognized the policy was absurd 
and the practice sometimes necessary.
164
 Despite the OIC, some merchants willingly created 
false receipts for goods and loaned them money anyway.
165
 The most expert farmer could not 
predict every item he required months in advance, nor could he account for unforeseen 
circumstances attributable to accident, weather or disease. Jamieson himself advanced money to 
individuals on Walpole Island and purchased items for them on his own account.
166
 
Circumventing policy in these instances gave Anishinabe communities a measure of freedom to 
earn money, spend their own annuities and
 
acquire the goods they needed and wanted.  
 Contrary to department rhetoric the chiefs did find ways to make some payments on their 
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accounts. In one instance, Jamieson applied to the department for money which Peterwegeshig 
distributed in the spring of 1849. After payments for various expenses were made several 
individuals approached him for small amounts of two to eleven dollars to assist the unfortunate 
and pay their debts to local merchants.
167
 Despite the 1839 OIC, communities continued to 
accumulate debt, and merchants continued to advance it to them because the business was, for 
the most part, necessary and lucrative. Two groceries in Port Sarnia were “principally supported 
by Indian funds.”168 Department policy did not always guarantee bills would be paid in a regular 
or predictable way, but exorbitant amounts of interest accrued in the meantime, and when they 
did make good, it was in cash.
169
 For better or worse, department officials remained complicit in 
the transactions too. Clench continued to submit accounts for payment, and the Civil Secretary 
continually reminded him that they were not allowed and would not be paid. Yet in 1849 again, 
the Walpole Island and Sarnia Chiefs received nearly £715 to pay debts incurred with local 
merchants.
170
 
 In a letter to Wawanosh, Metigoob wrote somewhat sarcastically; “we well know how 
poor & helpless we are in transacting our affairs with the white folks…”171 These transactions, or 
more accurately the ones that Keating and Clench knew about, gave the Anishinabe a worrisome 
level of independence. Frustrated that he could not stop these exchanges Keating recommended 
the department issue pawnbrokers’ licences to locals to protect the Anishinabe from what he 
conceded was widespread “fraud.”  Though some families were no doubt “deprived of the means 
of subsistence,” in the majority of cases, the opposite was probably true.172 Owing to the 
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parsimony of the department and the elimination of options available to them, these transactions 
were attempts to secure the means of subsistence to support their families.  
   The Indian Department went to great lengths to ban credit on the basis that it was abused 
by the Anishinabe, but those inclined to cheat or deceive them did so because they were seldom 
punished. Schemers employed simple methods that exploited their trust and the language barrier. 
By law, contracts had to be fully understood by both parties but unscrupulous “whites” simply 
changed the terms knowing the other party would be signing a contract for land or property that 
they could not read.
173
  In one instance, John McDougal purchased a horse from a resident of 
Walpole Island but later told the man the money was bad (counterfeit).  He gave him five dollars, 
assuring him he would return with the remainder, but he never materialized. The Customs 
Collector spoke to a local magistrate on the man’s behalf but conceded that “[i]t is almost 
impossible to keep a good horse or anything valuable about the place for rogues and 
robbers…such a system of defrauding the poor Indians ought not to be allowed.”174 Walpole 
Island’s hay crops and the marsh and oak savannah grasses along the St. Clair were also 
plundered by residents from Sombra who let their livestock loose on the Island in the summer 
months to forage.
175
  In the fall, they sometimes picked up animals that did not belong to them, 
leaving residents “to mourn in silence, the loss of…a horse, a calf or a pig.” Despite these 
incidents, the chiefs were willing to negotiate rental agreements with the residents to allow 
foraging for a portion of the year.
176
 Neighbouring farmers had no interest in paying rent for 
resources they simply accessed at will. In the absence of any deterrent, livestock and resource 
theft continued to hurt Indigenous communities and harm relations with the broader community.    
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 Agents also argued convincingly that annuity money and presents would be regularly 
exchanged for alcohol or otherwise tricked away if not vetted through the department and 
distributed on a limited basis. The Superintendent warned Talfourd to examine the accounts 
carefully for “ardent spirits” before arranging the payment.177 Commissioners investigating 
Jarvis reminded Keating that “[m]oney given to the Indians confers no benefit upon them, but 
rather leads them into dissipation or wasteful extravagance.”178 However, records I have 
examined in the district, suggest that Anishinabe peoples, for the most part, spent their money on 
provisions, tools and housing and tried to settle their accounts for these items whenever possible. 
After 1830, the financial situation of individuals was made worse by the commutation of 
presents to agricultural goods and the elimination of presents entirely in 1856. Chiefs constantly 
complained and petitioned that kettles, cloth, powder and ammunition and other goods were 
entitlements promised to them in perpetuity as allies of the Crown.
179
 Meagre annuity funds were 
thereafter expended on the purchase of articles that were formerly trade goods and presents, and 
local merchants like W.B. Clark profited handsomely for it. Between April and September 1864, 
the Chippewas of Sarnia spent nearly one hundred dollars on items such as thread, ribbon, 
muslin, cotton and lace that they once received as presents. Also listed in the account were new 
and additional expenses for gloves, socks and stockings, items absolutely necessary to cope with 
the climate that were once made from hides.
180
  While the burden of purchasing many items was 
transferred from the Crown to individuals, unscrupulous traders gave them alcohol for free.  In 
1836 Anna Brownell Jameson witnessed one such transaction on the St. Clair but she was also 
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shocked by “the prevalence of drunkenness” she encountered among Eurocanadians.181  
Anishinabe leaders repeatedly complained about the scourge of alcohol in their communities, 
asking officials to enforce the existing law and punish local distributors. But the legislation 
passed in 1835 prohibited the sale of alcohol to Indians, it did not prevent it from being traded or 
exchanged.
182
 Anishinabe peoples did not ‘waste’ the credit extended to them by purchasing 
extravagant items. It was instead abused by their neighbours, shopkeepers and the very people 
entrusted with their care. If they were “reckless and improvident” or their annuities were tricked 
away, it was only because the department would not give them what they wanted and would not 
enforce the law.
183
 
 Anishinabe Chiefs signed the Huron Tract Treaty in exchange for the support and 
provisions necessary to assist them to adjust in the changing economic world before them.  
Instead, years of cutbacks to the quality, kind and amount of their presents combined with 
mismanagement and outright theft of their land funds left them with insufficient annuities and 
made them vulnerable to the accumulation of debt. Reluctant to prosecute Indian Department 
officials and Eurocanadians for frauds perpetrated against them, prohibitions were instead placed 
on the Anishinabe. The 1839 Order-in-Council prohibiting the accumulation of debt together 
with the 1839 Crown Lands Act formed the core framework for future legislation regulating 
Indigenous peoples in Canada. Both were founded on the premise that only regulation and 
restriction could protect Indigenous people from the criminal behavior of Upper Canadian 
colonists. This policy was justified on the basis that Aboriginal people were not competent or 
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sufficiently educated to act independently of the department, a concept that would later be 
described as wardship.    
A Railway Economy 
 Provincial debt was another matter and despite financial mismanagement and 
accumulated public debt ameliorated only by Confederation in 1867, railways in the Western 
District brought significant and irreversible change to Anishinabe peoples. They facilitated the 
rapid movement of people and goods over distances that were prohibitive just a few years earlier. 
Aided by the 1849 Guarantee Act, municipal and provincial governments amassed large debts 
constructing railways just in time for the market to crash in 1857-8, the same year the last leg of 
the Great Western Railway reached Sarnia.
184
  By 1858, canal, road and bridge building had 
raised the Province of Canada’s debt to more than $22.5 million. More than $2.5 million in 
outstanding in railway loan guarantees went to the Great Western Railway which Den Otter 
estimates, cost $40,600 per kilometer to build.
185
 While investors poured money into 
development, an investigation that same year into the Indian Department concluded that it had 
largely been “left to its own resources.”186 In light of the future elimination of the Imperial Grant 
and transfer to the Province, the total budget of $17,316 was deemed too high.  Though it was 
reduced from $14,759 to $12,964, funding for Indian Affairs in Upper Canada remained 
insufficient. It was recommended that the sale of excess ‘Indian’ land be used to bridge the gap 
in funding with or without consent.  
 In the meantime, Sarnia was no longer a remote outpost dependent upon Detroit for 
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supplies; it was flush with investment money and a major hub in the Great Western Railway’s 
London to Sarnia Line. Ancillary development such as wharves, warehouses and grain elevators 
as well as train stations, hotels and taverns at Point Edward forever changed the economies and 
geography of Anishinabe territory.  In 1858, Talfourd reported that labour in Port Sarnia was 
“scarce” 187 but between 1861 and 1871, employment opportunities in Sarnia and Sombra and the 
number of people who described themselves as labourers were numerous and significant. 
Shipping and supplying local farm households provided the most employment in Sombra while 
Sarnia residents worked in occupations related to the railroad and in servicing the ‘well-to-do.’  
Unlike the crafts and trades practiced years before, these positions required specialized education  
Table 7: Primary Occupations in Sombra and Sarnia, 1861-1871: 
 Sombra Township Walpole Island Sarnia Township Sarnia Reserve 
Most 
Common 
Shared: 
 
Cottage/ 
Artisanal: 
 
 
 
 
 
Post-1850 
Skilled/ 
specialized: 
 
 
  
-farmer, labourer, 
lumbermen, servant 
 
-carpenter, baker, 
shoemaker, 
merchant, 
innkeeper, teacher, 
blacksmith 
 
 
 
-clerk, mechanic, 
engineer, captain, 
mariner, painter, 
weaver, plasterer 
-farmer, labourer 
 
 
(some employed 
in Michigan) 
 
 
 
 
 
-unskilled labour 
-farm 
-mills 
-railway 
-public works 
(roads/ditching) 
-farmer, labourer, 
servant 
 
-carpenter, teacher 
blacksmith, 
cooper, fishermen, 
innkeeper, 
merchant 
 
 
-railway employee 
(unskilled and 
skilled), clerk, 
machinist, 
hotelkeeper 
 
-farmer, 
labourer 
 
 
-Chief, 
Interpreter , 
Clergy, 
schoolteacher 
-carpenter (1) 
 
-unskilled labour 
-farm 
-mills 
-railway 
-public works 
 
 
Sources: LAC, RG 31, 1861 Census, Canada West, Lambton County, #185 Township of Sarnia, 
#187 Sombra, Indian Reserve in the Township of Sarnia, Walpole Island Indian Reserve; LAC, 
RG 31, 1871 Census of Canada, Dist. 3: Bothwell, F-Sombra; Dist. 4, Lambton County, F-
Township of Sarnia, Sarnia Town, Div. 1., 55-76. 
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and mathematical training, and the ability to read and write in English. Talfourd’s statement 
conceals the fact that labour was not scarce in Sarnia just as it was not in Sombra. As Table 7 
above illustrates, Anishinabe peoples on reserves in both locations simply did not have much 
access to stable wage employment. By 1871, one literate male on the Sarnia reserve was 
described as a carpenter but skilled tradesmen, machinists and mechanics of North American, 
British, Irish and Scottish origin occupied all new employment opportunities in town.188 This is 
surprising given that not all of these jobs required specialized skills. The Grand Trunk and Great 
Western Railways employed police, engineers, conductors and foremen but also a number of 
general labourers (identified in the census as railway employees). The enumerator noted that 
several farmers and residents in Sarnia were “well-off” indicating that they employed domestic 
servants and gardeners. While the township employed more in these fields, all hired help came 
from the British Isles. With the exception of Kettle and Stony Point who primarily hunted and 
fished, most Anishinabeg on reserves in Lambton were farmers or unskilled labourers like their 
Eurocanadian neighbours. However unlike Eurocanadians, they remained on the periphery of a 
changing economy offering opportunities they could not access, even in a thriving town like 
Sarnia.189   
 Eurocanadians who diversified early and built their fortunes acquiring cheap land were 
able to take advantage of lands on the St. Clair and Sarnia Reserve for development purposes. 
Malcolm Cameron, a self-proclaimed “friend to the Indians”190 and Assistant Commissioner of 
Public Works [1848-50], sat on the board of the Grand Trunk Railway while they planned the 
Lambton County route.
191
 Though reserve residents did not benefit from either the railway boom 
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or ancillary development, Cameron did. The substantial portion of the reserve he purchased for 
virtually nothing in the 1840s was extremely valuable by 1860. Continued surrenders and 
expropriation of the Sarnia Reserve throughout the second half of the century subsidized the 
expansion of the Great Western Railway. Anishinabe residents had little defense against such 
powerful interests and their allies on the Sarnia Town Council who openly discussed the 
elimination of their reserve in its entirety.  
Conclusion 
 Though Chawme and other Anishinabe Chiefs signed the Huron Tract Treaty to preserve 
and cultivate their relationships with Eurocanadians, the opposite occurred.  In gross violation of 
the Proclamation of 1763, the 1839 Crown Lands Act separated Aboriginal peoples from the 
management of their lands and transferred the control to their superintendents.  That same year 
an Order-in-Council prohibiting the accumulation of Indian debts separated Aboriginal peoples 
from the management of reserve economies and from fruitful commercial relations with their 
neighbours. As chronicled in the last chapter, Jones interfered with Anishinabe land transactions 
and Keating with their merchant accounts. Clench neglected their interests almost entirely so that 
he could focus on absconding with their land payments, the bulk of which were made before 
1855 during his tenure. As Schmalz has written, if Indigenous peoples were to be flourishing 
communities these were indeed “financially decisive years” when “every cent was required.”192  
 Denied fair market value for the sale of their lands, the Anishinabe could neither access 
annuities nor credit to develop or diversify their economies beyond the basics of a mixed 
subsistence.
193
 Beginning with guns and powder in 1844, items formerly given as presents were 
commuted to agricultural implements. After 1852, they were commuted to money at a rate of 
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25% at a time and they were fully eliminated in 1857. Gourlay argued that presents were used by 
officials “to swindle the Indians out of their property.” 194 After 1858 their property was 
increasingly ‘swindled’ away from them in order to acquire what they had formerly received as 
presents. Funding and assistance originally promised by Great Britain were whittled away to 
such a degree that by Confederation, Anishinabe capital was depleted almost entirely in the task 
of acquiring the necessities of day-to-day life. As government officials recognized that debts 
were contracted to supply “provisions” and “prevent distress and starvation” they chose at the 
same time to focus on waste and fraud and cut the department’s budget even further.195 
 Aboriginal people fought for the right to utilize their own resources and to enjoy the 
profits of their own land and labour. Unfortunately much of this occurred in the shadows of a 
barter economy and remains undocumented.
196
 Chiefs made oral agreements to buy, sell and 
trade goods with their neighbours and with each other, utilizing the mail system to circumvent 
Indian Department bureaucracy. Both intrusiveness and neglect drove them to conceal their 
transactions. Denied access to legitimate sources of credit, they were rendered vulnerable to 
debtor relationships with less scrupulous and honourable locals. Many of these individuals 
remained undeterred and seemingly unpunished by the law. Others, feeling that they did not need 
Indigenous business or thought it was more trouble than it was worth, came to see it as a form of 
charity or sacrifice or refused to serve them at all. 
 Neither agriculture nor commercial or wage employment necessarily had to compete with 
hunting, fishing or gathering.  The notion that agriculture had to be practiced to the exclusion of 
any other strategy denied Anishinabe communities the ability to follow the same paths to 
stability and prosperity utilized by their neighbours of European descent. Anishinabe and 
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Eurocanadian household economies were not that different and in both communities, “[i]n order 
to survive, many people worked at a variety of jobs in their lifetimes.”197 Civilization through 
agriculture in the Western District was not only externally imposed, paternalistic and foreign to 
Anishinabe culture, but it was imparted piecemeal and inconsistently on the reserves. Though the 
communities succeeded in developing their own particular economic strategies, “[t]hrough their 
own methods and their own sense of organization and consensus,” policy directives and 
bureaucratic red tape served only to impede them.
198
 Even if they were permitted to access them, 
presents and annuities were not sufficient to develop small businesses on their own. Anishinabe 
peoples required a commitment from the government that supportive policies and funds would 
be earmarked for such purposes.
199
 Assisting enterprising individuals or reserve communities to 
build mills, inns and wharves; to breed oxen, or become masons, contractors and artisans, could 
have developed the self-sustaining income the Colonial Office and the Assembly were always 
looking for and provided a source of skilled and unskilled labour required in the province. There 
seems no reason why shops owned by independent Anishinabe entrepreneurs could not have 
provided services to reserves or to residents in neighbouring towns. One leader observed; “[w]e 
see the white men put our money [in their] pockets & we get no benefit. We see our young men 
discouraged & cast down.”200 Leaders and councils recognized that some development was 
necessary, particularly after the turn of the century, if only to keep youth in the community.
201
 
 Evidence suggests that Aboriginal people were ready, willing and frustrated that they 
could not apprentice themselves or supply at least some of their own needs. Because they could 
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not grow their own wealth through business development and neither possessed nor could access 
their annuities, they only had two options: they could acquire debt to purchase goods or cede 
their lands and resources to raise money. Both situations bled equity from their communities and 
transferred it into towns adjacent to the reserves. Rather than instruct the Anishinabe in 
arithmetic and commerce and prosecute those who cheated or defrauded them, the department 
attempted to curtail all economic transactions between the two communities. The inability to 
create positive relationships and the growth of negative encounters only served to foster 
misconceptions and isolate them from neighbouring colonists. By 1850, Aboriginal economic 
development was stunted and residents in neighbouring communities thought them culpable.  
 Observers continually described development in the Western District as backward, 
especially when compared to cities like Detroit just across the river in the United States.
202
 
Lacking reliable and cheap transportation, it was too expensive to ship goods from the region to 
the east.
203
  Commercial elites believed that railways connecting Lambton County to the 
American Midwest and the St. Lawrence, would “make this fine country the granary and 
storehouse of the west…”204 But railway expansion and other public works were only intended to 
provide work for Europe’s “surplus population,” increase demands for goods and raise land 
values.
205
  For the Anishinabe, they heralded the beginning of a way of life where employment 
was difficult to secure and “very few were regularly employed outside of the reserve.”206 Though 
the commissions of inquiry describe the overall process of ‘civilization’ as a humanitarian 
endeavor, the measures introduced in a piecemeal fashion under its guise prevented the 
Anishinabe from participating in this growth. Reserve communities instead possessed land and 
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resources that would subsidize the expansion and development of the railway and port towns like 
Wallaceburg, Corunna and Sarnia.  
 Inquiry Reports discussed at length the costs associated with administering to Aboriginal 
people, creating the perception that much was expended on reserves with little return. While 
Indigenous peoples were criticized for not thinking about tomorrow, economic uncertainty 
limited their ability to plan for the future. The development of a “moditional economy” enabled 
them to survive by combining a number of economic strategies. Nevertheless, it remained 
uncertain, unfulfilling and ultimately unconscionable. Under the notion of alleviating 
“despondency and despair,” the department itself created and cultivated it.207  For Anishinabe 
people in Lambton County, this was an economic purgatory.  Prevented by policy from 
becoming commercial farmers, merchants, or tradespeople, they would also not be allowed to 
remain hunters or fishers either.
 208
  Resistance to taxation and expansionist desires on the part of 
township councils and business elites would transform the environment and transfer islands, 
reserve lands and resources to non-Aboriginal people.  After 1850 however, Aboriginal people 
would be placed in “an anomalous position at once laboring under the disabilities imposed by 
law upon minors, and enjoying some of the territorial privileges of independent sovereigns.”209 
The next chapter will discuss how a legal definition of “Indian” based on race emerged from 
these circumstances. This definition would attempt to assimilate First Nations into the Dominion 
of Canada by denying them the equal rights, title and livelihood promised to Chawme and the 
Huron Tract Chiefs in 1818. 
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Chapter 5: ‘For a dying race the Indians have lasted very well’: Indigeneity in Lambton 
County, 1850-1867. 
 In 1837 Bond Head stood proud of the fact that “the Protection and Allegiance between 
the British Crown and the Indians has hitherto most happily existed as an unwritten code.”1 Two 
years later, the 1839 Crown Lands Act transferred control of Indian lands to the Crown, and  
order-in-council prohibited Aboriginal people from using commonly held lands as collateral, and 
from receiving merchant credit. These twin directives form the core of the 1850 Act for the 
Protection of Indian Lands and legislation passed in 1857 and in 1869.
2
  Ted Binnema argues 
that some Indigenous leaders, primarily in Lower Canada, helped to shape the “legal definition 
of Indian” and that officials drafting the legislation acknowledged their customs and opinions.3 
In contrast, Norman Shields suggests that the opinions of the chiefs in Upper Canada towards the 
early Indian Acts and the effects various provisions would have in their communities differed 
considerably.
4
 While Indigenous leaders maintained control of community membership in 
Lambton County into the 1860s, it became increasingly difficult for them to do so after 1850. 
Under the guise of ‘protection,’ legislation preemptively regulated ‘Indians’ instead of punishing 
offenders. 
 In Lambton County, domestic law and policy usurped the Proclamation of 1763 and the 
Huron Tract Treaty as guiding documents in the relationship between Anishinabe peoples and 
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the British Crown.
5
  The St. Clair Chiefs, unlike their Lower Canadian counterparts, were not 
consulted prior to the drafting of any of the Indian Acts. Even so, they continued to ‘see with two 
eyes,’ petitioning and meeting in general councils to coordinate resistance to the growing 
intrusion of law and policy into their communities. Ultimately chiefs and councils could not 
avoid the problems isolation and marginalization caused.
6
 After 1850 growing intolerance and 
preoccupation with cultural and racial difference shaped the treatment of Indigenous peoples and 
physical, political and economic boundaries became entrenched in law. 
   Like prohibitions against ‘Indian’ testimony in the courts, Eurocanadians increasingly 
accepted cultural stereotypes and assumptions made about Anishinabe peoples, without question 
or reference to factual experience.
7
 As earlier chapters discussed, notions of Indigenous 
inferiority and wardship evolved from a multitude of factors including displacement and 
devastation following the War of 1812. While treaties initially sufficed to deal with land and 
settlement, the paradigm of co-existence, once agreed to by both parties, broke down. Lambton 
County residents and their governments largely ignored Anishinabe reserve communities, 
particularly after publication of the 1845 Bagot Report and its condemnation of civilization 
policy.8 By 1867, as the British North America Act transferred “Indians and lands reserved for 
Indians”9 to Canada without their consent or inclusion, organized protest and political action 
remained the only avenues left to chiefs in southwestern Ontario. 
 Historians and legal scholars often write about policy and identity formation by analyzing 
outcomes. Catherine Hall outlines three distinct stages of British policy. If as she argues, 
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humanitarian ideals first shaped policy in the 1830s, by the 1850s, legislation created a racialized 
“vocabulary of biological difference,” separating ‘Indians’ on reserves from the rest of the 
population.  By the 1860s, she suggests that legislation defined “Indigeneity,” in direct contrast 
to an idealized white, male “citizenship.” Not recognized as nations unto themselves, the 
Anishinabek would only be offered the opportunity to become ‘Canadian’ when they gave up 
what it meant to be ‘Indian.’10 But as Borrows writes, “judicial power often cascades,”11 
suggesting that the processes by which this occurred, particularly before Confederation, are 
important to understanding the interconnectedness of law and policy. Though administrators 
reluctantly and clumsily interfered with community definitions of Indigeneity, their steadfast 
refusal to empower or involve Anishinabe peoples in protecting their own lands, necessitated 
passage of a series of bad laws after 1839, 1850, 1857 and 1869, each a futile attempt to correct 
the failures of its predecessor. 
 As already discussed, between the War of 1812 and 1850, ‘protection,’ may well have 
been the central goal of policy, but local conditions, complicated by the intersections of human 
agency and environments, rendered most of these measures ineffective. The desire to accurately 
classify and count Aboriginal people coincided with the Colonial Office’s desire to manage and 
understand what had become an unwieldy empire. As a tool of empire, “accounting discourses 
and techniques” as Neu writes, enabled the department to “create an alternative reality” using 
data that gradually made the imaginary real.
12
 Curtis links the creation of uniform censuses to 
other bureaucratic reforms in government and standardizations in currency, weights and 
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measures.
13
 The science of “social management,” including statistics, phrenology and 
anthropology gave the Colonial Office a better though not accurate understanding of the different 
peoples inhabiting portions of British occupied Indian, Australia, Africa and North America.
14
 
The 1857 Indian Rebellion in particular, drew attention to the status of racialized peoples in the 
empire and led to greater use of the term “caste” in Canada and “half-caste” to refer to people of 
Aboriginal and Eurocanadian descent.
15
 Synonymous with “breed,” it too morphed into an 
imprecise combination of tribe, birth, class and race; characteristics believed to be predictors of 
behavior and intelligence or capability.
16
 But by 1857, there was a fiscal interest here as well for 
administrators in both the Colonial Office and Canada. On the eve of the transfer of Indian 
affairs to Canada, the ability to strike a significant number of people off the lists of those eligible 
to receive presents and annuities was extremely attractive.
17
 
 While the British generally recognized Aboriginal peoples “as they defined themselves,” 
local variations and consequences require consideration because “[u]ntil the first Indian Act of 
1857 clearly made ‘Indians’ both non-citizens and legal minors, their status was subject to 
conflicting interpretations.”18 Indeed, in some cases even after 1860, Anishinabe peoples saw 
their freedoms circumscribed, yet in others, they exercised immense control in their 
communities. Nonetheless, “ad hoc record keeping[,]…ongoing policy changes, dating back to 
pre-Confederation,”19  and codification after 1850, strayed further and further from the intent to 
protect Aboriginal peoples and from their relationship with the state as nations and allies. Census 
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data, policy and legislation together served to reduce the number of Anishinabeg who could 
claim entitlements, and in doing so imposed a racially-based definition of Indigeneity onto their 
communities. 
 Denied recognition as sovereign entities, Aboriginal people did not have the opportunity 
to define themselves within a growing collective consciousness centred on a shared British 
heritage.
20
 While residents in the British Empire were subjects and not citizens, one historian 
surmised that loyalism is perhaps akin to citizenship because United Empire Loyalists could 
claim a distinct “personal relationship to the sovereign.”21 Thus, the mark of distinction and the 
‘pioneer myth’ were “the most powerful…in Ontario,”22 and those who inherited their spirit and 
work ethic saw a growing dichotomy between the growth and progress in their towns, and 
isolation and poverty in the communities of their Anishinabe neighbours.23  The empire’s 
Indigenous inhabitants provided a convenient foil against which insecure Canadian colonists 
juxtaposed themselves, quelling “uncertainty about their own cultural identity.”24 Indigeneity, 
over the course of the nineteenth century, came to be defined by “treaty, by statute, and by 
departmental policy and practice,” 25 and by others who had a direct and conflictory interest in 
seeing them remain on the periphery. In the second half of the nineteenth century, outsiders 
usurped Indigeneity, once a fluid and flexible concept based on self-identification, kinship and 
place and transformed it into a legal ‘status,’ based on blood and separate from Canadian society 
and citizenship. 
 Though the British treasury controlled colonial policy, the colonial government withdrew 
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financial support just as domestic administrative costs increased.
 26
 The Parliamentary grant for 
Indian Department operating expenses declined, from more than £14,000 in 1849 to slightly 
more than £9000 in 1855 and was slated to disappear altogether in five years.
27
  Following the 
Mica Bay incident, the acquisition of land on the North Shores of Lakes Superior and Huron in 
the 1850 Robinson Treaties would bring even more Anishinabe peoples and land under the 
purview of the government.
28
 From his mission at the Sault, Reverend William McMurray wrote 
that the offer of citizenship and a part of the reserves in fee simple to “the most civilized” Indians 
might be an idea worth exploring, in exchange for renouncing their ‘Indian’ status.29 
 McMurray and others who influenced policymakers believed that Aboriginal people were 
a dying race and from the end of the War of 1812, their anecdotes were treated as fact. Even one 
of the founders of the Aborigines Protection Society, Thomas Fowell Buxton, stated with 
certainty that Aboriginal people “without exception…continued rapidly to dwindle away…in 
every British Colony.”30 In the late 1830s, Anna Jameson gave Aboriginal communities only 
three generations before “the unmixed race” disappeared.31 In the words of one historian, “[f]or a 
dying race the Indians have lasted very well.”32 Indeed, epidemics in the colonial period took a 
devastating toll on First Nations newly exposed to European contagions but peace brought 
Anishinabe survivors with acquired immunity to Upper Canada, and by the 1850s, community 
populations stabilized with improved living conditions and a vaccination program. Anishinabe 
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peoples on the St. Clair were not dying out.   
 Nevertheless, reserve-based self-sufficiency was not working and reducing the number of 
‘clients’ served several purposes that became more apparent to bureaucrats in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. The 1844-5 Bagot Repot condemned nearly every aspect of the 
civilization program. Placing the Indian Department under extreme scrutiny for incompetence 
and mismanagement, the report served as a catalyst for many stakeholders and policymakers who 
wanted to eliminate the department and redirect its budget. In the meantime, department officials 
believed that ‘Indians’ “ought to support themselves.” Presents would increasingly be replaced 
with annuity payments from the sale of their land.33 In order to put this into effect, officials 
needed to know how many Aboriginal people resided in the province and if in fact, they were in 
decline. If this could be proven, even further reductions in Indian Department expenses could be 
made. 34 In 1845 Clench received orders to create a master list of all those who received presents 
at the fall distribution. Children born after January 1st 1846 and anyone not able to attend on the 
one day they were given out would forfeit their eligibility.35 Declining numbers reassured 
superintendents that Aboriginal people were indeed “a fated people,” 36 if not in actual numbers, 
then in their incapability to achieve self-sufficiency. Training Anishinabe people to ‘assimilate’ 
into Eurocanadian society instead of ‘wasting’ funds on reserve development reduced the budget 
and freed up excess reserve land to be sold. The profits along with money formerly spent to 
manage their affairs could then be applied to much-needed public works projects like roads, 
railways and drainage. The creation of different categories of Indigeneity with corresponding 
benefits fermented dissent, lessening the likelihood that reserve communities could collectively 
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resist these economizing policies. But gathering information about Aboriginal people was not 
that simple and the Civil Secretary disputed the accuracy of Clench’s numbers for months after 
the distribution of presents.37 For the time being a centrally-controlled register of officially 
recognized ‘Indians’ had to wait until the technology of scientific management made it possible. 
 In the 1840s, rough terrain, limited funds and enumerators with little education limited 
the kind of data officials could gather. Beginning in 1842, the Western District council 
conducted annual censuses of freeholders for the purpose of taxation. To this end, questions 
focused on acreage under cultivation, improvements and livestock.  The funding for public 
buildings necessitated questions about religious affiliation and the number and ages of school-
age children in the second half of the century but the logistics of enumeration and evasion of the 
‘tax man’ continued to plague remote areas. The Council struggled to find literate and competent 
individuals willing to conduct censuses and assessments particularly since they also had to be 
returned to Sandwich.
38
 Unless individual ‘Indians’ owned land off-reserve or performed statute 
labour, enumerators seemed to pay them little concern.
39
  
 Separate from non-Aboriginal inhabitants in the district, the Indian Department continued 
to collect statistics for its own purposes of monitoring Aboriginal people and reforming their 
behavior.  In 1855 Bury informed Talfourd that it was imperative for the future management of 
Indian Affairs to determine “whether the Indian race in Canada is diminishing in numbers or 
otherwise.” Convinced that Aboriginal people or their agents had inflated past estimates to 
increase the amount of presents, Bury told Talfourd that he could only place Anishinabe people 
                                                          
37
 LAC, RG 10/436, Campbell to Clench, 22 November, 1848, 5 December 1848, 443-5.  
38
 F2007-2, Western District Fonds, Minutes of the Municipal Council of the Western District, Council Records, 
1842-49.   
39
 Curtis, Politics of Population, 59-60; John F. Leslie and Public History Inc., “Aboriginal People and Canadian 
Census Records: An Historical Overview to 1961,” (Claims and Historical Research Centre, Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada, May 2008), 18, 21.  
 278 
on the list that he could verify himself, “from personal observation or absolute knowledge of his 
or her existence.”40 In reports and inquiries, the last of which was conducted by Superintendent 
Richard Pennefather, Froome Talfourd and Thomas Worthington in 1858,
 
 the department 
counted ‘Indians’ who received presents and annuities, attended school, and farmed for 
headquarters and the Colonial offices but all were for immediate purposes and few used 
consistent categories from year to year.  In 1861, Alexander Vidal, the Census Commissioner for 
the County of Lambton arranged for local merchants and officials to enumerate the last census 
for Canada West conducted before Confederation. This census did include space for the 
identification of individuals as “coloured,” “Indian,” or “mulatto” but for Vidal and the others, 
who seldom encountered them, it was “very troublesome and difficult work” to enumerate 
Aboriginal people.
41
 While they resided in the township together, Anishinabe and Eurocanadian 
residents continued to be counted separately.  
 In 1850s, national origin rather than ‘race’ was of prime importance to a government 
focused on immigration and settlement issues. As a consequence, the 1851 Rural Census for 
Canada West included ‘Indians if any’ but most of the manuscript schedules for Lambton County 
have not survived. These totals were later included in the “General Abstract of Origins” and 
Lambton County aggregates according to place of birth.
42
 By 1861 attitudes had changed 
drastically and  enumerators counted every “Chippewa Indian belonging to the Sarnia Band” 
residing in the Townships of Sarnia, Bosanquet, Enniskillen and Walpole Island,  as “Indian” in 
a column marked “Colour.” Even though the Town of Sarnia breached the reserve boundary, the 
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Anishinabe were not enumerated with them. Symbolic of their physical separation from the 
social and economic life of the township, the Sarnia reserve schedules are filed at the end 
together with other ‘Indian’ reserves in Lambton Township. 
 Off-reserve, census methodology starkly reveals what appears to be the complete 
physical segregation of the Anishinabe from the surrounding community. According to the 1861 
Census, not one ‘Indian’ lived in the Township of Moore. Furthermore, no one of Aboriginal 
descent resided off-reserve in the Townships of Sarnia, Sombra, Plympton or Bosanquet. Only 
one ‘Indian’ person, Henry Rod[d], lived in the Town of Sarnia and five ‘Indian’ families, 
totaling sixteen people, remained on the original reserve land in Enniskillen.
43
  Portrayed as a 
static, isolated and homogenous group located only on reserves, the 1310 “Indians” in Lambton 
County include people known to be of mixed ancestry, like the Rodd and Menass families, in 
Sarnia and Enniskillen.
44
 By 1871, no one of Indigenous ancestry was recorded as living in 
Essex, Kent, Bothwell or Lambton and not a single “Indian” lived off reserve in any of the 
townships formerly inhabited by the Anishinabe.
45
 The act of “making and unmaking Indians,”46 
to use Miller’s words, had dire consequences.  Identities could be shifted, managed and 
manipulated by the state when self-ascription and community control did not remain a part of the 
process of census-taking.
47
 
The Problems with Census-taking 
 Archival evidence and literature suggests that colonial governments did not consult with 
Aboriginal communities before conducting censuses and this affected the quality of the data they 
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collected. District and provincial governments conducted censuses in the spring, and the Indian 
Department counted in both spring and fall when they distributed presents and annuity monies.
48
  
Both were particularly inopportune times in Anishinabe seasonal cycles when the majority of 
community members were away hunting, fishing and gathering. In 1846, Interpreter H.P. Chase 
attempted to determine the annual number of births and deaths on Walpole Island in March when 
most were at the sugar camps. Peterwegeshig petitioned the government stating that “few of the 
Indians are now on the Island.  We will not be able to procure the exact number of births and 
deaths until planting time.”49 Despite the timing of censuses, Jones and Keating routinely 
accused the chiefs of being difficult and purposely uncooperative. This is perhaps because 
‘fudging’ the numbers or refusing to provide information were methods used by communities to 
resist the intrusion of officials into their affairs and better their own material circumstances.  
 In 1831, Walpole Island Chief Bauzhigeeshigwashekum “refused to give…their names or 
numbers” to Jones, and Peterwegeshig also gained notoriety for resisting attempts to collect data 
in the community.
50
 The ages of children in particular varied widely, and in some years, the 
number of children decreased significantly but the number of adults increased. The last year that 
agents allowed children to be added to present lists saw the largest number of children under four 
years old ever reported, and Clench could not seem to explain the ‘increase.’ In other years, the 
opposite occurred. Boys over the age of 13 and girls over age 14 received adult presents and 
Chase suspected that in order “to receive more and better goods” for their families, Anishinabe 
mothers “by a scheme,” made “their children older than they actually are.”51 Keating, Jones, 
Clench and Chase often informed headquarters that they were waiting for the chiefs to give them 
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vital and agricultural statistics, suggesting that Chiefs Wawanosh and Peterwegeshig as well as 
the Odawah and Potawatomi Chiefs on Walpole Island controlled the amount of information 
they relayed to officials, and did so whenever they could. Though it sometimes contributed to the 
inaccuracy of census data, this ‘obstinacy’ was not without purpose.  
 The desire to count Aboriginal peoples in this period remained complicated by simple 
geo-politics. Superintendents at various locations counted “resident Indians” and “wandering 
Indians” who received presents, estimating them to number about 5000 in both provinces. At 
Amherstburg, Walpole Island and Port Sarnia, 1155 received presents in 1847 and 1532 the 
following year.
52
 In contrast, various estimates suggested that 14,000 Aboriginal people lived in 
the American borderlands in the 1840s and a further 332,500 were believed to be “within striking 
distance of the Western frontier.
53
 Whether they remained in the borderlands or crossed over into 
Canada West, neither was a desirable scenario if the British government cut the funding for their 
presents and settlement. As the resident expert, Anderson wrote from Manitowaning, that it was 
“impossible to know the exact number of who may come.”54 The fear that a large, unknown body 
of ‘wandering’ or ‘visiting Indians’ could cross over and become Canada’s ‘problem’ was ever 
present so long as inaccurate and conflicting data remained an issue. 
 At the same time, a great deal of economic and social mobility is distorted in 
Eurocanadian and Indigenous communities by using the de-jure method, or enumerating people 
where they ought to be, rather than where they might be found on census day.
55
 Farmers 
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travelled to market, to town, to work for wages and visit relations, yet the impression that 
Anishinabe people ‘wandered’ to excess remained. Even at Sarnia, missionaries and interpreters 
complained that the Anishinabe would not stay put long enough to be counted. In 1845 the 
department instructed Clench to encourage them to adopt English names so they could be tracked 
with better accuracy.56 However, the overwhelming majority, particularly on Walpole Island and 
at Kettle and Stony Point, did not change their names.57 In fact, their proximity to the border and 
tendency to “mix up together” continued to frustrate officials.58 The close relationship shared by 
Sarnia, Saugeen and Owen Sound sabotaged departmental efforts to maintain superintendency 
boundaries and to count and monitor them in their communities. Their ability to disappear at 
will, particularly into the United States frustrated officials as they could not be pursued. Well 
into the 1840s Chase often had to leave lists of questions in advance and rely on the “council 
census” or statistics later given to him by the chiefs and councilors of each reserve in response. 
Later in the decade, he sometimes took it upon himself to place people where he believed they 
ought to be.
59
  
 Categories that might have made sense to officials held little meaning for the Anishinabe. 
Population and other statistics fluctuated largely because departmental policies constructed 
artificial categories and placed Anishinabe peoples into them. Administratively, families could 
be divided by the international boundary, reserve boundaries, Superintendnencies, treaty regions, 
‘tribal affiliation’ and ‘band,’ all at the same time. These demarcations never corresponded to 
culturally significant locations, hunting and fishing camps or clan and kin-related units. Censuses 
reflect both the problems associated with attempts to artificially contain them and the lack of 
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initiative on the part of agents. William Jones seems to have rarely visited Stony Point (Sable) 
and it is difficult to know at times if he included them with Kettle Point, estimated their numbers 
or omitted them altogether. Further, as the years went on and reserve economies increased in 
complexity, different groups gained and lost their entitlement to different sums of money. Treaty 
annuity lists often combined all the recipients at Sarnia, Kettle and Stony Point together, while 
others counted only certain groups across all the reserves. Subsequent data sets manufactured 
from these statistics do not consider the artificiality of manufactured categories, causing errors 
and omissions to multiply and become untraceable.
60
 The inability to control these variables 
confounded the department executive and officials in the British Colonial office. Superintendents 
of Indian Affairs could not reconcile these inconsistencies with the degree of micromanagement 
increasingly demanded of them by their superiors. Indigenous communities suffered from 
incessant policy changes resulting from constant conflict between the “hard” data demanded by 
officials and less-verifiable observations made by missionaries, settlers and others in the field. It 
was within this context that Indianness became a category that was scrutinized more severely in 
the process of census taking.  
 While this chapter has demonstrated that Aboriginal people frustrated attempts to count 
and classify them, it cannot be established with any certainty that officials manufactured data, 
census or otherwise, to prove Aboriginal people were dying out. It can be stated however that 
officials interpreted data they received with pre-set policy goals in mind and emphasized and 
publicized data that furthered those goals. These factors notwithstanding, reports made by 
observers in the 1840s almost unanimously agree that the Anishinabe steadily increased in 
number and were not ‘dying out.’  Despite repeated outbreaks of cholera and smallpox, no 
evidence exists to suggest that Anishinabe people in the Western District were any more prone to 
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dying than their non-Aboriginal neighbours.
61
 Historians and epidemiologists interested in the 
effects of disease in Indigenous communities tend to focus on epidemics, but by late 1847 Dr. 
Thomas Johnston had vaccinated most residents of Walpole Island and Sarnia against smallpox.  
When the disease returned to the county in 1850, Andrew Jamieson’s wife vaccinated 87 more.  
By May of that year, 181 more people received vaccinations, and the community did not have a 
single case as a result.
62
  
 Alfred Digby, physician to the Six Nations, reported that there was no difference in the 
prevalence of disease between people of European or Indigenous origin. Rather, the problem was 
a lack of access to prompt and effective medical attendance, particularly in remote areas. He 
recommended that officials build an Indian hospital in a centralized location to contain 
contagious diseases when they first appeared and provide access to adequate medical care, which 
many reserve communities lacked.
63
 Despite the absence of an ‘Indian’ hospital, Keating 
informed his superiors that their health was better than “average” and “far better than that of the 
white population.”64 Three years after Digby’s recommendation, the government in concert with 
the Wesleyan Methodist Society willingly financed and began construction on the Mount Elgin 
Institution at Muncey to more efficiently ‘civilize’ Anishinabe peoples.65 The government would 
never build a central Indian hospital to improve their health and well-being. 
 Aboriginal deaths were also widely attributed to alcohol abuse. In the 1840s, Reverend 
James Coleman suggested that alcohol-related accidental deaths due to fire and exposure plagued 
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reserves in the district, but by 1860, this did not seem to be the case.
66
 According to Table 8 
below, in 1861 approximately 32 Indigenous people on the reserves under study died the 
previous year out of an estimated population of more than 1200. While large-scale epidemics  
Table 8: Main Causes of Death: 1861 Census, “Chippewa Indians.” 
 
Cause Infants  
(-2yrs.) 
Children 
(3-15) 
Adults (16+) Total 
Unspecified Fever & 
Brain Fever  
4  2 6 
Consumption  7 9 16 
Measles 1 1  2 
Unknown 7   7 
Infirmity/Old Age   1 1 
Total  11 8 12 32 
 
Source: LAC, RG 31, 1861 Census of Canada West, Lambton County, Chippewa Indians 
Belonging to the Sarnia Band in the Townships of Sarnia, Bosanquet, Enniskillen and Walpole 
Island, 39-64. 
 
appeared to be under control, Dr. Digby’s observations are corroborated by this data. Untreated 
and unspecified fevers and illnesses as well as consumption (Tuberculosis) took the greatest 
number of lives. Many were infants or individuals between the ages of twenty and thirty who 
lives might have been saved with timely access to medical care. 
 According to William Jones, the Anishinabe in the district were “generally on the 
increase” as two-parent families in the 1840s typically had five children and raised three of them 
to adulthood.
67
  By 1847, community populations in the district increased to such an extent that 
Superintendent T.C. Campbell demanded that Clench explain the “anomalies.” In 1847 Sarnia’s 
population declined by 47 but Walpole Island’s increased by 68 for a total increase of 21 people. 
Communities at the Thames also increased by 82 and the largest increases in all the communities 
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were women and very young children.
68
  In 1856 Pennefather confirmed what was becoming a 
consistent trend, reporting that “in some bands the births…exceeded the number of deaths” and 
the number of deaths were “scarcely appreciable.”69 While much was made of infant mortality in 
the 1847 Report, by 1855 an estimated 200 children, half of them school-aged, lived in the 
Sarnia Indian village alone.
70
 Officials continued to greet such statistics with surprise, focusing 
on decline, whenever and wherever they could find it. Most importantly, they failed to provide 
for additional growth on the reserves. 
 Some communities appeared to be in decline, but further investigation into the numbers 
reveals that people left the reserve, they did not die.
71
 As already discussed, some frustrated with 
department bureaucracy and conditions on the Sarnia Reserve in particular decided to relocate 
elsewhere in the province, in Canada and the United States.
72
 For instance, it appears that Sarnia 
and Kettle Point had a decline in population of 35 people between 1856 and 1857. Talfourd 
calculated a general decline by adding 12 who died to the 23 who moved elsewhere. While this 
number would be the centerpiece of his statistics, at the same time, he did not report that the birth 
rate exceeded the death rate. That same year, 17 babies were born, increasing the resident net 
population by five. Births were increasing during tough times when cycles of extreme weather 
alternated with crop failures caused by disease and insects. An extreme cold snap in the winter of 
1846 killed off game and fowl to such a degree that it is arguable whether food and fur bearing 
animals ever recovered to their former numbers.
73
 In the 1850s heat and drought destroyed half 
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the fruit and spring crops in the southern portion of the district.
74
  In 1859 a “great famine,” 
caused by wheat midge not only killed the crops but sent hungry farm families into the district in 
search of “squirrels, pigeons, rabbits and deer.”75 Population increases, combined with climate 
change and resource depletion created a perfect storm of mutual reinforcement. 
 When deaths are emphasized and factors like out-migration are ignored, departmental 
statistics fit into a general discourse of ill health and decline.
76
 Out-migration varied and peaked 
in only a few years and the statistics do not distinguish between individuals who were seasonally 
absent or who moved temporarily in search of employment and other economic opportunities in 
cities and towns like Sarnia, Windsor and Detroit.
77
 They often returned, and there was also no 
guarantee that individuals who genuinely intended to leave permanently would not return home 
too. When populations did increase, officials attributed better health to the acceptance of 
civilization and associated high rates of death and disease to unsettled and ‘pagan’ peoples like 
the Potawatomi. So while officials publicly bemoaned the looming demise of Indigenous 
peoples, privately the authors of the Bagot Report were made well aware of population increases, 
and that Anishinabe peoples were stable and increasing in the borderlands of Upper Canada both 
by natural increase and immigration.
78
  Continuously declining populations in even the smallest 
amounts justified funding cuts, enfranchisement policies and the sale of reserve land. While the 
Anishinabe in Lambton County were not a vanishing people, they were treated as if they were. 
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They became trapped in an administrative system designed for their eventual elimination as 
distinct communities. 
 If resident populations continued to increase and thousands of “American Indians” could 
arrive at any time, something had to be done to limit access and entitlement to goods and 
services. By 1855, the parliamentary grant for presents amounted to only £4600, and the British 
treasury was eager to eliminate even this small amount.
79
  In years to come, officials would 
spend extraordinary time and effort determining individual entitlement to receive money, 
supplies, presents or pensions based on “lifestyles, bloodlines and national boundaries”80 instead 
of “community, family and history.”81 As record-keeping improved and descent could be traced, 
the definition of “Indian” by 1868 would become much more restrictive.  But officials would 
also discover that the accuracy of the numbers mattered little so long as they could tell a story of 
decline and degeneration. For that reason, controlling ‘Indianness’ and imposing racialized 
understandings of Indigeneity, became key aspects of the process of policy formation. If 
Aboriginal people were not dying out, other ways had to be created to eliminate them.
82
 
Bloodlines 
 Though Aboriginal people historically governed admission to their own communities, 
Great Lakes First Nations understood their military alliances to be familial in nature. At a 
meeting at Mount Johnson in 1755 the Mohawk told William Johnson that they were “as one 
Body, one Blood & one People; the same king our common Father…your Enemies were 
ours…”83 As discussed in earlier chapters, kinship relations with British officials, traders and 
merchants provided Indigenous peoples with economic stability and protection against American 
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aggression. Sir William Johnson married Joseph Brant’s sister Molly, Alexander McKee married 
a daughter of Shawnee Chief Blue Jacket, and Matthew Elliot had a Shawnee wife and 
children.
84
  Clench, a direct descendant of Sir William Johnson, and Ironside Jr., whose mother 
was related to the Prophet Tenskatawa were the last generation of Indian Department employees 
of Indigenous ancestry who “shared [an] identity and a common past” with the communities they 
administered.
85
 Also of mixed descent, Peter D. Clarke wrote that, historically First Nations in 
the region adopted Euroamericans and African children into their families and that in his 
lifetime, most families were “mixed with the whites or with Indian blood of other tribes.”86  
 But race, prior to the publication of Darwin’s Origins of Species in 1859 did matter, 
according to Calloway and Taylor. The works of both historians tragically describe the racial 
dimensions of colonial warfare and chronicle atrocities committed by and between settlers and 
Aboriginal people in Northeastern North America. Where settlement directly interfered with 
Aboriginal ways of life, local acts of violence often erupted. Chiefs attending the Council at the 
Glaize, southwest of present-day Toledo, Ohio in 1792, repeatedly used the term “Nations of our 
colour” to refer to sovereign allies in the Western Confederacy and “the white people” to refer to 
Americans.
87
 While colour in this instance tended to represent the differing worldviews of two 
nations; Indian and American, ‘racialized’ violence in the colonial period captivated historians 
like Francis Parkman. Calloway suggests that colonial conflict in this period, as it was re-told, 
provided fodder for a “racial war” that lived on “in the national mythology[ies]”88 of the United 
States and Canada.  In the colonial period “white Indian” referred to European adoptees and 
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sympathizers or individuals who ‘went native,’ but ‘red’ and ‘white’ continued to be used 
informally to broadly differentiate between the cultures and worldviews of Aboriginal people 
and Eurocanadians into the nineteenth century. Certainly the publication of Darwin’s Origin of 
Species influenced the development of pseudo-scientific elements in the discourse of difference 
after 1859. Decades prior however, racial difference confounded those who sought a simple 
methodology for human classification.
89
 Confusing and contradictory descriptions of people in 
the Western District highlight the fact that Indigeneity proved to be an extremely difficult thing 
to identify.   
 Appearance complicated definitions of Indigeneity and perhaps as a result, officials did 
not use skin colour as a primary characteristic to identify people of Aboriginal ancestry in the 
first half of the century. For example, a “complexion” scale ranging from “fair” to “black” used 
to describe convicts in an 1846 penitentiary report did not identify Aboriginal people at all.
90
 
Local municipal and provincial administrators focused their efforts counting taxable property 
and tracking potential troublemakers based on their creed and origin. Municipal documents from 
the Western District and Kent and Lambton Counties, rarely mention their Indigenous 
neighbours for any reason. The 1842 and 1848 aggregate censuses were supposed to contain a 
“coloured race” category but the column is missing in most of the handwritten township 
manuscript schedules.
 
 Earlier legislation, prohibiting the sale of alcohol to “Indians” or 
exempting “Indians” from hunting regulations, rested on residency in the Province and did not 
define them in law.
91
 Sheriffs sometimes identified the prisoners they transported as ‘Indian’ and 
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several individuals were convicted in the District for selling liquor to ‘Indians,’ but until passage 
of racially-based legislation, local authorities recognized ‘Indians’ on the basis of appearance, 
social familiarity and residence.
92
 As already discussed, for much of the first half of the 
nineteenth century, officials attributed the propensity to commit crimes or engage in anti-social 
behavior to Americans or the French or Irish.
93
  
 Historically, the diverse origins of the population belied, attempts to create a systemic 
method of classification. Thus, ‘racial’ difference in the Western District was often a 
geographically specific conflation of colour, class, “manners, customs, practices and beliefs.” 94 
French and Indigenous nations were joined by waves of African-Americans, discharged Swiss, 
German and other Continental soldiers, Scots at Baldoon, famine Irish and British emigrants. 
These latter groups sometimes received worse treatment than their Indigenous neighbours. 
Susanna Moodie described the Irish as “vicious, uneducated barbarians” while Anna Jameson 
thought that the further Eurocanadian settlers lived from “civilization,” the more they 
“retrograde[ed]” into something wild and “savage.”95 On her travels through the district, she and 
other writers described the French Canadians, Scots and Irish, who lived precarious lives along 
the St. Clair and in the back townships, as “dirty” and “ragged.”96 Members of the upper classes 
attributed the deficiencies they encountered, not in terms of race or ethnicity, but to a lack of 
‘civilization’ and education. In the early years of settlement, Elizabelth Simcoe believed that 
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Aboriginal people, like the Brant family, could acquire these arts as easily as the Irish or anyone 
else. She found their manner of dress, work ethic and educations impressive.97 Gourlay 
“suspected that civilization” had “upon the whole, retrograded in the province” and would 
continue to do so if officials did not address the conditions of settlement and improve access to 
the institutions of “civilized society.”98 
 As early as the 1820s, officials referred “Bona fide Indians” but this tended to be a 
reference to people of Aboriginal descent allied to Great Britain and known to the Indian 
Department as reputable or trustworthy. German geographer Johann Kohl’s writings suggest that 
individuals of mixed British or French and Indigenous ancestry around Lake Superior were 
distinguished by colour, or by a loosely-applied fractional blood-quantum, but the precise 
amounts were immaterial.
99
 While observers made these and other generalized references to the 
existence of “distinguishing characteristics of Indians,” culture and lifestyle mattered as much as 
colour.
100
  Some officials believed that ‘half-breeds’ in the Upper Lakes were easier to identify 
because they knew the lineages of individuals and on the basis of dress and language, “the line of 
distinction can clearly be drawn.”101 The 1836 Treaty identified two classes of “half breeds.” 
One “adopted the manners, habits and customs of the Savages, lived with them...were completely 
identified with them and…recognized fully as Indians.” The second group “adopted the habits, 
manners & customs of the white people and spoke either…French or English.” While the former 
were often enumerated as Indians under terms of the treaty, the latter were distinguished by their 
reputation with the Anishinabe and their “greatest capacity to use and take care of property.”102  
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In later years, placing individuals in pre-defined categories became more difficult. One census 
enumerato reported in frustration that, “[t]hese people are so mixed up with Indians that I 
scarcely know what to call them. The principal mixture is white, and they cultivate the soil, so I 
call them white.”103 In the Western District too where practicable, most officials threw up their 
hands and deferred the task of identification to individuals and the chiefs.
104
 Relationships to 
communities and individual acceptance into them carried greater importance. Indigeneity was 
fluid and flexible and one did not have to be ‘full blood’ to be ‘Indian.’105 
Bloodlines 
 Mixed ancestry in the Upper Lakes might have been common but intermarriages between 
non-Aboriginal and reserve communities in western Upper Canada varied. Benjamin Slight, the 
missionary at the Credit, reported that relationships between the Mississauga and Eurocanadians 
“were common,” but they seemed to be less so elsewhere.106 Prior to 1857, reports from Walpole 
Island and Sarnia stated with virtual certainty that intermarriages between ‘whites’ and ‘Indians’ 
did not occur, and children of mixed parentage did not reside in any of the communities. Reserve 
residency was fluid in this period and a number of ‘Indian,’ ‘Metis,’ and ‘non-Aboriginals’ 
frequently came from Michigan, the Sault and the northeast to settle or conduct business in the 
St. Clair region. Richardson reported that at Sarnia, he could see a “dash of the white blood…in 
the bellies of the day.” At Walpole Island, he noted that there were “no regular half-breeds 
among them.” This however does not mean that individuals of mixed ancestry were not there at 
all. Rather, they were just not “recognized as such.”107 Keating stated that he knew of no 
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instances of white women married to “Indian” men except for Mrs. Peter Jones, and he and 
Reverend Coleman both denied ever seeing an identifiable child of “mixed-parentage.”108 Three 
years after making this claim, Keating identified F.X. Cadotte, the interpreter and witness of a 
number of deeds on Walpole Island, as “a half Indian.” Cadotte captured the interest of many 
visitors to the Island including Richardson who was also of mixed Aboriginal and European 
descent. The pair travelled from Walpole Island to Sarnia in 1848 to witness the distribution of 
the presents.  There, Richardson described Cadotte as “a half-breed, and a tall and well[-] 
proportioned fellow...”109 Along with the Rodd and Riley ‘bands,’ Richardson and the Cadottes 
descended from several generations of voyageur trader and administrative families in the 
northwest.
110
 According to Chute and Knight, “the Cadottes were regarded as more Native than 
European, yet not as fully Ojibwe” as Chiefs Little Pine and Nebanagoshing (Joseph Sayers).111 
In 1855, Missionary Solomon Waldron complained of the distraction caused by 
“numerous…French and Half-breeds at St. Clair (Sarnia),” particularly during lumbering season, 
and returns from fishery inspector William Gibbard, identify a French community, of mixed 
ancestry, further along the shore between the Sable and Goderich.
112
 Many Indigenous and 
Eurocanadian families intermarried, suggesting this had been a fact in the St. Clair-Lake Huron 
region since the seventeenth century.
113
 At the same time, local variations reflect not only how 
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the communities identified and defined themselves, but (aside from curiosity), how relatively 
unimportant ancestry was to Richardson, Keating and Waldron in the execution of their duties. 
 Attitudes towards ancestry changed as an increasing number of non-Aboriginal people 
attempted to settle on reserves. After 1839, Keating and Jones relied on community acceptance 
and belonging to identify trespassers but proving this in a court of law, as previous cases 
demonstrate, was difficult. In 1850, the Act for the better protection of the Lands and property of 
the Indians in Lower Canada contained the first legal definition of ‘Indian.’ It defined “Indians” 
as anyone with an Aboriginal parent residing on a reserve or an individual married to or adopted 
“in infancy” by someone who fit this criteria. This definition maintained Anishinabe cultural 
traditions that welcomed such people as community members without distinction.
114
 The Upper 
Canadian Act did not contain this definition. Instead it distinguished Indians from the rest of the 
population on the basis of residency and marital status.
115
 In the years prior and in remote places 
afterwards, many people of European-Indigenous ancestry lived on reserves, signed treaties and 
received presents within an informal system of community acceptance based upon ‘métissage’ or 
combinations of culture, lifestyle, kinship and ancestry.
116
 Individuals sometimes “drifted” 
between categories, identifying as ‘Indian’, mixed and white because of discrimination faced in 
surrounding Eurocanadian communities.
117
 In other words “’Indians’ often included people of 
mixed blood” but “not all people of mixed blood were understood to be ‘Indians.”118  The nature 
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of early record-keeping meant that the Indian Department, whether it wanted to or not, simply 
could not apply categories or definitions in any rigid way. Unable to prove that someone was 
European, intermarried, adopted, or full or fractionally of Indigenous ancestry meant that identity 
and residence largely remained in the hands of individuals and their communities.
119
 On the one 
hand, the St. Clair Chiefs had to rely on their agents to eject troublemakers like Robert Little, but 
on the other, they continued to define the parameters of membership by determining who did or 
did not belong in their communities. As categories began to trump family histories, the purpose 
of legislation after 1850 changed from managing Indian lands to controlling the people who lived 
upon them. 
 The notion that people of mixed Aboriginal and European ancestry acquired “the worst of 
both worlds” gained credence in the late 1840s.120 Bond Head’s letters contain similar themes of 
social and racial degeneration which he attributed to alcohol, intermixing and the acquisition of 
‘vices’ resulting from contact with ‘whites.’121 Richardson was rather surprised that upon his 
arrival at the Sarnia village, he did not see “the half-civilized, and…degenerate beings” that he 
“had been led to…find.”122 Expressed earlier as a set of complex curiosities, throughout the 
1840s, ‘Indianness’ acquired more identifiable boundaries. Richardson’s comments also show 
that mixed ancestry was becoming a mark of lesser status and conceived as something inherent, 
biological and permanent. As discussed in Chapter 4, though they shared kinship relations with 
nearby Anishinabe communities, officials increasingly began to describe the Métis as 
opportunistic squatters and after the 1849 Mica Bay incident, as agitators and sympathizers 
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too.
123
 If there was a reticence to acknowledge mixed relationships in the past, after 1850, 
perhaps because of the complex nature of the task at hand, there was outright denial that 
intermarriage occurred at all.
124
 Even Froome Talfourd, a long-time neighbour of the Sarnia 
Reserve and of many of the region’s French inhabitants, reported that he “never heard any 
reason…for the introduction of white blood among” the Indians except for the fact that “years 
ago, it was common for young French men to take Indian wives.”125 The prospect of children 
between people of Aboriginal and English descent so inflamed Indian Department clerk and 
accountant George Vardon that he felt it necessary to associate “white Indians” with 
degeneration, alcoholism, and the immoral sexual proclivity of Indian women in a lengthy 
investigation into Indian annuities.
126
  While British policymakers and humanitarians like 
Herman Merivale and Saxe Bannister spoke of an eventual “amalgamation of the races,” this was 
understood as the unavoidable and natural outcome of two peoples mingling in the same 
space.
127
 Until this occurred, humanitarians insisted that, “[s]eparate Laws must be made for 
different classes in society, whose wants, and conditions in life, are essentially dissimilar…not 
because the two races differ in complexion or in descent, but because their wants and 
occupations are entirely different.”128 The period saw a transformative change from this 
optimistic view, described as “humanitarian” and “paternalistic,” to a pessimistic one premised 
on elimination.
129
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 While studies of interracial marriage in the eighteenth and nineteenth century almost 
exclusively focus on relationships between “Indian women and French [or European] men,”130 
economizing directives issued in the 1840s forced the department executive to deal with a 
number of unanticipated combinations that challenged the utility of racial classification in 
policies to curtail ‘Indian’ rights. In 1829, a number of “Canadian women” married to “Indians,” 
particularly on the Wyandotte Reserve at Anderdon, attracted the attention of the Indian 
department executive. From that point on, agents inundated the head office with inquiries about 
what to do in such instances. Jarvis issued a policy directive in 1843 stating that only white 
women who were “actually the wives of Indians” and “not living in illicit connection with” them 
could live on the reserve, share in the presents, and receive the family annuity.
131
 Conversely, as 
early as 1818, storekeepers expressed concern with a growing number of Indian women who 
lived with European men. Deputy Storekeeper General William Robertson instructed officials to 
deny presents to these women and their children “because in almost every instance” they were 
“well provided for by the Europeans with whom they were living.”132 In the reserve period, 
Keating and Jones also assumed that Aboriginal women married to white men automatically left 
the community and moved in with their husbands, but this was not always true.
133
 In order to 
combat a growing number of ‘white’ men claiming the right to reside on reserves, women 
married to them after 1847 forfeited their presents.  Children of such marriages deemed ‘Indian’ 
or not, as well as “half breeds, or descendants of half breeds,” would also no longer receive 
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them. If the couple permanently separated, the department re-instated her presents. However, if 
her husband abandoned her, as long as they were raised with their ‘Tribe,’ only the children 
would receive them. Agents admittedly had difficulty monitoring and determining ancestry and 
marital status, and these directives mark increasing attempts to apply stricter residency 
requirements in an effort to control eligibility. After 1847, some Métis continued to receive 
presents and annuities but only if they were “adopted by the Tribe” and “live[d], as Indians 
among them.”134 These instances represent only a few examples where policy and the authority 
given to agents in 1839 sanctioned the denial of Indian rights before specific legislation targeted 
Indigeneity in Upper Canada in 1857. 
  It is evident that some combinations simply taxed the agents to the point where policy 
could not provide them with any solution.  The Delaware or Leni Lenape at Munceytown and 
Oneida included descendants of African, European and Indigenous heritages. Hundreds of 
fugitive slaves arrived in the years after the War of 1812, joining African-Canadian Loyalists at 
Amherstburg, in the Buxton settlement near Chatham and in several other communities in the 
Western District. When an Anishinabe woman married “a coloured man” in 1849, Clench argued 
that she had a right to live on the reserve and receive annuities but could not access money, 
schooling or goods requisitioned for collective use by the chiefs.
135
 In 1857, Ninham, a man of 
mixed African and white ancestry, married an Oneida women and claimed an “equal right” to 
live on the reserve. The chiefs requested the assistance of the government to expel him, not 
because of his ancestry but because they considered him a “bad character.”136 In the absence of 
legislation, these instances suggest that chiefs sometimes retained the authority to regulate 
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admission to their communities, but in other situations, they did not. Regardless, the department 
legally had the power to “make due inquiries” into the status of anyone living on Crown reserve 
land and to override the decisions of chiefs and council, if necessary.
137
  
 Of prime importance, these policies and later legislation defined ‘Indians’ as male. The 
notion that Indigeneity like other ethnic or ‘racial’ origins was transferred through the male was 
partly rooted in Western European concepts of marriage law in which a woman became the 
property of her husband. In 1869 Aboriginal women, who married ‘Indian’ men became 
members of their husband’s bands. But elements of the “one-drop rule” later characterized 
instructions given to census enumerators, and after 1901, all children of mixed ‘race’ marriages, 
irrespective of parentage, were to be placed in non-‘white’ racial categories.138 Despite this, 
“categorical instability” continued to plague census-taking as people of mixed ancestry “were 
variously classified as Indian, white, ‘other’ and from time to time again as half-breed.” Though 
it took until 1869 for a ‘homogenized’ yet no less “ambiguous” definition of 'Indian' to become 
law,
139
 department practices and polices in the interim gradually extended into areas that were 
formerly and unquestionably within the purview of communities alone.   
 The 1857 Gradual Civilization Act retained the definition from the 1850 Lower Canadian 
Act, defining ‘Indians’ as those with Indian blood, married to persons of Indian blood or 
acknowledged as members of the ‘tribe.’140 While it can be argued that legally, chiefs retained 
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the right to determine who lived in their communities,
141
 in practice, prior Crown Lands Acts and 
the 1850 Act made Indian Agents justices of the peace, and they possessed the power to eject 
trespassers as Crown Lands Officers. As the next chapter will discuss, this grey area gave agents 
and interpreters like Keating, Jones, Clench and Chase extraordinary power to control the lives 
of Anishinabe peoples, when and if they chose to do so. The inadequacy of legislation, as we 
have seen, left gaps that were sometimes filled by Anishinabe resistance, by policy, and 
occasionally by the individual proclivities of department employees and settlers. 
 Enfranchisement, introduced voluntarily in 1857 and forcibly under certain circumstances 
in 1869, automatically included a man’s wife and children, but it also contributed to negative 
stereotypes among those who refused it.
142
 Open to Indian men who were over the age of twenty-
one, literate, free of debt and of good character, enfranchisement eliminated legal distinctions 
between ‘Indians’ and any other British subject. Once the government established the legislative 
process of enfranchisement as a prerequisite for social acceptance and financial independence, it 
created an adversarial and hostile situation between the Anishinabe and their neighbours. So long 
as reserves existed, Eurocanadians perceived that the people living on them were not self-
sufficient and did not own property—they were not ‘good characters.’ Worst of all, because civic 
rights and property rights intertwined, the legislation suggested that Anishinabe people choosing 
to live on reserves rejected their civic responsibilities to vote and pay taxes. Consequently, 
though it did not specifically intend to do so, the 1857 Act reinforced notions that unenfranchised 
‘Indians’ who lived on reserves had to be illiterate, uneducated and fiscally irresponsible. 
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Moreover, by refusing enfranchisement their political, economic and social separation appeared 
to be a conscious choice after 1857. 
 The “hardening of attitudes” 143 in the wake of the almost wholesale rejection of 
enfranchisement is evident in the 1869 Gradual Enfranchisement Act. It stated that anyone not 
meeting what were essentially ‘blood-quantum’ requirements would be enfranchised against 
their will. Indigenous peoples lacking at least one Aboriginal grandparent (one-quarter Indian 
blood), and Anishinabe women who married ‘white’ men, along with their children, lost their 
status.
144
 Such persons lost access to property, annuities and services on reserves. Officials 
claimed that if this had not been the case, non-Aboriginal spouses could gain an interest in Indian 
reserve land and resources in the event the marriage dissolved.
145
 If it protected Indigenous 
women from white men with dubious motives, at the same time the Act ultimately forced 
‘Indians’ with uncertain ancestry, and women and children, out of their communities and away 
from their culture and extended families.
146
 Women who married non-Aboriginal men shared the 
same history and ‘blood’ as many of their relatives with ‘status.’ Despite this, their children 
became untraceable in subsequent censuses and they became “forgotten people.”147  
 As already discussed, executive officials had difficulty determining individual eligibility 
to what were already complex distributions of annuities and interest money long before the 1869  
law. But after 1857, intrusion into the lives of couples, and women in particular, reached the 
height of absurdity. In a confidential letter to Talfourd, the Civil Secretary wanted to know how 
                                                          
143
 Hall, Civilising Subjects, 47.  
144
 32-33
 
Vict. c.6, s.6. An Act for the gradual enfranchisement of Indians, the better management of Indian Affairs, 
and to extend the provisions of the Act 31
st
 Victoria, Chapter 42, 22 June 1869. Women became members of their 
husband’s band.  In the event they married men of Aboriginal ancestry from countries other than Canada, they lost 
their status as ‘Canadian Indians.’  
145
 Binnema, “Protecting Indian Lands by Defining Indian,” 15, 24.  
146
 Holmes, “Original Intentions of the Indian Act,” 19. 
147
 Wicken, Colonization of Mi’kmaw Memory and History, 188. A reference to The Long Journey of a Forgotten 
People: Métis Identities and Family Histories, ed. Lischke and McNab.  
 303 
the superintendent judged cases where white women married to Indian men lived together, what 
he did when the husbands were absent and what happened when husbands and wives lived 
elsewhere but attended on the date of distribution.
148
 Correspondence suggests in the most 
difficult cases, the department took the path of least resistance, opting to simply limit entitlement 
rather than expend the effort to locate individuals or amend policies to accommodate their 
economic or social circumstances. Overall officials could reduce the number of ‘Indians’ on 
paper but they could not hide the reality of growing Indian poverty on and off reserve. 
 Though these policies were implemented initially for fiscal reasons, they also became an 
important tool in ‘civilizing’ Indigenous peoples. Reform groups like the Aborigines Protection 
Society, determined to create English-speaking Anishinabe Christian families, as well as 
missionaries and officials, hoped these laws would encourage the Anishinabe to marry within 
their own communities and form nuclear families.
149
 As letters and petitions to the department 
demonstrate, the Anishinabe were reluctant to abandon their customs and many refused to 
conform to definitions of ‘Indian’ forced upon them. Some never married, and Quakgwan the 
chief at the Sable, seems to have retained the custom of keeping two wives. If it is true, only his 
Methodist wife appears in the public record. His other wife likely lived with him according to 
Anishinabe custom and kept well away from the prying eyes of officials.
150
 In places like the 
Sarnia village, where private intimacies became public knowledge, survival rather than cultural 
preference dictated that interracial couples and their children conceal their identities. In the hands 
of authorities, the unscientific and subjective nature of the exercise of defining transformed into 
a powerful tool that could prevent non-compliant individuals from receiving their entitlements 
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until they behaved in an appropriate manner.  
 Over time, the politics of identification also contributed to the growth of inaccurate data 
and statistics that did not reflect the conditions on or off reserves. In theory, but not in fact, the 
generations of men, women and children who lost their ‘Indian status’ diminished the overall 
number of Aboriginal people.
151
 Fearing they could be struck off the list at any time, instances of 
intermixing and real evidence of spaces in the second half of the nineteenth century where 
Eurocanadians and Aboriginal people coexisted in a way their ancestors once envisioned 
remained hidden.
152
  This contributed to the impression that reserves were culturally 
homogenous, completely divorced from the communities around them and that their inhabitants 
willingly chose to reject Eurocanadian society. 
 Evidence suggests that intercultural relationships across Canada declined in proportion to 
the economic, social and political distance placed between the two groups and the arbitrary 
inclusion and non-inclusion of individuals in particular categories.
153
 In accordance with the law, 
every year after 1857, Talfourd had to enumerate the number of “half-breeds and illegitimate 
children” in each of the communities and submit the numbers to head office.154 Walpole Island 
Chiefs appear to have controlled some aspects of this recordkeeping as Chief Buckwheat only 
identified six families or fewer than thirty people of mixed ancestry in October 1860.
155
 In 
contrast, a more detailed report from Sarnia suggests that ‘racialized’ policies did result in an 
intergenerational decline in the number of children born of mixed ancestry in the village. Forty-
six people claimed mixed heritage in 1860. More than two-thirds, or 34, were second generation, 
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born to a parent or parents who were themselves of mixed ancestry, and all but one set of parents 
had married in the church. In the same document, only eleven were first-generation, born to 
parents of mixed ancestry and of these, the list reported six as “illegitimate.”156 Without further 
research, it is difficult to assess whether interracial couples actually declined in number, 
concealed their status, or lost their entitlements and moved off the reserve. Anishinabe leaders 
agrued that women would evade legislation by consciously avoiding marriage, a prediction that 
evidently came true in many reserve communities.
157
 By 1860, fewer recorded interracial couples 
married in the church or lived openly on the Sarnia reserve, and fewer children of mixed heritage 
were documented as born in the community as a result.  
 By the late 1860s, dire consequences sometimes awaited those who had identities foisted 
upon them by the state. Had he been alive in the 1860s, Peter Jones, whose father was English, 
would have been white, and the children, born of his English wife Eliza, white too.
158
 In Sault 
Ste. Marie officials labeled Métis who lived in log homes and farmed as ‘white,’ whereas 
individuals of mixed heritage in similar circumstances further south were identified as ‘Indians.’ 
In 1840, former St. Clair Chief Wahpoose (George Menass) petitioned for the deed to his farm in 
Enniskillen which he had occupied before the land was purchased with Huron Tract annuities. 
While the government acknowledged that he had “a very strong claim,” they did “not know of 
any means of legal relief” for him. The Legislative Council suggested a licence of occupation be 
issued to him but the Indian department, who referred to him as a “half-Indian,” preferred to 
recognize his Anishinabe “half” instead of his European and would not approve it.159  While 
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other Eurocanadian settlers around him received deeds for land, he was denied even a licence of 
occupation, solely on the basis of his heritage. Indian Affairs records in the Western District 
contain dozens of appeals for justice where officials applied categories to the disadvantage of 
Anishinabe people. 
  Once an integral part of the formation of cultural alliances, the internalization of racial 
categories was a natural response to the prospect of having to admit and accommodate non-
Aboriginal spouses and their children as ‘Indians’ without any additional funds for their support. 
By 1875, so many former residents wanted re-admission to the Anderdon Wyandotte reserve that 
the community feared they would be overwhelmed and “absorbed by whites.”160 Thus in the face 
of negative fiscal consequences, the process of community integration and acceptance changed 
from ‘métissage’ or what Algonquin-Anishinabe-kwe scholar Lynn Gehl calls “redness,” (the 
combination of ancestry, values and philosophical world-view), to a status based solely on 
ancestry or blood-quantum.
161
 Utilizing policy in the field, biology in the census and legislation, 
the state assumed the power, not only to define Indigeneity and bestow identities upon people, 
but to take them away.
162
  
“Strangers among Us” 
 Treaty entitlements and British parliamentary largesse, according to policy and tradition, 
belonged to Britain’s Indian allies who resided in the province and were of good moral character. 
The department could significantly reduce expenses if it could deny benefits to those who did not 
‘deserve’ them. The term “undeserving,” would come to encompass a host of ‘immoral’ 
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behaviors.
163
 At this time it remained a label affixed to individuals who fought on the American 
side in the War of 1812, who were recent ‘American’ arrivals, or who could not prove they had 
sufficient ‘Indian’ ancestry.164 Odawah and Potawatomi Chiefs petitioned the Prince of Wales in 
1857, stating; “Great Chief! Altho’ we have no written words to remember by we still retain in 
our minds the promises made to us, and we felt when driven from our planting grounds and the 
graves of our dead that still we were coming Home when we crossed that River [the St. Clair] 
which marks the limits of their sway.”165 British officials seized the opportunity to curtail the 
distribution of presents to “visiting” Indians after 1843, but found it difficult to distinguish 
‘American’ Indians from ‘British,’ or ‘Canadian’ Indians. While officials acknowledged that past 
promises had to be honoured, Colonial Secretary Lord Stanley recommended in 1842 that 
officials stop encouraging Aboriginal people in the borderlands to live permanently in Upper 
Canada. In his opinion, “they add little or nothing to the strength of the Province, and are, of all 
settlers, the least desirable.”166  
 The elimination of presents the same year the 1857 Gradual Civilization Act passed 
meant that the use of collective annuities to pay communal expenses increased significantly. 
Individuals whose ancestors did not sign the Huron Tract Treaty did not receive annuities or 
goods paid in lieu of them, but the complexity of reserve economies raised serious and divisive 
questions. Did officials consider Huron Tract annuities to be communal funds and if so, were the 
items purchased with them only to be used by treaty signers and their descendants? Or were 
annuities, once paid into the hands of individuals, private funds? In either situation, did the 
‘band’ or agent retain a say in their use? Unless individuals purchased goods through the 
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department, how could anyone prove that they were paid with annuities, wages or received in 
barter? Though agents discouraged the Anishinabe from engaging in private transactions and 
working for wages in town without permission, officials simply lacked the means to prevent 
them from doing so. Moreover, Anishinabe farmers able to purchase their own farm implements 
often did so because the communal use and repair of the few items purchased by the department 
caused conflict.
167
 Eliminating presents not only increased reliance on annuities but empowered 
agents to insert themselves into band affairs under the guise of protecting communal funds and 
the movable property purchased with them.
168
 Individuals who could not earn their own money 
had far fewer options. 
 Superintendent Pennefather denied that indebtedness and poverty were the direct result of 
the elimination of presents. Instead, he suggested that “the reckless and improvident” used the 
non-forfeiture provisions “as a method of defrauding their creditors.”  The Six Nations 
accumulated so much debt to merchants that the department conducted an inquiry into the matter 
in the 1850s to adjudicate claims against them.
169
 Most claims were for agricultural goods, 
livestock and labour and had been in arrears for nearly ten years. In addition to the language 
barrier, it was clear that many individuals had unresolved disputes with merchants over prices 
and quality of goods received. In these instances, non-payment remained the only recourse 
available to them.
170
 Assumptions arising from this incident again convinced Eurocanadians that 
Aboriginal people were irresponsible with money, that they were incapable of dealing with 
merchants and that they did not have earned income on an individual basis. 
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 Pennefather’s denials concealed a growing problem of reserve poverty among those 
unable to work and unwilling to break the rules. Growing class differences on the reserves 
appeared between reserve employees, annuity recipients, wage labourers, crafters, hunters and 
fishers, as well as the old, sick and young. As early as 1842, Keating noticed the ‘better off’ on 
Walpole Island and the other reserves assisted the poor and hungry.
171
 Sometimes this was 
community assistance in the form of food or clothing and in other cases, the chiefs and councils 
voted to requisition small amounts from their annuity to alleviate distress. However, if the 
recipient was judged insufficiently ‘deserving’ the department could veto these decisions. In one 
instance Keating overruled the Walpole Chiefs and Council who wished to donate £25 to a poor 
widow.
172
 Additionally, in the late 1850s, language in Indian department correspondence 
increasingly referred to entitlements and land payments as charity and relief,
173
 making a 
mockery of Prevost’s promises to support veterans, widows and orphans. 
 To alleviate poverty among the young and old, after 1856 the department issued blankets 
and permitted the distribution of annuity monies to “aged, infirm and orphaned Indians.” While 
data for Walpole Island is incomplete, an average of 35 “aged Indians” in the community 
received a blanket in 1856 and 1858.
174
 In a humiliating and condescending letter, the policy was 
described as a “special favour” given only upon recommendation to “the oldest and best 
conducted.” A temporary expense that would decline in subsequent years, once a master list was 
compiled no more names could be added.
175
 But assistance was needed by more than the old and 
infirm. The number of individuals left destitute by fire also increased substantially in this period. 
Belongings accumulated in log cabins or huts heated by open pit fires and wood stoves were at 
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the most risk when left unattended for extended periods of time while residents procured fish and 
game.
176
 Even though four insurance companies operated in Port Sarnia, and two agents had 
extensive dealings with the Indian Department and Sarnia reserve as merchants and dry-goods 
wholesalers, I did not find any evidence that houses on the Sarnia Village were insured against 
fire.
177
 Once again, community annuities bore the brunt of Indian department policy-failures. The 
cases of those who became sick or infirm or who lost their belongings to fire were brought 
before their Chiefs, Council and Indian Agent, where they were judged to be ‘deserving’ of 
community charity. In 1858, the Sarnia reserve council paid a total of $340 and in 1859, $295, 
out of their annuity to support infirm males, and widows, the aged and orphans. The former 
received between $10 to $50 and the latter, $5 each per year.
178
 After 1869, legislation 
empowered the Superintendent General to distribute “aid from the funds of each tribe” for the 
support of “sick, disabled, aged or destitute” residents.179 The department judiciously maintained 
detailed lists of the entitled in each category to ensure that individuals, who were able to shift for 
themselves, did not receive them. Like other department charges, small amounts allowed for 
charitable purposes, did not make any measurable difference in the living conditions of 
recipients. Blankets and allowances provided little comfort while draining band accounts a 
dribble at a time. 
 While some suggest contact irreparably altered Anishinabek customs and practices,
180
 in 
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most cases, the chiefs supported some discriminatory measures in an attempt to alleviate growing 
fiscal and social problems in their communities.  By the 1860s, several generations of Aboriginal 
people from the United States and other First Nations intermarried. While Chief Joshua 
Wawanosh disagreed, Chief John Summer recognized that policies confining them to reserves 
made out-marriage inevitable. He is quoted as saying, that “when we look at the towns &c. there 
are all sorts of people—English—French—&c. It is not strange there should be some mixture 
amongst us.  We have strangers amongst us—men who married our sisters.  It would not be 
proper to marry our own sisters.” Summer and some other leaders supported provisions in the 
1869 and 1876 Acts that forced women to become members of their husband’s communities. 
New marital connections not only had the potential to improve their financial circumstances
181
 
but also to enlarge family and kin networks. Summer’s reference to marrying “sisters” suggests 
that small reserve communities had difficulty adhering to some Anishinabek kinship customs 
like cross-cousin marriage, to the extent that exogamy became spiritually and biologically 
imperative. Some elders believed that many social and economic problems in their communities 
resulted from “violation[s] of the incest-taboo against intra-nindoodem marriage.”182 Though 
many of these policies disproportionately affected women, they represent attempts to reconnect 
the communities and reestablish Anishinabek kinship alliances. But as the next chapter will 
discuss, individuals and communities who were not consulted on legislation, had to creatively 
adapt policy to address circumstances that prevented them from living in smaller and more 
mobile clan and kinship groupings.  
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 Until well into the 1860s, the original treaty and incomplete paylists were the only 
documents available to agents and interpreters.  This forced H.P. Chase to rely on the chiefs to 
identify descendants eligible to receive the annuity. By 1850 there were more than 225 on 
Walpole Island alone.
183
  This control sometimes benefitted individuals who, under laws passed 
after 1857, might otherwise have been ineligible to receive them. But by its very subjectivity, 
identity and belonging could be used by chiefs, councilors, department employees and 
individuals, as tools to resolve disputes on reserves and punish dissenters. The ability to add or 
strike individuals off lists gained greater consequences as the department acquired more 
permanent and accurate methods of taking censuses and keeping other forms of records from 
year to year.
184
 Similarly, vague moral judgements found in legislation like “sober and 
industrious,” “conducted himself to their satisfaction” and attained a sufficient “degree of 
civilization” not only masqueraded as legal terms, but found their way into agent reports as 
markers of deservedness for various entitlements. 
185
 Shifting the control of membership away 
from the chiefs and councilors meant that the ‘undeserving’ could not only lose their annuities. 
In some cases, they and their descendants could be ejected from the reserve and permanently 
impoverished as a consequence. 
 Because officials remained unwilling to recognize Anishinabe people as sovereign and 
independent of either the United States or Canada, they treated them as an uncontrollable 
element in the borderlands when convenient. In attempts to discredit and reduce claims to British 
‘generosity,’ officials often questioned the loyalty of individuals who resisted policy. Some were 
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referred to as ‘American Indians’ or ‘American emigrants’ and others, like 
Bauzhigeeshigwashekum were accused of fighting on the American side in 1812 and branded 
American sympathizers.
186
 Though these monikers were synonymous with treachery and treason, 
the estimated 3000 Miami, Shawnee, Delaware, and others invited by Alexander McKee as well 
as several thousand more Chippewa and Potawatomi who came in the 1830s and 1840s 
possessed only vague memories of their youth in what was now a foreign country.
187
 Other 
Chippewa who signed treaties in Minnesota, Wisconsin and Michigan, arrived as late as 1855, 
and many more passed the border unrecorded and settled in communities with the permission of 
various chiefs.
188
 Because they fought to retain their language, culture and spiritual beliefs, the 
Western Anishinabe and the St. Clair Chiefs in particular found themselves frequently 
characterized as ‘American’ in origin and ‘defiant’ in attitude.189 The Potawatomi came to 
embody the worst of all ‘Indian’ stereotypes. They were characterized as American, “wild, 
turbulent, mendicant, and dishonest,” averse to civilization and a nuisance to their neighbours. 
Roaming the back townships, officials and farmers alike accused them of spending their days 
drinking, hunting and wasting what little game they could find. Most arrived destitute because 
federal officials forced them to leave their personal property behind.  They remained poor 
because they lost their treaty annuities and land entitlements for leaving the United States and 
were not eligible for similar consideration under the terms of the Huron Tract Treaty.
190
 While 
the government initially invited all of the Western Nations to settle in Upper Canada, after the 
presents were discontinued in 1857, it would not provide any additional funds for their support. 
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 There was little if any documentation from the colonial era that could ‘prove’ the origins 
of people whose ancestry hitherto did not matter and whose world had been “turned upside 
down.”191 Many chiefs welcomed them and until the 1860s, used marriage and adoption to 
control community membership. Several widows or women widowed shortly after arriving in 
Canada married ‘treaty Indians.’ By doing so, the entire family received the annuity, including 
any children from their former husbands if their new spouse adopted them.
192
 But with the 
elimination of presents, the time one arrived in Upper Canada and ancestral ties to the original 
440 Huron Tract treaty signers carried new and enormous financial implications. While the 
Chiefs on Walpole Island appear to have ignored these distinctions,
193
 on the other reserves the 
original 440 had become nearly 1200. By the late 1860s and there was not enough money and 
not enough land for all of them. On the northern reserves, non-treaty descendants acquired 
incomes and considerable power as chiefs and councilors, and “the strangers became the 
Majority.”194 
 In an effort to clarify the various rights and entitlements of individuals on the reserves, 
Joseph Wawanosh and some descendants of the original treaty signers initiated an investigation 
into “foreign Indians” in the 1870s. The dozens of individual interviews of Anishinabe people 
are a precious historical resource documenting the early history and placement of various 
peoples in the Great Lakes, but they also tell a story of wartime displacement and separation, as 
the international boundary severed their territories and reserves divided their families. Defining 
origin and allegiance in a world of shifting boundaries was as difficult as determining identity 
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and the intense scrutiny into family histories had tragic consequences. Antoine Rodd, then 80 
years old, signed the Huron Tract Treaty and had always received annuities along with his wife 
and children. According to a list of “Halfbreeeds” made on the Sarnia Reserve in 1860, Rodd 
was born of “halfbreed parents in wedlock” and he personally stated his mother “was a pure 
Indian.” But after the investigation, the Indian Agent wrote to headquarters to state that Rodd’s 
father was the “illegitimate son of an Indian woman…and a French Canadian.” On this basis and 
because he was also married to a white woman, his children had “very little” Indian blood, and 
none of them could be considered ‘Indians’ according to the Indian Act.195 Indian agent 
Ebenezer Watson remained unsure when individuals became “Canadian,” when they became 
“British” and when they remained ‘American.’ However, after 1869, with some confidence he 
felt he could determine when they were not ‘Indians’ and to remove their benefits as a result. 
Andrew Nageeshig, an elderly 1812 veteran wrote “our Fathers lived some on one side of the 
River and some on the other…”196 At one time it had not mattered. 
 The creation of multiple hierarchies of status, further divided people of Aboriginal 
ancestry from each other, interfering with their ability to control their own membership. The 
thrust of the subsequent 1869 Act for the Gradual Enfranchisement of Indians and the better 
management of Indian Affairs is contained in the title—Aboriginal people had to be managed 
until they could be enfranchised. Assimilation paired with nation-building meant that 
enfranchisement would be made compulsory.  It was said in 1829 that Indian “improvement has 
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been so great and rapid within these few years, that the hand of God seems to be visible in it.”197 
But by forcibly attempting to assimilate Aboriginal people into British society and culture at a 
faster rate, legislation passed in 1869 effectively curtailed attempts to co-exist that were being 
made or might have been made. Speaking English, reading and writing or possessing other skills 
and education effectively put Aboriginal people at the risk of enfranchisement. Moreover, 
involuntary enfranchisement provisions targeted those best able to ‘see with two eyes,’ removing 
them from the communities and discouraging others who might follow. Anishinabe people 
responded with a renewed Indigenous political awareness, through which they would create their 
own parallel path, whether the Canadian state recognized it or not. “Traditional patriarchs” in 
Ontario, though they faced renewed challenges, covertly corresponded in Ojibway, visited 
England, confronted the Prince of Wales and met annually in Grand Indian Councils to formulate 
their own policies and hold governments to account for their actions.
198
  
 Métissage and intercultural interactions that once fostered co-existence and cooperation 
between the Anishinabe and other First Nations and Eurocanadian settlers by 1869 threatened 
their very existence. Confederation and the passage of legislation in 1869 represented an attack 
on Indigenous governance itself.  Rev. Allen Salt, formerly of the Sarnia Indian Village, “wanted 
four natives in the House of Commons, in Ottawa, to represent the different tribes.” 199 In June 
1870, delegates at the General Council agreed that it was “the position of the Indians of Western 
Canada…to have their interests more consulted by the Government, to allow them more weight 
in their own affairs. The Council voted to study the 1869 legislation in detail, “consider it 
carefully” and “reject what, is bad and keep what is good.” The Council ultimately rejected 
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almost all sections of the Gradual Enfranchisement Act because they transferred control of land, 
membership and money from the authority of communities and their leaders to the federal 
government.  
 While the confederation debates and British North America Act excluded Indigenous 
peoples almost entirely, it would later become apparent that they could not expect acceptance in 
Ontario either.
200
 The premise that Aboriginal people would assimilate and the two cultures 
would merge “into a harmonious and egalitarian society” was “naïve.”201 While Herman 
Merivale desired an “amalgamation” or the “acculturation” of the ‘races,’ by 1867 neither could 
be reconciled with what McNab calls the “dark side of responsible government.” The estimated 
12,000 Aboriginal people in Ontario and 120,000 ‘Indians’ in the new county202 became 
representations of the past rather than partners of the future, symbolizing “the primitive condition 
of the colonies before the colonizers had laid on the hand of progress.”203 Transferred to Canada, 
“Indians and lands reserved for Indians” would be managed between 1869 and 1875 by the 
Enfranchisement Act. In 1876 the Consolidated Indian Act nationalized and legalized the 
inherent incompatibility of Indianness and civil rights in Canada.
204
 
Conclusion 
 Recommendations of the Bagot Report forced colonial officials to make extremely 
difficult decisions based on incomplete and inconclusive data. Their demands for regulation and 
information could not be reconciled with circumstances as they existed in Upper Canada. Instead 
of relying upon the expertise of the people they sought to manage, officials too often made 
                                                          
200
 Smith, “Macdonald’s Relationship with Aboriginal Peoples,” 68-70.  
201
 George W. Stocking, Victorian Anthropology (Don Mills: MacMillan, 1987), 85. 
202
 McNab, “Herman Merivale and the British Empire,” 203 & 215 and No Place for Fairness, 21; Miller, “Canada 
and the Aboriginal Peoples,” 171 & 173. 
203
 Radforth, “Performance, Politics and Representation,” 4.  
204
 Berkhofer, White Man’s Indian, 29. 
 318 
assumptions and generalizations based upon the recommendations of local self-proclaimed 
experts, many of whom had little experience or evidence farther than the tip of their nose. In the 
1850s Indigenous communities sat on a precipice: reports consistently demonstrated that 
Anishinabe people had the desire, health, and aptitude to be partners. Acknowledging that it was 
“impolitic to keep a large body of people in a state of tutelage for ever,”205 government officials 
could either commit public funds and energy to work with First Nations leaders to create 
something akin to sovereign Anishinabe municipalities, or they could give up and withdraw 
support altogether. They chose the latter. Beginning in the mid-1840s, minimal policies 
maintained a façade of assistance as communities in most cases they were “left to fend for 
themselves.”206 By Confederation ‘Indians’ would be a group apart, defined by blood, and 
confined to reserves. 
 But it did it not have to be this way and many First Nations refused to accept this 
proposition.  Peter Jones and others continued to ‘see with two eyes;’ to advocate for property 
rights, for the vote and economic development—while retaining their culture and worldviews. 
The next chapter shows how Quakgwan utilized the legislative ambiguity between 1839 and 
1850 to his advantage by raising funds to purchase land in Bosanquet Township. The underlying 
themes of this study are taken from the major events in Quakgwan’s life. He devoted his life to 
finding ways to co-exist with Eurocanadians while maintaining his independence and self-
sufficiency. He ultimately became the trustee of his own village and formed beneficial 
relationships with non-Aboriginal residents in the adjacent community who supported him in his 
endeavour: for a time Quakgwan had the best of both worlds. But Quakgwan’s experiences 
demonstrate that irrespective of the presence of legislation, self-interested members of the Indian 
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Department could manipulate policy and local circumstances to characterize the Anishinabe 
leader as a troublemaker and turn his people against him. This occurred years after the 1839 
Crown Lands Act and mere months before the passage of the 1850 Act for the Protection of 
Indian Lands, legislation that would not protect Quakgwan’s land because he would not allow 
the state to define him.
 320 
Chapter 6: A ‘Lot’ in Common: Quakgwan’s Settlement in Bosanquet Township 
 In 1849, Quakgwan, a St. Clair Chief, 1812 veteran and Huron Tract Treaty signer, 
petitioned the Governor General for the deed to one hundred acres of land he had purchased with 
several others in 1840. On this lot, southeast of the Sable Reserve, Quakgwan lived in a large log 
home and the ‘band’ made extensive improvements, cleared the land and planted crops.  Over 
the course of nearly ten years, the residents cultivated friendships and sought assistance from 
their neighbours to sustain their village. Leading them steadily towards self-sufficiency and 
independence, this community represents the kind of co-existence envisioned by First Nations 
leaders in 1825. A shining light in what has otherwise been an overwhelming discourse of 
Anishinabe struggle and imperial policy failures, this settlement might have just been the 
solution everyone was looking for…had officials allowed it to continue. 
 In the wake of the 1844-5 Bagot Report, officials pressured “wandering bands” to 
relocate themselves on established reserves where they could be “civilized”  in a more intensive 
and cost-effective manner.
 
 Officials targeted Quakgwan as part of this aggressive removal 
strategy in 1847 demanding that he resettle the community either at Sarnia or on Walpole Island. 
The chief reluctantly agreed to surrender the land to the Crown but only under two conditions: he 
wanted the land and improvements sold at fair market value and the proceeds equally divided 
between the residents who had expended the effort. Curiously, not long after, the community 
fragmented and the families who settled with him primarily moved to Sarnia. Determined to stay 
on the land, Quakgwan petitioned the Governor General to have the deed sent to him. Thus, in 
1849 in Upper Canada, a “Chippewa Chief”, member of the Sarnia reserve and recipient of treaty 
annuities, stood poised to take possession of a lot of land in fee-simple. He would be legally 
recognized as both an “Indian” and a “freeholder,” entitled to participate fully in the social, 
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economic and civic fabric of both Indigenous and Upper Canadian communities. Authorities, no 
doubt aware of the precedent this would set, denied Quakgwan his deed allowing the Indian 
Department to intervene and sell his land to the son of a prominent UEL, Allen Kennedy who 
eventually became a reeve and magistrate.
1
 In the spring of 1851 as he prepared to embark the 
sixty mile journey to Walpole Island, Quakgwan suddenly died and the Chippewa Indians of Port 
Sarnia received the proceeds of the sale of the lot.2 
 Self-sufficiency and prosperity should have followed passage of the 1839 Crown Lands 
Act. But as already discussed, without enforcement, Anishinabe lands and resources could be 
taken at any time, and they often were. Anishinabe and Eurocanadian communities grew distant 
and fearful of each other as they competed for dwindling resources.  Legislation passed in 1850 
combined earlier land and debt restrictions into what we now know as legal wardship. 
 Increasingly restrictive acts sought to define ‘Indigeneity’ by blood, confine them to 
reserves and curtail their participation in Upper Canadian society unless they enfranchised and 
renounced this status. Though this latter period is well-known, this chapter discusses 
Quakgwan’s community in the context of evolving definitions of Indigeneity, status, and 
landholding in Upper Canada. Aboriginal landholding strategies in Upper Canada prior to 1850 
are complex and fluid, defying characterization according to Western notions of legal tenure. As 
a result of policy, local circumstances and personalities, ideas that Anishinabe peoples were a 
collective in need of protection evolved in Upper Canada as options available to Indigenous 
peoples declined. In the latter half of the 1840s, under these auspices, officials justified the 
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confiscation and sale of Quakgwan’s land. 
 Quakgwan embodied “two-eyed seeing,” and his settlement is indicative of what might 
have been had Anishinabe peoples controlled their own destinies. He and the other St. Clair 
Chiefs historically portrayed as superstitious traditionalists who stubbornly clung to their old 
ways, simply refused to sacrifice their own cultural beliefs as a prerequisite for economic 
coexistence with Eurocanadians. Quakgwan spent his youth immersed in some of the worst 
fighting in the Northwest, and as a young man, he and the St. Clair Chiefs fought alongside 
Tecumseh in the War of 1812.
 3
 These experiences would not soon be forgotten and Anishinabe 
leaders exercised greater caution and exhibited considerably less optimism in peacetime, as a 
result.  
Figure 14: Quakgwan’s Dodems (Totems): 
 
 
 
Sources: Top: LAC, MG 19 F1, Claus Papers, Vol. 11, 1819 Provisional Agreement, 190; 
Middle: RG 10/1843, IT 087, 1825 Provisional Agreement; Bottom: RG 10/1843, IT 091, 1827 
Huron Tract Treaty. 
 
 Quakgwan attended three of the four ‘official’ Huron Tract Treaty gatherings. Soon after 
the War of 1812, he was shot in the face and permanently disfigured during a disagreement with 
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“an old Indian.” As a result, he may have been too injured to attend the council and hear 
Chawme’s speech at Amherstburg in 1818.4  Quakgwan did sign the three subsequent 
agreements with what appear to be two forms of beaver dodems (see figure 14 above).
5
 
 Amherstburg post records reveal that Quakgwan received presents along with a number 
of other men, women and children between 1820 and 1825.
6
 Listed as a “Deserving” Chief and 
Warrior, he sustained serious injuries fighting in the War of 1812 and received presents “of a 
finer texture” and quantity as his pension. Observing the distribution of the presents conducted 
by Chase and Clench in 1848, author John Richardson no doubt watched as Quakgwan received 
a “beautif[ul] white blanket tied up at the corners…containing cloth for leggings and breech-
clouts, Cavendish tobacco, thread, needles, knives, combs, linen for shirts, &c.,” as well as 
“three day’s ration of pork and flour,” and a shawl.7 The life histories of this “last generation” of 
Anishinabe leaders in southwestern Ontario, according to historian Donald B. Smith, are 
absolutely vital in order to contextualize Anishinabe responses to colonialism. Quakgwan and 
this generation of Chiefs on the St. Clair, not only had “direct memories of…life before the War 
of 1812,” but of a time after its conclusion when they “were promised great things.”8  
 Like many Indigenous veterans, Quakgwan came to Upper Canada, permanently camping 
on Squirrel Island, one of six that make up Walpole Island First Nation (Figure 15 below). 
Intrigued by the prospect of learning to farm at the Sarnia Village, he leased part of this land in 
November 1831 to Duncan and Dougal McDonald of Sombra for a term of twenty-one years.
9
 
Like other leases he agreed to on the St. Clair, the McDonald lease should have protected the 
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land from squatters and earned Quakgwan rental income while he was away. When the lease 
expired in 1852, should he wish to return to Walpole Island, he would come home to a house and 
improved farm. 
Figure 15: Plan of Walpole Island Indian Reserve, c.1915. 
 
 
 
Source: LAC, RG 10 M78903/78, Cartographic Material, File 442626 pt. 1, Box 2000002033, 
Microfiche NMC27435.  
 
 Anishinabe chiefs chose the locations of the reserves but had no say afterwards in the 
development of civilization policy.
10
 As Quakgwan and other leaders of small family groups 
gathered together on reserves, disagreement, dissention and conflict divided them, making it 
more difficult to resist more coercive aspects of the civilization program as a unified force.  
Historically, Anishinabek political structure was ‘flat’ or exercised on the basis of consensus 
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rather than in a hierarchical order.
11
 One person did not hold administrative power for the entire 
community or the authority to speak on their behalf but some like Joshua Wawanosh rose to this 
role at the Sarnia Village simply because the government demanded it of them, particularly after 
the implementation of elected councils. British officials tended to support those they deemed 
most compliant and foisted artificial designations onto Anishinabe political and family 
structures.
12
 The department considered Quakgwan a “Chippewa Chief” and those who 
accompanied him as “his band.”  He represented the group, perhaps because he was adept at 
dealing with Eurocanadians, but unlike Wawanosh, he seems to have reluctantly accepted this 
role and exercised it in a limited capacity.  
 Tested by a number of complex issues that came to a head in the early 1840s, Anishinabe 
councils found it difficult to achieve consensus.
13
 Mounting debts and delayed and poor quality 
goods caused hardships, made worse by the fact that between 1837 and 1839, Munsey Town, 
Walpole Island and the Upper and Lower St. Clair Reserves did not receive presents. Though the 
department blamed supply issues caused by the Rebellions of 1837-8, previous chapters argue 
this is only one of many problems communities faced with respect to presents.
14
 The 
communities welcomed Chippewa and Potawatomi fleeing removal in the United States, but the 
new arrivals strained already meagre resources. By virtue of population alone, Sarnia out-voted 
the other communities on a regular basis.
15
 Further disruption came at the hands of a succession 
of Methodist and Church of England Missionaries who barely had time to establish a routine of 
school and religious instruction before their transfer to other locations. Until the Methodists built 
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a separate church in town in 1837, Eurocanadian residents of Port Sarnia worshiped at the 
Anishinabe Methodist Church and Schoolhouse on the reserve and buried their dead together in 
the cemetery. But by 1840, the services were largely divided by race and held in separate 
locations.
16
 In 1861, all but 19 residents of the Sarnia Village were identified as Wesleyan 
Methodists. With this majority, Sarnia became known as the Christian Village while the 
“pagans” remained at Walpole Island and at Kettle and Stony Point. On Walpole Island, though 
the majority were ‘pagans;’ under the influence of Andrew Jamieson, they had a large number of 
Church of England converts, a slightly smaller number of Wesleyan Methodists and even fewer 
Roman Catholics.
17
 Quakgwan’s Methodist leanings may have provided the impetus for his 
move from Walpole Island to Sarnia. 
 In terms of the degree and manner in which they dealt with non-Aboriginals, the chiefs 
differed philosophically and politically. Joshua Wawanosh believed that surrendering some 
reserve land and resources to people of influence like Malcom Cameron were gestures of 
goodwill that cemented partnerships and secured funds for the Sarnia community.
18
 Other St. 
Clair Chiefs, fearful that too much conciliation was at their expense, disagreed. The fact that 
Sarnia could numerically overpower them in council votes made Wawanosh’s leadership appear 
“overbearing and dictatorial.”19 Quakgwan seems to have been one of the Head Chief’s harshest 
critics. In November 1839, William Jones wrote that four families, who could “no longer endure 
the arrogance of Waywanosh,” left Sarnia and “several others…intend going away for the same 
reason.”20 By the 1840s, “traditional patriarchs” like Peterwegeshik, Joshua Wawanosh and 
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Wahpagas, though they disagreed in their approaches, sought creative ways to evade and deflect 
the intrusion of departmental administration into their affairs.
21
 
 Quakgwan’s experience suggests that by 1840, it was already difficult for Anishinabe in 
the district to leave a reserve and strike out independently of the department. In the midst of the 
debt and land crisis precipitated by the questionable dealings of Jarvis, Keating and Jones, the 
Western Superintendency spiraled into dysfunction, fed by rumours of inappropriate behavior 
involving agents, chiefs, missionaries and interpreters at Walpole Island and Sarnia. Wawanosh 
was removed in 1844 and the department overhauled, but until then, both Wawanosh and Jones 
wielded considerable power to thwart Quakgwan’s success and make a return to Sarnia 
impossible.
 22
  
 In 1839, Quakgwan walked away from a house and ten acres of cleared land in the Sarnia 
village.
23
 His dodem [totems] and those of his brother and several others, who settled with him, 
suggest the majority were members of the beaver clan. Consequently, he and those who went 
with him must have felt it absolutely necessary to leave and re-establish themselves in smaller 
kin or clan groupings of the pre-treaty period.
24
  Before he left, Quakgwan asked Jones to vouch 
for him in a “certificate,” stating that they were not “defiant” and leaving on good terms. If 
Quakgwan felt he had to have written proof of character to show his neighbours, did they in turn 
feel obliged to seek the Indian Agent’s permission before dealing with him? If this is true, it 
suggests that Jones could discourage merchants or ‘blacklist’ individual Anishinabe he deemed 
‘troublesome.’ Either scenario opens a disturbing window into the nature of the power that Jones 
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and agents in general wielded in their communities. Regardless of the circumstances under which 
he left, Jones did not give Quakgwan the letter.
25
  
 Quakgwan did not go to the reserve at Stony Point which had a population of about fifty 
people in 1839 under Chief Wahpagas.  The residents of Stony Point found it difficult to farm the 
sandy soils and repeatedly sought to exchange it for better land containing maple groves. At the 
1818 council, Chawme insisted that they retain the right to “augment” the reserves.26  Twenty 
years later the chiefs reminded Jones of this promise. They retained the right to control their 
reserves, to control the funds arising from their land sales and to purchase more land “from the 
Government or from the individuals who may have located on such places.” In 1836 the chiefs 
approached Jones unanimous in their desire to trade or sell the Sable and Lower (Moore) 
Reserves for several “small tracts of land.” One month after Quakgwan left, Sarnia’s frustrated 
Chiefs again demanded to know when they could purchase land.
27
  
 Locating himself southeast of the Stony Point Reserve, Quakgwan returned to an area 
where large chert and flint deposits at Kettle Point had attracted Early Archaic hunters. The 
Crawford Site, located just east of Quakgwan’s lot was a “densely populated” village, occupied 
long before the Attawendaron/Neutral and their displacement by Iroquoian peoples in the 16
th
 
and 17
th
 centuries.
28
 During the occupation of the region by the Neutral, the emergent Western 
Chippewa hunted and fished in the St. Clair River and Michigan region and returned after 1701.
 
As one resident of the Sable notes, “we were one of several Nations, organized under traditional 
Chiefs.  We did not live in one location, but migrated seasonally throughout our territory which 
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included southwestern Ontario. We used the available resources of the local river valleys, the 
Lake Huron shoreline and numerous inland hunting and maple sugaring areas.”29  
 At Rock Glen near Arkona, the Sable River descends into a series of waterfalls, pools and 
springs known for plentiful fish, and extremely rare plants, rock and fossil formations. Early 
pioneers noted it as a sacred and important place for local Indigenous peoples, and it soon 
became a part of Eurocanadian folklore.
30
 Bosanquet itself contains a variety of ecological zones 
which by the nineteenth century included Carolinian forest in the southwest, cedar and tamarack 
swamps in the northeast and sandy dunes in the northwest.
 
 A high ridge of land between the 
southeast shore of Lake Huron and west bank of the Ausable (Sable) River continued to be used 
by peoples well into the historic period. Quakgwan chose this location southeast of the Stony 
Point Reserve. The Anishinabe noted the agricultural fitness of this particular area in 1830 when 
they initially refused to remove to the Sable. According to Ironside, the location chosen by 
Givens “was represented to me by the Indians to be a place quite unfit for settlement….excepting 
a small piece about a mile back from the lake and River Aux Sables and covered thickly with 
Pine, Cedar, Birch, [and] a few Oak and Maple Trees.”31 Until the 1870s, the ridge was adjacent 
to three small lakes and remained the only portion on an unstable floodplain suitable for 
farming.
32
  
 The area also figures prominently in the pursuit to preserve a large portion of the 
remaining Indian Territory in Ontario as a refuge for Indigenous peoples.  Evidence suggests that 
Captain John Norton visited England in 1816 with the intention of establishing a “settlement” on 
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the Sable or “Sand” River as compensation for the Western Nations “who had suffered losses in 
the war.”  His letter, recorded by Christian Denke on Christmas Day at the Moravian Settlement 
on the Thames, stated that a “grant in perpetuity” for a large “Indian Territory” was “graciously 
approved.”33 
 Anishinabe people discussed the idea of creating a refuge again, after the disastrous 1836 
Bond Head Treaties. If they could not get deeds on an individual or collective basis for their 
reserves, maybe they could compromise and voluntarily move to lands of their choosing. Joshua 
Wawanosh as well as many Anishinabe in southwestern Ontario had family and clan ties to the 
Saugeen and he and Alexander Madwayosh corresponded frequently in Ojibwe about economic 
and political matters.
34
 Arguing the 1836 Saugeen Treaty was invalid without their consent, 
Chiefs from Walpole Island and Wawanosh, who was directly related to Saugeen Chief 
Tagannini, believed the western Anishinabe retained interest in the land from the Sand River 
(Sable River), west to Goderich and Owen Sound.
35
  Undated council documents from the 1840s 
suggest a number of Anishinabe Chiefs, including David Sawyer, Peter Jones, Madwayosh and 
Wawanosh discussed “emigrating” to the Saugeen for the purpose of creating their own reserve; 
“a future refuge for a general colonization of the ojibway Nation comprising the settled Tribes in 
Canada West.” Though Wawanosh did not move, as the Town of Sarnia continued to encroach 
on the reserve, the chief seriously considered it.
36
  Knowing they were all facing increased 
pressure to remove themselves from southwestern Ontario, these lands would be “opened to all 
the Tribes” so that “they might have nothing to fear [from removal].” These sentiments were 
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placed in a petition presented by Wawanosh and George Copway to the Lieutenant-Governor to 
secure them these lands, “still known as the Indian Territory.”  The request, signed by more than 
a dozen chiefs asked to “have the only remaining lands we have to ourselves unmolested.”37  
Quakgwan’s fear that they were losing too much land and his anger at Wawanosh for 
acquiescing to demands for more land were not unfounded. In 1854, most of the remaining 
territory in the Saugeen was surrendered in Treaty 72, and the opportunity for an Indian Territory 
in southwestern Ontario was lost forever.
38
  
 The Colonial Office undersecretary Robert Wilmot-Horton also looked to the region to 
raise funds to pay for Upper Canadian war losses.  In 1826 he authorized John Galt and other 
London merchants to form the Canada Company, to purchase and colonize the one million acres 
of land surrendered in the Huron Tract Treaty.
39
 Bosanquet, the township named after the 
company’s Governor Charles, remained the least desirable and the last to be settled.40 Though a 
large reserve would not materialize, the area was a veritable wilderness into the 1850s rendering 
it ideal for all Aboriginal subsistence strategies. Until the mid-1840s, limited credit offered by 
the Canada Company ensured that only very few settlers of means could purchase land there and 
the adjacent townships.
41
  But difficulties purchasing land did not impede settlement, and 
Quakgwan was not the only person drawn to the area. During his 1826 survey, Burwell 
encountered several well-established settlers including Asa Townsend, who came to exploit the 
region’s salt deposits further south in Arkona. Townsend received a grant of 300 acres as 
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payment for assisting the surveyor and established a farm. Benjamin Brewster also settled on a 
military grant and built the first mill on the Sable River.
42
  
 The “most remote settlers of the district,” became even more so in the early 1840s, when 
the Sarnia-Plympton road tumbled into Lake Huron during a storm, severing Bosanquet from the 
western townships. The Western District Council voted a paltry £50 to pay for repairs the 
surveyor estimated would cost at least £500. The location of the new road became mired in 
conflict between farmers on inland lots and “a few influential individuals” on the waterfront who 
did not want their properties bisected by the route. Storms continued to wreak havoc on the  
Table 9: Township Populations and Densities 
 
 
Source: F2007, Western District Municipal Records, General Returns of Population, 1842-1845. 
General Return of the Population of the Western District for the Year 1842,  MS 168, File 10, 
0135; Historical Atlas of the County of  Lambton,Ontario,1880 (Edward Phelps, Sarnia, 1973) 
64. 
 
sandy shoreline and new construction as well as the maintenance of bridges over the several 
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creeks proved too expensive and controversial for ratepayers.
43
 As a consequence, the dispersed 
population remained so small; it had to be merged with Warwick for administrative purposes  
until 1847 when residents formed a municipal council.
44
 Until the 1850s, Bosanquet was remote 
and essentially unorganized territory, largely ignored but administered by officials in the 
adjacent townships of Warwick and Plympton via the Western District council at Amherstburg.  
Table 9 above illustrates the marked differences in population between the earliest settled 
waterfront townships and the interior, as evident in the 1842 Census. Extreme differences 
between Sarnia and Moore and Bosanquet for example, would have been reflected in their 
environments, economies and lifestyles of the people who lived in them.
45
   
 The land Quakgwan purchased was owned by an old and well-established Loyalist family 
named the Wards.
46
  Petitioning in 1830, on behalf of themselves and their now widowed 
mother, Rachel, Sampson and Henry explained that during the American Revolution, their father 
John served on the British side as a private in McGregor’s Company. His mother’s “house was 
Plundered,” in his father’s absence forcing her to flee “on account of the Enemy’s and the 
Indians.”  The family settled on waterfront lots #55, 56 and 57 in Moore Township on the basis 
of an Indian deed negotiated between John and the St. Clair Chiefs in 1811. In 1812, John and 
Sampson fought together in the Kent Militia and were present at the 1814 battle of Longwoods.
47
 
On two occasions while he was surveying the township in 1829, Roswell Mount stayed at the 
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home of Sampson Ward
48
 where he perhaps explained how insecure the family’s tenure was. Not 
long after, along with other settlers of Moore, Sampson’s petition arrived before Sir John 
Colborne, explaining that his father was dead and his mother ill. They had lost everything in the 
Revolution and served the Crown faithfully, and though they had lived in Moore for twenty-two 
years and had extensive improvements, they did not possess a deed. Approved for grants by an 
Order-in-Council in 1833, like other Loyalists on the St. Clair, Sampson and Henry chose to 
locate some of them in Bosanquet.
49
  In later years, Sampson, Henry and their brother Samuel 
expanded their holdings by purchasing and leasing additional land from the Canada Land 
Company southeast of the Stony Point reserve boundary in adjoining lots 26, 27 and 28 in 
Concessions 3, 4 and 5 (see Figures 16 and 17 below).
50
 This height of land was known as “the 
‘Ridge’ which formed the south-western boundary of the Lake Burwell tract.” 51  
 In September 1837, Sampson Ward purchased Lot No. 27 in Concession 6 (Figure 16 
 
below). He received the deed less than one year later and made a final payment in 1840.  That 
 
same year, H.P. Chase, the Indian Department interpreter for the region reported that Quakgwan 
and his brother Ashqugonaby (later George c1810-1872) agreed to purchase the lot from 
Sampson Ward by installment over a period of ten years.
52
  Quakgwan collected money from 
approximately eight individuals and, no doubt using some of his rental income from Squirrel 
Island, paid almost £4 down on the lot.
53
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Figure 16: Quakgwan’s Lot and Ward Family properties in the Township of Bosanquet 
 
 
 
Source: Beldon’s Illustrated Historical Atlas of the County of Lambton, ed. Edward Phelps 
(Sarnia, ON: 1973).With the exception of the reserves, the Canada Company purchased all 
unsold lands in Bosanquet, Williams, McGillivray and Stephen Townships in 1826.  
 
Figure 17: Quakgwan’s Land and Ward Family Lots in Bosanquet 
 
 
Source: OA, F129, Canada Company Fonds, Pkg. 2, Map 163, D750948. Map of Part of the 
Township of Bosanquet, Stephen and McGillivray Recertified for the Drainage of Lake Burwell, 
July 1865; and Series B-3, Registers and Deeds, MS 729, Vols. 19, 30, 31. 
Ward 
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 Though the Crown assumed control of Indian Reserves and ungranted ‘wild’ land in the 
1839 and 1849 revised Crown Lands Acts, no laws expressly prohibited Aboriginal people, 
individually or collectively, from purchasing or owning land. Officials could only control items 
incidental to land ownership such as annuity money, business opportunities, or access to 
documentation and registration. Until 1850, colonial officials and agents appointed as trustees 
and commissioners of Crown Lands simply operated on the assumption that individual ‘Indians’ 
could not own land in fee simple. By scrounging up the money to purchase the lot, Quakgwan 
assumed the role of trustee himself, exploiting a window of opportunity to circumvent the 
civilization program. In ten years, he would hold the deed on behalf of the community and 
together, they could manage the land as they saw fit. Moreover, he would possess all the rights 
and entitlements of any other landowner in the district, including the right to vote and run for 
office. Though it would gradually become illegal after 1850 to be an ‘Indian’ and a landowner, 
until such time, Quakgwan’s neighbours treated him as a freeholder in the Township of 
Bosanquet. 
 Quakgwan found a way to meld two extremes of landholding into gray area—one that 
utilized the legal and economic security that individual title provided but that was worked by the 
residents in a communal way. Moreover, this settlement provides further evidence that 
Anishinabe people successfully farmed prior to the reserve period and that their methods and 
results matched or exceeded those of their neighbours. At 111 acres, Quakgwan owned one of 
the largest lots in Bosanquet.
54
 In 1848, Chase reported the community “made large clearings” 
that were fenced and “enlarge[ed] annually…”  More significantly, this report indicated that they 
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had “cleared ninety acres…by themselves.”55 Even if this is an overestimation, and they cleared 
significantly less than eighty percent of the lot, compared to other farmers in the region, the 
number is remarkable. Between 1826 and 1848, the average clearance rate for all of the Western 
District never reached more than twenty percent of the lands occupied.
56
  In 1851, Lambton 
County farmers had cleared about twenty percent of the lands they occupied, and by 1871 they 
still on average had cleared less than thirty-five percent. Clearance rates in Lambton County 
were so low that in 1880 the authors of an atlas speculated that census numbers might have been 
recorded in error.
57
 As already discussed, farming records from Walpole Island, where lots were 
also worked by family groups, suggest that communal fields were more productive than 
individual lots. Here too, the several “large clearings,” worked by either individuals or families, 
were all fenced and under cultivation by 1849.
58
 
 Their housing and improvements were also comparable to those of Eurocanadian settlers 
in the area. Francis Wilson (Wahbahnoosay), the half-brother of Mississauga Reverend Peter 
Jones, owned a house and schoolhouse on the neighbouring lot where he taught the children in 
the community.
59
  Though others might have lived in more customary forms of housing, 
Quakgwan lived in a twenty by twenty four foot, two-room log home with three windows, a door 
and a “[s]tone Fire Place and Chimney.” Another home was almost as large, and both were 
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shingled and “comfortably arranged and furnished.” 60 It will be remembered that houses slightly 
more than half this size were built on the Sarnia reserve. Without an Indian Agent or Royal 
Engineer, these residents provided ample and comfortable housing and secured access to a 
school, and a competent teacher, minister and interpreter in Wilson. 
Partnerships 
 The community balanced their desire to remain undisturbed and independent with the 
need to engage non-Aboriginal people for economic purposes. As Ferris notes, “it is likely that 
some Ojibwa activities were minimized or ignored in the records, while other aspects of Ojibwa 
settlement-subsistence remained unknown, particularly if such pursuits were conducted away 
from observers.”61 Given the distance to markets and the lack of land suitable for farming, early 
“pioneers” depended on Quakgwan’s community to supply them with maple sugar, fish, game 
and other supplies. In return, settlers developed cottage manufactures and processed local 
resources like wheat, which the Utters could grind in their grist mill.
62
 The Wards had access to a 
wide array of agricultural tools, goods and livestock and Brewster’s mill cut lumber for the 
community’s housing. Both supplied requisitioned items to the Stony Point Reserve under 
contract with the Indian Department.
63
 Between the time he purchased the lot in 1840 and 1848, 
there is almost no record of Quakgwan or the families living on the lot in Bosanquet, suggesting 
they were independent and fairly self-sufficient on the land.   
  Quakgwan’s success was in large part due to a number of advantageous relationships he 
established with his neighbours. If he knew English, he never publicly made it known and 
communicated to the Indian Department through interpreters. Wahbahnoosay and influential 
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non-Aboriginal people like George Hyde acted on his behalf and bridged the language and 
cultural barriers between the two communities. By 1848, Hyde was Reeve of the nearby town of 
Plympton, an active member of the council, and sat on a number of committees.  He investigated 
several of his colleagues for irregularities and was instrumental in crafting council rules and 
procedures. He referred to Quakgwan as “my Indian friend” in correspondence to the 
department.
64
 During the Rebellions, Henry and William Jones, Hyde, Vidal and Keating all 
served as officers in the Sarnia and Plympton Militias.
65
 Since retiring from the Navy in the 
1830s, Hyde had lived on a waterfront lot near the town of Errol, an important stop along the 
principal shoreline route to and from Sarnia.
66
  He would have been quite familiar with most, if 
not all of the residents in the northern half of the township. Quakgwan engaged influential 
individuals who could advance his interests, and these people rendered him assistance. 
Relationships with Hyde, the Wards and other local residents were based on Covenant Chain 
principles: a mutually beneficial exchange of friendship, goods and information. 
 Indian Department censuses show that the community of approximately 50 men, women 
and children owned at least four yokes of oxen, two steers, various farming implements, and 
potatoes and seed.
67
  In 1842 Henry Ward assumed the role of Township clerk and performed a 
number of administrative tasks including the execution of a comprehensive census of 
freeholders. According to this census taken on March 30, 1842, Bosanquet had 26 resident 
families and a total population of 134.  The average family size was five but five families alone 
had nine or more members, accounting for one third of the population. The ratio of males to 
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females over sixteen was fairly even with 38 men and 34 women, but there was a larger gap of 
38 boys and 24 girls under the age of sixteen. Ward recorded Quakgwan and his wife in this 
census along with one son over the age of sixteen. Much later, he would be reported as having 
“several sons & daughters” as heirs.68 One document in the late 1840s suggests that “his two 
wives exercise an influence over him,” but the identity of a second wife remains elusive.69  Since 
Quakgwan was the only taxable “freeholder,” Henry Ward did not count any other Anishinabe 
community members in the township census. There were no single men among any of the non-
Aboriginal residents living on their land alone and with the exception of one widow who lived 
with her son, Bosanquet at this time was a community of families, recorded and unrecorded.  
 Methodists and Congregationalists were the principal settlers in Bosanquet, (Table 10)  
Table 10: Denominations as a Percentage of the Population of Bosanquet, 1842 
 
 
Source: AO, F2007, Records of the Western District, 1842 Census of Bosanquet. MS 390. 
suitable because in the 1842 Census, ‘Jacob Quakgwan’ and his family were recorded as 
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Methodists, and would have attended services along with the Ward and Brewster families.
70
 
Congregationalists were the next most populous denomination, and there were several Roman 
Catholics, a smaller number of Baptists and even fewer members of the Church of England and 
Scotland. Neither the numerical superiority of two denominations nor the presence of a number 
of other religions appears to have been divisive, even within families. In fact, the diverse 
backgrounds of the settlers may have been a substantial unifying force in the community. 
 Many settlers in Bosanquet could be called “persisters.” These founding families, along 
with succeeding generations, profoundly influenced the history and development of the region.
71
  
Though they might not have been considered extremely wealthy or influential elsewhere, this 
local elite gained power and prominence as clerks, path masters, tax assessors, postmasters and 
councilmen. At various points in the 1840s, Henry Ward was the Township Clerk, Thomas Ward 
served on the council and as a Path master in 1848, and the Utter, Eastman and Brewster families 
filled other administrative and public duties.  
 For all intents and purposes, Quakgwan lived as any other settler in the community and 
exercised what we normally consider the rights of citizenship. Along with families already 
mentioned, Quakgwan was present at the house of John McWilliams in January 1848 and voted 
in the township elections held there. Elected one of six path masters for the “Quakgwan Indian 
Village,” Quakgwan assigned and inspected roadwork fronting the land and collected money 
paid in lieu of labour. That year his division performed thirteen days of statute roadwork on the 
portion fronting the lot.
72
 That fall, Quakgwan and nine of his neighbours signed a petition 
requesting the formation of a school section in their district, presumably to replace Francis 
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Wilson’s. Sometime in early 1847, Wahbahnoosay contracted smallpox while away at school. 
His tragic death that same year left the community without a teacher and school.
73
 
 By the latter half of the 1840s, Jacob Quakgwan was a veteran of the War of 1812, a 
community leader, landowner and path master. As a freeholder, he voted in township elections, 
and was elected to a position of responsibility. He and the others residing on the land with him 
suggest that, at least in some parts of Upper Canada, it cannot be assumed that political, social 
and economic conditions prior to 1850 were necessarily the same for Aboriginal people after. 
Quakgwan’s community demonstrates that with proper supplies, autonomy and encouragement, 
Indigenous settlements like this could have flourished throughout Upper Canada. He had access 
to the same routes to ‘prominence’ as his neighbours, and yet by 1850, the community no longer 
existed. So the question remains, why weren’t the members of Quakgwan’s community 
persisters too? 
 “the supposed township of Bosanquet”74 
 Unfortunately there is very little documentation from the early years of the settlement and 
from Bosanquet Township. Residents of Bosanquet had stronger ties to Goderich than Sarnia. 
Consequently, while the residents of Plympton petitioned the District Council for a road west 
along the Huron shoreline to Port Sarnia, the residents of Bosanquet petitioned for a road north 
to the harbour at the mouth of the Sable River.
75
 Perhaps even as a measure of self-imposed 
exile, settlers willingly went to a township that possessed one of the lowest population densities 
south of the Canadian Shield.    
 Early on, Quakgwan formed relationships with a heterogeneous “pioneer” generation 
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who shared similar histories of persecution and beliefs that, by the 1830s, increasingly conflicted 
with rigid class-based liberal and religious values of the Family Compact establishment. 
Bosanquet settlers largely consisted of three groups: loyalists, soldiers and militia with land 
grants, “alien” Americans and native-born settlers who squatted until they could apply for land, 
and emigrants from the British Isles who came as part of Colborne’s plan to settle Britain’s 
excess and indigent populations. Early settlers to Plympton and Bright’s Grove like Hyde were 
discharged soldiers and naval officers. Awarded large grants based on service and loyalty, they 
located themselves in the front concessions along Lake Huron.
76
 While Henry Jones’ Maxwell 
settlement fell victim to fire and lack of interest, he and a number of the original residents stayed 
in the area.
77
 In the 1830s, the Petworth Emigration Committee similarly assisted the poor from 
towns and cities in Southern England to settle in remoter parts of Plympton and Warwick. 
Though they were promised settlement aid in the form of housing and supplies, many found this 
support wanting.
78
 Remote and topographically and environmentally challenging, the interior 
portions of Plympton, Bosanquet and Warwick presented challenges that stretched the mental 
and physical resources of the most experienced settlers. Without roads or close access to open 
navigable waters, the low-lying nature of much of the district rendered its habitability extremely 
susceptible to flooding caused by fluctuations in temperature and rainfall. Initially by necessity 
and perhaps later by choice, the backgrounds of the people and conditions of settlement created a 
particular dynamic that brought Indigenous peoples and Europeans together in the interests of 
survival. 
 The temperaments expressed by settlers in their petitions to the council suggest they were 
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fiercely individual in their personal and spiritual beliefs but cognizant that their survival 
necessitated cooperation. There were disputes over the distribution of contracts and frustration 
that the tax base did not support improvements, yet the residents of Bosanquet did not seem 
engage in the same kinds of conflict characterizing other townships at the time. As already 
discussed, a shortage of land framed disputes in Moore and Sombra while residents in Plympton 
argued that particular classes received unfair advantage in that location. As the town of Sarnia 
expanded into the reserve, competition over development acquired racial dimensions as the 
‘Indian’ reserve was constantly blamed for impeding progress. Bosanquet functioned at the local 
level on a grassroots basis because well into the 1850s, it lacked civil, religious or political 
hierarchies of authority. When Benjamin Brewster’s mill kept flooding farms on the Sable River, 
residents protested, and the Canada Company took him to court, to no avail. In 1860 the mill 
mysteriously burned down.
79
 When Henry Ward wrote to the Western District Council to be paid 
for his services, the council decreed that since Bosanquet was not a township, “there could be no 
town clerk.”80 But these circumstances would not last, and it is no coincidence that the pressure 
placed on Quakgwan to relocate occurred at the same time that the district’s population rapidly 
increased. The Hyde’s, Ward’s, and Maxwell and Petworth settlers were really the first half of a 
wave of immigration punctuated only by the uncertainty of the rebellion period. In the early 
1830s, as good available land ran out, the populations of Essex and the southern townships of 
Kent leveled off. The growth of Kent, which began to outpace Essex in 1835, represents the 
beginning of a new phase of settlement which expanded into hitherto less desirable lands in the 
northeastern interior. By 1851, the population of the new County of Lambton stood at 10,815, 
lagging only slightly behind Essex and Kent whose populations were 16,817 and 17,499 
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respectively.
81
 As the Great Western Railway reached Sarnia, the town, along with Chatham and 
Windsor, laid the foundation for the region’s development into western Ontario’s urban 
commercial and industrial powerhouse.
 
(See Table 11 below). At the root of this rapid growth 
would be an increasingly homogenous population of British emigrants changing the way of life 
of this “pioneer” generation. Chatham incorporated as a town in 1855, “Port” Sarnia in 1856 and 
Windsor (Sandwich), in 1858. 
Table 11: Population Growth, Essex, Kent and Lambton, 1851-1881. 
 
Source: Province of Ontario, Sessional Papers, Vol. XVI, Part VII, No. 55, (Toronto: Grip 
Printing and Publishing Co., 1884), Table XLI, Area and Population, 118. 
 
Fragmenting 
 To hasten assimilation and cut the exorbitant expenses of the Indian Department 
identified in the Bagot Report, the Governor General issued instructions to amalgamate smaller 
“bands” on larger reserves where superintendents could undertake more aggressive forms of 
schooling and social control.
  
In 1848, Chase arrived to assess the value of Quakgwan’s 
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improvements so the lot could be sold.
82
 Several decades’ worth of broken promises and a rash 
of suspicious surrenders initiated by Sir Francis Bond Head in the 1830s led Anishinabe peoples 
to hold steadfast. Contrary to the Governor General’s instructions, they and Quakgwan 
demanded protection for unsurrendered land and title to their reserves. 
 By the late 1850s, Quakgwan’s remote community could not escape the hardening of 
attitudes towards racial difference and a lack of enforcement of Indigenous land rights. He was 
pressured to surrender the lot at the same time that his options to resist were eliminated. Torn 
between staying and complying with what can only be described as a policy of removal, 
Quakgwan understandably took considerable time weighing his options. He considered a return 
to the lot on Walpole Island in 1848, but when the time arrived, he refused and said he would 
stay on his “improvements.” Quakgwan added, through missionary Andrew Jamieson, that he 
would only relocate if their removal was “urged” and only if he “and the families under his care” 
received the proceeds of the sale of the land.
83
  While they were ‘urged,’ the sale of the lot 
caused significant controversy.
84
 
 Despite Quakgwan’s concern for the residents of the community, sometime between 
January 1848 and September 1849, most or all of the people returned to the Sarnia Indian 
Village.
85
 Given the circumstances under which he left, Quakgwan did not want to return to 
Sarnia. But he could not return to Squirrel Island either. Two settler families claimed leases 
directly from Quakgwan: Duncan and Dougal MacDonald and John McDougall Sr. The 
MacDonalds held a 20 year lease authorized by Keating in 1831 while McDougall Sr. held a 21 
year lease negotiated in 1833 with the Chief and Jones. Though the original lease was slated to 
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expire in 1851, in Quakgwan’s absence, the MacDonalds subdivided the land and sub-leased it to 
others for terms well beyond the original agreements.
86
 I was able to find no less than eight 
people by the 1840s, who claimed rights on the Island traceable through these original two 
leases.
87
 These and other overlapping claims eventually swallowed up most of Squirrel Island. If 
Keating claimed to have expelled them in 1841, how could they lawfully prevent Quakgwan 
from returning to a lot on unsurrendered ‘Indian’ land nearly ten years later? 
 The original agreement between the MacDonalds and Quakgwan was purportedly 
translated by Cadotte and witnessed by William’s son, Alexander Jones.88  Within two years of 
receiving their agreements, renters violated them by sub-leasing the land to others.
89
 Like 
petitioners in Moore, after 1839, the original renters claimed legitimacy as veterans and loyalists 
returning from defending the province. They believed that they possessed legal lease agreements 
and claimed to have spent enormous sums of money on improvements. Subsequent renters pled 
that they were innocent third parties.  
 But Anishinabe Chiefs did not negotiate leases to deprive themselves entirely of the use 
of the land. It is evident that leaders invited some of the original lessors, like the MacDonalds 
and McDougalls, to protect the land.  They settled on the basis of historic relationships and 
agreed to oral conditions permitting the shared use of the land. But as discussed in chapter 4, the 
petitions of sub-lessors on Walpole Island state clearly that they also expected the Island to be 
surrendered imminently and used leases to claim lots before they were officially put on the 
                                                          
86
 LAC, RG 10/121, No. 35, Petition, Hugh, Alexander and Neil McDonald, 6 January, 1845, 5134-5135; No. 3 
John McDougall, 25 May, 1844, 4866-7. 
87
 LAC, RG 10/441, 23 April, 1849, Clench copy of Keating’s Letterbook, 377. RG 10/571, Keating to Jarvis, 12 
June 1843, 4-6. Hugh, Alexander and Neil McDonald, George Jasperson and Jacob East are linked to the 1831 lease 
while John McDougall Sr., Lauchlan McDougall(d), Isaac Klein and Kelsey Ripley claimed on the second.  
88
 LAC, RG 10/121, Petitions of George Jasperson, 26 May, 1844, 4682-4 and John McDougall, 25 May 1844, 
4865-8.  
89
 LAC, RG 10/438, Jamieson to Clench, 19 November, 1849, 457-8; RG 10/121, No. 35, Petition Hugh, Alexander 
and Neil McDonald, 6 January, 1845, 5134-5. 
 348 
market.
90
    
 Whether the chiefs actually received rent from the settlers is also uncertain.  Quakgwan 
seems to have received enough to assist him to purchase the lot, but this was in the 1830s. 
Several years later, the chiefs complained that settlers around the mission house were delinquent 
in their payments and it is possible that some rent payments found their way into the pockets of 
Jones and Keating.
91
 In 1839 three men who sub-leased land from the MacDonalds had their 
farms burned to the ground and their property destroyed.
92
 But as we have already seen, the 
motives behind Keating’s seemingly altruistic efforts to evict the squatters two years later are 
complex.  Keating and Jones blamed Aboriginal people for their own misfortunes, for inviting 
whites to settle on their land in the first place. Jones told Jarvis that Americans “made the Chief 
Quaykegouin drunk and prevailed on him to sign a Lease for a very large tract of the Island after 
I had warned them not to do so.”93 Used to justify and further extend departmental authority into 
the management of Indian lands, Jones and Keating did not advertise the fact that they 
sanctioned many of the leases to Baldoon Scots. 
 The same letter accusing Quakgwan of intoxication contains Jones’ admission that he 
witnessed and signed leases in ignorance before he entered the Indian Department. However, 
Jones authorized both of Quakgwan’s leases after he was on the Indian Department payroll and 
the latter lease, while he was supervising the construction of the Sarnia Village. Despite these 
admissions and the fact that Walpole Island was legally unsurrendered Indian land, the bearers of 
these problematic leases were allowed to trump the rights of a legitimate Aboriginal person 
wishing to return to his community.  
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 In 1849, Quakgwan planned to remove to the portion of Squirrel Island “rented” by John 
McDougall Sr., known as “The McDougall Farm.” In Quakgwan’s absence, McDougall divided 
the farm and leased the halves to merchants Jacob East and Thomas Fisher.  Fisher abandoned 
the farm and moved to Moore after his lease expired in 1846 but East, who claimed to lease 
several lots on the Island, continued to cause mischief.
94
 Chief Nahdee, an old and respected 
veteran of the War of the 1812, who “pitched his tent” near the farm, said that the chiefs did not 
agree to East’s lease, and it was void. To the contrary, East insisted that two years remained on 
his lease. He claimed the timber and prevented “the Indians” from farming the land and Nahdee 
was “very much annoyed at this conduct…”95 In November 1849, just as Quakgwan was set to 
move back to Walpole Island yet another claimant stepped forward with a lease for the farm. 
East and the newest claimant, Lauchlan Macdougall said they paid rent to the previous 
leaseholders under agreements witnessed by Keating and Jones. Jamieson wrote to Clench on 
Quakgwan’s behalf, but by 1849, Keating was in Sault Ste. Marie and Jones was dead.96 Without 
any witnesses, Lauchlan Macdougall demanded that if he was going to be ejected, the ‘Indians’ 
were going to compensate him for the rent he paid. Other renters wanted the Anishinabe to pay 
them rent to use the land and compensate them for damaged or confiscated property.
97
 Valid or 
not, the amounts would have come out of Walpole’s accounts which had dwindled to virtually 
nothing under Keating’s stewardship. The department again took the path of least resistance and 
permitted East and Macdougall to stay for the duration of their leases.
98
 
 If Quakgwan could not return to Sarnia and the farm on Walpole Island was no longer an 
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option, he now had to fight the sale of the lot. In January 1848 Chase determined that the land 
and improvements, with ninety acres, was worth £2 per acre or £222.
99
  This amount appears 
reasonable as two years earlier, raw Huron Tract land without improvements sold for an average 
of 13s.
100
  But Chase valued Quakgwan’s house at £25, the cost to build it six years earlier, and 
nothing was said of two other substantial log houses, cattle and oxen, agricultural implements 
and other items owned by the community. Sampson Ward originally paid £62.8.9 for the lot and 
documents suggest that Quakgwan paid him £78 for the land.
101
 Described as still making 
payments, Quakgwan was friendly with other landowners in the area and would have known that 
he possessed some of the best cleared land in the township. By 1849, good quality land in this 
state was highly valuable, and the community would barely recover their initial investment if 
they accepted Chase’s estimate. It seems no coincidence that Quakgwan petitioned the Governor 
General demanding his deed right after the valuation was made. Consequently, the Indian 
Department took control of Quakgwan’s land the only way they could; they divided the 
community and questioned the source of the funds for the initial purchase and improvements. 
Chase summarily mounted a concerted effort to turn Quakgwan’s community, the government, 
and Indian Department executive against him.  He suggested Quakgwan, having “acted contrary 
of the Governor General’s instructions” was some kind of despot determined to profit from a 
collective interest in the land. By the fall of 1849, Chase reported that most or all of the people at 
the settlement “have obeyed their great Father, the Governor General and…left Bossanquett.  He 
boasted that they were now living on the Sarnia Reserve “enjoying equal privileges and share of 
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their Annuity.”  That Chase uses the words “equal privileges” and “share” is not insignificant.102  
 Once officials eliminated the possibility of resistance from the community, the 
department launched an investigation to find the source of the funds used to purchase the land 
and improvements. If they could find that any monies came from annuities paid under the Huron 
Tract Treaty, officials could question Quakgwan’s sole interest in the land and prevent him from 
disposing of it.  By doing so, the lot would become communal land: in other words, a reserve. 
Officials were aided by the passage of the 1849 Crown Lands Act. The bill, which received 
Royal Assent in April that year, repealed the 1839 Act and extended the power of 
Commissioners to police all Crown lands in Upper Canada with the authority of magistrates.
 103
 
Intended to protect Crown, Clergy, School, and Indian lands, occupied or not, from squatters and 
trespassers, the act empowered officials to protect the Anishinabe of Sarnia from Quakgwan. 
 Chase was convinced Quakgwan only wanted the deed “to deprive [the residents] of any 
claims on the Lot in future.”104 The Chief may have indeed felt abandoned by the community. 
Even so, it seems more likely that a sense of responsibility compelled him to hold it on their 
behalf until a better solution became known to him. We cannot assume that he wished to sell the 
land or that he would not have repaid the original contributors, if he did.  He was adamant that 
“the people under his care” reap the benefits of any sale, and this alone is evidence of his 
concern for their economic well-being.
105
 But by 1849, the government viewed Aboriginal 
peoples as only ever having a collective interest in land and this land could only be on reserves 
held in trust for them by the Crown. So long as Quakgwan stayed on the land, he deprived the 
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others, now residing at Sarnia, of their fair “share” in it.   
 In departmental correspondence between 1847 and 1849, Quakgwan’s role changed from 
that of a caretaker to a schemer. Initially, Chase used neutral language describing him both as a 
trustee and sole purchaser who used funds raised independent of the annuity to purchase the lot, 
on behalf of the community. But in 1849, Chase informed Clench that contributions from the 
annuity were made to purchase the land and supplies in common. In another letter, Clench 
suggested that the land was purchased for them by the Department.
106
 The latter two scenarios 
contradict a matter-of-fact explanation offered to Jamieson by the Chief himself. During a visit 
to Walpole Island in 1847 he requested Jamieson write to Clench to clear up any confusion.  
Jamieson wrote: 
 He says that he thinks that you are labouring under some wrong  
 impression in regard to the said land.  He informs me that the land  
 was purchased by himself—that it was purchased by money earned  
 by himself---that with the exception of 84 dollars advanced by Mr.  
 Jones late Indian Agent—all the money paid for the land was paid  
 by himself…107  
 
Quakgwan then explained that for these reasons, he wanted the proceeds to go to those who 
expended the effort to clear and farm it.  
 Unfortunately we do not know where all the funds came from to purchase the lot. Two 
plausible scenarios were offered: the payment plan in Chase’s valuation in January 1848 and the 
lump sum explanation offered in response to Quakgwan’s petition for the deed. Chapter four 
discussed how Anishinabe people came to have some cash on hand earned by working fields or 
selling fish, Aboriginal crafts, baskets or other items. Richardson noted the Anishinabe 
frequently sold handicrafts to tourists and to visitors and observers during gatherings for the 
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distribution of presents.
108
 Chase himself suggested an external source like “the proceeds of 
Pipes,” and Quakgwan had some rental income paid by his tenants on Walpole Island.109 Keating 
complained that money gave the Anishinabe enough independence to thwart attempts to confine 
them and control their behavior. To counteract this, in the 1820s and 1830s, officials first worked 
to prevent the accumulation of presents and access to annuity funds. In the 1840s, they diverted 
rental income away from the chiefs and discouraged settlers and merchants from engaging in 
commercial transactions with ‘Indians.’ Though Quakgwan purchased land before these policies 
could stop him, by 1850, they prevented him from keeping it.   
 The suggestion that Jones contributed $84 towards the purchase would be Quakgwan’s 
undoing. Without offering any evidence, Chase penned a hostile-toned letter to Clench in 1849, 
in which he stated with certainty that they did not have legitimate sources of income to purchase 
the lot.
110
 According to Chase, Quakgwan used the contributions of eight individuals, 
“deprive[d] the Chiefs on Walpole Island” of their rent money and received an advance of £16 
(approximately $80), from an anonymous source which he used to buy the lot. If this were not 
scandalous enough, Chase now asserted that the three houses, oxen, seed and implements on the 
property had been requisitioned through the department and paid out of the annuity, along with 
£25 to pay Quakgwan’s personal debts. Chase concluded that Quakgwan “has no good reason to 
complain as he “received much more of the Annuity than any one Indian in the whole 
Community.” Since some of the initial funds used to purchase the lot were paid with common 
funds, “all Claimants of the Annuity” had “a claim in the tract of land.”111  Chase only made the 
allegations when officials deemed the community a threat and acted to remove them. 
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 For most of the decade department officials did not even know where Quakgwan lived 
and repeatedly confused him with the Stoney Point community led by Chief Wahpagas. Initially 
it seems that the department thought Quakgwan lived within the boundary of the Stoney Point 
Reserve since both communities were separated by only two concessions.  An 1845 Census 
taken by Chase indicates that 32 lived with Wapagace and Quakegwun had 45 in his “band,” but 
he did not differentiate between their living arrangements suggesting even to historians that they 
lived together at the Sauble.
112
 Francis Wilson ministered to both communities and their children 
probably attended the schoolhouse on his property.
113
 In correspondence, officials referred to 
Wahpagas and Quakgwan both as the “Indian Chief[s] at the Sable” and their residents as the 
“River aux Sable,” “Aux Sable” or “Sable” Indians.114  Conforming to the Governor General’s 
instructions, the Civil Secretary instructed Clench to secure a number of surrenders in the area. 
In 1847, Clench told him that “a small band headed by Chief Wahpagas in the township of 
Bosanquet on the River Aux Sable, has expressed a desire to remove to the Walpole Island with 
his party and the lot containing 100 acres, 82 cleared, which they command shall be sold for their 
benefit.”115 Clench was obviously mistaken because the Sable Reserve settled by Wahpagas’ 
‘band’ to the northwest contained ten times the acreage of Quakgwan’s lot. On more than one 
occasion the superintendent muddled the names of leaders and locations of the Chippewa of 
Anderdon, and the northern reserve communities.
116
   
 If Quakgwan was aware of the confusion, he may not have been too eager to correct the 
misconception. It does seem that his community received some items through the department. In 
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1846, Chase complained to Clench that the chiefs made requisitions to pay “Mr. Ward” for “one 
Yoke of oxen and two Steers and a quantity of Potatoes for seed.” These were apparently 
delivered to “Chief Quakejewan’s Band” in 1841 or 1842.117 At the time Chase wrote, the 
requisitions were five years old, and Ward and Brewster’s accounts appear on Sarnia’s massive 
list of debtors made in 1848 as suppliers of housing, potatoes, seed grain and lumber. But these 
were only supposed to be paid if all the chiefs agreed and after all the details were “read and 
explained to them” in council. Quakgwan may not have even aware of the debts as Wahpagas 
signed but Quakgwan did not, and there is no way to prove that the goods went to, or remained 
with the communities that requisitioned them.
118
  
 An examination of some receipts suggests the chiefs exploited their collective 
administration and Clench’s ignorance by charging supplies to each other and sharing goods.   
Quakgwan received farm implements ordered for the Sable, and Sarnia seems to have received 
supplies to build two houses at the same time Quakgwan was billed for them.
119
 In 1853 Clench 
received a bill for “dwelling houses, working oxen” and “farming implements &c.” supplied to 
Quakgwan’s band based on an estimate dated September 4, 1852. This was simply not possible.  
The community dispersed and the land was sold more than two years earlier.
120
 Some of these 
expenses occurred during the tenure of Keating and Jones and others after. It is plausible that in a 
few instances merchants double-billed and communities did receive the goods they ordered. 
Quakgwan also no doubt circumvented the department entirely and bartered with Ward privately, 
since Sampson and Henry lived just down the road. Only when they thought they could discredit 
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him, did the department seek to correct any misunderstandings about the community. 
 Finding the source of funds to purchase the lot and improvements proved to be moot once 
Chase realized that Quakgwan had outstanding debts. The department used this as a window of 
opportunity to eliminate any doubts, by paying them with Sarnia’s annuities.121 Clench could 
now argue that since band funds were expended on Quakgwan’s enterprise, the department was 
morally compelled to do something, including confiscating the land in order to pay back the 
annuity. Therefore, by October, 1849, Superintendent General T.E. Campbell assuredly wrote 
that “the land was purchased in partnership with other Indians and was in part paid from the 
funds of the tribe.”122 Once the department shifted the focus away from his legal entitlement to 
the deed, to protecting the collective interests of the residents, Quakgwan had no defence. 
 In 1847, government officials recognized that “Indians have purchased land for 
themselves with the proceeds of their annuities” or became “landholders by the purchase or 
leasing of lands from whites.”123 According to law and the Department’s own policy, 
Quakgwan’s lot was owned by an ‘Indian,’ it was not Indian land.  As Figure 18 below 
illustrates, the land began as Indian Territory under the Proclamation of 1763, but the Crown 
argued that Anishinabe Chiefs surrendered all their rights and entitlements in the Huron Tract 
Treaty. The Crown sold it to the Canada Company and the Canada Company sold it to Sampson 
Ward. Based on the leases and other documents made on the St. Clair, Quakgwan had 
considerable experience negotiating with non-Aboriginal people, and he made a similar 
agreement to purchase the lot from Ward. As discussed in previous chapters, it is also evident 
that the ability to control documents and access to them formed an important aspect of colonial 
control in the period before 1850.  
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Figure 18: Anatomy of a Lot 
 
 
 
 If this was indeed a ‘gentleman’s agreement,’ Quakgwan relied on those involved to 
honour it and to secure the paperwork necessary for him to legally possess the lot.
124
 According  
to Jamieson, Jones, who retained connections with the Canada Company from his tenure as a 
land agent in the Baldoon office between 1830 and 1835,
125
 contributed money to help purchase 
the lot. Writing in January 1850, Quakgwan was under the impression that William Jones kept 
the deed and told Hyde as much. But Jones died sometime the previous year, and Clench did not 
receive his papers until May 1851.
126
 Quakgwan knew that he needed paper proof to keep the 
land. Sampson Ward’s deed for the lot signed by William Allen and Thomas Mercer Jones of the 
Canada Company is in the Lambton County Archives. Whether Quakgwan’s deed was lost or 
simply concealed, he did not have it, and its whereabouts at this time are unknown.  
 More than twenty years after he signed the Huron Tract Treaty, and after three private 
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land transactions, the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs argued Quakgwan’s lot was 
Indian land simply because Anishinabe people lived on it. Once ceded by treaty and opened for 
settlement, nothing existed in law to prohibit or prevent people of Aboriginal ancestry from 
purchasing land privately like any other settler. But the surrender provisions outlined in the 
Proclamation of 1763 and the outcome of the dispute between Peter Russell and Joseph Brant 
concerning the alienability of Six Nations lands seem to have empowered officials to act as 
trustees in all transactions involving Indigenous lands.
127
 The 1839 Crown Lands Protection Act 
transformed Indian land into Crown land. However, this initially only applied to reserves. The 
1849 amendment, extended the provisions to unsold Crown lands, but Sampson Ward’s lot was 
not Crown Land. Nevertheless, by the late 1840s, in theory, opinions appear to have shifted to a 
general understanding that Aboriginal people could not purchase land, and that these restrictions 
applied to ‘Indians,’ rather than ‘Indian Reserves.’ Preventing access to annuities and blocking 
access to government without the permission of the superintendent meant that land could not be 
purchased, located, registered or deeded after 1850. By law, in 1857 and most assuredly by 1869, 
Aboriginal people as individuals on reserves, could not shed these encumbrances without 
renouncing their status and enfranchising. 
 But in 1849, legally there was nothing to prevent Quakgwan from possessing his deed. 
Rather, policy and ideology empowered the department to assume control. George Hyde, who by 
all accounts was an educated man, a council member and a magistrate appeared genuinely 
confounded when Quakgwan asked him to inquire about his deed.   Quakgwan appears to have 
told Hyde that he was going to sell the lot himself. But the magistrate did not know, as he 
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confessed to Clench, “whether he has the right to do so or not[,] I am ignorant…”128  The fact 
that Quakgwan owned land privately off reserve, or was in the process of purchasing it, shows 
that he operated in a legislative vacuum.  It was in that space, in the absence of any legislation 
saying otherwise, that Indian department policy gained a foothold and prevented him from 
receiving his deed. 
 Department officials did not care whether Quakgwan intended to keep the lot, or sell it on 
his own, for the benefit of his people. Quakgwan simply could not get more than his fair share, 
even if community members earned their money individually through paid labour, even if his 
‘band’ contributed more than Sarnia, and even if he was summarily disadvantaged by that very 
equality. Placed in a catch-22, Quakgwan could not keep the land himself because the 
government insisted it be sold to pay back the annuity fund.  He could not sell the land himself 
because no one would let him have the deed.  As he feared would happen, the government took 
care of it for him. Left with no choice, in February 1850, he reluctantly agreed to surrender the 
lot and move to Walpole Island. One year later, in February 1851, the lot was sold to Allan 
Kennedy, the local postmaster and magistrate. That same spring, Quakgwan died.
129
 
Post-Script 
  In 1880 Quakgwan’s son Wilson Jacob, hired a lawyer and launched a claim on behalf of 
the family. According to Jacob, Quakgwan eventually did surrender the land for the benefit of 
the Sarnia Indians. Sampson Ward, who seems to have possessed the deed all along, agreed to 
pass it to the Crown. In exchange, Quakgwan would receive $900: $100 to move him to Walpole 
Island, $400 to build him a house and $400 to be placed in trust for his children. But he died 
before these conditions were fulfilled. His wife and children went to Sarnia, and they never 
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received the money.
130
 The Crown Lands Office searched the files, but found no evidence that 
Quakgwan ever purchased the land and no agreement, in writing, for $900.
131
 Crown Lands 
informed the attorney that the family was not entitled to any money because the lot had been 
Indian land surrendered to the Crown for the benefit of the Sarnia Band, and he was presented 
with a copy of the surrender as proof. But this is not quite true. Quakgwan thought he transferred 
the land to the Crown, but Sampson Ward transferred it by direct conveyance to Kennedy in 
1850. Kennedy did not make any payments until early 1851, after passage of the Act for the 
Protection of Indian Lands gave Clench the exclusive legal right to deal with Indian lands, after 
it prohibited non-natives from engaging in commercial transactions with Anishinabe people, and 
after it banned ‘Indians’ from contracting debts.132  
  Kennedy paid the amount recommended by Chase in four installments, receiving an 
incredibly valuable lot cleared for him with the sweat of Anishinabe labour. But when he applied 
for his patent in 1855, officials discovered that no surrender had been made. To rectify what the 
Department perceived to be a minor procedural error, four years after Quakgwan’s death on the 
27
th
 of September 1855, the principal Chiefs of the Sarnia reserve surrendered his lot to the 
Crown.
133
 By the end of the decade Kennedy and his brothers possessed land worth more than 
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five times what they paid for it.
134
 Eerily similar to the circumstances surrounding the McKenna 
lot in Moore Township, they also stood accused of poaching timber from the Stony Point 
Reserve which they processed in their sawmill.
135
 These agreements not only deprived 
Anishinabe peoples from the enjoyment of their lands and the proceeds of their sale, they 
introduced people into the community who continued to steal the limited resources that 
remained. 
  Quakgwan and the estimated forty-five people who resided on the lot with him are 
virtually erased from the land records of Bosanquet and from the history of the area. His name 
does not appear in the records of the Canada Company, in the municipal land records or even in 
the transfer of the lot from Ward to Kennedy. The roads adjacent to the land are named after 
Eurocanadians and the local cemetery, where the Ward and Kennedy families are buried, bears 
no hint of these Anishinabe residents.  
Conclusion   
  Despite a potential language barrier, Quakgwan developed close relationships with those 
around him and over the course of ten years, became a part of the community. However, these 
relationships were primarily oral agreements made in the course of their day-to-day existence, 
on the farm, in church and on the road. Quakgwan trusted that people would act honourably and 
that his community would flourish as his neighbours did. By the late 1840s, attitudes began to 
change and officials and policy makers increasingly viewed Indigeneity as something 
incompatible and separate from Upper Canadian society and institutions. Though Quakgwan had 
proven this wrong, legislation passed in the second half of the nineteenth century forced this 
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Figure 19: The Corner of Lot 27, Concession 6, Municipality of Lambton Shores, Ontario. 
 
Source: Photo by the Author, 2013. 
 
status upon all Indigenous peoples, limiting the possibility that such instances of co-existence 
could, or would exist in the future. Clench and the Indian Department executive mounted a 
concerted effort to deny that that the community ever existed. As a result, only the Wards and 
Kennedys are remembered and commemorated as founding pioneers. There is no evidence that 
the “Quakgwan Indian Village” once stood here. By the time Quakgwan’s heirs came to claim 
their fair share they were confronted with a history that erased their family’s story and the stories 
of the other families who lived with them. 
 The aggressive ‘civilization’ program and the proposition foisted upon Aboriginal people 
either to remain ‘Indians’ isolated on reserves or ‘citizens’ without a homeland, was by design, a 
plan to “break them to pieces.”136  By assuming the role of trustee instead of deferring to Crown 
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Figure 20: The Ward Cemetery  
 
 
 
Source: 9411 Sitter Road, Municipality of Lambton Shores, Ontario. Photo by the Author, 2013. 
 
officials, Quakgwan threatened the system of communal landholding and economic and legal 
wardship.   Paradoxically, these became the central tenets of a civilization policy designed to 
teach Aboriginal people to farm, so their reserves could be severed into individual lots and sold 
to non-‘Indians.’ Quakgwan and the people who moved with him to Bosanquet Township 
rejected this policy.  By the late 1840s they had molded a way of life that worked in both 
Indigenous and Eurocanadian worlds. While they recognized that they could no longer live as 
they had in the past, neither did they have to wholly embrace a society and economy devoid of 
Anishinabek culture and values.     
 But by the second half of the nineteenth century, this was not acceptable.  While the 
settlement in Bosanquet was part of a customary or oral arrangement between Quakgwan, the 
residents and Sampson Ward, it occasioned little notice and in the absence of any law prohibiting 
it was tolerated by Jones and Clench. Once Quakgwan demanded the right to reside on the land 
alone, he assumed a role that would not be tolerated in the 1850s—that of an independently 
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established Aboriginal yeoman farmer. Though Quakgwan saw himself as a freeholder, entitled 
to his deed and possessing title, owning land of this quantity entitled him to all the rights such a 
position conferred.
137
 But legislation passed in 1850 combined the worst of both restrictions 
concerning the alienability of land in the 1839 Crown Lands Act, and those in the 1839 Order-in-
Council prohibiting contract and debt.  Additional legislation that followed in 1857 and 1869 
served to further separate Aboriginal people by defining Indigeneity and reserves as something 
physically and economically separate from the towns and villages around them.  
 By the time Quakgwan died, he had an interest in three separate plots of land all held 
under different systems of tenure. According to Anishinabeg systems of land allocation, 
Quakgwan had a spot allotted to him on Walpole Island for his own use. In his absence, Nahdee 
camped on a portion and in 1831 he leased another for a term of twenty-one years. Had he lived, 
Quakgwan would have returned to a house built for him with the proceeds of the sale of the lot 
on Unceded Indian land. On the Sarnia reserve, he also had a village lot that he farmed from 
1831 to 1839. The reserve was later surveyed and divided into individual lots for which he would 
have received a location ticket.  Instead he moved to Bosanquet, put some money down and paid 
for a lot of land by installment. Though his name would have been on the deed, he held the land 
in trust and farmed it in common with “the families under his care.” This was another oral 
agreement based on mutual benefit, trust and kinship. In the Township of Bosanquet, Quakgwan 
was a farmer, a path master for the township, and a landowner. Along with other freeholders, he 
signed a petition, voted in township elections and was elected to a position of authority. Yet, at 
the same time he retained his language, culture and chieftainship. In ten short years, Quakgwan 
and his band were able to achieve a level of self-sufficiency and independence that the Indian 
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Department could not in one hundred, precisely because they settled on their own terms.   
 Though more research needs to be done, Quakgwan’s life and his settlement in 
Bosanquet has the potential to provide new information concerning the settlement of Aboriginal 
people in Ontario and the many ways they negotiated the unrelenting and suffocating intrusion of 
colonial policy into their daily lives.  It suggests that custom was very much alive in the post-
treaty period and that customary ways of working the land came to be reworked yet preserved 
within the narrow confines of Western notions of landholding.  By mutual agreement they 
merged the advantages of communal land use with the protection of fee-simple ownership, 
adapting parts of the civilization policy to their own benefit and rejecting others, thereby giving 
them the best of both worlds. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Upper Canada evolved politically, economically and socially in what was initially an 
Indigenous homeland. However, in terms of our present historiographical understanding, the 
period between the American Revolution and the first legislation directed at Aboriginal people in 
the 1850s is understudied.  Though the Aborigines Protection Society informed Lord Durham in 
1838 that, “[a] very general prejudice” considering Indigenous peoples “an inferior race of 
men,”1 already existed, between the 1780s and 1850, attitudes formed in the absence rather than 
the presence of law. While the ‘traditional patriarchs’ saw the future with two eyes, British 
officials crafted Indian policy with one eye focused on assimilation and agents implemented it by 
“[g]roping in the dark.”2 Although it is true that the Anishinabe began the century as allies and 
transformed into wards, it was not always this way. This dissertation examined some of the 
processes involved in this transformation in the years before Confederation by exploring how 
Upper Canadians understood Indigeneity and how Indigenous lives were lived and transformed. 
 In 1818, Anishinabe leaders on the St. Clair chose Chawme to express their collective 
will to John Askin. In contrast, in 1857 the Potawatomi and Ottawa of the St. Clair gave a 
petition to the H.R.H. Prince of Wales which read, in part: 
 Great Chief! We are poor! We were hunted from the Lands we occupied 
 and we deeply regret that we no longer receive the presents which by your 
 Chiefs were promised to us, “so long as the waters of our rivers flowed towards 
 the vast Salt Lake, so long as the grass grows up towards Heaven.” 
 
 Great Chief! Altho’ we have no written words to remember by we still retain in  
 our minds the promises made to us, and we felt when driven from our planting 
 grounds and the graves of our dead that still we were coming Home when we  
 crossed that River which the St. Clair mars the limits of their  [Americans] sway. 
  
 Great Chief! We were not deceived---We are sheltered and protected but your  
 warm blankets no longer cover us—Why is this? Are the “White Elk’s” [Alexander 
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 McKee] words forgotten? Shall we grieve…that his promises to us are not fulfilled… 
 Great Chief! When you wanted us we were ready—Should you want us again soon… 
 should we echo back the reply that we are ready[?]3 
  
 Anishinabe leaders in both of these instances looked to a history of relationships with 
each other and with British officials to build a mutually beneficial future in what would become 
Lambton County. This dissertation argues that a complex combination of politics, policy, land 
and economics coalesced over the first half of the nineteenth century to radically transform 
Chawme’s vision from one that contained the seeds of self-sufficiency and independence to one 
that by Confederation, sought to confine and define ‘Indians’ as legal wards. 
 In keeping with the parallel paths symbolized by the Two Row Wampum, the 
Proclamation provided a legal basis for the separate treatment of Indigenous peoples. Though 
they were not British subjects, the ‘traditional patriarchs’ sought to ‘see with two eyes’ or 
establish a partnership in which they remained separate but sovereign. This seemed entirely 
possible when the Indian Territory consisted of much of the interior of North America, but as 
European settlement slowly eroded the boundary and the population of non-Aboriginal people 
increased in their territories, the choices available to these Indigenous leaders changed. Both 
American and British governments looked to settling Indigenous lands as a way to rebuild 
economies decimated by years of colonial warfare.  If Anishinabe peoples could not be dispersed 
they would have to be collected somewhere and for many, the Northwest was no longer an 
option. 
 After the War of 1812, the St. Clair Chiefs had no recourse to the tools of direct action 
utilized by Pontiac, Bluejacket and Tecumseh. Settlement and removal in the former Northwest 
forced Bauzhigeeshigwashekum and his son Peterwegeshig, Shaweny-Penince, Wawanosh, 
Quakgwan and other leaders, into new and complex economic and social relationships with the 
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growing number of settlers, officials and merchants in the remnants of the Indian Territory in 
Upper Canada. 
 The Western Confederacy was loyal, but it is evident that they were loyalists of another 
kind. Throughout the latter half of the eighteenth century, the destruction of Aboriginal villages, 
the decimation of their cornfields and displacement of their inhabitants were cornerstones of 
American Indian policy designed to populate the land west of the Appalachian Mountains with 
settlers.
4
 If the Western Confederacy was not in dire circumstances in 1778, their plight most 
certainly resembled that of their fellow loyalist refugees by 1815 and in 1830, when the Saginaw 
Chippewa and Potawatomi faced removal in the United States. But the reality of settlement in the 
Western District focused on compensating non-Aboriginal loyalists with Anishinabe land is 
fundamentally different from nineteenth century United Empire Loyalist narratives grounded in 
King and Country.  
 It is generally assumed that Anishinabe peoples and Eurocanadians originally settled in 
Upper Canada together as refugees and veterans as equals, with access to similar opportunities.  
This is part of a broader historical “fiction” generally accepted by Canadians premised on the 
belief that ‘our’ Indian policy was more “liberal” or humane than the militaristic American 
removal program.
5
 To the contrary, this research shows that to many loyalists, the Anishinabe 
symbolized their persecutors, and remained reminders of the horrors and losses they suffered 
during the Revolution and American occupation of the Western District. Successive governments 
and their employees failed to honour Prevost’s promises of presents, pensions and assistance to 
veterans and their families. While sympathetic officials and Indigenous peoples negotiated 
shared settlement in the 1790 McKee and 1796 Chenail Ecarté Treaties, the agreements 
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contained oral promises that were insufficient to protect the land from newcomers ignorant of the 
terms. The Huron Tract Treaty, meant to rectify this deficiency by building a foundation for 
Indigenous self-sufficiency, was not honoured either in terms of settlement or payment for the 
land. The department continually reduced entitlements and cutback expenses by draining 
Anishinabe annuities without providing agricultural or trades training to replace the loss. By 
1862, recipients of Huron Tract Treaty payments were “very poor,” receiving a little more than 
$2 each per year.
6
 In contrast, settlers in Canada historically received enormous amounts of 
government assistance in the form of money, tools and provisions as well as tax and settlement 
exemptions. Governors-General consistently accepted their appeals over the needs of Anishinabe 
communities, yet the misconception that Aboriginal people were undeserving or gratuitous 
recipients, remains.
7
  
 Anishinabek Chiefs could see that growing settlement in the northwest and Western 
district threatened their way of life. While they, and waves of Delaware, Shawnee, Wyandotte 
and others wished to play a role in the future development of the region, they also demanded that 
change be culturally sensitive, at their own pace and on their own terms. In 1818, when Indian 
Agent John Askin approached the Chenail Ecarté, St. Clair, Kettle and Stony Point and Thames 
River people to discuss a surrender of their lands, they knew they needed the tools to 
successfully make this transition in exchange for the use of the land. A letter written by the 
Aborigines Protection Society, on behalf of the Chippewa and Munsee of the Longwoods Tract, 
states that the signers expected to “receive the proceeds” of the sale of land to white settlers.8 
Access to these funds, combined with farming and other economic activities, would have 
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allowed communities or individuals to purchase more land if required. As discussed, Aboriginal 
economies did not solely depend on agriculture, and lands suitable for hunting, fishing, gathering 
and maple-sugaring were equally, if not more, important than farmland.  Controlling the lands 
they possessed combined with income generated from lands surrendered formed a strategic plan 
designed to provide a solid economic base for future generations. A long history of Indigenous 
leasing as well as purchases of maple groves in Enniskillen and the land in Bosanquet 
demonstrate that Anishinabe peoples intended to, and were capable of, managing their own 
communities. Beginning in colonial America, the pattern of transferring Anishinabe lands 
through Indigenous leases and treaties, to settlers for a fraction of its value, compelled leaders 
from Hendrick to Quakgwan, to recreate the Indian Territory with each successive loss, at 
Stanwix, Ghent, Shawanoe, the Sand River and Saugeen.  
 Lord Goderich wrote that settlers would spread “everywhere over the country like a flood 
of water.” Aboriginal people could either be “swept away,” or they could take up “grants of 
land.”  If they took up agriculture, Goderich assured them, they would “gradually increase their 
numbers and their wealth, and retain their situation in a country in which they were so well 
entitled to have a share.” He maintained that the British government “had a very sincere desire to 
see them prosperous and happy.”9 Seeking balance and compromise, Anishinabe leaders wished 
to have their children educated to facilitate economic and social exchanges with Eurocanadians 
on an equal basis. The development of a new ‘trade’ economy with the assistance of a 
blacksmith, agricultural implements and instructors to teach them to farm, when added to the 
culture, language and lifeways they learned at home, would enable them to ‘see with two eyes,’ 
so they would possess the best of both worlds. Nonetheless, instead of cementing an ongoing 
partnership, many settlers conceived of the treaties as nothing more than one-time transactions. 
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Believing the Anishinabe were paid handsomely for the land, they no longer wished to deal with 
them and felt they should be removed from areas they formerly frequented and utilized.
10
 While 
presents, promises, pensions and settlement assistance were understood as separate payments to 
be provided by the British and Canadian governments, Aboriginal people ultimately paid for 
them out of their land sales.
11
 The Anishinabek lost their land and sacrificed as much as their 
neighbours. However, ‘Loyalists’ were not created equal in Upper Canada. 
 Non-Indigenous Loyalists could do what they wished with their land grants, monetary 
compensation and settlement assistance. In contrast, the 1828 Darling Report outlined a program 
to ‘civilize’ Anishinabe peoples by congregating them into villages where they could be provided 
with instruction in Christianity and agriculture and inculcated with British culture. As this 
dissertation discussed, the difficulties Anishinabe communities experienced had nothing to do 
with their culture and everything to do with outside control and interference. Anishinabe people 
knew where to locate the village, how big their houses should be and that working the land 
together proved more efficient than individually. Yet it the Sarnia Village did not function until 
the late 1830s because colonial officials insisted Jones locate them in the interior. His dithering 
and the unexpected appearance of cholera and rebellion meant that Anishinabe farmers had 
barely begun to harvest a crop and develop their communities before officials deemed the village 
and the civilization policy expensive failures.  
 Aside from instructions related to broad projects such as village settlement, much of the 
ad hoc nature of British Indian relations really occurred in a legal and policy vacuum. Though 
the 1849 Municipal Act incorporated townships with as few as 100 households,
12
 colonial 
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officials denied Anishinabe reserves any legal status. While English law did not protect or 
impose upon Aboriginal people, by far, the fact that they were not permitted to exercise 
independent legal authority in the face of settler illegality on their lands, wrought the most 
destruction in their communities.13 It rendered them completely dependent on their agents and 
officials who in years past might have looked at Aboriginal people with “hopeful eyes.” Their 
replacements by the mid-1850s lacked even the most basic patience and understanding.
14
     
 Anishinabe leaders and their communities constantly found ways to work within a system 
that worked against them. The number and size of deeds and treaties negotiated in the Detroit 
and later the St. Clair River region are directly related to changes in their political and economic 
circumstances. After pouring thousands of pounds of goods, ammunition and other supplies into 
the Northwest in the 1790s and again in 1812, the Colonial office called for an inhumane level of 
thrift. Anishinabe Chiefs and their villages struggled to retain what they could of the Indian 
Territory along with a “means of livelihood.”15 Nevertheless, once peace was achieved the 
disbursement of land became intertwined with loss and sacrifice.  
 The rights of particular people to occupy and possess Aboriginal lands directly linked to 
their class and the extent and nature of their social connections. Initially, McKee and Elliot 
believed their oath to protect the public good, and their obligations under the Covenant Chain 
entitled them to bend the rules.
16
  Less inclined to build positive relationships with Anishinabe 
peoples, Ironside and Clench amassed control and influence through a developing state 
bureaucracy, favouring themselves and local settlers and merchants, while excluding others.  
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Policy therefore, did not solely determine the ‘outcomes’ of land and economic disputes on the 
St. Clair.  
 Anishinabe Chiefs could not have known that the Crown would usurp the responsibility 
for the protection and control of Indian lands in 1839.  By the 1840s, the Colonial office under 
Herman Merivale acknowledged “that ‘laws and regulations’ were almost always unenforceable.  
The actions of the “’trader, the backwoodsman, the pirate, the bush ranger’ were far more 
important elements in the development of the relationship between the native peoples and 
Europeans than laws.”17 In the course of mediating disputes between local settlers and the 
Anishinabe, Jones and Keating occasionally appealed to higher powers for guidance. However, 
they manufactured policy by manipulating leases on Walpole Island and judging character in 
their capacity as magistrates and Crown Lands officers.  But throughout the 1840s, officials 
simply allowed encroachment on the reserves to continue and the government looked the other 
way as the town of Port Sarnia slowly invaded the Indian village. Rather than prosecuting 
trespassers on Aboriginal lands, British policymakers effectively sanctioned squatting by 
offering compensation and goading communities into surrendering small surrenders of occupied 
lands. Under such circumstances, reserve residents became suspicious. In the late 1840s they 
resisting attempts to survey and subdivide the land and demanded deeds to protect them.  
 Restrictions on land ownership combined with the inability to borrow to purchase land, 
tools or businesses prevented the Anishinabe from engaging in any meaningful business 
transactions off reserve after 1850, except as clients and customers. Keating and Clench’s 
treatment of Indian Department creditors soured relations further, and when economic conditions 
worsened after 1857, merchants would not engage in any substantial credit transactions without 
the surety of collateral. Upper Canada’s stunted growth and stalled development was noted by 
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Gourlay, Jameson and other travelers which they attributed to labour shortages and deficits in 
innovation and production. In the meanwhile, Anishinabe people had to leave their communities 
to purchase the most basic necessities and could not even saw their own lumber or grind their 
own grain. Indian Department business, highly sought out by local tradesmen and suppliers, 
channeled opportunity and Anishinabe annuities, into the pockets of non-residents. While agent 
incompetence and disinterest thwarted independent initiatives, stunting economic growth on the 
reserves, the Anishinabeg funded development in the neighbouring towns of Sarnia, Wallaceburg 
(Baldoon), Chatham, and Algonac, Michigan.
18
 By the 1860s, access to Anishinabe business, 
land and resources, provided Malcolm Cameron, the McDougalls, the Mackenzies and other 
founding families, with the financial and political wherewithal to create the “state and business 
enterprise” that rationalized Confederation.19  If Indigenous and Euroamerican loyalists settled 
together in the district by 1867, neither local settlers in Lambton County nor their representatives 
in Ottawa, gave much credence to Anishinabe contributions to the county’s cultural, economic or 
political development.
20
  Documents and petitions demonstrate that this was the exact opposite of 
what Chawme, Quakgwan and others intended when they signed the Huron Tract Treaty.  
 Neither Kempt nor Colborne wished ‘civilization’ policy to create dependent and 
impoverished communities nor did missionaries Andrew Jamieson or E.F. Wilson or interpreter 
H.P. Chase, choose to become accomplices in the process.
21
 It was also not the outcome 
expected by Peterwegeshig and Wawanosh when they asked for schooling and economic 
assistance in their communities. ‘Seeing with two eyes’ became a response to these policies and 
an attempt to survive in a changing world, while preserving Anishinabe culture and values. 
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Enfranchisement ran completely counter these values and the costs, in the end, were not worth it. 
If law and policy failed to ‘protect’ and ‘civilize’ the Anishinabe, legislation introduced after 
1857 would fail to ‘assimilate’ them as well.22 To renounce everything for a slim chance of 
success in an indifferent and sometimes openly hostile British world was a gamble few 
Anishinabe people were willing to make. 
 Officials implementing the civilization program failed to accommodate and consult with 
the very people intended to benefit, transforming it into a temporary system designed for their 
elimination after 1857. Crown Lands legislation, which the Anishinabe thought would confirm 
their rights and provide a way to prosecute squatters, did the opposite. It allowed non-Aboriginal 
people to erode Indigenous land and resource rights which when combined with the 1839 OIC, 
prevented them from engaging in the kind of self-sufficient commercial activities government 
officials always demanded they acquire. As early as the 1840s, policies drove Anishinabe people 
off the Sarnia reserve in search of opportunities elsewhere. Development of state and 
bureaucratic infrastructure necessary to count, categorize and track populations gave legislators 
false confidence that ‘Indians’ as well as their residency, rights and entitlements could be 
regulated in some legitimate or consistent way. Permissions, bans and regulations contained in 
Acts passed in 1857 and 1869, along with the increased use of annuities for commercial 
transactions, became powerful tools of control in the hands of Indian agents allowing them to 
play favourites, show preference and punish those who protested. As discussed in chapters four 
and five, the failure to protect Anishinabe communities from encroachment and assist 
communities in implementing reserve-based education and economic development became more 
evident as populations increased. Great Britain and then Ottawa abandoned the communities 
entirely on the premise of failure, but reserves could not be sold unless they were emptied of 
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residents, either by the enfranchisement of ‘bona fide’ Indians or the expulsion of persons not 
entitled to live on them. By 1876, Superintendent of Indian Affairs David Laird summed up the 
choices available—‘Indians,’ he stated, “must either be treated as minors or as white men.”23 In 
this statement, there is no suggestion of coexistence, no evidence of a partnership and no 
recognition of several hundred years of history that came before. 
 Laird and officials operated under the assumption that “Indians were incapable of dealing 
with persons of European ancestry without being exploited.”24  The examples presented in this 
study show this to be patently false. Instead, the ability to exploit Anishinabe peoples without 
fear of punishment made such behaviours permissible and even socially acceptable in heavily 
populated locations on the St. Clair. In the interior, Quakgwan lived his entire life according to 
the principles of ‘two eyed seeing’ and the settlement in Bosanquet is indicative of what might 
have been, had officials allowed Anishinabe people in the Western District to control their own 
destinies. Quakgwan’s ability to purchase land and develop a community shows that until 1850, 
legal and ethical boundaries were fluid, and Aboriginal people could transgress them. Quakgwan 
was not any different than Peterwegeshig, Shaweny-Penince, Wawanosh, Ahbettuhwahnugund 
or Wahpagas, and each leader defined their relationships with Eurocanadians in their own way 
and in accordance with the values of their own communities. Striking out on his own with a 
small group, Quakgwan essentially established an Anishinabe Township in Bosanquet. His 
community challenged civilization policy, demonstrating that Anishinabe and Eurocanadian 
economies remained symbiotic well into the 1840s, and that fee-simple land ownership, 
combined with communal ways of working the land, led towards self-sufficiency.
25
 Recognized 
                                                          
23
 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, Third Session, Third Parliament, (Ottawa: Maclean, 
Roger & Co., 1876), 30 March, 1876,. 933. 
24
 Tobias, “Protection, Civilization, Assimilation,” 39. 
25
 Cronon, Changes in the Land, 77. Few settlers were self-sufficient and no one could make every item they 
 377 
as a leader in the “Quakgwan Indian Village,” he built political alliances at both the municipal 
and district level. He fulfilled civic responsibilities in the broader community, voted, worked 
with residents in Bosanquet to maintain the roads and added his name to petitions for services. 
By the mid-1840s, residents recognized the village as a part of the Township.  This was a direct 
threat to Indian policy which was entirely premised on the belief that Indigenous peoples were 
incapable of managing their own affairs or contributing to Upper Canadian society.  
 Increasing financial independence, education and alliances with individuals, missionaries 
and organizations like the Aborigines Protection Society, allowed an increasing number of 
Anishinabe people to publicize their plight to sympathetic audiences in the United States and 
Great Britain. Peterwegeshig worked tirelessly to make their concerns known to the government 
and Bagot Commissioners and to convince all the Western District Chiefs to appear before the 
Queen.
26
 Though Clench and allies of the department dissuaded the other Chiefs, Peterwegeshig 
and a delegation from Walpole Island went to England “on a mission connected with the 
encroachment of the whites” to demand restitution.27 
 Designed to address the Bagot Report’s scathing criticism of the status quo, 
Superintendent Clench and locals like Jones and Kennedy used the removal instructions issued 
by the Governor General to undermine Quakgwan’s trusteeship and profit from his displacement. 
Defined as ‘Indians,’ department officials told Quakgwan and the families who farmed with him 
that no single person could own land because their lands were held in common. When officials 
could not force Quakgwan to surrender the lot, they made his land a reserve and sold it on behalf 
of the residents of Sarnia, and they did this using the language of equity and fairness. Once 
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officials eliminated the threat of individual ownership, legislation targeted collective tenure by 
subdividing the reserves into allotments and encouraging their allocation to enfranchised Indians 
in fee-simple. Anishinabe communities clung to communal landholding to protect the reserves 
against a government bent on dismantling them through private ownership.
28
   
 Anishinabe people in Lambton County have waited 187 years for the promises in the 
Huron Tract Treaty to be honoured.  In 1996, the RCAP recommended a renewed partnership to 
restructure the relationship between First Nations and Canadians (via governments).  Measures 
to recognize the treaties and implement self-government, economic development, education and 
training and resource sharing programs should be well established today.
29
 But so little has been 
done eighteen years later that Ontario’s Regional Chief Stan Beardy and the organization known 
as “Canadians for a New Partnership,” (CFNP) had to reiterate the same demands for a 
restructured “partnership” between First Nations and Canadians.30 Locally, seven years after the 
inquiry into the death of Dudley George at Ipperwash (Stoney Point), “minimal if any progress 
has been achieved” to implement the thirty-one recommendations in the report. Though 
partnership once again was one of the principal recommendations made by Justice Linden, the 
descendants of Chawme, Wawanosh, Shaweny-Penince, Quakgwan and the other chiefs who 
signed the original Huron Tract Treaties, still wait for a commission to implement the terms of 
the treaty that they, and the Crown agreed upon nearly two hundred years ago.
31
 
 How might the partnership be restructured and the spirit of the treaties honoured? Many 
historians explain the differences between the original treaty expectations and outcomes as we 
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know them today, as “misunderstandings.”32 McKay rejected this term, citing it as another 
example of the liberal project and a ruse frequently used by the Crown to evade its 
responsibilities under a rubric of equality.
33
 As a consequence, the inability or unwillingness to 
uphold treaty promises has also been characterized as fraud.
34
 As an analytical tool used to 
discuss fissures in the relationship between First Nations and the Crown, it implies intent and as 
this study demonstrates, is not nuanced enough to fully explain how events transpired in pre-
Confederation Ontario.
35
 More accurate perhaps is Webber's notion that periods existed at 
different times during European and Aboriginal contact, when “rules” and laws were flexible, 
and “the structure of the relationship was formed as much from the compromises on the ground 
as from abstract principles of justice.”36  That this may have been deliberate at times and 
intermittent and unplanned at others better explains the variability inherent in relationships 
between Europeans and Indigenous peoples in Upper Canada. The British 'fraudulently' 
articulated a partnership couched in Covenant-Chain style language, indicating the spirit of 
coexistence and 'two eyed seeing' would continue, but failed policy outcomes, lack of interest, 
and employee incompetence were not always deliberate or intentional. Evidence instead suggests 
that misunderstanding, fraud, trial and error, incompetence and consequences both unintended 
and unforeseen were simultaneously involved in the disintegration of the partnership between 
First Nations and the Crown and later Canada.   
 According to the residents of Kettle and Stony Point, “[t]he issues which flow from the 
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violation of our Treaty rights and the imposition of legislation are historically complex and 
require ongoing investigation.
37
 Rotman explains that the Crown’s fiduciary relationship with 
Aboriginal Peoples is “situation-specific” and “rooted in the historical, political, social and legal 
interaction of the groups from the time of contact.”38 Furthermore, he argues that the judiciary in 
Canada will continue to lack the understanding necessary to determine Crown duties and 
responsibilities towards Aboriginal peoples in a modern context until more localized studies are 
written to document their complex histories.
39
 After countless court decisions reminding the 
Ontario government that it has a fiduciary duty to Aboriginal peoples as a trustee, it and all the 
citizens it represents should not need commissions, inquiries or court decisions to do what is fair, 
just or sensible. 
 Compensation for losses continues, most often in the form of large cash settlements 
awarded to Anishinabe communities for specific historic treaty breaches. These decisions neither 
protect the land base, nor force governments to create long-term resource sharing agreements. 
The failure to implement the terms of the treaties combined with Indian Act regulations that 
hamper innovation prevent community recipients of compensation from implementing any 
fundamental change to the status quo.
40
 The federal government’s willingness to ‘breach now 
and pay later,’ and steadfast refusal to ‘inconvenience’ “good faith purchasers,” is no different 
than the myriad of concessions given to Jacob East, the McDonalds and the Moore deed holders 
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in the 1830s and 1840s.
41
 Today, it is in the “public interest” to favour “equity’s darlings,” not 
because of their loyalty, good character and improvements, but because too much time has 
passed and remedies for trespassing applied in such circumstances, to “third party land titles” are 
viewed by the courts as unfair.
42
 
 We must stop looking to the past to justify the present and instead study the past to 
understand our future.
43
 Understanding the massive framework of colonial laws, policies and 
processes is absolutely necessary to deconstruct them. Anishinabe communities in this region 
were cheated out of much needed annuities, assistance and opportunities in the early nineteenth 
century. Had they been paid the true value of the land and paid the interest that would have 
accrued on their investments over the course of more than one hundred and fifty years, they 
would today be some of the most successful communities in the province. Most importantly, as 
Upper Canada cried for artisans and skilled workers in the 1840s, Ontario today continues to fail 
to benefit from a great deal of the creative energy and innovation in its midst. The status quo is 
not acceptable, either for Anishinabe communities, whose ancestors did not surrender them into 
poverty, nor for governments and non-Aboriginal people, who no longer wish to subsidize a 
policy of political, economic and cultural apartheid. As the Aborigines Protection Society stated 
in 1839, the benefits and profits from Indigenous lands “makes us already their debtors for 
whatever funds are wanted.”44 Ontario has the largest, youngest and fastest growing First 
Nations populations in Canada.
45
 It is far more expensive to continue to support the breach of the 
treaties than to cooperatively build mechanisms to honour them. 
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APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY 
Anishinabe, Western Anishinabe: Refers to Ojibwe (Chippewa), Odawa (Ottawa), 
Potawatomi, Shawnee, Miami and Delaware (Lenni Lenape) peoples occupying the northwest 
and Lake Huron, Michigan and Ohio borderlands. They are members of the Central Algonquian 
language family, speaking variants of the Anishinaabemowin dialect. See Western Confederacy 
 
annuity: Replaced lump-sum payments of goods for surrendered Indian land after 1818 in Upper 
Canada. Depending on the specifics of the treaty, Indian Affairs retained and managed the 
principal. Indian agents dispensed small percentages or per-person amounts on a half-yearly or 
annual basis in money, or the equivalent value in goods.  
 
band: An anthropological term used by Indian affairs to describe individuals linked by clan, 
kinship or alliance to particular chiefs or headmen. In the reserve period officials also used it to 
describe political alliances or factions associated with individual chiefs like ‘Wawanosh’s band’ 
and to individual reserve communities (Sarnia Indian Band). In the Indian Act, ‘band’ is a legal 
and administrative term referring only to communities recognized by the Department of 
Aboriginal Affairs (Indian band, band funds, band council etc.). The term has fallen into disuse 
in favour of ‘nation’ or ‘First Nation.’ 
 
Big Bear Creek/Bear Creek/Sydenham River:  Where it meets the Chenail Ecarté at St. 
Anne’s Island (Walpole Island), the Sydenham River branches off into a northern and a southern 
branch. Bear Creek Chippewa Territory consisted of the area between two branches of the river. 
The southern branch, also called Big Bear Creek, runs eastward from Wallaceburg, through 
Camden to the town of Florence in Euphemia Township. The northern branch, sometimes called 
Bear Creek, flows northeast through Sombra and the town of Petroilia in Enniskillen Township. 
See Enniskillen. Officials divided this territory between the Huron Tract and Longwoods 
Treaties. Chawme requested the reserve for Tomago’s group, believed to have camped west of 
the town of Florence in 1818 and it was supposed to have been included in the 1822 Longwoods 
Treaty. The reserve was never made and the Chippewas of the Thames settled the “Big Bear 
Creek Claim” with the Federal Government in 2013. Because the reserve was never made, some 
Bear Creek Chippewa moved to the Thames while others continued to frequent the northern 
branch in Enniskillen. As a result, officials often confused the two. (See Ferris’ report on the 
location of the Bear Creek Reserve cited herein). 
 
Cholera: Cholera is spread by ingesting bacteria found in contaminated water or food or through 
contact with an infected person. Severe diarrhea and vomiting most often resulted in death from 
dehydration. When it appeared in Canada, high fatality rates and an unknown method of 
transmission incited fear and panic and captured the attention of doctors and scientists. As a 
result, cholera played an important role in the development of sanitation and public health 
measures.  Major outbreaks also occurred in 1832, 1849, 1851, 1852 and 1854.  
 
Currency Conversions: Until Canada produced its own currency in (1858 for coins and 1866 
for paper bills), economic transactions were conducted in American dollars and British pounds. 
One British pound (£1) equals 20 shillings or 240 pence. In Canada, £1 Halifax currency was 
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worth about £1.11 or $4 U.S. Conversions used in this study use a 1:4 exchange ratio.1 
  
Cuyahoga Purchase: In the 1790s, John Askin and his son John Jr. along with William 
Robertson, surveyor Patrick McNiff, Israel Rutland, John Dodemead and Alexander Henry 
negotiated a 999 year lease with Ottawa, Chippewa and Mississauga Chiefs for land on the 
southern shore of Lake Erie from the Cuyahoga River (Toledo) to Sandusky. The Chiefs 
received the equivalent of one dollar (five shillings Halifax currency), plus fifteen shillings rent 
per year and unspecified benefits. The 1795 Treaty of Greenville voided these private 
agreements. See Stanwix, Treaty of. 
 
Dodem/Totem: Var. spellings. Dodem in Anishinaabemowin means ‘clan.’ Clans or dodems are 
Anishinabe kinship groups whose members descend from a common an animal ancestor. Certain 
dodems like the Crane around Sault Ste. Marie were associated with specific locals. Individuals 
representing different clans resided together in villages which served to unite Anishinabe peoples 
spiritually, socially and politically throughout the Great Lakes and beyond. Pictographic symbols 
or totemic ‘signatures’ found on treaties and other documents from the St. Clair show that 
Wawanosh and Wahpagas used antlers, believed to be representative of the caribou dodem. 
Quakgwan and his brother Ashqugonaby used a beaver dodem while Peterwegeshig’s resembles 
a bird foot. Additionally, individuals from Walpole Island, Sarnia and Kettle and Stony Point 
throughout the 1800s, used crane, pike and turtle dodems, as well as unidentified birds, fish and 
animals. (For illustrations, see Joan Holmes cited herein). 
 
enfranchisement: Administrative process contained in legislation after 1857 enabling literate 
males over the age of 21, free of debt and of good character, to renounce their ‘Indian’ status. At 
the end of a probationary period individuals would receive a one-time payout of treaty annuities 
and 50 acres of reserve land. Subject to taxation, liable for debts and entitled to run and vote in 
elections, enfranchisement severed all legal distinctions between ‘Indians’ and non-Aboriginal 
people and automatically included spouses and children. Under certain circumstances, after 1869 
‘Indians’ could be forcibly enfranchised against their will. 
 
Enniskillen: Township bounded on the west by Moore and in the north by Plympton. Both the 
St. Clair Anishinabe and Bear Creek Chippewa frequented the area for hunting and sugaring. 
Officials granted land in Enniskillen to United Empire Loyalists, veterans and elites who resold 
and leased them to others. Increasing settlement compelled the chiefs purchase land in the area to 
protect it and they proceeded to do so with their annuities in 1841. In the late 1850s, speculators 
and squatters lured to the area by the discovery of oil flooded the area and the Town of Petrolia 
was established just east of the lots reserved by the Anishinabe. Five families resided there in the 
1860s but the integrity of the reserve could not be maintained and the government illegally sold 
the lots. Residents moved to the Thames and St. Clair reserves. See Bear Creek. 
 
Haudenosaunee or Six Nations: Confederacy of Mohawk, Seneca, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga 
and Tuscarora. Along with the Six Nations, the Wyandotte (Huron), Petun (Tobacco) and 
Neutral are members of the Iroquoian language group and lived in large palisaded villages in 
southern Ontario and New York State. To avoid confusion with documentary references, this 
                                                          
1
 A.B. McCullough, “Currency Conversion in British North America, 1760-1900,” Archivaria, 16 (Summer, 1983): 
92. 
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study uses Six Nations after 1784, to refer to the administrative superintendency and reserve 
community located on the Grand River at Brantford Ontario. 
 
improvements: Changes made to land that increase its productivity and value. Fencing, drains, 
removal of stones, trees and brush, and the construction of houses, barns and other structures are 
all improvements.  
 
Loyalist: Historically defined as men, women and children who fled from the Thirteen Colonies 
to British North America during the American Revolution. They and their children were awarded 
monetary compensation, settlement assistance and land grants in Upper Canada.  In 1789 Lord 
Dorchester created an official register of these individuals who arrived before 1783 and 
permitted them to use the title “United Empire Loyalist” (UEL). References to these individuals, 
their contemporaries and descendants are capitalized. The term ‘late-loyalist’ refers to 
individuals who arrived between 1792 and the end of the War of 1812. I refer to loyalist 
sentiment in general; individuals who appealed to their personal duty and sacrifice and others 
who tended to support the British in whole or in part as small ‘l’ ‘loyalists.’   
 
Maxwell Settlement: In 1829, Henry Jones [1776-1852] established the Maxwell settlement, an 
agrarian utopian community based on Owenite principles of cooperation. It was located north-
east of the town of Sarnia on lots fronting the Lake Huron shoreline. The community dissolved 
but many residents continued to live in the county. 
 
Métissage: Studies identifying Métis communities on the basis of “mixedness” or miscegenation 
are often criticized for racializing the process of identity formation.  Métissage refers to a broad 
spectrum of political, economic, cultural and kin-based connections and exchanges shared 
between Indigenous peoples and Europeans, including, though not exclusive of blood quantum 
or ancestry. 
 
Mica Bay:  A protest led by Chief Shingwaukonse, First Nations, Métis and their sympathizers 
in 1849 demanding compensation for trespass and illegal mining on their lands. The action led to 
the 1850 Robinson-Huron Treaties. 
 
Moravians/Muncey/Chippewa of the Thames: Also known as Moraviantown or 
Munceytown. In 1792 a number of Moravians and their Munsee-Delaware (Lenape) converts 
fled Ohio. After brief stays in Michigan and on the McKee estate they established the village of 
Fairfield on the Thames River. After it was destroyed by Americans in 1813, a village called 
New Fairfield was rebuilt in its current location just east of Chatham-Kent. After 1830 Chippewa 
(some from Bear Creek) permanently settled a portion of the community, as did Oneida from 
New York State in 1841. 
 
presents: Presents are an extension of covenant-chain gestures of goodwill and ceremonial gift-
giving. The French and English exchanged gifts with Aboriginal peoples before engaging in 
trade and diplomacy. Distributions continued in the reserve period however economizing 
directives after the War of 1812 reduced them in quantity and quality until the British 
government eliminated them entirely in 1857. 
 
 418 
Shawanoe Township: Also called ‘Shawnee’ Township.  A block of more than 92,000 acres 
reserved by Anishinabe leaders in the 1796 Chenail Ecarté Treaty adjacent to and north of 
Walpole Island. By the 1840s, the area known as Sombra Township was overrun by squatters 
and gradually sold for settlement.  
 
Stanwix, Treaty of: Negotiated in 1768, the treaty moved the boundary established by the 
Proclamation of 1763 north from the Appalachian Mountains to the Ohio River. This was the 
Northwest, claimed by the American Republic and subsequent 1812 Ohio Valley battleground. 
The 1795 Treaty of Greenville moved the Stanwix Line north from the Ohio to the Maumee 
River east along a straight line to the state of Pennsylvania. Subsequent treaties eliminated it 
entirely. See also Cuyahoga Purchase. 
 
Tribe: Now fallen into disuse, ‘tribe’ was a popular term used to describe groups sharing a 
similar geographical location, political organization, ancestry, language, and culture. In the 
nineteenth century Aboriginal people and officials used ‘tribe’ to refer to other ‘nations’ 
(Anishinabe, Haudenosaunee, Wyandotte etc.) and occasionally to individual reserve 
communities. Some Indigenous peoples, particularly in the United States and Western Canada, 
continue to refer to themselves as ‘tribes’ and to their collective organizations as ‘tribal 
councils.’ Similar usage to ‘band’ and ‘nation.’ 
 
Vandalia: Proposed colony containing more than one million acres south of the Ohio River. 
Under the guise of protection, these lands were deeded by Haudenosaunee Sachems to British 
officials and traders in the eighteenth century. The scheme was never approved and the bulk of 
the region became the states of Kentucky and (West) Virginia. 
 
Western Confederacy: A coalition of First Nations that grew after the 1760s in response to 
American intrusions in the Indian Territory and Ohio Valley. Under charismatic leaders like Blue 
Jacket, Tecumseh and Joseph Brant, western nations like the Anishinabe, Shawnee, Delaware, 
Miami, and Wyandotte were joined by chiefs and warriors from the Six Nations, Midwest, and 
Quebec. All shared a collective interest in protecting their territory from advancing American 
settlement and many allied themselves with Great Britain. 
 
Western Superintendency: In accordance Bagot Report recommendations, after 1845, Canada 
West was divided into five Indian Department Superintendnencies: Six Nations, Central 
(Toronto), Eastern (Alnwick), Northern (Manitoulin) and the Western (Sarnia) Superintendency. 
Joseph Brant Clench, the former resident agent at Muncey/Carradoc, became Visiting 
Superintendent (VSIA). He replaced George Ironside Jr. (Anderdon), William Keating (Walpole 
Island & the St. Clair) and William Jones (Sarnia, Kettle & Stony Point), and assumed oversight 
of all communities west of the Grand River.  
 
Wyandotte (Wendat): Also known as Huron. Iroquoian-speaking confederacy originally 
inhabiting the Georgian Bay region known as Huronia. In 1649 the Haudenosaunee attacked the 
villages and the inhabitants fled to Quebec and the Detroit borderlands. This latter group settled 
on the Anderdon reserve near Amherstburg.  Residents surrendered portions of the reserve 
throughout the nineteenth century until the entire community enfranchised in the 1880s.  
 
